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The majority of online products and services, such as search engines, social networks, 
digital maps and electronic communications apps, are offered free of charge. But there is a 
catch. In exchange for the use of their ‘free’ services, online firms collect their users’ 
personal data and process it for myriad of commercial purposes. The ability of firms to 
collect vast amounts of data and process them through sophisticated algorithms to reveal 
patterns, trends and associations (Big Data) has opened new routes for dominant firms to 
abuse their market power, and at the same time, has given rise to pressing online privacy 
and consumer protection issues which, whilst falling outside the scope of competition 
law, have nevertheless an impact on the competitive process in online markets.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to uphold the importance of Article 102 TFEU enforcement for 
the healthy operation of competition in online markets. To this effect, it explores recent 
proposals for the passing of a new sector-specific regulation applicable to online 
platforms and for lax antitrust enforcement in the digital economy, exposes their flaws, 
and demonstrates that the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU can be flexible enough to 
account for the challenges posed by online markets. The key is to identify the features 
that differentiate online competition from competition as traditionally conceived in 
competition analysis, and to determine how such differences translate into new emphases, 
tests and approaches. In addition, acknowledging the interrelated nature of competition, 
data protection and consumer protection issues that arise from data-driven competition, 
this thesis proposes the creation of a new category of abuse of dominance based on 
infringements of data protection and consumer protection law, when such infringements 
are linked to the infringer’s dominant position, adversely affect innovation and choice, 












In this day and age, most people have used a ‘free’ online service such as a search engine, 
a digital map, a social network or an electronic communications app. Online firms, 
however, are not charity institutions, as in exchange for the use of their free services they 
collect and process their users’ data for commercial purposes. Data-driven competition 
has expanded the ways in which dominant firms may abuse their market power, and has 
also given rise to pressing privacy/data protection1 and consumer protection issues which, 
whilst falling outside the scope of competition law, may nevertheless have an impact on 
competition. This thesis deals with abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) in online 
markets. 2  In particular, this thesis upholds the importance of Article 102 TFEU 
enforcement for the healthy operation of competition in the digital economy. In addition, 
this thesis proposes a law enforcement solution for the interrelated concerns and 
regulatory failures that arise from data-driven competition. 
 
The Internet has exponentially expanded the potential for economic activity, leading to a 
flow of new innovative products, services and business models. Consumers can use 
computers or other devices with access to the Internet to look up a specific location, get 
in contact with friends and even arrange a taxi ride. Information about products and 
services can be easily reached, with a greater level of detail than ever before. Ubiquitous 
Internet access and network services with widespread coverage have dramatically reduced 
transaction, search and distribution costs, to the benefit of consumers.  
 
However, concerns have been raised with regard to the seeming dominant position of 
some undertakings in online markets. For example, the US Federal Trade Commission 
(the “FTC”) launched3 and subsequently closed4 an investigation into Google’s alleged 
monopolisation practices, whilst the European Commission (the “Commission”) recently 
																																																								
1 The scope of the rights to privacy and data protection is different, although there is an important overlap. 
See Chapter 5 footnote 6. In this thesis, privacy and data protection will have the same meaning.  
2 In this thesis, the terms ‘online’ and ‘digital’ are used interchangeably. 
3 Jessica Guynn and Jim Puzzanghera, ‘FTC Launches Investigation of Google’ (2011) Los Angeles Times 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/25/business/la-fi-google-ftc-20110625>. 
4 FTC, ‘Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices - In the Matter of 





imposed a €2.42 billion fine on Google for abusing its dominance as search engine,5 and 
continues investigating Google’s conduct in relation to its AdSense service6 and Android 
OS.7 Some Internet services such as YouTube, Facebook Amazon and eBay are by all 
metrics the undisputed leaders of their business segments, and high concentration in 
online markets is perceived as a sign of weak competition. The main concern voiced in 
connection with these undertakings is that, by gaining and/or maintaining market power 
by means of anticompetitive practices, they may dominate or threaten to dominate online 
markets, exploit consumers and prevent the introduction of new innovative services.   
 
Some argue that such concern is largely overstated, since if any firm attains a dominant 
position, such position is likely to be transitory, as market power in high-tech industries is 
essentially fleeting, permanently disciplined by the threat of a firm launching a new ‘killer’ 
product that conquers the entirety of the market.8 Moreover, most online services are free 
to consumers, for which reason there cannot be any consumer harm.9 Intervention on the 
part of competition authorities is likely to be harmful, since it chills innovation incentives 
to the detriment of consumers.10 Others consider that competition law has failed to 
control the market power enjoyed by the leaders of the most popular online industries.11 
To address the perceived deficiencies affecting online markets, they plea for the passing 
of a new sector-specific regulation to be applied in conjunction with competition law.12 
Finally, others contend that competition law is sufficiently flexible to adapt to the specific 
challenges posed by digital markets, and that it remains the best method to ensure that 
																																																								
5 European Commission, ‘Press Release - Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service’ (2017) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm>. 
6 European Commission, ‘Press Release - Antitrust: Commission Takes Further Steps in Investigations 
Alleging Google’s Comparison Shopping and Advertising-Related Practices Breach EU Rules’ (2016) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2532_en.htm>. 
7 European Commission, ‘Press Release - Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google 
on Android Operating System and Applications’ (2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
1492_en.htm>. 
8 J Gregory Sidak and David J Teece, ‘Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law’ (2009) 5 Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 581. 
9 Robert H Bork, ‘Antitrust and Google’ (2012) Hudson Institute <https://www.hudson.org/research/8861-
antitrust-and-google>. 
10 Geoffrey A Manne and Joshua D Wright, ‘Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust’ (2010) 6 Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 153. 
11 Sigmar Gabriel and Emmanuel Macron, ‘Letter “Digital Market Strategy EM-SG” Addressed to 
European Commission Vice President Andrus Ansip’ (2015) 
<https://www.contexte.com/medias/pdf/medias-documents/2015/04/Letter_Digital_Strategy_EM-SG_-
_A._ANSIP-2.pdf>. 




competition is not distorted by dominant firms.13 These diverging views encompass the 
debate on what role competition policy on Article 102 TFEU should play in online 
markets. 
 
To settle this debate, two recent phenomena must be analysed: the rise of platforms and 
the collection of user data for commercial purposes. The leaders of online industries are 
organised as platforms, that is, “an undertaking operating in two- (or multi-) sided 
markets, which uses the Internet to enable interactions between two or more distinct but 
interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one of the groups”.14 
Platforms benefit from network effects, which if strong enough, may lead to ‘tipped’ 
markets. In addition, the main business proposition of some of the most popular online 
platforms (think of Google and Facebook) is the provision of free services on one side of 
the market and paid advertising services on another side. To provide these services, online 
platforms need vast amounts of data. The more data is available to be processed, the 
higher the chances that unexpected and potentially valuable correlations, predictions and 
information can be obtained. In this context, online platforms collect data in the form of, 
for example, search queries, browsing behaviour or social network profiles, to improve 
the quality of both the free and paid services, and also to develop new ones. The ability of 
a firm to collect extremely large amounts of data and process them through sophisticated 
algorithms to reveal patterns, trends and associations (Big Data)15 adds a new dimension 
of market power which deserves special attention on the part of competition authorities.  
 
Chapter 1 discusses the main opposite views on the debate on the proper role of 
competition policy in online markets. Then, Chapter 2 explains the organisation of their 
market leaders as platforms and the dynamics of data-driven competition. Building on 
these two Chapters, Chapter 3 addresses market definition and dominance assessments in 
digital markets. It defines the product markets for search engines, social networks and e-
commerce platforms, and assesses whether Google, Facebook and eBay hold a dominant 
position therein. It also identifies data-driven abusive conduct in which dominant 
																																																								
13 House of Lords, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’ (2016) 52. 
14 European Commission, ‘Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online 
Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing and the Collaborative Economy’ (2015) Digital Single Market  5 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-
platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud>.  
15 See Chapter 2 Section II.2 for the characteristics of Big Data and its relationship with Big Analytics.  
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platforms can engage. The analyses and conclusions contained in these three Chapters 
settle the debate above in a conclusive manner.  
 
The concerns arising from competition in online markets, however, are not confined to 
competition law. In particular, problems stem from the fact that most of the data online 
platforms collect is ‘personal data’,16 the protection of which is enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”).17 Competition in online 
markets creates tension between undertakings’ incentives and individuals’ right to data 
protection. On the one hand, undertakings strive to gather and process as much data as 
possible to gain a competitive advantage; on the other hand, efforts to gain such an 
advantage result in widespread surveillance and the violation of individuals’ data 
protection rights. Free online services have become the norm, but ‘free’ comes with a 
cost.  
 
In view of the interrelated nature of privacy harms and data-driven competition, some 
approaches have been articulated to address privacy concerns in competition analysis, 
including the definition of markets for data, the incorporation of data protection 
considerations in the notion of consumer welfare (i.e. the incorporation of fundamental 
rights into competition substantive analyses), and conceiving data protection as a non-
price parameter of competition. On account of the concerning tendencies affecting online 
marketplaces and the need for a solution, such theories deserve close examination. 
Chapter 4 explores these theories, and answers the question of whether their 
implementation would be sound competition policy.  
 
Competition law does not exist in a vacuum; rather, it belongs to the EU legal order. In 
this legal order, multiple fields of law coexist, and regulatory failures may arise at different 
levels before competition enforcement. These regulatory failures may have an impact on 
the competitive process. Numerous consumer surveys show that many consumers (60-
70%) are concerned about the protection of their personal data,18 and consequently would 
be interested in services that are more ‘privacy-friendly’. However, market forces have 
failed to satisfy the latent demand for those services, partly due to a combination of data 
																																																								
16 Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. See Article 4(1) GDPR.  
17 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/02. 
18 See Chapter 4 Section II.2.3, text accompanying footnotes 76 to 82.  
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protection and consumer protection regulatory failures, and partly as a result of the 
unlawful conduct of some dominant platforms.  
 
The most common legal basis to which online firms resort to process personal data is 
unambiguous, specific and informed consent on the part of consumers. In practice, for 
that consent to arise, data protection law places upon consumers the highly cumbersome 
task of carefully reading and understanding the privacy policies of all the online services 
they use in order to make a decision as to whether the expected benefits arising from the 
use of the service outweigh any possible privacy harms they may envisage. Yet, consumers 
are placed at a disadvantage to carry out this assessment prior to giving their consent. To 
begin with, there is a significant informational gap between undertakings and consumers: 
whilst firms know everything about their data collection and processing practices and the 
value they can derive from data, some consumers struggle to understand even what a 
privacy policy is. This informational gap is further reinforced by the drafting technique 
commonly used in privacy policies. These policies tend to be lengthy, vague and rife with 
legal jargon. Additionally, consumers have bounded rationality and commonly make their 
decisions based on heuristics, simplified models and the way choices are framed. Facing 
these obstacles, most consumers decide not to read the privacy policies of the online 
services they use, and proceed to simply ‘tick the box’. Other consumers attempt to 
understand the implications of their online activities, but fail to overcome the 
informational gap and their bounded rationality. Finally, those few consumers who 
manage to defeat all of the aforementioned obstacles realise that there are no viable 
choices to protect their online privacy, and ultimately become resigned to ubiquitous data 
collection. As a result, there are no incentives to compete on the basis of data protection, 
in spite of the latent demand for ‘privacy-friendly’ services. 
 
Dominant firms may avail themselves of the regulatory failures above and further violate 
the data protection and consumer protection laws to reinforce their position, prevent the 
introduction of privacy-friendly services capable of threatening their data-driven business 
model, and exploit consumers. The question that follows is whether and how a new 
category of abuse of dominance based on infringements of data protection and consumer 
protection law may be prosecuted. Chapter 5 answers this question, proposing a law 




CHAPTER 1. Diverging Views on the Role of Article 102 
TFEU in the Digital Economy 
Introduction 
 
The US DOJ’s monopolisation lawsuit against Microsoft in the late 90s triggered a debate 
on the role of antitrust in high-technology markets. 1 Recent technological developments 
and the popularity of many online products and services have  reignited this debate, now 
with a particular focus on digital markets. In this debate, three main positions can be 
identified. 
 
Some believe that competition authorities should refrain from intervening in digital 
markets. Antitrust intervention, which has historically aimed at achieving static 
efficiencies,2 is likely to chill the very innovation that characterises these markets, to the 
detriment of consumers in the long run.3 In addition, in view of online platforms’ inherent 
complexities and innovative business practices, competition agencies are very likely to 
mistakenly condemn procompetitive behaviour (i.e. false positive or overenforcement 
error).4 Since the cost of such errors will be higher than the costs of mistaken acquittals of 
anticompetitive behaviour (false negatives or underenforcement errors), because 
challenging online platforms’ innovative products or services will likely chill innovation 
and therefore inflict significant long-term harm upon economic welfare, whereas 
underenforcement costs will be probably lower, only leading to short-term harm which 
can be corrected by market forces in the form of competition, innovation and entry by 
																																																								
1 See for example Robert Pitofsky, ‘Antitrust Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th Century Discipline 
Addresses 21st Century Problems’ (1999) <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1999/02/antitrust-
analysis-high-tech-industries-19th-century-discipline-addresses>; Daniel Rubinfeld, ‘Competition, 
Innovation, And Antitrust Enforcement In Dynamic Network Industries’ (1998) 
<https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/competition-innovation-and-antitrust-enforcement-dynamic-
network-industries>. 
2 David S Evans and Keith N Hylton, ‘The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its 
Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust’ (2008) 4 Competition Policy International 203, 231–233. For 
an explanation of the different types of efficiencies see below footnote 46.  
3 David J Teece and Mary Coleman, ‘The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High-Technology 
Industries’ (1998) 43 Antitrust Bull. 801, 809. 
4 Geoffrey A Manne and Joshua D Wright, ‘Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case against the 
Antitrust Case against Google’ (2010) 34 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 171, 180. 
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other firms, it is sound competition policy in high-technology markets to err on the side 
of underenforcement5 (the “hands-off approach”). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, others are of the opinion that competition law is not 
sufficient to tackle the challenges posed by the advent of platforms and the digital 
economy; rather, regulation is required to ensure a system of undistorted competition. For 
example, the European Parliament recently considered that the “Commission should act 
to create and ensure a legislative and legally certain environment conducive to 
encouraging creativity and innovation”, calling on the same “to consider proposals aimed 
at unbundling search engines from other commercial services as one potential long-term 
means of achieving the aforementioned aims”.6 Similarly, in a joint letter sent by German 
minister Sigmar Gabriel and then French minister Emmanuel Macron to European 
Commission Vice President Andrus Ansip, the ministers stressed the need for a 
“regulatory framework ensuring a fair competition between all digital players”, as well as 
the “need to regulate essential digital platforms”7 (the “regulatory approach”). 
 
Finally, some believe that competition law and policy are the right tools to address market 
power issues and foster competition in innovation-driven, digital industries. Although 
digitalisation poses some difficult challenges, competition law can be applied in a 
sufficiently flexible manner to allow competition enforcers to intervene effectively and 
restore competition.8  
 
Section I of this Chapter contains a brief description of the main characteristics of digital 
markets. This description is necessary, firstly, to provide some context, and secondly, 
because supporters of both the regulatory approach and the hands-off approach base 
their arguments on one or more of said characteristics. Subsequently, Section II discusses 
and rebuts the arguments put forward by the proponents of the regulatory approach. It is 
submitted that ex-ante regulation in online markets is bound to do more harm than good, 
as it would likely entail a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach incapable of accounting for the 
																																																								
5 ibid 185–186. 
6 European Parliament Resolution of 27 November 2014 on Supporting Consumer Rights in the Digital 
Single Market 2014/2973(RSP). 
7 Sigmar Gabriel and Emmanuel Macron, ‘Letter “Digital Market Strategy EM-SG” Addressed to European 
Commission Vice President Andrus Ansip’ (2015) <https://www.contexte.com/medias/pdf/medias-
documents/2015/04/Letter_Digital_Strategy_EM-SG_-_A._ANSIP-2.pdf>. 
8 “It was undisputed at the hearings that existing competition laws are sufficiently flexible and nuanced to be 
applied in the digital economy.” OECD, ‘Hearings: The Digital Economy’ (2013) DAF/COMP(2012)22, 7.  
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variety of business models pursued by different platforms, and as such it would be likely 
to deter innovation, to the detriment of consumers. Then, Section III discusses and rebuts 
the arguments posited by the proponents of the hands-off approach. It argues that the 
Schumpeterian vision of competition just tells one part of the story, as modern economic 
literature and empirical research have proven that competition is a significant driver of 
innovation. It also contends that the argument advancing laissez-faire in digital industries 
based on the higher social costs arising from overenforcement errors relative to 
underenforcement errors is misplaced, as the error-cost framework relies on assumptions 
that are not met in digital markets. Lastly, some conclusions are presented.  
 
I. Digital Markets and their Main Characteristics 
 
Digital markets (also referred to as the ‘digital economy’9) can be loosely described as 
those that focus on digital technologies to trade or supply digital goods and services.10 
Accordingly, they comprise markets for products and services as diverse as operating 
systems (OS) (for example, iOS), applications (or ‘apps’) for mobile devices (such as 
Google Maps), app stores that distribute such apps (for example, the AppStore), online 
marketplaces (such as eBay), video-sharing portals (for example, YouTube), search 
engines (such as Google) and social networks (for example, Facebook). Digital markets 
commonly have all or most of the following features: 
 
Research and Development and Intellectual Property: High-tech industries in general are 
characterised by “a competitive process dominated by efforts to create intellectual 
property through R&D, which often results in rapid and disruptive technological 
change”11. Investments in R&D are essentially costly, risky and uncertain, 12 and the 
majority of such efforts prove unsuccessful. Intellectual property protection, copyrights 
and patents provide limited monopoly rights over technical assets which are essential for 
the development of new products or services, or which can be withheld to prevent 
																																																								
9 ibid 5. 
10 ibid. 
11 David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, ‘Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically 
Competitive Industries’ in Adam B Jaffe, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy 
Volume 2 (MIT Press 2001) 3. 
12 J Gregory Sidak and David J Teece, ‘Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law’ (2009) 5 Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 581, 592. 
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competitors from pursuing certain product development paths. At the same time, the 
prospect of market power serves as the incentive for firms to undertake risks, produce 
innovation and generate dynamic efficiencies.13 
 
Network Effects (or Network Externalities): Network effects take place when the value to 
a buyer of an extra unit is higher when more units are sold, everything else being equal.14 
Network effects can be direct, where increasing the number of users of a good in turn 
increases the value of the good to individual users (e.g. telephone networks), or indirect, 
where the increase in the value of the good is driven by the number and variety of 
complementary products that will be produced, which in turn increases with the number 
of users of the underlying product.15  
 
High fixed/sunk costs, and low marginal costs: Some digital industries demand great 
investments, whether in the form of R&D or by establishing a physical or virtual network 
to develop and deliver their products. But after the initial investment, it is cheap to 
produce additional units: new software might cost an astonishing amount of money to 
develop, but once the original code has been written, the cost of making an additional 
copy is negligible.16  
 
Rapid pace of Innovation and Technical complexity: The explosion in computing power 
has shortened the time required to develop new products or copy the competitors’ 
products. “Moore’s Law” is commonly used to depict the ever-increasing fast pace of 
change: the power of a silicon chip doubles every eighteen to twenty-four months, 
thereby quickening the rate of technological advances. 17  Moreover, in fast-changing 
markets, the speed of technological change brings about great uncertainty as to possible 
market outcomes. Uncertainty will revolve around issues such as which products are in or 
out of the market, which products converge over time, the possible length of product 
lifecycles and the path of technology.  
																																																								
13 Thomas O Barnett, ‘Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation’ (2007) 15 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 1191, 1201. 
14 Nicholas Economides, ‘Antitrust Issues in Network Industries’ in Ioannis Kokkoris and Ioannis Lianos 
(eds.), The Reform of EC Competition Law - New Challenges (Kluwer Law International 2010) 345. 
15 Network effects are explained in detail in Chapter 2 Section I.3.1. 
16 Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust in Software Markets’, in Jeffrey Eisenach and Thomas Lenard 
(eds), Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 1999) 34–35. 
17 Thomas A Piraino Jr, ‘A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology Competition’ (2002) 44 Wm. 




(Multisided) Online (or Digital) platforms: Online platforms are essentially ‘matchmakers’ 
that allow for the creation of value for one or more groups of users that would not be 
created otherwise were it not for the platform.18 The most successful businesses on the 
Internet such as search engines, social networks and online marketplaces are online 
platforms.19  
 
Competition for the Market (rather than in the market): In dynamic industries generally, 
competition is said to be best depicted as a race to develop new products or replacing old 
technologies through drastic innovations. Victory in one race leads to an undisputed 
leadership position in one or several product markets (winner-takes-all or winner-takes-
most competition). However, winners cannot lay back and relax, quietly enjoying the 
rewards of victory. Winners must keep innovating continuously and incessantly; 
otherwise, they may be overtaken by the next successful innovative product. Thus, a series 
of consecutive wins by the same undertaking, and its corresponding high market share 
and leadership position in a product market, do not necessarily entail that competition is 
weak. On the contrary, there is fierce competition to become the dominant firm, 
especially at the early stages of a given market’s existence. Innovation competition leads to 
“paradigm shifts”, with new products and services becoming the “next thing”, displacing 
the old ones.20 This dynamic has led some to contend that:  
 
“the information economy is populated by temporary, or fragile monopolies. 
Hardware and software firms vie for dominance, knowing that today’s 
leading technology or architecture will, more likely than not, be toppled in 
short order by an upstart with superior technology”.21 
 
In contrast to mature industries, where competition is in the market and entrants gain 
market share gradually by means of cutting prices and/or expanding output, undertakings 
compete for the market in digital markets through intensive R&D and innovation.   
																																																								
18 See generally David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided 
Platforms (Harvard Business Review Press 2016). 
19 Online platforms are analysed in detail Chapter 2 Section I. 
20 Teece and Coleman (n 3) 804. 
21 Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard Business 
School Press 1999) 173. 
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II. The Regulatory Approach 
 
1. Pro-regulation Arguments 
 
The Commission published in May 2015 its “Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe”.22 
In such document, the Commission noted: 
 
“Some online platforms have evolved to become players competing in many 
sectors of the economy, and the way they use their market power raises a 
number of issues that warrant further analysis beyond the application of 
competition law in specific cases.”23 
 
Subsequently, in September 2015, the Commission launched a “Public consultation on the 
regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud computing 
and the collaborative economy”.24 The Commission’s enquiry focused on the question of 
whether new regulation for online platforms should be passed in view of the perceived 
challenges they pose. Sharing the Commission’s sentiment, Ofcom argued: 
 
“The scale and impact on the European economy of some of the largest 
operators mentioned – such as Google, Facebook, eBay, or Amazon – is 
clearly significant. It is appropriate and timely to consider whether the 
current competition rules and general regulatory frameworks are adequate, 
and whether additional or different regulation may be needed.”25  
 
Within this context, voices have been raised in the sense that a new sector-specific 
regulation is needed to address the challenges posed by the platforms which dominate the 
digital economy. In particular, it has been argued that (i) the growing power of some 
digital platforms warrants a regulatory framework for “essential digital platforms”, which 
should ensure that edge providers have open access to all end-users;26 (ii) all forms of 
discrimination by online platforms against partners and users should be made unlawful, 
																																																								
22 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe’ (2015) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=EN>. 
23 ibid 11. 
24 European Commission, ‘Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online 
Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing and the Collaborative Economy’ (2015) Digital Single Market 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-
platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud>. 
25 House of Lords, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’ (2016) 14. 
26 Sigmar Gabriel and Emmanuel Macron (n 7) 2. 
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especially with regard to access to content, for which purposes the hosting and publishing 
functions should be separated; 27  (iii) a principle of “platform neutrality” should be 
introduced, whereby platforms would be banned from making abrupt, discriminatory or 
opaque changes to the parameters for accessing their markets (such as general and 
technical conditions, algorithms or APIs);28 and (iv) end-users should have the possibility 
to run applications and services of their choice on essential platforms.29 
 
The proposals outlined above advance some kind of fair and non-discriminatory access to 
“essential platforms”, motivated by the perception that anticompetitive restrictions to 
access to platforms, as well as other anticompetitive practices in which said platforms 
engage, cannot be adequately dealt with and punished by competition law. The question 
that follows is whether specific ex-ante regulation, in addition to competition law, to force 
access to “essential digital platforms” is necessary or at least advisable.  
 
2. Arguments against ex-ante  Regulation 
 
The regulatory approach has the advantage of being both clear and predictable, yielding 
more certainty to incumbents and competitors. Competition law, conversely, requires 
always an assessment of the specificities of a particular case. Therefore, the application of 
competition law is normally more precise and accurate. However, competition 
proceedings take time, entailing a risk of large delays in the imposition of remedies or 
measures, to the detriment of competition.30  
 
Nonetheless, regulatory proposals must be assessed with caution, especially when they 
target disruptive competition and are the result of growing appeals from incumbents. 
Attempts to use regulatory restraints to raise rivals’ costs and distort competition are likely 
to be more harmful than anticompetitive actions deployed by private parties, as such 
																																																								
27 French National Digital Council, ‘Platform Neutrality - Building an Open and Sustainable Digital 
Environment’ (2014) 21 <https://cnnumerique.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf>. 
28 ibid 5. 
29 Sigmar Gabriel and Emmanuel Macron (n 7) 2. 
30 Anne-Kathrin Baran, Philipp Eckhardt, Iris Hohmann, Matthias Kullas and Bert Van Roosebeke,  
‘Competition Challenges in the Consumer Internet Industry - How to Ensure Fair Competition in the EU’ 
(2016) cepStudy 35 <http://www.cep.eu/Studien/Consumer_Internet_Industry/CII_Study.pdf>. 
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attempts have no offsetting procompetitive virtues, and if successful, they have long-
lasting effects that cannot be corrected by market forces.31    
 
Therefore, it is safe to contend that within the context of disruptive forms of competition 
through new technologies or business models, regulatory efforts that have the effect of 
benefiting incumbents should be seen with scepticism.32 Take the example of Uber. 
Through an app installed in mobile devices, Uber allows consumers to request, and 
drivers to accept, car rides from a pickup location to a determined destination. Solving a 
transaction and coordination problem for drivers and consumers, Uber has contributed to 
consumer welfare significantly, reducing waiting times and improving convenience for 
users, and allowing drivers with idle capacity to engage in a lucrative activity. However, 
taxicab operators across the world33 have strongly opposed to Uber and other companies 
offering transport services through smartphone apps, with some proposing laws to 
regulate them.34 Such proposals are likely to protect incumbent taxicab operators from the 
disruptive competition brought about by undertakings offering transport apps, to the 
detriment of consumers.  
 
Relatedly, telecom operators, which are subject to ex-ante regulation, have been particularly 
vocal about the need of an ex-ante regulation applicable to what they call Over the Top 
(OTT) operators, which rely on their infrastructure to deploy new services and generate 
value (such as Google or Facebook).35 This is probably motivated by the fact that some 
online platforms offer services, such as consumer communications services (for example, 
Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp), that compete with services provided by telecom 
operators (such as SMS). For instance, Carlos López Blanco, Telefonica’s head of public 
and regulatory affairs, advanced in an interview Telefonica’s Digital Manifesto, a set of ten 
recommendations aimed at “establishing the same rules for the same digital services”, 
																																																								
31 Joshua Wright, ‘Regulation in High-Tech Markets: Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC’ 
(2015) 7 <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/634631/150402clemson.pdf>. 
32 ibid. 
33 ‘Uber Protests and Legal Actions’, Wikipedia (2017) 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Uber_protests_and_legal_actions&oldid=779790504>. 
34 Dan Adams, ‘Baker Proposes Law to Regulate Uber, Lyft, Other Ride-Sharing Services’ (2015) 
BostonGlobe.com <https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/04/24/baker-proposes-law-regulate-uber-
lyft-other-ride-sharing-services/qIrS2IDNs0WElrtbNxj60I/story.html>. 





which in turn means “opening up mobile operating systems and app stores.”36 The 
beneficial effects on consumer welfare of such proposals are ambiguous, but it is easy to 
see how they could benefit telecom incumbents.  
 
In addition, considerations of innovation and its inherent benefits should be given 
appropriate weight in the regulatory debate. In the “Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe”, the European Commission noted:  
 
“[P]latforms have proven to be innovators in the digital economy, helping 
smaller businesses to move online and reach new markets. New platforms in 
mobility services, tourism, music, audiovisual, education, finance, 
accommodation and recruitment have rapidly and profoundly challenged 
traditional business models and have grown exponentially. The rise of the 
sharing economy also offers opportunities for increased efficiency, growth 
and jobs, through improved consumer choice […]”37 
 
The benefits online platforms have brought about should not be taken for granted. 
Innovation is inherently costly and risky.38 The administrative burden arising from ex-ante 
regulation applicable to online platforms is likely to add another layer of difficulty to 
successful innovations, thereby reducing innovation’s pace and ensuing benefits. This 
sentiment is shared by the UK and other member states:  
 
“we should avoid introducing legislation that might act as a barrier to the 
development of new digital business models and create obstacles to entry 
and growth in the European digital market. Such legislation might have an 
unintentionally damaging effect on the innovation, competitiveness and 
economic growth of the European digital industries. It would not be in the 
interests of European businesses nor of consumers and would put us at a 
disadvantage in relation to global competition.”39 
   
Furthermore, there is a definitional issue. Any ex-ante regulatory framework ensuring free 
and non-discriminatory access to “essential” online platforms would require an accurate 
definition of “essential” online platforms. However, there is no universally agreed-upon 
																																																								
36 Telefonica, ‘Q&A: Carlos López Blanco, Telefónica’s Head of Public and Regulatory Affairs’ (2015) Public 
Policy <https://www.telefonica.com/en/web/public-policy/blog/article/-/blogs/q-a-carlos-lopez-blanco-
telefonica-s-head-of-public-and-regulatory-affairs>. 
37 European Commission (n 22) 11. 
38 Baran et al. (n 30) 30. 
39 Various EU Member States, ‘Joint Letter from the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria to European Commission 




definition of platforms.40 As will be seen in Chapters 2 and 3, online platforms differ 
greatly in terms of the business model they follow.41As the CMA has explained:  
 
“there is no ‘one size fits all’ definition. While many share the common 
feature of acting as intermediaries between other actors in the market, they 
may have quite different functions including: providing a market place where 
sellers and buyers can meet (such as peer to peer sites); 
providing information about sellers or buyers (such as review sites); 
and/or facilitating a transaction (such as payment intermediaries)”42 
 
Accordingly, one can wonder how a “one-size-fits-all” approach could ensure ‘fair’ and 
‘non-discriminatory’ access to platforms as diverse as social networks, search engines, app 
stores, operating systems, sharing economy apps or e-commerce platforms, as a means to 
promote competition. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that access to some of said platforms 
is absolutely ‘essential’ to ensure that competition is not distorted in possible downstream 
or neighbouring markets. 43  Therefore, any sort of ex-ante regulation applicable to 
“essential” online platforms risks being over-inclusive and ultimately unnecessary. 
Competition law enforcement, which relies on concrete evidence and applies on a case-
by-case basis, is undoubtedly more suitable to deal with any access or other 
anticompetitive issues in the digital economy without deterring the innovation that many 
online platforms have brought about to the benefit of consumers.  
III. The Hands-Off Approach 
 
1. Arguments supporting a Hands-off Approach  
 
Supporters of the hands-off approach to competition enforcement in digital markets 
commonly rely on Schumpeter’s ‘dynamic competition’ notion. Schumpeter famously 
																																																								
40 As Gawer notes, “[w]hile the term platform is used across […] different literatures, the meaning of the 
term seems to differ between them […] One could even wonder at first glance if they are discussing the 
same underlying phenomenon. In the vernacular of business, the term platform can also have different 
meanings.” Annabelle Gawer, ‘Platforms, Markets and Innovation: An Introduction’, in Annabelle Gawer 
(ed), Platforms, markets and innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 46.  
41 See Chapter 2 Section I.2 and Chapter 3 Sections I.5.1, I.5.2 and I.5.3. 
42 CMA, ‘Written Evidence for Report Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’ (2015) 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-
market-subcommittee/online-platforms-and-the-eu-digital-single-market/written/23391.html>. 




described competition as the “perennial gale of creative destruction” that “strikes not at 
the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms, but at their foundations 
and their very lives”.44 In dynamic markets, the competitive race does not reward the 
producer selling more at the lowest price, but rather the innovator who comes up with the 
best ‘killer’ product that conquers the entirety of the market. Schumpeter also noted that 
the process of creative destruction is the main source of economic progress and growth, 
for which reason, if the promotion of consumer welfare lies at the core of competition 
policy, it should foster dynamic competition instead of its “weaker cousin”, static 
competition.45 
 
However, competition policy is deeply rooted in a model of static competition, 46 which 
depicts perfect competition47 as the welfare-maximising structure and the benchmark for 
																																																								
44 Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge 1942) 84. 
45 Sidak and Teece (n 12) 600; Schumpeter (n 44) 105–106.  
46 The notions of static and dynamic competition and static and dynamic efficiencies are of paramount 
significance for competition analysis. Generally, economists distinguish between three broad classes of 
efficiencies: 
- Allocative efficiency: this efficiency is achieved when the existing goods are allocated through the 
price system to those buyers who value them most, in terms of willingness to pay or willingness to 
forego other consumption possibilities. At an allocatively efficient outcome, market prices are 
equal to the real resource costs of producing and supplying the products.  
- Productive efficiency: this efficiency addresses the question of whether any given level of output is 
being produced by a firm/industry at least cost or, alternatively, whether any given combination of 
inputs is producing the maximum possible output. The state of technology determines what 
alternative combinations of resources can produce a given amount of output. Productive efficiency 
is achieved when output is produced in plants of optimal scale (or minimum efficient scale) given 
the relative prices of production inputs. 
- Dynamic efficiency: it is connected to whether appropriate incentives and ability exist to increase 
productivity and engage in innovative activity over time, which may yield cheaper or better goods 
or new products that afford consumers more satisfaction than previous consumption choices. 
Allocative and productive efficiency are static notions concerned with the performance of an economy, 
industry or firm at a given point in time, for a given technology and level of existing knowledge, as opposed 
to dynamic efficiency, which is a dynamic notion concerned with the ability of a firm, industry or economy 
to exploit its potential to innovate, develop new technologies and thus expand its production possibility 
frontier. 
Static competition manifests itself in the form of multiple providers of existing products offered at low 
prices, offering an unchanging menu of unimproved products at very good prices (for which reason is 
consistent with the perfect competition paradigm, see below n 47). Logically, static efficiencies arise from 
this kind of competition. Conversely, dynamic competition is a style of competition that relies on 
innovation to produce new products and processes and concomitant price reductions of substantial 
magnitude. Improvements based on innovation are forms of dynamic efficiencies.  
For a more comprehensive explanation of static versus dynamic competition and efficiencies, as well as 
their respective trade-offs, see Miguel De la Mano, ‘For the Customer’s Sake: The Competitive Effects of 
Efficiencies in European Merger Control’ (2002) Enterprise Papers No.11 8–9.  
47 Perfect competition is a theoretical construction which depicts markets showing the following features: 
free entry an exit, no significant economies of scale in production, no individual supplier can influence the 
market price, the equilibrium price is determined by the interplay between demand and supply, and all 
suppliers are “price takers”. Perfect competition produces static desirable outcomes for the economy as a 
whole: (i) production takes place at the lowest level of cost (productive efficiency); and (ii) all consumers 
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measuring losses associated with departures from this ideal world. Yet, “perfect 
competition is to economics what the frictionless plane is to physics: an abstract ideal that 
is never attained in reality”. 48  Accordingly, it is argued that the traditional ‘static’ 
competition framework fails to account for the true nature of competition in high-tech 
sectors:  
 
“[I]n the static sense, competition in such high-tech industries appears far from 
being rigorous. A few dominant firms have significant market power and they 
set prices well above marginal costs. In the Schumpeterian view, however, the 
expectation of short-run market power is a necessary condition for dynamic 
competition and the existence of short-run market power does not necessarily 
imply lack of competition.”49  
 
Moreover, the combination of economies of scale, network effects and high fixed and 
sunk costs is likely to be conducive to a near-monopoly or a highly concentrated market, 
but this tendency to monopoly is relatively benign, given that monopoly positions are 
inherently fragile:  
 
“competition in high technology markets is frequently characterized by 
incremental innovation, punctuated by major paradigm shifts. These shifts 
frequently cause incumbents positions to be completely overturned […] 
[A]ntitrust authorities need to be cognizant of the self-correcting nature of any 
dominance that is obtained in a particular regime [… as] market dominance in 
technologically progressive industries is likely to be transitory.”50 
 
From the above follows that in dynamically competitive industries no undertaking is 
capable of maintaining a monopoly or dominant position unless it permanently 
outperforms its competitors by being the most innovative firm, introducing consecutive 
generations of superior products. This premise implies that, because of the very nature of 
the competitive process, no anticompetitive action deployed by a dominant firm can have 
a significant role in preserving its dominant position.51 As a result, “antitrust intervention 
																																																																																																																																																																
who are willing to pay a price that covers this cost of production are indeed served. The “right” amount of 
resources in the economy is allocated to production (allocative efficiency).  
48 Evans and Schmalensee (n 11) 13. 
49 Sanghoon Ahn, ‘Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence’ 
[2002] OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 317 8. 
50 David J Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic, and Policy Dimensions (OUP 2000) 160–
163. 





is likely to be rendered both unnecessary and undesirable, except in the most unusual of 
circumstances.”52 
 
In addition, it is argued that the task of distinguishing aggressive but procompetitive 
behaviour from anticompetitive conduct is rendered all the more difficult in online 
markets due to the following reasons: 
 
a) Defining markets and drawing inferences about competition from market structure is 
extremely problematic in the digital realm:53 for example, the SSNIP test, the main tool to 
define markets, is unsuited to online industries.54 Moreover, competition enforcement 
agencies commonly construe “high” market shares as an indicator of a significant degree 
of market power, and in merger cases, increases in concentration in the relevant market 
are taken as a proxy for reduced competition which, if large enough, may lead to 
substantial price increases. However, “current product-market shares may indicate very 
little about the future of the industry or about whether any given firm will possess 
significant market power.”55 As a result, intervention based on such inferences is bound to 
be mistaken or counterproductive;  
 
b) Online markets exhibit competition for the market through drastic innovation rather 
than in the market through price/output decisions: with innovation, “the number of new 
entrants explodes, but once a dominant design emerges implosions are likely, and markets 
become more concentrated.”56The competitive pressure exerted upon incumbents comes 
from innovative competitors and entrants that may leapfrog the incumbents over time, 
rather than from current product-market competitors attempting to gain market share by 
cutting prices and/or expanding output. Given that firms in online markets compete on 
the basis of innovation, price decisions play only a second role, if any. This is particularly 
true in the case of certain online services, such as search engines and social networking 
sites, where end users enjoy the services free of charge.57 
																																																								
52 Teece and Coleman (n 3) 809. 
53 ‘[A]n assessment of the true economically-relevant market for search advertising is an extremely 
complicated endeavor.’ Manne and Wright (n 4) 196.  
54 See Chapter 3 Section I.4.1.3. 
55 Michael L Katz and Howard A Shelanski, ‘“Schumpeterian” Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-
Tech Markets’ (2005) SSRN paper 10 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=925707>. 
56 Sidak and Teece (n 12) 604. 
57 “Many of the [described] web-based platforms… are free to a least one group of customers”. David S 
Evans, ‘The Web Economy, Two-Sided Markets and Competition Policy’, in David S. Evans (ed), Platform 




c) Innovation is closely related to antitrust error: According to Manne and Wright, 
historical experience shows that innovative practices, products and services have been 
commonly treated harshly by competition authorities. Novel practices have resulted in 
monopoly explanations from economists followed by hostility in courts, and only 
subsequently a more nuanced and thorough understanding of the novel practice emerges, 
commonly recognising procompetitive virtues. 58   Therefore, antitrust analysis in 
innovative settings such as online industries is highly likely to be biased towards ascribing 
an anticompetitive explanation to a practice which the subsequent literature and evidence 
will prove reasonable or efficient. This bias towards false positives is increased by the fact 
that “economists know much less about the relationship between competition and 
innovation, and in turn, consumer welfare, than they do about standard price 
competition”.59 More importantly, this bias is bound to have the unintended effect of 
slowing innovation and economy welfare.60 
 
In view of the aforementioned difficulties, the argument runs, competition authorities are 
bound to make errors. Since the social costs arising from false positives or 
overenforcement errors are greater that those associated with false negatives or 
underenforcement errors, as market forces offer at least some corrective with respect to 
the latter and none to the former61 and both types of errors are inevitable,62 a relaxed, 
cautious “hands-off” approach to competition enforcement in digital markets is advised.  
 
2. Arguments against the Hands-off Approach 
 
In the Schumpeterian view of competition, large undertakings and monopolies are more 
innovative than firms in competitive markets, for which reason monopoly, rather than 
competition, is perceived as more conducive to innovation. Logically, this view implies a 
																																																								
58 Geoffrey A Manne and Joshua D Wright, ‘Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust’ (2010) 6 Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 153, 165. 
59 ibid 166. 
60 ibid 171. 
61 This assertion is based on Easterbrook’s error-cost framework. See Frank H Easterbrook, ‘Limits of 
Antitrust’ (1984) 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15. 
62 “Distinguishing precompetitive from anticompetitive actions with certainty is impossible”. David 
McGowan, ‘Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp.’ (2005) 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1185, 1189. 
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lenient treatment to monopolies and unilateral conduct, especially in high-tech industries, 
“where the stakes of error are much higher.”63 
 
However, modern economic theory and empirical research do not support Schumpeter’s 
argument that monopoly is more likely to lead to innovation than competitive markets. 
Baker notes that the economic literature seeking to relate innovation in an industry to the 
extent to which firms in the market compete has rendered important principles that 
disprove Schumpeter’s hypothesis, such as “competition in innovation itself – that is, 
competition among firms seeking to develop the same new product or process – 
encourages innovation”, and “competition among rivals producing an existing product 
encourages those firms to find ways to lower costs, improve quality or develop new 
products.”64 After surveying the empirical evidence relating competition and innovation, 
he concludes:  
 
“As a general rule, competition does not just lead firms to produce more and 
charge less; it encourages them to innovate as well. Competition supplies a 
powerful motive for innovation”.65 
 
In a similar vein, Katz and Shelanski argue that “economic intuition suggests an 
overarching presumption that innovation will be most intense in firms with a mix of 
competitive incentives and supracompetitive returns”,66 and after a thorough analysis of 
the empirical research on the relationship between market structure and innovation, they 
conclude:  
 
“Our analysis, therefore, suggests that the claim for systematic laissez-faire in 
technologically dynamic markets is not soundly grounded in economics. It will 
not always, or even often, be true that unchecked consolidation will produce 
the conditions fostering the intense investment in new technology that leads to 
sequential competition ‘for the market’, as the Schumpeterians sometimes 
argue”.67  
 
Nor is a lenient approach towards exclusionary conduct advisable to promote innovation, 
as it is at least as likely to stifle the very innovation it aims to promote, given that under 
																																																								
63 Manne and Wright (n 58) 167. 
64 Jonathan B Baker, ‘Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation’ (2007) 74 
Antitrust Law Journal 575, 579. 
65 ibid 587. 
66 Michael L Katz and Howard A Shelanski, ‘Mergers and Innovation’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 1, 19. 
67 ibid 29–30. 
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such approach competitors or potential competitors of dominant firms are dissuaded 
from incurring risky investments in R&D by fear of increased exclusionary conduct, 
which in turn leads to lower pressure on dominant firms to innovate. As Gavil notes:  
 
“What firm will undertake – and what investor will seriously support – entry 
into a market occupied by a dominant firm that has already demonstrated its 
penchant for entry-deterring strategies – especially if it has already received the 
imprimatur of the courts?”68 
 
Nor can the hands-off approach be justified by a fear of deterring procompetitive 
conduct by dominant undertakings. There is no evidence whatsoever that dominant 
undertakings refrain or have refrained from engaging in procompetitive conduct as a 
result of fear of liability under Article 102 TFEU (or its equivalent in other jurisdictions).69  
 
Moreover, a permissive approach to unilateral conduct cannot be justified either by the 
higher social costs arising from false positives relative to those arising from false 
negatives, as the error-cost framework used to advance such approach rests on several 
economic assumptions that are no fulfilled in online markets.  
 
As Baker explains, the error-cost framework assumes inter alia that (i) markets self-correct 
through entry, (ii) monopolies innovate and foster market growth (i.e. the dynamic 
competition argument), (iii) monopolists cannot obtain more than a single monopoly 
profit, and (iv) prevalent business practices cannot harm competition.70 However, firstly, 
as will be seen in Chapters 271 and 3,72 some digital markets are characterised by very high 
barriers to entry. In particular, as explained above, some digital markets show “winner-
takes-all” dynamics, which means that an innovator conquers the entirety or most of a 
market. In the presence of network effects, the strong dominant position of the innovator 
is likely to be strengthened with the passage of time. In this scenario, even entrants or 
competitors with better products or services are likely to fail in their challenges against the 
incumbent. This is one of the reasons why competition agencies must remain vigilant and 
																																																								
68 Andrew I Gavil, ‘Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance’ 
(2004) 72 Antitrust Law Journal 3, 40. See Chapter 5 text accompanying footnote 200.  
69 Gavil notes that there “is no data to support the accusation that Section 2 is over-deterring some kind of 
‘legitimate conduct’”. ibid 51. 
70 Jonathan B Baker, ‘Taking the Error out of “Error Cost” analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right’ 
(2015) 80 Antitrust Law Journal 1, 8–17. 
71 See Chapter 2 Section II.5.2.3. 
72 See Chapter 3 Sections II.5.1, II.5.2 and II.5.3. 
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monitor closely digital markets, ensuring that undertakings win the competitive race and 
conquer the market on the basis of better prices, quality, innovation or choice, and that 
even after a firm achieves a dominant market position, said position may still be 
challenged. Perhaps more importantly, competition authorities must ensure that dominant 
positions are not abused, thereby preventing entry, chilling innovation or obstructing a 
transition to a new technology.  
 
Secondly, with regard to the dynamic competition argument discussed above, it must be 
reiterated that the claim that competition policy should be permissive of high 
concentration and unilateral conduct in order to promote innovation lacks empirical 
grounding,73 and at any rate, is unconvincing, because it ignores the ways in which more 
competition enhances innovation. 
 
Thirdly, as demonstrated by Post-Chicago scholars,74 monopolists can and do indeed 
extract more than one single monopoly profit through exclusionary conduct such as 
raising rival’s costs75 or leveraging of market power.76 In particular, digital markets are 
almost invariably multisided, 77  which means that there are multiple links and 
interdependences between the different groups of customers a platform serves, as well as 
links between the platform and downstream or neighbouring markets. In addition, digital 
platforms tend to be data-intensive, and the data they collect and process on one side of 
the market can be reprocessed and used on another side or market. These two features 
allow incumbents in digital industries to leverage their market power onto other markets 
with particular ease.78  
 
Fourthly, practices that are commonplace in some digital markets are very harmful to 
competition. Chapter 2 explains that there are important economies of scale and scope in 
the processing and use of data, as a result of which incumbents with great data collection 
and processing capacity enjoy a significant competitive advantage. In turn, Chapter 5 
explains that some platforms, driven by an insatiable appetite for data to derive a 
																																																								
73 Katz and Shelanski (n 66) 26. 
74 Andrew I Gavil, Jonathan B Baker and William E Kovacic, ‘Note on “Single Monopoly Profit” Theory’ 
(2014) SSRN paper <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496932>. 
75 Thomas G Krattenmaker and Steven C Salop, ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to 
Achieve Power over Price’ (1986) 96 The Yale Law Journal 209. 
76 Steven C Salop and R Craig Romaine, ‘Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and 
Microsoft’ (1998) 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 617. 
77 See Chapter 2 Section I and Chapter 3 Section I.4.1. 
78 See Chapter 3 Section III.3 and Chapter 5 Section II.5.3.1.2. 
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competitive advantage, violate the right of individuals to data protection on a regular 
basis. When such violation of rights is of significant magnitude and allows for the 
extraction of valuable data, said violation fuels the abovementioned economies of scale 
and scope, thereby consolidating dominance, lessening competition, and enabling the 
leveraging of market power onto related markets. 79 
 
In view of the above, competition policy that refrains from intervening in digital markets 
seems far from sensible, especially on account of the fact that some of said markets tend 
to be characterised by the presence of super dominant firms, as a result of which the 




This Chapter has argued that neither an ex-ante regulation nor a hands-off approach is 
suitable to address the perceived competition concerns that are present in digital markets. 
The enforcement of Article 102 TFEU, it is submitted, remains more than ever necessary 
to prevent, stop and deter anticompetitive conduct that would otherwise constrain the 
healthy process of competition in digital markets. The next two Chapters elaborate in 
support of this contention. In particular: 
 
As seen above, the proposal of lenient competition enforcement in digital industries rests 
on dubious grounds: there is no evidence that concentrated markets are more conducive 
to innovation, there is no evidence that undertakings refrain from procompetitive conduct 
by a fear of antitrust liability under Article 102 TFEU, and there is no evidence that the 
social costs arising from false positives are higher than those stemming from false 
negatives. But this is not the end of the story. The hands-off approach overlooks the 
significance of two recent phenomena:  
 
• As will be seen in Chapter 2, the market leaders of digital industries are organised 
as platforms. These platforms have certain characteristics that raise concerns of 
																																																								
79 See Chapter 5 Sections II.5.2.1 and II.5.3.1.  
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great complexity and severity, which warrant special attention (as opposed to 
laissez-faire) on the part of competition authorities.  
 
• The business model of several online platforms revolves around the collection and 
monetisation of data. As will be explained in Chapter 2, data is an input to the 
products and services a platform offers, as well as a strategic and valuable asset. 
The central role of data in online markets forces competition authorities to 
understand how undertakings compete therein, as well as the manner in which 
data may be used to abuse market power.   
 
In addition, whereas the proponents of the hands-off approach are right when they argue 
that conventional tools to define markets are not particularly useful when applied to 
digital industries, that structural presumptions based on market shares are less relevant in 
fast-changing markets, and that competition analysis should depart from the ‘traditional’ 
excessive focus on price, these observations are a poor justification for a lax enforcement 
policy in digital industries. Chapter 3 demonstrates that, by being aware of the pitfalls and 
limitations of the ‘traditional’ price-oriented competition analysis, and through a flexible 
application of the competition assessment tools that have been developed throughout 
years of experience, markets can be readily defined and market power (dominance) can be 
properly assessed.  
 
Finally, an ex-ante regulation runs the risk of being overly inclusive, and this risk is 
extremely high. As will be seen in Chapters 2 and 3, although online platforms share some 
common characteristics, they vary greatly in terms of the business models they follow, and 
consequently, they derive their market power from different sources. A “one-size-fits-all” 
regulatory solution is inherently incapable of accounting for these nuances, and its long-




CHAPTER 2. Online Platforms and Big Data 
Introduction 
 
The argument for laissez-faire in digital markets fails to account for two recent 
phenomena: some firms have followed a ‘platform’ business model, and competition 
takes place to a large extent on the basis of the collection and processing of personal data. 
Understanding these phenomena and their implications is of the essence to settle the 
debate on the role that competition policy on Article 102 TFEU should play in digital 
markets.  
 
Section I analyses online platforms and their main characteristics. In particular, online 
platforms show network effects, have an asymmetric pricing scheme and collect and 
process personal data. These features may in specific cases lead to concerns of great 
complexity and severity which warrant a vigilant role on the part of competition 
authorities. Section II analyses and discusses the ‘Big Data’ and ‘Big Analytics’ 
phenomena. Big Data and Big Analytics bring about significant benefits, but at the same 
time, raise concerns of market power. The Big Data and competition policy debate is still 
in its infancy, and the Commission has only assessed whether Big Data may raise barriers 
to entry and confer market power in merger decisions. In its decisional practice, the 
Commission has developed two criteria to assess any possible ‘data-advantage’: (i) 
whether or not producing the data is costly and resource-intensive (whether the data is 
easily replicable or expensive and difficult to replicate), and (ii) whether post-transaction 
there remains available an amount of data sufficient for competitors to match the 
competitive advantage arising from the transaction for the merging firms (whether data is 
widely available or scarce). It is argued that the second criterion is particularly 
problematic, as it confuses ‘data being widely available’ with ‘data being fungible’ and 
‘readily accessible’. It will be seen that some data may not be substitutable with other data. 
Additionally, data may be ‘widely available’, and yet not readily accessible to entrants or 
competitors. Indeed, even if non-rivalrous, a particular dataset may be nevertheless costly 
and time-consuming to replicate. Further, a data advantage depends to a large extent on 
Big Data’s volume, variety and velocity, as well as on learning-by-doing and spill-overs 
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among the different sides of a platform’s multisided market. The consideration of these 
factors should be central in the assessment of whether a data advantage confers market 
power. Section III presents some conclusions, a test to assess the ‘data-advantage’, and 
some caveats regarding the Big Data debate. 
 
I. Online Platforms 
1. General 
 
Search engines, social networks, e-marketplaces, sharing economy apps and App Stores 
are all examples of online platforms. These platforms are a species of what is known in 
the economics literature as multisided platforms (MSPs).1 There is no universally accepted 
definition for MSPs., but they can be described as building blocks (be it products, 
technologies or services) that serve as the foundation upon which different groups of 
economic agents interact, unleashing hidden economic value from interactions between 
such groups that otherwise would not happen or would be significantly costlier.2 Hardly a 
new phenomenon, MSPs were recently uncovered as a species of business by Rochet and 
Tirole,3 from whose work it is now understood that inter alia payment card systems, 
operating systems, shopping malls, video game consoles, advertising-supported media and 
dating sites are all MSPs.  
 
Evans and Schmalensee have defined a MSP as having “(a) two or more group of 
customers; (b) who need each other in some way; (c) but who cannot capture the value 
from their mutual attraction on their own; and (d) rely on the [platform] to facilitate 
value-creating interactions between them”.4 They contend that MSPs provide a real or 
																																																								
1 When referring to a platform provider it is commonplace to see in the literature the terms “two-sided” or 
“multi-sided” markets. In this thesis, however, the “multi-sided platform” concept will be preferred, as 
multisidedness is a characteristic of a business model rather than of a market itself.  
2 This definition draws on Annabelle Gawer, ‘Platforms, Markets and Innovation: An Introduction’, in 
Annabelle Gawer (ed), Platforms, markets and innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011).  
3 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, ‘Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ (2003) 1 Journal of 
the European Economic Association 990. 
4 David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, ‘The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses’ 




virtual meeting place that facilitates interactions between members of at least two distinct 
groups of customers.5  
 
The Monopolkommission has put emphasis on the intermediary function of online 
platforms.6 Since they are essentially intermediaries, (some) online platforms do not have 
to invest in the creation of content or goods or in the provision of services to which they 
give access; rather, they rely on the workforce and resources of third parties,7 as depicted 




5 David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, ‘The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided 
Platforms’, in David S. Evans (ed), Platform Economics: Essays of Multi-Sided Businesses (Competition Policy 
International 2011) 9. 
6 Monopolkommission, ‘Special Report 68: Competition Policy: The Challenge of Digital Markets’ (2015) 19 
<http://www.monopolkommission.de/index.php/en/reports/special-reports/284-special-report-68>. 
7 This is not the case of all online platforms. For example, search engines need to crawl the web and devise 
an index to enable value-creating interactions between searchers and advertisers. Generally speaking, no 
across-the-board statements for competition policy should be made in respect of online platforms. 
8 Taken from ‘Wetpaint | Creative Digital Solutions’ <https://wetpaint-mena.com/>. 
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2. Benefits and Types of Online Platforms9 
 
According to the European Commission, online platforms “play an ever more central role 
in the online world and hence in social and economic life.”10 Online platforms’ perceived 
benefits are manifold, including:  
 
• consumer convenience (time saving, accessibility at any hour of the day, 
personalisation, simplified transaction system and home delivery); 
• accessibility of information and price transparency (through search engines, rating 
systems and comparison tools);  
• improved awareness (ads promoting goods and services that the user was unaware 
of, more accessible product information); 
• greater choice (diversity of products and sellers); 
• monetary benefits (offering packages of goods and services, promoting deals, 
reducing costs of access to information); 
• additional sources of income (consumers can sell their products on marketplaces, 
offer services through sharing economy platforms); 
• reduction of transaction costs11 and access to a wider market than businesses 
would otherwise reach through their own websites; 
• stimulation and opening up of research, innovation and access to knowledge.  
 
It is possible to observe the following types of online platforms: 
 
• Online marketplaces or e-commerce platforms: These platforms are entities which 
offer a ‘virtual space’ to buyers and third-party sellers of goods and services in 
exchange for a fee, enabling direct transactions between them. Examples are eBay, 
Amazon, Alibaba and Rakuten. 
																																																								
9 This section draws on European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document - Online Platforms 
Accompanying the Document Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’ (2016) 
1–40 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-staff-working-document-online-
platforms>. 
10 ibid 1. 
11 Transaction costs are the costs associated with the participation in a marketplace, and can include inter alia 
search or information costs incurred for the identification of opportunities, costs of negotiating contracts, 
and costs of transferring a good or providing a service.  
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• Application Distribution Platforms (or ‘Apps stores’): These are virtual 
marketplaces which enable users to download apps to mobile devices, and app 
developers to reach users. Google Play (for Android OS) and App Store (for iOS) 
are the most salient examples. Platforms charge Store fees and sales commissions 
to app developers.  
• Search Engine platforms: They help Internet users to find the relevant answers to 
their search requests from amongst tens of billions of webpages, and facilitate 
direct interaction between Internet users, website operators seeking an audience 
for their content, and online advertisers targeting potential customers. There are 
‘general’ (i.e. they cover any category of information) search engines such as 
Google, Bing and Yahoo!, and ‘vertical’ (i.e. they cover specific categories of 
information) like Booking.com, Expedia.com and TripAdvisor.com. 
• Social Media and Content Platforms: Social media platforms are online meeting 
places which allow users to create profiles, invite friends, organise groups, surf 
other user profiles, and in general communicate with a network of users. 
Examples are Facebook, MySpace, Google+ and LinkedIn. On the other hand, 
content platforms principally serve to publicly share user generated content such 
as opinions (Twitter), videos (YouTube), images (Flickr) and music (Soundcloud), 
sometimes incorporating a ‘social network’ element. The primary revenue source 
of these platforms is advertising.  
• Sharing economy platforms: Also known as ‘collaborative consumption’ 
platforms, these platforms are virtual places which allow for peer-to-peer-based 
activities of obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and services. The 
most successful examples are Uber (car sharing) and Airbnb (apartment rentals).  
 
It is worth noting that the distinctions above are not always clear-cut. For example, some 
general search engines also include vertical search functionalities, or alternatively provide 
direct access to specialised apps (as is the case of Bing with Bing Maps). Also, some social 
media platforms enable the sharing of user generated content, and also incorporate 
electronic communication services, online gaming and other features. Perhaps more 
importantly, some online platforms are vertically integrated and have presence in two or 
more of the segments above (the most striking example being Google, with its Android 
OS, Google Play Store, Google engine, YouTube video platform and an array of other 
services).   
Chapter 2 
 42 
    
3. Characteristics of Online Platforms 
 
Online platforms (1) show network effects, (2) have an asymmetric pricing scheme, and 
(3) rely on the collection and processing of consumer data. Notably, these characteristics12 
tend to raise issues of great complexity and severity that warrant a vigilant role on the part 
of competition authorities.  
 
3.1 Network Effects 
 
Network effects (also known as network externalities or positive-feedback effects)13 
emerge when the value of a product or service to its users is increased with the number of 
other users of such product or service. Network externalities are one of the most defining 
features of digital markets and platforms, since the increasing popularity of a platform 
attracts additional users and other economic operators (such as application developers 
and advertisers) to the platform.14  
 
Network effects can be direct or indirect. Direct (or club) network effects arise where 
there is interaction between the users of a product, and having more users makes the 
product more useful and valuable for all users. A good example is given by social network 
platforms such as Facebook:15 the more users on the network, the higher its attractiveness 
is for users. As a matter of fact, every new member of Facebook brings in 200 friends on 
average.16 The same applies to telecommunication networks, such as ‘traditional’ phones, 
Skype or WhatsApp, as the universe of people with whom to communicate increases with 
the number of users. As a result, networks with a large use base tend to grow bigger, as 
they attract more customers, all else being equal.  
																																																								
12 In particular, these characteristics have significant repercussions on market definition and market power 
assessments. See Chapter 3 Sections I.4 and II.5.  
13 With regard to network externalities in general see for example Stan J Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis, 
‘Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy’ (1994) 8 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 133; 
Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities’ (1986) 
94 Journal of Political Economy 822; Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Network Externalities, 
Competition, and Compatibility’ (1985) 75 The American Economic Review 424. 
14 OECD, ‘Hearings: The Digital Economy’ (2013) DAF/COMP(2012)22 8 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/The-Digital-Economy-2012.pdf>. 
15 Other examples are Instagram, Pinterest or Xing.  




Conversely, indirect network effects arise where the increasing use of a product increases 
its attractiveness to another economic group, which in turn renders indirect benefits for 
the original users of the product. Indirect network effects are said to be the most 
significant feature of two- or multi-sided platforms and markets.17 Think about OSs: 
widespread adoption of an OS attracts application developers who will devise and make 
available new applications compatible with such OS, thereby increasing its value for its 
users. The same applies to e-commerce platforms such as eBay: the more buyers the 
platform has, the more attractive the platform is for sellers, as they have a wider group of 
users with whom to consummate transactions.  Increased value to the platform’s different 
customer groups results in a positive feedback loop, whereby more customers on one side 
attract more customers on the other side.    
 
Network externalities may be positive for one group of customers but negative for 
another. MSPs create value where one side benefits from more demand on the other side, 
but the other side obtains no benefit or would even prefer less or no demand from the 
other side. This phenomenon can be seen in some advertising-supported platforms: 
although advertisers will value more an advertising platform (such as a search engine) the 
more “eyeballs” it can reach, users are likely to be indifferent or even annoyed by 
advertisements. Thus, the platform enables the interaction between the different groups 
by subsidising users (with content or services), so they are willing to see advertisements. 
Insofar as the externalities’ net value is positive, benefits arise from the interaction, some 
of which may be internalised by the platform.18 
 
The internalisation of network externalities is of the essence for a MSP’s success. The 
platform must recognise the interdependency among the demands from its different 
customer groups and devise a strategy to get enough customers on every side, so as to 
secure sufficient “critical mass” and propel indirect network effects.19 Without one side of 
the platform, the other sides will not join, and vice versa. This amounts to the well-known 
“chicken and egg problem”:20 what side should join first? For instance, low or zero prices 
on one side of the platform aids the platform to solve the chicken and egg problem by 
																																																								
17 Evans and Schmalensee (n 4) 2. 
18 ibid 8. 
19 ibid 9. 
20 Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, ‘Chicken and Egg: Competing Matchmakers’ (2001) CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 2885. 
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attracting the participation of the benefited group, which in turn, by propelling network 
effects, incentivises the participation of the non-benefited group or groups (the so-called 
“divide and conquer” strategy21).  
 
When a platform effectively manages to harness network effects and achieves critical 
mass, it is ready to take off and enjoy rapid growth. Conversely, a platform incapable of 
achieving critical mass is almost certainly doomed to extinction. If a platform does not 
achieve critical mass, the members who have jointed it will tend to stop participating 
because the platform does not render enough value, and new members on the other side 
will stop joining because they cannot realise enough value either. In this case, instead of 
taking off, the platform implodes through reverse positive feedback effects: few 
customers on one side will cause a reduction in the number of costumers on the other 
side, which in turn leads to more customers on the first side exiting the platform, and so 
on. Needless to say, attaining critical mass is quite a challenging task which the immense 
majority of start-up platforms fail to accomplish. For instance, by the time YouTube was 
commencing operations in 2005, there were over forty video sites attempting to secure 
enough viewers and take off, yet as of 2011 virtually all of such competing video sharing 
sites were gone. YouTube was the most successful video-sharing platform in obtaining 
both people uploading videos and viewers in enough numbers to ignite and attain 
exponential growth.22 Conversely, for example, Goggle Video did not achieve critical mass 
because it was incapable of generating enough content to attract viewers and could not 
attract enough viewers to attract user-generated and paid content.23 
 
Where network effects are strong, snowball effects are likely to occur, since consumers 
will want to be part of the largest network that offers the highest value. If there is no 
interoperability amongst competing networks’ products and services, switching from the 
largest network entails loss of network benefits. Switching costs24 are especially salient 
																																																								
21 Bruno Jullien, ‘Competition in Multi-Sided Markets: Divide and Conquer’ (2011) 3 American Economic 
Journal: Microeconomics 186. 
22 David S Evans, ‘The Web Economy, Two-Sided Markets and Competition Policy’, in David S. Evans 
(ed), Platform Economics: Essays on Multi-Sided Businesses (Competition Policy International 2011) 257. 
23 “In the case of Google Video, the company’s fans might have settled for “Don’t be mediocre”. David 
Pogue, ‘Google Video: Trash Mixed With Treasure’ (2006) The New York Times  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/19/technology/circuits/google-video-trash-mixed-with-
treasure.html>. 
24 Switching costs “can be defined as the real or perceived costs incurred when changing a supplier but 
which are not incurred by remaining with the current supplier”. See CMA and Autorité de la Concurrence, 




when ecosystems are technically incompatible, as components have to be repurchased, 
learning costs may be high, or contents cannot be transferred to other platforms (i.e. lack 
of data portability). For example, search engines have moved beyond being mere search 
tools, since they offer myriad of online tools in platforms having search functionality at 
their core. For consumers who use all the services offered by a search engine platform 
(such a inter alia Google search, Gmail, Google Docs, Google Scholar and Google 
Chrome), switching to a different search engine may be costly due to reasons related to 
familiarity or convenience. In these cases, consumers can become “locked-in”. In turn, an 
increasing number of locked-in economic agents served by a platform will eventually lead 
the market to a “tipping point”,25 thereby creating a barrier to entry (or expansion) in the 
form of higher costs of overcoming the network benefits arising from the leading 
platform. Once the tipping point is reached, “the value of the network of the dominant 
player will so far outstrip that of its competitors that the market collapses into a natural 
monopoly”26. Last but not least, when a platform becomes a technological standard (for 
example, Microsoft’s Windows), network externalities can define the path of technology, 
as subsequent inventions are likely to follow the “path” defined by the first firm taking a 
significant lead, even in the presence of some other superior standards in the technical 
sense or otherwise.27  
 
3.2 Pricing Asymmetry  
 
Overcoming the chicken and egg problem is just the first step in a platform´s quest for 
success. Once the platform has enough numbers of costumers on board and has decided 
the price level it will charge,28 the platform still has to devise and keep an optimal price 
structure29 to be profitable. The price structure needs to “balance” the demands of the 
platform’s different sides. For example, when determining prices, a MSP needs to 
consider that charging a higher price to side A will have the effect of fewer A customers 
																																																								
25 Daniel Rubinfeld, ‘Competition, Innovation, And Antitrust Enforcement In Dynamic Network 
Industries’ (1998) 8 <https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/competition-innovation-and-antitrust-
enforcement-dynamic-network-industries>. 
26 Daniel F Spulber and Christopher S Yoo, ‘Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden 
Side of Trinko’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 1822, 1890. 
27 According to David, QWERTY keyboard’s dominance is a prime example of “standardization on the 
wrong system”. Paul A David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’ (1985) 75 The American economic 
review 332, 332–337. 
28 Price level can be defined as the sum of the prices of the two or more sides of the platform. 




using the platform, which in turn will decrease the platform’s value to B customers. In 
addition, it must take into account the fact that there need to be enough A customers for 
the platform to be of interest of B, and enough B customers for the platform to be of 
interest of A. This assessment commonly results in MSPs setting price structures which 
are highly skewed towards one side of the market. For example, in an analysis of the price 
structure of different MSPs, Evans found that approximately 80% of newspapers revenue 
comes from advertisers (applicable to Newspapers and Magazine platforms), 
approximately half of FOX’s revenue comes from advertisers (Network Television 
platform), at least 67% of Microsoft’s revenue comes from licensing packaged software 
(especially Windows) to final consumers (OS platform), and over 82% of American 
Express’ revenue come from charges to merchants (Payment System platform).30 
 
In digital markets, this skewed price structure is commonly taken to the extreme: one side 
served by the platform gets the product or service for “free”. For example, passengers do 
not pay for the Uber service, but drivers do. Search engines’ users do not pay to search 
engines, but advertisers do. Social Network sites’ users do not pay for signing up and 
using the platform, but advertisers do. Buyers do not pay fees on online transaction 
platforms (such as eBay), but sellers do.  
 
When products and services are offered for “free”, some are inclined to argue that there is 
no market and no harm to consumers. For example, in Kinderstart.com, the plaintiff 
KinderStart sued Google for inter alia attempted monopolisation and monopolisation in 
violation of the Sherman Act. The US District Court of California dismissed the claim on 
the following grounds: 
 
“KinderStart has failed to allege that the Search Market is a “grouping of 
sales”. It does not claim that Google sells its search services, or that any other 
search provider does so. […] KinderStart cites no authority indicating that 
antitrust law concerns itself with competition in the provision of free services 
[…] Thus, the Search Market is not a “market” for purposes of antitrust 
law”.31  
 
Relatedly, suggesting the idea that zero prices and harm to consumers are mutually 
exclusive, Wright and Manne have argued: 
																																																								
30 David S Evans, ‘Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform Industries’, in David S. Evans (ed), 
Platform Economics: Essays on Multi-sided Businesses (Competition Policy International 2011) 33. 




“it’s really hard to see the above-marginal-cost pricing in these [digital] 
markets. From the point of view of the buyers… these monopolists are really 
pathetic at extracting profits, as most of them give away their products for 
free…”32  
 
It is submitted that, instead of signalling the absence of a market, the presence of zero 
prices indicates that the supplier of free products or services is making money somewhere 
else.  A proper analysis of markets with products or services priced at zero must begin by 
understanding why the supplier is charging zero prices, and how the supplier is earning 
profits. As will be seen in Chapter 3, markets for products and services offered for ‘free’ 
can be readily defined by taking into consideration all the sides served by the platform and 
the interdependencies between them.33  
 
Moreover, the contention that there can be no harm to consumers when products or 
services are “free” is one-dimensional and mistaken. Price is only one parameter of 
competition. Accordingly, consumer harm arising from monopolistic conduct or other 
practices may not result in higher prices (or positive prices if products were offered free 
of charge), but it can certainly take of form of lower innovation, service quality or choice.  
For example, if access to an App store is denied to a privacy-friendly app for no reason 
other than the threat posed by such app to the business model of the App store’s owner, 34 
such conduct reduces choice and lowers incentives to innovate in privacy-friendly 
technologies.  
 




To ability to know the preferences and tastes of consumers is logically a driver of 
commercial success, as it allows to adjust supply to demand, thereby reducing transaction 
costs and avoiding waste. But brick-and-mortar businesses only have access to limited 
																																																								
32 Joshua Wright and Geoffrey Manne, ‘What’s An Internet Monopolist? A Reply to Professor Wu’ (2010) 
Technology Liberation Front <https://techliberation.com/2010/11/23/whats-an-internet-monopolist-a-reply-
to-professor-wu/> . 
33 See Chapter 3 Section I.5. 
34 See Chapter 3 Section III.3.2.  
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information about their customers, as they can know, at best, what types of products a 
given consumer buys, the frequency with which he visits the shop, his credit history and 
other personal data such as card details and home address.  
 
In this connection, online platforms have an advantage relative to brick-and-mortar 
shops, as they have more information at their disposal. The larger the platform is and the 
wider the range of product and services it provides, the more detailed and accurate will be 
the consumer profiles it can elaborate. For example, upon becoming an Amazon 
consumer, Amazon applies data to every user click to guide the consumer’s experience 
and “guess” what sort of products a consumer may like. In addition, Amazon’s ads reach 
mobile and its Kindle devices, which in turn provides the platform with more valuable 
user data.35 Google does something similar, but its net is wider.36 In this way, large digital 
platforms can control the who (identification of the consumer, his preferences and 
demographic profile), what (personal interests, surfing habits, likes and dislikes), where 
(physical location either by IP address, mobile phone location or cross-device targeting) 
and when/why (platforms used predictive algorithms to determine what drives consumer 
behaviour) of consumers.37 
    
3.3.2 Roles of User Data 
 
For online platforms, data serves three roles: it can be (i) an input of production allowing 
undertakings to develop and improve their services; (ii) a strategic asset that may be used 







35 Marcus Wohlsen, ‘Amazon’s Ad Business Makes Twitter’s IPO Look Puny’ (2013) Wired 
<https://www.wired.com/2013/09/amazon-tops-twitter-in-ads/>. 
36 See below text accompanying footnote 228. 
37 Renee Hill, ‘The Google Effect: What Will Be The Ultimate Cost?’ (2014) AdExchanger 
<https://adexchanger.com/data-driven-thinking/the-google-effect-what-will-be-the-ultimate-cost/>. 
38 Howard A Shelanski, ‘Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet’ (2013) 161 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1663, 1679. 
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3.3.2.1 Data as an Input of Production 
 
Widespread collection of personal data and monitoring of users have enabled online 
platforms to carry out extensive analyses of users’ activities.39 The information resulting 
from such analyses can be seen as an input of production when online platforms use it to 
provide and improve their services. The improvements are seen mostly in the form of 
personalisation of online services (on the user or free side) and targeted advertising (on 
the advertiser or paying side). 
 
Broadly speaking, search engines deploy computer programs that ‘crawl’ the web and 
build and update automated indexes of web content, and employ sophisticated algorithms 
that evaluate the content of a user’s search query to determine which parts of the web 
index may contain relevant responses, rank the potential responses based on the predicted 
likelihood of their relevance, and display the most relevant results to the user’s query. As 
users search information online, they provide search engines with valuable information 
such as inter alia user locational data, date and time of the queries entered and resulting 
browsing behaviour (the search results that are clicked on). This information is 
subsequently used to improve the performance of their algorithms by enhancing the 
relevance of (i.e. personalising) their results. For instance, search engines typically render 
personalised search results based on the users’ search history and location (a query 
consisting of ‘restaurants near me’ will render results based on the specific user’s current 
location and likely preferences).40 Social network platforms also rely on algorithms to 
provide, improve and personalise their service. Based on the data gathered from user-
generated content and interactions with the platform, social network algorithms can 
increase the relevance of social network engagement, suggested friends or suggested 
interests that are shown to specific users. For example, on Facebook, the stories shown in 
a user’s ‘News Feed’ are determined by the user’s connections and activity on Facebook, 
which allows the platform to show more stories that interest a specific user posted by 
friends with whom such user interacts the most.41 Similarly, e-commerce platforms also 
rely on algorithmic technology to predict the relevance of ‘purchase suggestions’ that are 
shown to users. For instance, Amazon’s ‘item-to-item collaborative filtering’ algorithm, 
which is based on what a user has purchased in the past, what items are contained in a 
																																																								
39 Monopolkommission (n 6) 30. 
40 See Chapter 5 Section II.5.2.1.1, 2). 
41 Facebook, ‘Help Centre’ <https://www.facebook.com/help/327131014036297/>. 
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user’s shopping cart, what items have been ranked and liked by the same individual, and 
what other customers have viewed and purchased, enables the personalisation of users’ 
shopping experiences to a great extent. As one analyst notes, “[a] gadget enthusiast my 
find Amazon web pages heavy on device suggestions, while a new mother could see those 
same pages offering up baby products”.42  
 
On the advertiser side, the collection and analysis of user data are of tremendous 
significance for the provision of as-targeted-as-possible online advertising. As noted by 
Analysys Mason, “[t]he online sector relies on data collected about consumers as an 
important driver of revenue from advertising and e-commerce”,43 for which reason there 
is an incentive to gather and process as much consumer data as possible, since more 
consumer data enables more efficient, targeted and valuable advertising.44 More data 
allows online platforms to identify specific consumers that may be interested in specific 
ads. These ads are then shown to said consumers during their interaction with the 
platform. Advertisements on search engine platforms are basically text ads labelled 
“Sponsored Results” that are shown alongside organic search results.45 Advertisers bid for 
keywords they want to be associated with, and the outcome of the auction determines the 
rank of the ads to be placed in the search results based on the maximum bid for the 
keyword and the relevance of the ads to a given user’s query. On the other hand, social 
network platforms display ads based on the information contained in user profiles, thus 
being able to target by age, gender, location and interests.46 Advertisements have typically 
a social context in the form of inter alia ‘page likes’ (for example, the ‘linking’ of a page of 
or ‘checking-in’ to a restaurant by a user’s friend can be shown as advertisement), page 
post engagement (used to promote popular company placed by an advertiser) or clicks to 
websites (deferrals to external websites placed on social network platforms).47 The more 
users a social network platform has, and the greater their engagement with the platform 
and therefore the information surrendered by them, the larger the audience advertisers 
can reach with highly targeted advertisement. Similarly, e-commerce platforms like 
Amazon display advertisements on different places of their websites, such as below search 
																																																								
42 JP Mangalindan, ‘Amazon’s Recommendation Secret’ (2012) Fortune 
<http://fortune.com/2012/07/30/amazons-recommendation-secret/>. 
43 Analysys Mason, ‘Online Data Economy Value Chain – Report for Ofcom’ (2014) 14 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/online-data-value/online_customer_data.pdf>. 
44 Shelanski (n 38) 1680. 
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results, in the right column on search results pages, and in an ad placement on detail 
pages.48 For example, through the ‘Sponsored Products’ service, Amazon targets ads 
based on keywords bid by advertisers, the product category and description, and the 
estimated relevance of the ad to product search queries made by users.49 
 
3.3.2.2 Data as a Strategic Asset 
 
Data constitutes a core economic asset that may create a significant competitive advantage 
for firms.50 Thus, in order to obtain or maintain this competitive advantage, online 
platforms have powerful incentives to block access to their datasets by other 
undertakings,51 to foreclose access by competitors to sources of valuable data,52 to make it 
harder for consumers to switch to other technologies or platforms, 53 or to otherwise 
engage in exclusionary conduct to reinforce their market power.54  
 
In particular, insofar as consumer data is used as an input to provide a given platform’s 
services and said data is not equally available to such platform’s competitors, a data-
advantage can readily consolidate dominance and lessen competition. For example, in the 
FTC investigation against Google, FTC Staff found that Google had entered into 
exclusionary agreements with websites for syndicated search and search advertising 
services.55 The agreements had the effect of foreclosing a great part of the market, thereby 
denying access to data and therefore scale to Google’s main competitor (Microsoft), in 
addition to raising barriers to entry for potential entrants in the long run.56 Microsoft 
claimed, and FTC Staff agreed with it, that by being unable to access data and gain scale, it 
was not able to improve its search and search advertising services and gain market share, 
																																																								
48 Amazon, ‘Amazon.com: Sponsored Products - FAQ’ (2017) Amazon.com 
<https://services.amazon.com/services/sponsored-products-questions.html>. 
49 ibid. 




51 See Chapter 3 Section III.2.2. 
52 See paragraph below and Chapter 3 Section III.2.1. 
53 See Chapter 3 Sections III.3.1 (discussing contractual restrictions on Android OS) and III.3.2 (discussing 
demotion in SERP).  
54 See generally Chapter 3 Section III. 
55 See Chapter 3 Section III.2.1. 
56 FTC Staff, ‘FTC Staff Report on Google - File No. 111-0163’ (2012). This document was supposed to 
remain private but half of the pages were inadvertently disclosed in an open-records request and 
subsequently published by the Wall Street Journal. See <http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/>. 
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and that by having exclusive access to the largest websites’ search and search advertising 
data, Google was able to amass more data to make improvements to its products and 
services that its competitors could not replicate, and to maintain, preserve and reinforce 
its monopoly power in the markets for search, search advertising and search syndication.57 
This theory of harm is consistent with the view of the EDPS contained in its Preliminary 
Opinion ‘Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data’, where he argued that the 
exploitation of economics of aggregation “create[s] barriers to entry through [the 
platforms’] control of huge personal datasets alongside proprietary software which 
organises the data.”58 
 
3.3.2.3 Data as a Product 
 
The data gathered and combined by online firms can be sold to advertising intermediaries 
or other third parties which assemble it into consumer profiles. These profiles “can be of 
enormous value to prospective employers, insurance companies, and business looking to 
identify potential customers or product lines”.59 In this way, user data constitutes a 
product and serves as an additional revenue stream for online businesses. For example, 
through its enterprise API platform Gnip, Twitter “delivers aggregate information about 
audiences [defined by an advertiser], making it easy to derive valuable insights about these 
audiences on Twitter”.60 However, amongst large online platforms, this is more the 
exception than the rule, as in view of the strategic nature of data as an asset, they have an 









57 ibid 108–112. 
58 EDPS, ‘Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor.  Privacy and Competitiveness 
in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer 
Protection in the Digital Economy’ (2014) 30. For a more detailed discussion on this topic see below 
Section II.5.2.3. 
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As seen above, the characteristics of online platforms may, individually or in conjunction 
with each other, derive into issues of great complexity and severity. In view of inter alia the 
significance of the digital economy,61 the natural tendency of high-tech markets to high 
levels of concentration, and the ability of dominant firms to engage in abusive conduct,62 
competition authorities should pay particular attention to said issues and intervene when 
necessary.  




The ubiquity of ICT systems and Internet connectivity, declining computer costs, and the 
migration to the Internet of traditionally ‘offline’ socioeconomic activities have been 
important drivers of the increasing generation and use of data. An IDC study indicates 
that there were 4.4 trillion gigabytes of data produced globally in 2013, and this amount is 
forecast to double every two years, in such a way that by 2020 around 44 trillion gigabytes 
will be generated. 63 Mobile telephones with Internet connectivity (smartphones) and 
tablets have contributed to this trend significantly, as they support a large array of services 
provided through applications (or apps) which are dependent on the collection and use of 
data (for example, maps, running apps, or transport-related apps such as Uber). 
According to Cisco, global mobile data traffic grew 63% in 2016; mobile data traffic has 
grown 18-fold over the past five years, and almost half a billion (429 million) mobile 
devices and connections were added in 2016.64 In addition, the advent of the Internet of 
things (IoT)65 has expanded the number of offline activities being digitally recorded, and 
																																																								
61 See generally European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission, A Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe’ (2015) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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62 See Chapter 3 Section III.  
63 IDC, ‘The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internet of 
Things’ (2014) 2. 
64 Cisco, ‘Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2016– 2021, White 
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consequentially the flow of data. According to a study conducted by MGI, over 30 million 
networked sensor nodes are present in the transportation, automotive, industrial, utilities 
and retail sectors, and said number is growing at a rate of more than 30% a year.66 The 
resulting phenomenon is commonly described as “big data”. In a data-driven economy, 
data enhances economic competitiveness and drives innovation.67  
 
According to one study, 68 big data has the potential to positively impact several sectors 
ranging from public administration, healthcare & social care, utilities, transport and 
logistics, retail & trade, geospatial to application & services. For example, it has been 
argued that “[b]y making their operations more data-driven, cities can fine-tune 
regulations, improve the allocation of scarce resources, and forecast future needs”.69 At 
the same time, big data’s potential to discriminate and aggravate structural inequalities has 
called the attention of regulators and policy-makers. “We must begin a national 
conversation on Big Data discrimination, and civil liberties”70, stated a report issued by the 
Obama administration, which referred to a study that found that search queries involving 
names commonly associated with black people (such as Tyrone) were more likely to 
display ads having the word “arrest” than those involving names commonly associated 
with white people (like Benedict)71.   
 
Big Data raises many legal, moral and ethical issues, such as cybersecurity and the 
undertakings’ accountability for the actions of their algorithms.72 This Chapter, however, 
focuses on the implications of big data for competition policy.73 The debate on big data’s 
competitive significance is highly polarised, with some arguing that data has little, if any, 
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67 OECD, ‘Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report’ (2014) 7. 
68 European Big Data Value Partnership, ‘European Big Data Value Strategic Research and Innovation 
Agenda’ (2014). 
69 Edward L Glaeser, Scott Duke Kominers, Michael Luca and Nikhil Naik, ‘Big Data and Big Cities: The 
Promises and Limitations of Improved Measures for Urban Life’ (2015) Harvard Kennedy School Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series RWP15-075, 1. 
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71 ibid 7. 
72 Maurice Stucke and Allen Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP 2016) 1. 
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addressed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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competitive significance,74 whilst others contend that big data almost inevitably leads to 
“winner-takes-all” outcomes and high concentration.75 It is submitted that these views are 
too broad and extreme. As will be seen below, any assessment of big data and any 
possible advantages derived therefrom must be carried out on a case-by-case basis, as data 
that are relevant for the provision of one service may be irrelevant for the provision of 
another.76  
 
2. What are Big Data and Big Analytics?  
 
Big data is a generic concept which lacks a universally accepted definition. According to 
the Article 29 Working Party, “[b]ig data refers to the exponential growth both in the 
availability and in the automated use of information.”77  It is commonly defined by 
reference to four “V”s:78 volume (large amounts of data), velocity (the speed at which data is 
generated, collected and processed), variety (the diversity of data coming from different 
sources) and value (the usefulness of the data for different purposes).   
 
Advancements in data science have led to the ability to learn fast and deep from big data 
with the aid of algorithms that access and analyse vast amounts of information (i.e. big 
analytics). Said advancements include inter alia data-mining techniques such as association 
analysis, data segmentation and clustering, classification and regression analysis, anomaly 
detection and predictive modelling.79 The analysis of data, performed through algorithms 
and such advanced data processing techniques, becomes more valuable to the extent that 
it allows for specific patterns to be found and new correlations to be made between 
several datasets coming from combined different sources, thereby allowing to deduce or 
infer new information and potentially predict trends and behaviours or assess the 
likelihood for certain events to occur.80 The access to large amounts of data and the 
recognition of unidentified patterns through big analytics reveal big data’s main 
underlying postulate: the more data is available for processing, irrespective of its apparent 
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significance or value, the higher are the chances to obtain unexpected and potentially 
valuable information.81  
 
In addition, big data has propelled the design and development of smart, self-learning 
algorithms (i.e. deep learning) that carry out myriad of functions relating to inter alia 
pricing decisions, matchmaking, planning, logistics, online communications and e-
commerce. Deep learning technology attempts to mimic the activity in layers of neurons 
in the neocortex, the 80% of the brain where thinking takes place. Deep learning software 
and algorithms crunch large datasets, thereby ‘learning’ to recognise patterns in digital 
representations of sounds, images and other data.82 As a result, algorithms can understand 
and translate languages, identify images, write news articles and analyse medical data.83 For 
example:  
 
“In October, Microsoft chief research officer Rick Rashid wowed attendees 
at a lecture in China with a demonstration of speech software that transcribed 
his spoken words into English text with an error rate of 7 percent, translated 
them into Chinese-language text, and then simulated his own voice uttering 
them in Mandarin. That same month, a team of three graduate students and 
two professors won a contest held by Merck to identify molecules that could 
lead to new drugs. The group used deep learning to zero in on the molecules 
most likely to bind to their targets.”84 
 
Companies like Tesla, Ford, Uber, Jaguar, Apple, Toyota and Google have been using 
deep learning technology to develop ‘driverless’ cars.85 The algorithms steering the cars 
will make decisions concerning directly the physical integrity and even life or death of 
people, for example by the choice programmed in the event of an unavoidable crash or 
accident.86 Relatedly, tech giants such as Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft are 
racing to develop their own artificial intelligence (AI) personal assistants. Endowed with 
predictive learning capability, these personal assistants have the ability to ‘learn’ to make 
decisions and proactively provide information to the user and make suggestions based on 
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user input and data, such as frequent search queries, emails, past meetings and locations 
that the user commonly checks into.87 
 
Large volumes of data collected from a great variety of sources and processed at high 
velocity through big analytics leads to increased value of data (the fourth ‘V’). Indeed, big 
data and big analytics are engaged in a mutually reinforcing relationship, as machine 
learning requires access to large datasets, and in turn, big data would have significantly less 
value if firms were not able to quickly analyse the data and act thereupon. The capacity of 
the algorithm to learn and improve increases as it processes more relevant data. 88 This is 
illustrated by the Rubicon Project’s89 description of its advertising platform which relies 
on the interplay amongst big data, machine learning and network effects: 
 
 “As we process more volume on our automated platform, we accumulate 
more data, such as pricing, geographic, and preference information, data on 
how best to optimize yield for sellers and more. This additional data helps 
make our machine learning algorithms more intelligent and this leads to more 
effective matching between buyers and sellers. As a result, more buyers and 
sellers are attracted to our platform, from which we get more data, which 
further reinforces the network effect and thereby increases market liquidity, 
which benefits both buyers and sellers.”90 
 
The volume of data is of particular significance. There is a belief that simple algorithms 
with lots of data outperform sophisticated algorithms with little data (partly as a result of 
the opportunity for algorithms to learn through trial and error).91 As Newman observes:  
 
“One often-cited example of how brute force data analysis beats other forms 
of insight is the evolution of computer chess-playing computers. Decades ago 
the assumption was that computers needed to in some way develop a deep 
and complex analysis of the game to beat human players. Instead, 
programmers found it was more effective just to feed in massive amounts of 
information about recorded chess games and let the computer search for past 
game positions that match whatever game it’s currently playing, then make 
the move that worked in the past.”92 
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3. Types of Data 
 
Data can be classified in ‘actively declared (or volunteered) data’ and ‘passively supplied 
(or observed) data’.93 Actively declared data corresponds to information that consumers 
voluntarily hand over when registering for services, purchasing products and services, 
creating a social network profile, uploading photos, participating in surveys and the like. 
Users may be unaware of the implications arising from the provision of these data; 
however, the creation of this data is fairly obvious or at least intuitive. Passively supplied 
data corresponds to data which is observed by online platforms and collected in the 
background as consumers carry out certain online activities. Locational data generated by 
smartphones and tablets, IP addresses, links on which consumers click on webpages, and 
search histories are examples of observed data which are recorded onto virtual profiles of 
consumers and kept by online platforms to target products of their liking. Informed users 
may be aware of the creation of this type of data, although much of their creation is likely 
to go unnoticed. 
 
In addition to data actively and passively supplied by consumers, it is possible to add 
‘derived data’ and ‘inferred data’. Derived data are data generated from other data, after 
which they become new data elements related to a particular individual. These data can be 
used for predictive purposes, although it is not based on probabilistic reasoning. By way 
of example, it is possible to mention computational data (for instance, calculation of 
customer profitability based on the ratio between number of visits and the items bought). 
On the other hand, inferred data arise from the detection of correlations that are 
employed to predict behaviours, and result from probability-based analytic processes. 
Predictions are subsequently used to categorise individuals. Statistical data, for instance, 
credit risk scores and profiles built from online activities belong to this category. It is 
worth mentioning that users to whom these two types of data relate do not get involved 
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Data can also be “structured” or “unstructured”. This distinction has implication for the 
possibilities to extract economic value from the data, as well as for the methods necessary 
to do so. Structured data follows a model that defines a number of fields, what type of 
data is contained therein and how such data relate to each other. An example of this kind 
of data is a consumer address database containing information on the name, surname, 
address, age and phone number of consumers. Conversely, unstructured data does not 
conform to a specific model and normally has to be processed by different algorithms in 
order to render commercial value. Structured data can be more easily processed and used 
for commercial purposes than unstructured data, provided that traditional methods are 
considered.95 
 
Last but not least, data can be classified in non-personal and personal data.96 Personal data 
is data that relates to an identifiable living individual. ‘Identifiable’ means that the 
individual can be identified from that data, either alone or in combination with other 
information. 97  Researches Narayanan and Shmatikov, by demonstrating feasibility of 
large-scale re-identification98 using movie-viewing histories and in general any behavioural 
or transactional profile,99 have proven that “once any piece of data has been linked to a 
person’s real identity, any association between this data and a virtual identity breaks the 
anonymity of the latter”.100 Since current analytical methods allow to link data relating to 
inter alia search queries, websites visited, GPS locations and IP addresses back to an 
identifiable individual, virtually all consumer data overlaps with personal data.101  
 
Big data does not necessarily involve the processing of personal data. For example, the 
use of climate and weather data can enable new discoveries and improved forecast 
services without using personal data. However, it is personal data the type of data on 
which the discussion regarding data and competition law focuses, because this data has 
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more relevance for commercial purposes (as it enables improved targeting and therefore 
higher monetisation). In addition, as will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, personal data is the 
common denominator of competition, data protection and consumer protection concerns 
which warrant a holistic approach to law enforcement.102 
 
4. The ‘Data Advantage’ 
 
The fact that big data and big analytics confer a competitive advantage is virtually 
undisputed. Early in 2011, a MGI report observed: 
 
“[T]he impact of developing a superior capacity to take advantage of big data 
will confer enhanced competitive advantage over the long term and is 
therefore well worth the investment to create this capability. But the converse 
is also true. In a big data world, a competitor that fails to sufficiently develop 
its capabilities will be left behind.”103  
 
Big data’s roles104 as well as the mutually reinforcing relationship between big data and big 
analytics105 are the source of myriad of benefits accruing for both undertakings and 
consumers. Firms have understood the power of this competitive advantage, and have 
developed a ‘hunger for data’ that is demonstrated by certain events explained below. 
 
4.1 Benefits of Big Data 
 
First and foremost, the ability to collect and process data is a key driver for the 
innovativeness of online platforms and firms, since it allows them to identify potential 
trends and develop new products and services of particular relevance for users.106 From a 
dynamic efficiency standpoint this is of the utmost significance, as the introduction of 
new products and services, and therefore the creation of new markets, allows latent 
demands and new consumer surplus associated with new demand curves to be realised by 
consumers.107 
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Secondly, detailed knowledge on consumers’ preferences and behaviour allows platforms 
to better target ads and products, supply personalised services and increase consumer 
retention and loyalty.108 Targeted advertising in turn can increase sales and revenues for 
marketers and merchants,109 reduce advertisement investment that gets wasted when 
addressed to consumers uninterested in the advertised product,110 and reduce consumer 
annoyance.111 Moreover, based on observed behaviour, big data enable the redesign 
and/or improvement of services, business processes, strategies and efficiency in general 
(for example, big data can be used to speed up transactions and reduce likelihood of 
product returns).112 
 
Furthermore, big data benefits may be passed on to consumers in the form of reduced 
search costs,113 more efficient interactions online (in the form of personalised services), 
and ‘free’ content or services. As Lerner explains, “the ability to earn greater advertising 
revenues enhances competition for users, creating incentives for providers to invest in 
improving the quality of services offered and to offer those services to users at low or 
zero prices”.114 
 
4.2 Hunger for Data 
 
Acknowledging the benefits that can be derived from big data, undertakings have begun 
to deploy different efforts to have access to as much data as possible in order to seize the 
‘data advantage’. For starters, some online platforms are increasingly acquiring companies 
that own large datasets. Amongst the most notorious examples it is possible to mention 
Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick,115 Nestlab and Dropcam,116 Facebook’s acquisition 
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of Instagram 117  and WhatsApp, 118  Microsoft’s acquisition of LinkedIn, 119  and Intel’s 
acquisition of Mobileye. 120  According to the OECD, “the number of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) has increased rapidly from 55 deals in 2008 to almost 164 deals in 
2012”121 in data-driven industries.  
 
The appetite for data has led some platforms to gather more data than is reasonable for 
the provision of their services. For example, in 2015, Uber relaxed its privacy policy. After 
the privacy policy amendment, Uber was able to track its users’ location even when they 
are not using the Uber app (“we may also collect the precise location of your device when 
the app is running in the foreground or background”), as well as to access their address 
books, collecting all the names and contact information contained therein in order to 
facilitate social interactions and for other purposes described in the privacy policy or in 
the future.122 Aside from the privacy issues arising from this amendment,123 the problem is 
that it is unclear how access to the data described above is supposed to improve Uber’s 
car-sharing and delivery services. As Ezrachi and Stucke observe:  
 
“For its app to function, Uber doesn’t need to continuously monitor your 
location. It doesn’t need to know who all of your friends, family, and co-
workers are, as well as anyone else listed among your contacts. Nor does 
Uber have to allow others to track you across the web, including when you 
visit Uber’s website. So what explains Uber’s actions? Here again the answer 
is data.”124 
 
The fact that some platforms actively strive to gather data that is both related and 
unrelated to the services they provide suggests that data are valuable. As a result, there is 
likely to be no incentive to share the data, as sharing it may reduce the competitive 
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advantage sought by the data collection efforts. Indeed, the majority of companies that 
are active on markets on which they collect data are commonly reluctant to share the data 
they collect with competitors, and sometimes this reluctance materialises in efforts to 
prevent competitors from accessing the same data. For example, Google restricts the 
portability of advertising campaigns and requires website publishers to enter into 
exclusivity contracts for search advertising syndication,125 and Facebook prohibits third 
parties from collecting users’ content or information “or otherwise access Facebook using 
automated means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders or scrapers)” without its prior 
permission.126   
 
5. Big Data Advantage and Market Power  
 
The problem with the data advantage is that, if large enough, it may lead to industry 
concentration, strong barriers to entry, and market power giving rise to a significant risk 
of anticompetitive conduct.127  As a result, competition authorities must evaluate the 
extent of the competitive advantage that data provides. Thus far, this exercise has been 
carried out only in merger decisions. In its decisional practice, the Commission has used 
two criteria to assess the ‘data advantage’: (i) whether or not producing the data is costly 
and resource-intensive (whether the data is easily replicable or expensive and difficult to 
replicate), and (ii) whether post-transaction there remains available an amount of data 
sufficient for competitors to match the competitive advantage arising from the transaction 
for the merging firms (whether data is widely available or scarce).  
 
5.1 The Commission’s Criteria: Ease of Replicability of Data (or data difficult 
to replicate) - Availability (or scarcity) of Data  
 
The decisions below contain the criteria developed by the Commission to determine the 
advantage conferred by a dataset or combination of datasets upon merging firms. In 
neither of these cases did the Commission find that the data advantage arising from the 
transaction led to anticompetitive risks in the relevant markets under analysis.  
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5.1.1 TomTom/Tele Atlas128 
 
In 2007, the manufacturer of portable navigation devices (“PNDs”) and supplier of 
navigation software TomTom sought to acquire one of the two main suppliers of 
navigable digital map databases, Tele Atlas. Navigable digital map databases are an input 
that is integrated in navigation software, and the integrated product (software and 
database) is then included in the PNDs that TomTom sells to end-consumers or sold to 
other manufacturers of navigation devices for their inclusion in their devices.  
 
The Commission observed that a digital map database is a compilation of digital data 
including (i) geographic information which contains the position and shape of each 
feature on a map (such as roads, railways, rivers and indications of land use), (ii) attributes 
containing additional information related to features on the map (like street names, 
addresses, driving directions, turn restrictions and speed limits), and (iii) display 
information. The data included in the databases is derived from several sources such as 
aerial photographs, satellite images, official government map databases, other government 
sources and field data produced by field forces using customised vehicles.129 
 
The Commission distinguished between digital map databases for navigation purposes 
and non-navigation purposes. It noted that, to be used for navigation, a digital map 
database must be sufficiently detailed, accurate and updated, as opposed to databases for 
non-navigation purposes, which are simpler and contain more basic information.130 The 
Commission also observed that upgrading a basic database to navigable quality required 
‘substantial costs and time’. 131 In particular, it argued that: 
 
“Whereas it is possible to produce a basic digital map database for many 
territories relatively quickly and at limited cost by compiling data from 
various public sources, producing a navigable digital map database is costly 
and very resource-intensive.” 132 
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The Commission developed further, noting that a supplier of basic digital map datasets 
wanting to switch production to navigable digital map datasets would have to commit 
‘substantial resources’ to gather all additional information necessary to achieve 
navigational capability. To this end, field forces driving the roads to record road features 
to be included in the database are of the essence. In addition, after completion of a 
database, it has to be permanently updated to incorporate all changes made to the road 
network. 133  For this purpose, TomTom has to collect data constantly. The OECD 
reported that TomTom adds 6 billion data points everyday.134  
 
Accordingly, entry barriers for the navigable digital map database market were very high. 
Indeed, the Commission found that even undertakings offerings Internet-based map 
applications were unlikely to enter the market, 135 as it would be too costly and time-
consuming for them to obtain and process the necessary data. Therefore, any firm in 
possession of such data, like TomTom, is likely to have market power in said market. 
Nevertheless, the Commission ultimately allowed the merger, as it found that the merged 
entity would not have the incentive to exercise market power or engage in an input 
foreclosure strategy.136 
 
5.1.2 Google/DoubleClick137  
 
In this case, both Google and DoubleClick were active in the online advertising industry, 
albeit providing different services. Google was active as ad publisher with its own search 
engine webpages, and as ad intermediary with its ad network AdSense. On the other hand, 
DoubleClick offered ad serving tools138 to both publishers and advertisers.  
 
As a result of their commercial activities, the merging firms collected and processed large 
amounts of personal data. Consequently, one of the theories of harm was that the merged 
entity could attempt to combine Google’s and DoubleClick’s datasets, thereby achieving a 
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position that could not be replicated by its competitors. 139  In this connection, the 
Commission observed:  
 
“It is not excluded that, from a factual point of view, the merged entity 
would be able to combine DoubleClick’s and Google’s data collections. Such 
a combination, using information about users’ IP addresses, cookie IDs and 
connection times to correctly match records from both databases, could 
result in individual users’ search histories being linked to the same users’ past 
surfing behaviour on the internet. For instance, after such a match, the 
merged entity may know that the same user has searched for terms A, B and 
C and visited web pages X, Y and Z in the past week. Such information could 
potentially be used to better target ads to users.”140 
 
The Commission, however, dismissed the possibility of a combination of the merging 
firms’ datasets. In particular, the merged firm would not have the ability to combine the 
datasets, as DoubleClick was contractually prohibited from using the data regarding which 
webpages a user visited to improve targeting of search ads on Google’s sites or in the 
AdSense network.141 Moreover, the merged entity would not have the incentive to do so, 
as such combination would prompt DoubleClick’s customers to switch to competitors 
(given that advertisers have no interest in other advertisers having access to their data).142 
At any rate, the Commission argued that even if the merged firm combined Google’s and 
DoubleClick’s datasets, it would be unlikely that said combination could confer upon the 
merged entity a competitive advantage that could not be matched by its competitors, since 
 
“the combination of data about searches with data about users' web surfing 
behaviour is already available to a number of Google’s competitors today. 
For instance, both Microsoft and Yahoo! run search engines and offer ad 
serving. Competitors may also purchase data or targeting services from third 
parties such as comScore, a global internet information provider which 
maintains extensive proprietary databases that provide a measurement of the 
various ways in which the internet is used. Data is also available from internet 
service providers […]”143 
 
From the Commission’s analysis transpires that the competitors’ option to access data 
similar to that of the merged entity was the key factor in establishing whether a 
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competitive advantage that could not be matched by them would arise from the 
transaction (i.e. that similar data was available).   
 
5.1.3 Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV144 
 
The transaction under review in these proceedings consisted in a joint venture (“JV”) set 
up by the UK mobile network operators (“MNOs”) Telefónica UK, Vodafone UK and 
Everything Everywhere. The JV was aimed to provide mobile services to the parties to 
the JV and third party mobile operators. In particular, the JV planned to offer a platform 
enabling the supply of transaction services (the “Wallet Platform”), which would allow 
consumers to carry out transactions online; mobile advertising services for advertisers and 
media agencies wishing to develop advertising campaigns targeted at customers of mobile 
operators; and data analytics services. The JV intended to collect and analyse the data 
generated from the wallet platform and its advertising intermediation services in order to 
provide its customers with valuable insights into consumer behaviour.145 In particular, the 
JV would rely on basic customer data collected by the MNOs, such as age, residential 
status, profession and location, data collected via the wallet platform, and data collected 
on the basis of contracts with merchants.146  
 
The Commission assessed whether the JV would foreclose competing providers of data 
analytics or advertising services by combining personal information, location data, 
response data, social behaviour data and browsing data, thereby creating a unique 
database essential for targeted mobile advertising that no competing provider of said 
services would be able to replicate.147  
 
Noting that the information available to the JV was also available to a large extent to both 
existing and new market players such as Google, Apple, Facebook, card issuers, reference 
agencies or retailers, which were already using the information to provide targeted 
advertising, the Commission dismissed the risk of foreclosure. Notably, the Commission 
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held that customers normally tend to give their personal data to many market players, for 
which reason this type of data “is generally understood to be a commodity”.148  
 
The Commission’s decision in this case is a clear depiction of its view that concentrations 
of vast amount of data in one undertaking are unlikely to give rise to anticompetitive risks 
when data are widely available, especially if the data at sake are in possession of different 




In the review of this acquisition, the Commission found that Facebook was active in the 
market for social networking services and online advertising services, and that Facebook 
collects data regarding the users of its social network and analyses them in order to serve 
advertisements that are as much as possible “targeted” at each particular user. 151 On the 
other hand, the Commission found that WhatsApp was active in the market for consumer 
communications services, and that WhatsApp does not sell any form of advertising and 
does not collect or store data about its users that would be valuable for advertising 
purposes.152 
 
One of the theories of harm analysed by the Commission was that the merged entity 
could start collecting data from WhatsApp users with the aim of improving the accuracy 
of the targeted ads served on Facebook’s social networking platform to WhatsApp users 
that are also Facebook users.153 However, it was suggested in the proceedings that the 
merged entity would not have the incentive to start collecting data from WhatsApp users, 
as this data collection could prompt some users to switch to other consumer 
communications apps that they could perceive as less intrusive.154  
 
Moreover, the Commission analysed a potential concentration of Facebook’s and 
WhatsApp’s data only to the extent that it was likely to strengthen Facebook’s position in 
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the online advertising market or any sub-segments thereof,155 and held that even if the 
merged entity started using WhatsApp user data to improve targeted advertising, 
competition concerns were unlikely to arise, as there would still remain large volumes of 
user data that are valuable for advertising purposes and that are not within Facebook’s 
exclusive control.156  
 
The Commission’s analysis confirms that the key factor to determine whether 
anticompetitive risk arise from a transaction that entails the combination of large datasets 
is whether there remain sufficient data available for competitors to provide online 
advertising services.  
 
5.2 Critique of the Commission’s Criteria 
 
It is submitted that one should be aware of the fact that merger control consists in an ex-
ante assessment based on different predictions and assumptions as to the evolution of the 
relevant market under scrutiny. Subsequent developments (i.e. after the consummation of 
the merger) may prove them wrong. In addition, it is argued that the criterion consisting 
in whether data is widely available or scarce is too vague and broad. As will be seen below, 
data may be widely available, but it does not necessarily follow that data is fungible or 
readily accessible to competitors. Indeed, data may be widely available and at the same 
time costly and time-consuming to replicate. Finally, it is sustained that the significance of 
data’s ‘volume’, ‘variety’, and ‘velocity’, learning-by-doing and spill-overs between 
different sides of the MSP must be central in the assessment of whether data is likely to 
raise barriers to entry and confer market power.  
 
5.2.1 Predictions and Assumptions of an ex-ante Assessment may be Mistaken 
 
Decisions in merger review are made based on assumptions and predictions as to why the 
merger at hand is or is not likely to substantially lessen competition. Oftentimes 
competition agencies predict correctly; however, on occasions they predict wrongly. 
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As explained above, in Google/DoubleClick, the Commission dismissed the theory of harm 
under which Google would combine its datasets with those of DoubleClick to gain a 
competitive advantage that could not be matched by its competitors, as it would have 
neither the ability nor the incentive to do so.157  
 
Fast forward to year 2016: Google amends its privacy policy, deleting the part that 
promised keeping DoubleClick’s database of web-browsing records separate from the 
personal data Google collects from its many ‘free’ services. After the amendment, users’ 
activity “on other sites and apps may be associated with [their] personal information in 
order to improve Google’s services and the ads delivered by Google.” According to 
Propublica: 
 
“The practical result of the change is that the DoubleClick ads that follow 
people around on the web may now be customized to them based on your 
name and other information Google knows about you. It also means that 
Google could now, if it wished to, build a complete portrait of a user by 
name, based on everything they write in email, every website they visit and 
the searches they conduct.”158 
 
Similarly, in Facebook/WhatsApp, Facebook informed that it had “no current plans to 
modify WhatsApp’s collection and use of user data”, 159  and it was suggested that 
Facebook did not have the incentive to collect data from WhatsApp, as consumers could 
switch to more ‘privacy-friendly’ competing messaging apps.  
 
Fast forward to year 2016: WhatsApp’s terms of service were amended in August, after 
which the app started to share user phone numbers, profile data, status message and 
online status with Facebook. The Article 29 Working Party urged WhatsApp to stop 
sharing user data whilst it investigated its privacy practices,160 and after pausing the use of 
WhatsApp data in the UK upon request from the ICO, Facebook stopped using these 
data for advertising across Europe.161 However, ever since then Facebook has been 
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negotiating with the Irish Data Protection Authority to ‘reach a deal’ to allow it to use the 
data collected from WhatsApp.162 
 
In view of the above, the Commission predicted wrongly the incentives of Facebook and 
Google with regard to the data to which they would have had access after their respective 
mergers. These mistaken predictions suggest that in spite of data being ‘widely available’ 
and not within the merged firm’s exclusive control, the combination of specific data 
troves in possession of the merging entities may in some cases be quite attractive from a 
business standpoint, as a significant competitive advantage can be derived therefrom. 
They also suggest that the importance of ‘volume’ and ‘variety’ of big data may be greater 
than is acknowledged in the decisions examined above.163  
 
5.2.2 Problems with the Commission’s Criteria  
 
It is submitted that, for the purpose of analysing a data-advantage, the criterion consisting 
in whether or not producing the data is costly and resource-intensive (whether the data is 
easily replicable or expensive and difficult to replicate) is a sound one. Indeed, in Opinion 
No. 10-A-13, the Autorité de la Concurrence explained that the criteria it uses to 
determine whether the use of customer datasets could result in a restriction of 
competition include the conditions under which the dataset was created, as well as 
whether the dataset could be replicated under reasonable conditions by competitors.164 If a 
dataset is easily replicable, or replicable under ‘reasonable conditions’, barriers to entry are 
unlikely to arise. 
 
However, the second criterion is problematic. In Google/DoubleClick, Telefónica 
UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere and especially in Facebook/WhatsApp, the 
Commission concluded that the concentration of data that could take place after the 
acquisition was unlikely to raise competition concerns, as there remained large amounts of 
data available to competitors. At first glance, this conclusion appears correct. After all, 
data can be obtained from third parties, and is inherently non-rivalrous and non-exclusive. 
These features define data’s wide availability and seem to reinforce the Commission’s 
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conclusion. However, from a deeper analysis of these features, a more nuanced picture 
emerges: even if widely available, data is not fungible, and may not be readily accessible to 
entrants and competitors. Accordingly, even if widely available, data may still raise barriers 
to entry and confer market power.  
 
5.2.2.1 Data can be Obtained from Third Parties 
 
Data intermediaries, or data brokers, are “companies whose primary business is collecting 
personal information about consumers from a variety of sources and aggregating, 
analyzing, and sharing that information, or information derived from it, form purposes 
such as marketing products, verifying an individual’s identity, or detecting fraud.”165 They 
routinely collect, maintain, manipulate and share information about consumers without 
interacting with them directly. Examples of data brokers are Axciom, Corelogic, 
Datalogic, ID Analytics, Intelius and Experian.  
 
Data intermediaries collect data from several sources, including governmental sources, 
publicly available sources such social media, blogs and the Internet, and commercial 
sources.166 In particular, some data brokers obtain information “by crawling social media 
sites, such as Bebo and LinkedIn, where individuals have not set their privacy settings to 
restrict access to their information and the social media sites have given the data brokers 
access to such information”.167 They can also obtain behavioural data derived from 
tracking cookies168 or pixels,169 or transaction-specific data about purchasers from retailers 
and catalogue companies. This data may include the types of purchases (for example, 
videogames, products associated with a medical condition or a sports activity), price and 
date of the purchase, and payment method used.170 
 
																																																								
165 FTC, ‘Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ (2014) 3. 
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5.2.2.2 Data is Non-rivalrous and Non-exclusive  
 
Data is essentially non-rivalrous and non-exclusive, 171 which means that the collection of 
certain data by a specific firm does not prevent other companies from gathering the same 
type of data through similar or other means and using such data for multiple purposes. 
Users regularly provide information such as gender, age, home address, and name upon 
registering for online services (for instance, when creating a profile on a social network or 
registering for online games), for which reason the same data is in possession of several 
firms at the same time. In addition, since the value of data derives from the insights it is 
possible to extract from it rather than from just amassing the data,172 different firms may 
extract the same knowledge from different sources and types of data.  For instance, Apple 
may know the music preferences of a specific user based on his last purchases on iTunes, 
whilst Google may hold the same information based on the videos searched by the same 
user on YouTube.  
 
Moreover, online platforms and firms in general do not have exclusive access to any 
specific user, as there is neither exclusive contracts with users nor pricing structure that 
may lock-in users to a specific platform or firm. Some argue that the lack of exclusivity 
over users is confirmed by the fact that users commonly ‘multi-home’, and therefore share 
their information with several online platforms and firms. For example, Lerner notes that 
“there is extensive user multi-homing whether one looks at websites that provide similar 
services (e.g., general search providers such as Bing, Yahoo!, Google, and Ask!) or 
differentiated websites that nevertheless may compete for users with regard to a particular 
activity (e.g., Amazon and Google)”.173 
 
5.2.2.3 Limitations to Data´s Features and Implications: Data is not Fungible, and may 
not be readily Available to all Undertakings  
 
As noted in a report prepared for the White House, big data can be “bought, bartered, 
traded and sold”.174 However, the data collected by data brokers is limited as compared to 
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the volume and variety of data collected directly by large online platforms like Google or 
Facebook. For example, browsing data collected through tracking cookies or pixels is 
likely to be limited in scope and therefore imperfect substitutes with personal data 
voluntarily provided by users as a result of their interaction with a platform, since tracking 
cookies only render information on the websites that a given user has visited, but may not 
allow to gather detailed socio-demographic information, which may be particularly 
valuable.175 As seen above, some data brokers obtain data from social media profiles with 
privacy settings disabled.176 The data they are likely to obtain cannot possibly be compared 
to the data gathered from a social media platform operator, especially a dominant one. As 
will be seen below,177 the greater the variety of data sources, the more valuable and 
accurate the predictions and insights that can be derived from data. Data brokers rely on 
restricted data sources, as opposed to vertically integrated super platforms like Apple or 
Google, which have inter alia mobile OSs, App Stores and Map apps to extract personal 
data from large customer bases. In this connection, writing in the US context, Newman 
observed:  
 
“There has recently been a flurry of political interest in abusive practices by 
data brokers who buy and sell personal data, with major reports released by 
both the U.S. Senate and the Federal Trade Commission […] it is worth 
noting that the companies involved are relative minnows in the big data 
ecosystem compared to the major big data platforms […] Experian is one of 
the largest at $4.8 billion in sales per year, while Acxiom, a data broker often 
cited as having one of the largest datasets on consumers, has only about $1 
billion per year in revenue. Even collectively, these data brokers are dwarfed 
by a company like Google with over $60 billion in annual revenue.”178  
 
The fact that data brokers’ data is limited in scope suggests that its impact in terms of data 
availability is likely to be also limited. As a matter of fact, the CMA observes that “the 
more sensitive the type of data, the less likely it is to be available from an intermediary.”179 
 
Moreover, the fact that data is non-rivalrous and non-exclusive should not lead to broad 
statements such as ‘data is widely available’. It is true that consumers can surrender the 
same kind of data to different offline and online service providers, and that the same data 
can be used by multiple firms to draw inferences, create consumer profiles or for myriad 
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of other purposes. But the fact that two or more companies could have the same data 
does not necessarily entail that they will have it.180 Apple and Google can both have 
profiles of the same consumer, but that hardly means that the comprehensiveness of such 
profiles is the same, or that both companies have made the same inferences. Moreover, 
although certain data is effectively non-exclusive, “a lot of data that are of particular 
relevance for companies are in the exclusive control of the companies that collected it and 
that, therefore, decide about its use, often denying access to competitors”,181 as for 
example, search data derived from queries entered in websites having exclusive search and 
search advertising syndication agreements with Google,182 Facebook’s user profiles,183 or 
Yelp’s and TripAdvisor’s user reviews.184 
 
Yet, these considerations seem to be overlooked in the Commission’s assessments 
outlined above.185 In its Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, the Commission held that 
the transaction would only raise competition concerns if the concentration of data within 
Facebook’s control were to allow it to strengthen its position in advertising,186 and 
dismissed that scenario because there were ‘a significant number of market participants 
that collect user data alongside Facebook’, including Google and other companies such as 
inter alia Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo!, Twitter, IAC, LinkedIn, Adobe 
and Yelp,187 and there would be a large amount of Internet user data valuable for 
advertising purposes not within Facebook’s exclusive control.188 For illustrative purposes, 
the Commission calculated the share of data collection across the Internet:189 
 
																																																								
180 Robert Mahnke, ‘Big Data as a Barrier to Entry’ (2015) 5 Antitrust Chronicle 3. 
181 Schepp and Wambach (n 76) 2; In the same vein CMA (n 93) 87. 
182  European Commission (n 125). 
183 Facebook (n 126). 
184 FTC Staff (n 56) 34–36. 
185 See Section II.5.1 above. 
186 See above text accompanying footnote 155.  
187 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 150) [188]. 
188 See above text accompanying footnote 156. 





The problem with the Commission’s line of reasoning and its calculation of data 
collection share above is that it confuses ‘data being available’ with ‘data being fungible’: 
the fact that data is widely available does not entail that all data is substitutable with each 
other. As Mahnke observes, “[t]here are data, and then there are data”,190 and it is highly 
uncertain whether the data Microsoft, Twitter, Adobe and Yelp collect are equally 
valuable to Facebook for its advertising business as the data it could collect from 
WhatsApp after the consummation of the merger. Data is not fungible, for which reason 
the relevance of some kind of data is likely to vary to a great extent with respect to 
different business models.191 For example, the information social network platforms have 
on their users is likely to be as rich or even richer than that gathered by search engines 
from search queries, but unlike social network data, search data have the advantage of 
allowing to identify consumers who are in active search for a specific product or service,192 
as a result of which they are unlikely to be substitutable.  
 
Curiously enough, the Commission has engaged in assessments of substitutability of data 
in other cases. As seen above, the Commission concluded in TomTom/Tele Atlas that 
digital map databases for non-navigational purposes could not be deemed substitutes to 
navigable digital map databases, as these databases have much more detailed information 
(such as road type, road class, traffic flow information and turn restrictions) and are 
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therefore more costly and time-consuming to produce. 193  Similarly, in Telefónica 
UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere joint venture decision, the Commission found that 
there were possibly separate markets for static online and mobile data analytics,194 as data 
analytics for static online advertising cannot be substituted by data analytics for mobile 
advertising. Lack of substitutability arose from the fact that the two services collect 
“different type of information and amount of consumer details”; for example, “the 
information collected via mobile data analytics is usually more personal, geo-located, and 
can be cross referenced with call behaviour, which cannot be offered by online data 
analytics to a comparable extent.”195 It is submitted that distinctions between data like this 
are more suitable to arrive to a sound conclusion as to the competitive implications of any 
given concentration of data (i.e. whether it confers market power) than calculating data 
collection shares on the Internet in broad terms and dismissing competitive risks on 
grounds of (alleged) availability of data that are not within the merged firm’s (or the 
dominant firm’s) exclusive control.  
 
In addition, the Commission’s assessment also confuses ‘availability of data’ with 
‘accessibility to data’. Other competitors may collect data alongside Facebook, and there 
might have well been a large amount of data up for grabs post-transaction, but that hardly 
means that Facebook’s actual and potential competitors will have ready access to the kind 
of data Facebook was able to access post-merger: 
 
• Any entrant that wishes to compete in an online platform market (for example, in 
a search engine, social network or App store market) must build a platform 
capable of providing services capable of competing with those of the incumbent. 
Setting up a platform demands high investments in R&D. For example, FTC Staff 
found that search and search advertising platforms “require enormous 
investments in the technology and infrastructure required to crawl and categorize 
the entire Internet”, noting that Microsoft invested in 2010 more than USD 4.5 
billion to develop its algorithms and building the physical capacity necessary to 
operate Bing.196 In addition, the collection, storage, processing and analysis of user 
																																																								
193 See above text accompanying footnote 132. 
194 Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV (n 144) [202]. 
195 ibid [200]. 
196 FTC Staff (n 56) 76. 
Chapter 2 
 78 
data involves substantial fixed costs and low or negligible marginal costs,197 which 
means that established firms have cost advantages over entrants in this regard.  
 
• Setting up the platform is not enough. To launch an effective challenge (and 
therefore to have access to the data necessary to compete), competitors must be 
able to attract a sufficiently large user base. To this effect, they must overcome 
direct and/or indirect network effects.198 This task may not be precisely easy. 
Additionally, as will be seen below,199 economies of scale, scope and speed, trial-
and-error and spill-over effects interact in a positive feedback loop which 
enhances the quality (and hence the attractiveness) of the incumbent’s products 
and services in online platforms markets, thereby making a successful challenge 
against it all the more difficult. This difficulty may be compounded even further 
by switching costs or status quo bias200 arising from an unmatchable distribution 
channel (such as for example, a search engine app preinstalled in a dominant 
mobile OS).  
 
In view of the above, the fact that data is non-rivalrous and generally non-exclusive does 
not entail that data is fungible and readily accessible to any firm. A particularly 
comprehensive dataset, such as for example, navigable digital map databases, social media 
sentiment analysis201 or a searchable index of the Web, may be composed of non-rival and 
non-exclusive data, but it does not follow that such data is substitutable with other data 
(such as locational data or browsing data), or that said data is readily accessible to 
competitors (as compiling such data may be prohibitively costly or time-consuming). To 
reach sound conclusions as to the competitive significance of data, any assessment of 
whether a data advantage may lead to market power and anticompetitive risks must 
account for these factors on a case-by case basis. 
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5.2.3 The Role of ‘Volume’, Trial and Error/Learning-By-Doing, ‘Variety’, 
‘Velocity’ and Spill-Overs  
 
The extent of the competitive advantage arising from data depends largely on its scale 
(‘volume’), scope (‘variety’) and the velocity with which it is collected and processed. In 
addition, there are ‘trial and error’ or ‘learning-by-doing’ effects202 and spill-overs feeding 
the positive feedback loop between big data and big analytics.203 These factors must be 
central in the analysis of any data-advantage.  
 
5.2.3.1 Volume (scale of data) and Learning-by-doing 
 
Scale of data and learning-by-doing effects are of the essence for the successful operation 
of a search engine. As noted above, online search services are provided free of charge, for 
which reason search engines compete on the basis of quality and innovation.204 Perhaps 
the most important dimension of quality is the provision of fast ‘relevant’ search results to 
users. When confronted with a given search query, the search engine must ‘guess’ which 
links the user entering the query is more likely to click on.205 The ‘guessing’ process 
operates as follows: 
 
“When a consumer enters search terms, those terms are processed by the 
search engine’s mathematical algorithms, which determine the probability 
that any given webpage will be responsive to the search. The user then 
receives results that are rank-ordered based on the search engine’s judgment 
of the likelihood that each result matches what the user was seeking in 
entering the search terms. This process necessarily depends on multiple 
variables and constant refinement.”206 
 
By observing on which links a user clicks after entering a search query, the search engine 
is able to determine the likely relevance of the links to said user, and to rank them 
accordingly (i.e. moving them up or down). The more users a search engine has, the more 
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data the search engine has at its disposal to improve the relevance of its results, and 
therefore the more trials its algorithms will be able to conduct to guess consumer 
preferences. Accordingly, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between data, trials 
and quality: more data enables more trials, thereby leading to enhanced quality, and 
greater quality, in turn, attracts more users, in a positive feedback loop that strengthens 
the incumbents’ position.  
 
In Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business,207 the Commission analysed Microsoft’s acquisition of 
Yahoo!’s business in online search and search advertising. The Commission observed that 
“scale is an important element to be an effective competitor”, and that the majority of 
respondents to the market investigation considered that Microsoft did not have enough 
traffic volume to be an attractive alternative to Google.208 In addition, it found that “the 
effects of scale [were] likely to allow the merged entity to run more tests and experiments 
on the algorithms in order to improve its relevance.”209 The Commission ultimately 
approved the merger, as it predicted that the merged entity would enjoy greater scale of 
data and therefore would be able to improve its algorithms through trial and error, 
thereby exerting more competitive pressure on Google. Therefore, in the eyes of the 
Commission, the accumulation of big data is likely to confer a competitive advantage 
under certain circumstances.  
 
The OECD confirmed the Commission’s findings, noting that there are ‘increasing 
returns to scale’ from data collection. The OECD noted, in particular, that: 
 
“[t]he accumulation of data can lead to significant improvements of data-
driven services which in turns can attract more users, leading to even more 
data that can be collected […]For example, the more people use services such 
as Google Search, or recommendation engines such as that provided by 
Amazon, or navigation systems such as that provided by TomTom, the better 
the services as they become more accurate in delivering requested sites and 
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These increasing returns to scale, however, are not infinite. In Microsoft/Yahoo! Search 
Business, Google observed, and Microsoft acknowledged, that “the value of incremental 
data decreases as the amount of data increases.” 211  Put in other words, there are 
“diminishing returns to user data scale.”212 This would be particularly the case of queries 
frequently entered by users (also known as ‘head queries’), such as queries related to 
celebrities (e.g. ‘Angelina Jolie’) or notable events (e.g. ‘World Cup’), the marginal value of 
which “is likely to be minimal, or even zero, at a very low scale for a search provider”.213 
Thus, a search engine holding search data for 10,000 previous queries for ‘Angelina Jolie’ 
is capable of rendering the most relevant results just as another search engine having 
entertained that query on 100,000 occasions.  
 
There are two problems, however, with the ‘diminishing returns to scale’ argument: (i) it 
does not identify the point at which the returns to scale taper off (i.e. the ‘optimal scale’ to 
operate is uncertain), and (ii) it does not distinguish between different types of queries.  
 
In the FTC investigation into Google, the minimum efficient scale for the successful 
operation of a search engine was a contentious issue. Google argued that whilst scale 
matters, ‘it only matters up to a point’, and as a ‘rough rule of thumb’, “as query volume 
doubles, a search engine might expect to see a one percent increase in quality.”214 Google 
also contended that Microsoft had passed already the point at which scale matters, and 
that “any volume gains made by Bing would yield minimal improvements in either Bing’s 
search quality or its monetization ability.”215 Microsoft logically disagreed. This issue has 
not been settled. The FTC Staff concluded: 
 
“The main bone of contention between Google and Microsoft is where on this 
scale curve Microsoft currently operates. This is an important question, but one 
which evade easy answers. This is, in part, because neither party can identify a 
fixed number of queries or ads that constitutes the “minimum efficient” 
point of operation.”216 
 
Moving on to the second problem, the value of incremental data may be negligible for 
frequent queries, but that is not the case of queries that are infrequently made (known as 
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‘tail’ queries), which include misspelled queries, addresses, product descriptions, model 
numbers and detailed queries comprised of several terms, in respect of which greater scale 
provides a competitive advantage. For these queries, a greater amount of user click and 
query data is indeed valuable, since this information may contain data for said tail queries. 
A search engine with small scale may have no data on user clicks in response to the same 
or similar queries previously entered by users, whereas a large search engine may have an 
advantage over smaller search engines to the extent that it has seen the same (or a similar) 
tail query before.217 Illustrating this point, Stucke and Ezrachi give a theoretical example of 
two search engines, one having five million daily search queries and the other 5 billion: 
 
“Suppose a search, such as “law and economics professors” and NCAA, 
averages one per 10 million searches. The smaller search engine will get one 
search every two days while the larger search engine gets 500 queries per day. 
If tail queries make up a significant component of daily searches, then the 
larger search engine will enjoy an inherent advantage.”218 
 
Increasing returns to scale and learning-by-doing are not exclusive to search engines; they 
actually underpin algorithmic technology and AI in general. For instance, the Economist 
recently observed:  
 
“The more users write comments, “like” posts and otherwise engage with 
Facebook, for example, the more it learns about those users and the better 
targeted the ads on newsfeeds become […] 
 
Facebook gets its users to train some of its algorithms, for instance when 
they upload and tag pictures of friends. This explains why its computers can 
now recognise hundreds of millions of people with 98% accuracy. Google’s 
digital butler, called “Assistant”, gets better at performing tasks and 
answering questions the more it is used.”219 
 
Similarly, Amazon’s recommendation engine ‘you may also like…’ also learns from 
personal data in order to render recommendations to customers based on its 
‘collaborative filtering’ technology.220 The same applies to Waze’s turn-by-turn navigation 
App: the more people that actively or passively contributes data to Waze, the more 
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accurate and fresher the mapping data becomes, and the more likely is that others would 
use the app.221 
 
Last but not least, Google’s ‘Assistant’, Apple’s Siri, Microsoft’s Cortana and Facebook’s 
‘M’ personal assistant are also examples of technology that benefits from increased scale 
and trial and error. Notably, when it comes to AI, the ‘diminishing returns to scale’ 
argument loses validity even further. Machine learning is self-teaching, and the more and 
the fresher the data they are fed, the better. Indeed, marginal returns from data may 
actually go up as applications multiply. According to Weyl, for example, “after a ride-
hailing firm has collected enough data to offer one service – real-time traffic information, 
say-more data may not add much value. But if it keeps collecting data, at some point it 
may be able to offer more services, such as route planning.”222 
 
5.2.3.2 Variety (scope of data) 
 
Depending on the usage of data, the scope of data may be as important as its scale.223 The 
integration of data from different sources may significantly increase the value of the 
dataset.224 For example, going back to the search engines, to deliver relevant results in 
response to queries a search engine has never seen before, data from different sources 
may be required. Relevance of results returned to a query consisting in a specific product 
model number, for instance, can depend on whether the search engine has ‘crawled’ web 
pages containing such exact model number, or whether such data is obtained from other 
sources such as product data feeds from manufacturers or retailers.225 
 
If a platform offers a variety of services that collect data, economies of scope are likely to 
arise insofar as data linkage is possible. Linked data is a source of ‘super-additive insights’ 
and value that are greater than the sum of its isolated parts (data silos).226 As Schepp and 
Wambach explain:  
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“The linkage of these data [i.e. from different sources] can give companies 
more insights into user habits, enabling them to further improve their 
services and reinforce their market position. Generally speaking, the more 
data a company can combine, the better its chances to gain knowledge that 
can be used to strengthen its market position.”227  
 
Google is perhaps the most salient example of data-related economies of scope. Not only 
does it collect consumer data from its search engine, but also from a plethora of data-
intensive products and services it offers at zero-prices, such as its mobile operating system 
(Android), web browser (Chrome), email service (Gmail), video streaming site (YouTube), 
mapping service (Google Maps), social networking service (Google Plus), website 
analytics tool (Google Analytics), cloud platform service (Google Apps), and many 
others,228 in addition to the products offered by its ad-serving companies DoubleClick and 
AdMob. By the same token, Amazon guides the consumers’ shopping experience and 
“guesses” what sort of products a consumer may like by applying data collected from its 
e-commerce platform, ad-serving tools and Kindle devices.229 Diverse datasets allow large 
online platforms to create highly detailed user profiles that could not be created with each 
single service.230 
 
The Commission acknowledged to some extent the importance of the scope of data. In 
Google/DoubleClick, it noted:  
 
“Competition based on the quality of collected data thus is not only decided 
by virtue of the sheer size of the respective databases, but also determined by 
the different types of data the competitors have access to […]”231 
 
According to the ICO, many industry players contend that the most important 
characteristic of big data is variety.232 This is particularly the case in the world of AI. 
Writing on Facebook’s digital assistant ‘M’, Stucke and Grunes explain that the more 
users rely on Facebook’s other services (such as its social network platform or its 
WhatsApp app), the greater the variety of personal data on particular users, the better the 
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digital assistant can segment results by user profiles, and the better the digital assistant can 
personalise results. They conclude:  
 
“So the feedback loop adds a dimension: it is no longer the trial-and-error, 
learning-by-doing from earlier queries, but trial-and-error in predicting 
individual tastes and preferences from the variety of personal data the 
company collects across its platform (such as the person’s email, geo-location 
data, social network, browser history) and Internet (from the cookies placed 
when the person visits a website). Now the digital assistant – in personalizing 
results – can target users with specific sponsored advertisements that they 
will more likely click (thereby generating more revenue for the platform 
operator).233 
 
5.2.3.3 Velocity (economies of speed) 
 
The value of data is essentially variable. As a general rule, the most valuable data are 
‘predictive’ data, that is, data relating to future likely purchases, or from which a purchase 
intent can be inferred, such as data on particular products a consumer has been searching 
for, click-on behaviour and locational data; however, the value of this data is transitory, 
being relevant over a limited period of time.234 The velocity of data acknowledges its time-
value.235  
 
As some types of data lose its value rather quickly,236 online platforms have the necessity 
to keep gathering up-to-date information about diverse events and the interests and 
preferences of users in order to be able to return relevant responses and deliver targeted 
advertising services.237. First access to data and the ability to process it in real-time confer 
a competitive advantage under certain circumstances.   
 
If users’ interests suddenly change as a consequence of a recent event, online platforms 
need to react rapidly and adapt to the new scenario. Having access to data flowing from 
																																																								
233 Stucke and Grunes (n 72) 186–187. 
234 CMA (n 93) 76; However, other data has more persistent value, such as users’ names and dates of birth 
or data relating to customer transaction history on auction sites like eBay. See Alex Chisholm, ‘Alex 
Chisholm Speaks about Online Platform Regulation.’ (2015) CMA 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/alex-chisholm-speaks-about-online-platform-regulation>. 
235 Stucke and Grunes (n 72) 21. 
236 For example, current locational data is important for search queries such as “restaurants near me”, but 
historic location data is clearly of less value in this regard.   
237 Inge Graef, ‘Market Definition and Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms’ (2015) World 
Competition 38, No. 4 473, 483. 
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the largest established user base is key for quick adaptation. As noted by Microsoft’s 
consultant Susan Athey: 
 
“When Michael Jackson died, for instance, there was a huge spike in internet 
traffic, and the search engine companies wanted to be able to figure out in 
the first 30 seconds to stop sending people to general pages about the 
performer and start sending them instead to the latest news. By using the 
latest data — crowd-sourcing what you want — a search engine can be a 
quick learner. 
 
All search engines try to do that, but how well they do it is a function of how 
fast they get the data. So Google will do it faster than Bing, because more 
people come to Google first.”238  
 
In the case of platforms with user-generated content, the benefits of having a large user 
base to show relevant and updated content are obvious. For example, within the first 
twelve hours of news that David Bowie had died, thirty-five million people had one 
hundred million interactions about Bowie’s passing on Facebook.239 
 
Another example of ‘economies of speed’ is “nowcasting”. Rubinfeld and Gal define 
nowcasting as “the capacity of a company to use the velocity at which a data set grows to 
discern trends well before others.”240 Nowcasting enables undertakings to make real-time 
forecasts (or “nowcasts”) of phenomena and users’ and even competitors’ behaviour, and 
to respond more quickly accordingly.241 For instance, it has been reported that  
 
“[b]y analysing patterns from mobile phone usage, a team of researchers in 
San Francisco [was] able to predict the magnitude of a disease outbreak half 
way around the world. Similarly, an aid agency [saw] early warning signs of a 
drought condition in a remote Sub-Saharan region, allowing the agency to get 
a head start on mobilising its resources and save many more lives”.242 
 
Nowcasting is already making inroads into some industry segments. For example, 
partnering with Google, Auction.com, an online real estate auction firm, recently launched 
																																																								
238 Kathleen O’Toole, ‘Susan Athey: How Big Data Changes Business Management’ (2013) Stanford Graduate 
School of Business <https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/susan-athey-how-big-data-changes-business-
management>. 
239 Colin Stutz, ‘David Bowie’s Death Leads to 100 Million Facebook Interactions in First 12 Hours’ (2016) 
Billboard <http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/rock/6836601/david-bowie-death-100-million-
facebook-interactions-12-hours>. 
240 Rubinfeld and Gal (n 79) 353. 
241 ibid. 
242 World Economic Forum, ‘Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development’ 
(2012) 2 <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TC_MFS_BigDataBigImpact_Briefing_2012.pdf>. 
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the first ‘nowcast’ of the real estate industry, “a new housing report that combines 
industry data, proprietary company transactional data and publicly available Google 
Trends data to predict market trends as they are occurring – weeks before the findings of 
other benchmark studies are released.”243 Notably, Auction.com’s press release refers to 
“the power of Google search trends to predict economic outcomes.”244 
 
Accordingly, the competitive significance of data, and the ability to extract value 
therefrom, depends partly on the ability of undertakings to access, process and monetise it 
as quickly as possible.245  
 
5.2.3.4 Spill-overs (network effects amplified by data-driven network effects) 
 
As explained above, online platforms are characterised by indirect, and sometimes direct, 
network effects.246 These effects are amplified by increasing returns to scale, learning-by-
doing, increasing returns to scope and economies of speed, thereby giving rise to spill-
overs between the different sides of the relevant MSP.  
 
Take the example of Facebook’ social networking platform. On the user side, more users 
increase the value of the platform to other users, thereby attracting more users and traffic. 
This increased number of users and traffic translates into more data. The more data users 
provide, the more data the social network has to carry out experiments to render more 
‘relevant’ social network interactions and generally make its platform more attractive to 
users. At the same time, increased volume, variety and velocity of data help to improve 
ad-targeting, thereby increasing advertising revenues, and also allow for the development 
of new products and services that increase the platform’s data collection capacity. More 
users and improved ad-targeting in turns attract more advertisers, thereby increasing 
advertising revenues even further. The data the platform collects can be processed and 
reprocessed for its subsequent use on any side of the MSP. As the OECD observes:  
 
																																																								
243 Peter Muoio, ‘Auction.com Launches Real Estate’s First “Nowcast”’ (2014) Auction.com 
<https://www.auction.com/blog/auction-com-launches-real-estates-first-nowcast/>. 
244 ibid. 
245 Stucke and Grunes (n 72) 46. 
246 See above Section I.3.1. 
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“The reuse of data generates huge returns to scale and scope which lead to 
positive feedback loops in favour of the business on one side of the market, 
which in turn reinforces success in the other side(s) of the market.”247 
 
When a platform is highly vertically integrated, spill-overs are likely to be more 
pronounced: 
 
“[C]onsumers that appreciate customized search results and ads by Google’s 
search and webmail platform will spend more time on the platform, which 
allows Google to gather even more valuable data about consumer behavior, 
and to further improve services, for (new) consumers as well as advertisers 
(on both sides of the market). These self-reinforcing effects may increase 
with the number of applications provided on a platform, e.g. bundling email, 
messaging, video, music and telephony as increasing returns to scope kicks in 
and even more information becomes available thanks to data linkage.”248 
 
These self-reinforcing effects are likely to lead to a worrisome scenario: big platforms 
become bigger and barriers to entry are raised, which aids them to attain, maintain and 
strengthen their dominant position, and to leverage market power onto adjacent 
markets.249  
 
III. Conclusions, a Data-Advantage Test and a Few Caveats  
 
The business models of online platforms tend to be complex. It is of the essence to 
understand the manner in which online platforms are organised and earn their profits in 
order to decide correctly when to intervene. Competition authorities must be mindful of 
online platforms’ main features, as network effects, asymmetric pricing schemes and the 
collection and processing of personal data are capable of raising issues of great complexity 
and severity that deserve their special attention.  
 
The assessment of whether any advantages arising from big data and big analytics confer 
market power upon a specific firm is a highly intricate one, and must be carried out on a 
case-by-case basis.  
 
																																																								
247 OECD (n 67) 29. 
248 ibid. 
249 See Chapter 5 text accompanying footnote 192.  
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The Commission’s criteria to assess the data advantage are, at first glance, reasonable and 
pragmatic, as they essentially consider data as an asset. If it is costly and time-consuming 
to produce or replicate, data raises barriers to entry and may confer market power; if it is 
widely available and not under the exclusive control of a firm, anticompetitive risks are 
unlikely. 
 
However, as seen above, such analysis is too simplistic. The fact that data is inherently 
non-rivalrous and in principle non-exclusive does not mean that data is fungible. Some 
types of data are not substitutable with other types of data. And even if, on account of 
such features, data is available from different sources, it may not be readily accessible in 
the volume, variety and velocity needed to compete against a platform incumbent.  
 
Indeed, data is an asset, but not an ordinary one. Its competitive significance depends 
largely on its volume, variety and the velocity with which it is accessed and analysed. The 
magnitude of these three ‘V’s of data and data’s interaction with big analytics, in turn, 
determine the ‘Value’ extracted therefrom, which as seen above, is likely to be augmented 
by network effects and spill-overs on the different sides of the relevant MSP. Positive 
feedback loops are likely to reinforce the incumbent’s position and allow it to expand 
onto related markets to increase its data-advantage even further.  
 
Therefore, even if widely available and not under a firm’s exclusive control, access to data 
on the scale, scope, and with the velocity available to the incumbent, taking into account 
direct, indirect and data-driven network effects, may in fact be costly and resource-
intensive. Accordingly, the following test to assess a data advantage is proposed:  
 
Whether accessing the data on the scale and scope, and with the velocity available to the incumbent, is 
costly, resource-intensive and time-consuming for entrants and competitors to replicate. 
 
Under this test, the wide availability of data is no longer important, as even though data is 
non-rivalrous and non-exclusive, to compete effectively in a market, it may be necessary 
to access and process data on a scale and scope, and with a speed at least similar to that 
available to the platform incumbent. This test will be applied in Chapter 3250 to determine 
																																																								
250 See Chapter 3 Sections II.5.1, II.5.2 and II.5.3. 
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whether a data advantage enjoyed by the incumbents in the markets for search engines, 




It is not suggested here that big data will always lead to competition problems;251 rather, 
this Chapter attempts to contribute to the debate on big data and competition policy by 
determining big data’s actual competitive significance, and the manner in which big data’s 
four ‘V’s, in conjunction with traditional and data-driven network effects and other 
factors, may impact competition.  
 
In this debate, some big players are not playing fairly. For example, to dismiss the 
importance of data, Google resorted to the academia. It has been reported that from the 
beginning of the FTC investigation through 2013, Google gave USD 762,000 to the 
George Mason University’s Law and Economics Center (LEC), in exchange of which the 
“LEC issued numerous studies supporting Google’s position that they committed no legal 
violations, and hosted conferences on the same issues where Google representatives 
suggested speakers and invitees.”252 In addition, between 2009 and 2015, there were at 
least 66 published studies by over 45 academics ‘commissioned by Google’, ‘funded by 
Google, or ‘supported by a gift from Google Inc.’ All of such studies take Google’s side 
on competition, data, privacy and other related issues.253 Relatedly, Google’s chairman 
argued in a speech in Berlin: “[o]ur experience is that you don’t need data to compete 
online.”254 
 
Practices and statements like those referenced above do not advance the debate on big 
data; rather, they polarise it between ‘black or white’ propositions (i.e. data is not 
necessary to compete / data is of the essence to compete) and are proof of the 
reproachable efforts deployed by some incumbents to create confusion about big data in 
																																																								
251 Actually, at the time of writing, no competition authority or court has found yet a per se data-advantage 
capable of lessening competition. 
252 David Dayen, ‘Google’s Insidious Shadow Lobbying: How the Internet Giant Is Bankrolling Friendly 








order to preserve the status quo.255 It is worth quoting here some prior statements from 
Google’s top executives:  
 
“Sale is key. We just have so much scale in terms of the data we can bring to 
bear.”256 
 
“We don’t have better algorithms than everyone else; we just have more 
data.”257 
 
“Never delete anything, always use data – it’s what Google does.”258 
 
These statements suggest that data is indeed quite important to Google, despite its current 
efforts to try to convince otherwise policy-makers, competition enforcers and the public 
in general. 
 
It is not suggested here either that dominance follows invariably from big data. After all, 
dynamic markets are characterised by rampant innovation, and today’s leader may be 
tomorrow’ laggard. Commonly cited examples of entrants displacing incumbents in 
dynamic markets are Google and Facebook, which dethroned Yahoo! and MySpace 
respectively.  
 
However, these examples of successful entrants are not necessarily illustrative of current 
entry conditions, as these conditions might have changed since their time of entry.259 For 
example Yahoo! in the beginning was a man-made index of the web with each URL, and 
did not rely on the collection of data to make profits.260 Moreover, Yahoo! did not 
develop its search engine until 2002, having relied previously on Google’s search 
technology, which probably gave Google the scale necessary to improve its own search 
engine and leapfrog Yahoo!. Other factors may come into play. According to Gehl, 
																																																								
255 See Chapter 5 Section II.5.2.2. 
256 Statement of Google’s Chairman Eric Schmidt (2009) in Fair Search, ‘Fact-Checking Google: Scale Is a 
Barrier to Entry in Search’ (2011) Fair Search  <http://fairsearch.org/fact-checking-google-scale-is-a-barrier-
to-entry-in-search/>. 
257 Google’s chief scientist Peter Norvig in Matt Asay, ‘Tim O’Reilly: “Whole Web” Is the OS of the Future’ 
(2010) CNET  <https://www.cnet.com/news/tim-oreilly-whole-web-is-the-os-of-the-future/>. 
258 Google Cloud Platform’s director of product management Tom Kershaw in Quentin Hardy, ‘Google 
Offers Cheap Storage for Certain Kinds of Data’ (2015) Bits Blog  
<https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/google-offers-cheap-storage-for-certain-kinds-of-data/>. 
259 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (n 95) 30. 




MySpace’s demise was due partly to problems with vandalism, phishing, malware and 
spam which it failed to curtail, making the site seem inhospitable.261 
 
Therefore, current entry conditions must be clarified, in particular the extent to which the 
significance of data is higher today for the development of new products and services 
than it was a decade ago, as well as the importance of traditional and data-driven network 




261 Robert W Gehl, ‘Real (Software) Abstractions on the Rise of Facebook and the Fall of MySpace’ (2012) 
30 Social Text 99. 
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As explained in Chapter 1, proponents of the hands-off approach demand less 
intervention in digital markets, pointing out to some enforcement challenges: traditional 
market definition tools are unsuited to online markets; the ensuing structural 
presumptions are bound to lead to mistaken conclusions (i.e. overstating market power in 
the assessment of dominance), and the traditional price-oriented competition framework 
sits at odds with online markets in which consumers enjoy products or services at zero-
prices. In view of said difficulties, intervention by competition authorities is likely to 
punish procompetitive conduct, to the detriment of consumers. 1 At the other end of the 
spectrum, proponents of the regulatory approach argue that the passing of new regulation 
applicable to ‘online platforms’ is the only way to ensure fair competition in digital 
markets.2 
 
This Chapter demonstrates that the aforementioned views are mistaken. Admittedly, 
multisidedness, product differentiation, innovation and the collection of data complicate 
market definition in online industries, and too much reliance on strict boundaries may 
lead to erroneous inferences about market power and the effects of dominant firms’ 
practices. However, by being aware of these market definition challenges and factoring 
them in at some point in the competitive assessment, the competition dynamics of online 
markets can be readily accounted for in Article 102 TFEU cases.  
 
In support of this contention, this Chapter defines the product markets3 for search 
engines, social networks and e-commerce platforms, taking Google, Facebook and eBay, 
respectively, as the central point of analysis. These industry segments and respective 
platform leaders were chosen on account of their extreme popularity: according to the 
																																																								
1 See Chapter 1 Section III.1. 
2 See Chapter 1 Section II.1. 
3 The analysis of geographic market definition is excluded, as it does not present significant differences or 
challenges relative to traditional industries.  
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Commission, online platforms lead the list of the most accessed websites in the world, 
with search engines, social media and e-commerce as the most visited types of platforms.4 
After defining these markets, a market power assessment in respect of these platforms is 
presented. It is shown that it is not necessary to rely on structural presumptions to make 
inferences about market power and establish dominance; rather, market shares can be 
used as a screening test to dismiss cases in which anticompetitive problems are unlikely. 
More importantly, the market power analysis departs from the excessive focus on price 
pointed out by the proponents of the hands-off approach. This analysis takes into 
consideration the interdependences between the platforms’ different sides, and based on 
the test proposed in Chapter 2 (Conclusions), it assesses the extent to which the collection 
and processing of data can raise barriers to entry. It will be seen that the dynamics of big 
data and big analytics, network effects, switching costs and other factors may confer 
market power and create and/or consolidate dominance, contrary to the Schumpeterians’ 
prediction of fleeting market power in dynamic markets. It will be also seen that, as a 
result of said market power, some firms have the ability to engage in data-driven abusive 
conduct and distort competition. If online markets are left unchecked, competition is 
likely to be impaired.  
 
At the same time, by defining platform markets and assessing market power therein, a 
natural conclusion emerges: online platforms follow different business models, rely on 
data to different extents, and derive their market power from different factors. Any ‘one-
size-fits-all’ regulation is bound to be incapable of accounting for these differences and 
the manner in which they impact competition, for which reason any beneficial effect 
stemming from such regulation is at best doubtful.  
 
Therefore, vigilant competition authorities conducting case-by-case analyses of market 
power and of the impact of a given firm’s practices on competition remain the most 
important control mechanism to ensure a system of undistorted competition in online 
markets. 
 
Section I addresses market definition in online platform markets. It discusses market 
definition’s basic concepts and most significant challenges for its implementation in 
																																																								
4 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document - Online Platforms Accompanying the 
Document Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’ (2016) 1. 
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online industries. In particular, it explains the manner in which multisidedness, product 
differentiation, innovation and the collection and processing of user data complicate 
market definition, and proposes a ‘best course of action’ to address such complications. It 
then proceeds to define relevant product markets for search engines, social network and 
online marketplaces. Section II discusses the assessment of dominance in online platform 
markets. It argues that when the interdependences between the platform’s different sides 
cannot be taken into consideration at the market definition stage for some reason, the 
assessment of dominance is an adequate analytical step to account for them. It also argues 
that market shares need not have their traditional preponderant role in this assessment; 
rather, they can be used as a screening mechanism to determine whether further analysis 
is warranted. It then proceeds to assess a potential dominant position of Google, 
Facebook and eBay in the markets defined in Section I, focusing on the role of direct and 
indirect network effects, multihoming possibilities, switching costs, access to data and 
strength of dynamic competition. Section III explains certain data-driven abuses in which 




















I. Market Definition  
 
1. General  
 
The definition of the relevant market is a useful first step to frame competition disputes. 
Within the context of Article 102 TFEU, it is a precondition for the assessment of 
dominance.5 Its main purpose is the identification of the most significant competitive 
constraints that are exerted upon the firm or firms under scrutiny, and entails an informed 
yet ultimately subjective judgement as to which is the set of products (or services) that 
compete with each other (the relevant ‘product market’6) in a given geographic location 
(the relevant ‘geographic market’).7  
 
2. Competitive Constraints 
 
The competitive constraints most commonly used to define markets are demand-side and 
supply-side substitution. Weaker competitive constraints, such as potential competition, 
are considered at the later stage of the competitive assessment.8 
 
Demand-side Substitution: The ability of consumers to switch to other products when 
confronted by a price increase9 (demand-side substitution) constitutes the most direct 
constraint on undertakings’ behaviours and decisions. A relevant market on the demand 
side is composed of all those products that are substitutes of the product offered by the 
undertaking under scrutiny. Two products are substitutes when a price increase in one 
product causes consumers to switch their demand to the other product. As a general rule, 
																																																								
5 Case 6-72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v Commission of the European Communities 
[1973] ECR 215 [32]; See also Case T-62/98, Volkswagen AG v Commission [2002] ECR II-2707 [231]. 
6 'A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and 
their intended use.' European Commission, Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the 
Purposes of Community Competition Law [1997] OJ C 372/5, para 7. 
7 'The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in 
the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of 
competition are appreciably different in those areas.' ibid para 8. 
8 ibid para 24. 
9 For simplicity, the market definition exercise is conducted as if price were the only relevant parameter of 
competition. However, price increase can be equated to consumer harm, and consumer h.arm can be 
materialised in several dimensions, such as inter alia quality reduction, lower service and decreased 
innovation. Consumers can switch away to other products for any of these reasons.   
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the presence of more and better substitutes mitigates the ability of an undertaking to 
increase the price of its product.  
 
The conceptual framework most commonly used by competition authorities10 to assess 
demand-side substitution is the hypothetical monopolist test (‘HMT’ or ‘SSNIP’ test), 
whereby it is determined whether consumers would switch to other readily available 
substitute products in response to a hypothetical small (5-10%) but significant and non-
transitory increase in price (hence the ‘SSNIP’) of the product in question.11 If the 
application of a SSNIP to the product at stake would result in consumers switching to 
other alternative products, and the loss of customers would render the price increase 
unprofitable, it means that the product at hand does not constitute a separate market. In 
this scenario, additional products are included in the relevant market, and the test is 
carried out again until the increase in price would be profitable and hence the relevant 
market would be worth monopolising.12 
 
Supply-side Substitution: Supply-side substitution is the second constraint most widely 
used to define markets. However, in order to be considered, its effects ought to be 
equivalent to those of demand-side substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy, 
which means that suppliers must be “able to switch production to the relevant products 
and market them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks in 
response to small and permanent changes in relative prices.”13 These strict requirements 
explain why supply-side substitution rarely affects the outcome of market delineation in 







10 European Commission (n 6) paras 15–17; FTC and DOJ, ‘U.S. 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ s 
4.1.1; Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading, ‘Merger Assessment Guidelines’ s 5.2; 
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, ‘Merger Guidelines’ s 4.19-4.22. 
11 European Commission (n 6) para 17. 
12 ibid. 
13 European Commission (n 6) para 20. 
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3. Market Definition and Market Power 
 
There is unanimous agreement as to market definition not being an end in itself,14 but 
rather a tool to frame competition disputes and identify anticompetitive scenarios. 
Anticompetitive scenarios occur where there is market power. An undertaking has market 
power if it only faces weak competitive constraints and is consequently able to raise prices 
above the competitive level or otherwise adversely affect other parameters of 
competition, thereby harming consumers. The ultimate goal of market definition is “to 
help understand these competitive constraints and thus the degree of market power.”15 In 
Article 102 TFEU proceedings, the determination of the degree of market power of the 
firm under investigation is part of the assessment of dominance.16   
 
4. Problems concerning Market Definition in Online Markets   
 
The traditional analytical steps of competition cases “typically follow a one-way procedure 
starting from the assumption that the market definition is a given concept that can and 
must be figured out first, and then forms the background for the rest of the analysis.”17 In 
this framework, market definition results in a binary decision on whether certain products, 
suppliers and locations are ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the market, and the boundaries drawn in this 
way (i) determine the array of competitive constraints that will be considered in (and 
excluded from) further competitive analyses, and (ii) serve as a basis for the calculation of 
the participants’ market shares and market concentration, from which inferences about 
market power are made. As a result, the broader the market (that is, the more substitute 
products the relevant market contains), the less likely the finding of dominance or a 
significant impediment of competition, for which reason market definition “sets up a 
battle between the ‘we-win because it is a narrow market’ plaintiffs and the ‘you-lose 
because it is a broad market’ defendants.”18  
 
																																																								
14 Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading (n 10) para 5.2.2; OECD, ‘Market Definition’ 
(2012) 13, 405 (BIAC’s submission), 231–232 (France’s submission), 256 (Israel’s submission) and 286 
(Poland’s submission). 
15 David S Evans, ‘Lightening Up Market Definition’, in Einer R. Elhauge (ed), Research Handbook on the 
Economics of Antitrust (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 58–59. 
16 See below Section II. 
17 European Parliament, ‘Challenges for Competition Policy in the Digitalised Economy, a Study for the 
ECON Committee’ (2015) 50.  
18 Evans (n 15) 53. 
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This approach is not problematic in, for example, one-sided markets where undertakings 
produce homogeneous products and compete on the basis of price. However, it is 
problematic when applied to online platform markets, which are characterised by 
multisidedness, product differentiation, innovation, and the collection of data. The above-
mentioned mechanistic approach to market definition is incapable of capturing significant 
competitive constraints that stem from these features. 
 
However, the problems stemming from online platforms’ features for the purposes of 
market definition, as will be seen below, are not insurmountable. The following sections 





The multisided nature of online platforms19 pose three main challenges concerning market 
definition: (i) the existence of two or more potential markets to be defined; (ii) the 
peculiar interdependencies between the platforms’ different sides; and (iii) the absence of 
nominal prices on at least one side. 
 
4.1.1 The Existence of two or more Potential Markets to be Defined 
 
Problem: The first question that arises when defining multisided markets is whether one 
should include both sides of the platform in the market definition or just one side.20  
 
To answer this question, van Damme et al. proposed a dual distinction of two-sided 
markets:21 on the one hand, there are transaction markets, characterised by the presence 
and observability of a direct transaction between two groups of users.22 This is the case of 
payment card systems or online marketplaces. On the other hand, there are non-
																																																								
19 See generally Chapter 2 Section I. 
20 David S Evans and Michael D Noel, ‘The Analysis of Mergers That Involve Multisided Platform 
Businesses’ (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 663, 674. 
21 Eric Van Damme, Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin, Simon Keunen, Tobias Klein, Thomas Michielsen 
and John Wileur, ‘Mergers in Two-Sided Markets – A Report to the NMa’ (2010) 
<https://www.acm.nl/download/documenten/nma/NMa_Two-Sided_Markets_-_Report_-
_16_July_2010.pdf>. 
22 Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin, Eric Van Damme and Pauline Affeldt, ‘Market Definition in Two-
Sided Markets: Theory and Practice’ (2014) 10 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 293, 298.  
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transaction markets, which are characterised by the absence of direct transactions between 
two different groups of customers, as in the case of advertising-supported media 
platforms (like Google and Facebook). 
 
According to Filistrucchi et al., whether one should define a single market or two 
interrelated markets depends on whether we are dealing with a two-sided transaction 
market or a two-sided non-transaction market: in non-transaction markets multiple 
relevant markets should be defined for each side of the platform, whereas in transaction 
markets only one market should be defined.23  
 
Best course of action: The distinction explained above should be followed, as it is both 
sound and grounded in economic reality. Indeed, in the case of transaction markets, a 
platform is “either on both sides of the market or on none”,24 whereas in non-transaction 
markets a product can be in the relevant market on one side but not on the other. For 
example, an online marketplace such as eBay must be on both the buyer and seller side or 
on neither side, since a transaction between a buyer and a seller takes places through eBay 
(by using both sides) or it does not take place on eBay at all. Conversely, in the case of 
advertisement-supported platforms, it is highly unlikely that users regard Google and 
Facebook as substitutes (since broadly speaking users resort to Google to find 
information on the Internet whist they use Facebook to interact with their friends and 
acquaintances), whereas it is at least possible that some advertisers regard search and 
social network advertising as substitutes.25 
 
4.1.2 The Necessity of Capturing the Specific Interdependencies between the 
Platform’s Different Sides 
 
Problem: As explained in Chapter 2, platforms are characterised by interdependence and 
interactions between their multiple sides, since increased participation on one side attracts 
more participation on the other side(s).26 Capturing “the peculiar relationship between the 
different sides […] is a crucial step for product market definition[, since] absent 
																																																								
23 ibid 301–302. 
24 ibid 301. 
25 See below Sections I.5.1.2 and II.5.1. 
26 Kevin J Boudreau and Andrei Hagiu, ‘Platform Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms as Regulators’, in Annabelle 
Gawer (ed), Platforms, Markets and Innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 164. 
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recognition of such peculiarity, the risk is that an authority overlooks the important 
consequences than an apparently innocuous alteration of the market conditions on one 
side can have on the other.”27 In particular, given that there is a link between the demands 
of the different sides of the platform, the profit function of a hypothetical monopolist 
that applies a SSNIP on one side is linked to the profit in the other side, “and the 
question arises of which feedbacks between the profits on the two sides of the market 
should be considered.”28 
 
In this regard, there seems to be a consensus as to that all feedbacks between the different 
sides of the platform should be taken into account.29 Put in other words, it is necessary to 
consider the extent to which an increase in price (or reduced quality or innovation) on 
one side causes a shift in demand on the other side, and vice versa. To this effect, the 
competitive constraints exerted upon the platform on each side must be duly accounted 
for,30 taking into consideration the fact that the level of competition faced by the platform 
on one side (for instance, the advertiser side) will depend, inter alia, on the number of 
costumers on the other side (for example, the search user side) relative to other 
platforms.31 For example, if a search engine has a significantly larger user base than its 
competitors, it is possible to predict that a price increase on the advertiser side is likely to 
lead to a loss of advertisers smaller than if all of the search engines had a similar user base.  
 
To take these feedbacks into account, economists have endeavoured to adapt the existing 
quantitative tools for market definition to multisided markets. Noting that “standard tools 
used for analy[s]ing market definition and unilateral effects for mergers need to be 
modified when the parties are MSPs”, Evans and Noel proposed an extension of Critical 
Loss Analysis (a popular method to apply the SSNIP in practice), deriving formulas for its 
implementation. 32  Similarly, acknowledging the unsuitability of the SSNIP test to 
multisided settings, Filistrucchi develops analytical formulas for the implementation of the 
																																																								
27 Nicolo Zingales, ‘Product Market Definition in Online Search and Advertising’ (2013) 9 The Competition 
Law Review 29, 33. 
28 Lapo Filistrucchi, ‘A SSNIP Test for Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Media’ (2008) NET Institute 
Working Paper No. 08-34 2–3. 
29 ibid 12; Evans and Noel (n 20) 666; Filistrucchi et al. (n 22) 319. 
30 David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, ‘The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses’ 
(2013) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18783 18 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w18783>. 
31 Filistrucchi et al. (n 22) 320. 
32 David S Evans and Michael D Noel, ‘Defining Markets That Involve Multi-Sided Platform Businesses: 




test in media markets.33 Relatedly, Cosnita-Langlais et al. discuss how it is necessary to 
extend Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) analysis in mergers between platforms by taking 
into account the changes in externalities as well as changes in prices.34 However, data 
requirements for the implementation of the SSNIP test and other quantitative tools in 
multisided markets are higher than for single-sided markets, as it is necessary “to estimate 
not only the matrixes of the own and cross price elasticities of demand on the two-sides 
of the market but also the matrixes of the network effects.” 
 
Best course of action: there is no need to be alarmed about the difficulties of applying the 
SSNIP test or other quantitative market definition methods to multisided markets. It is 
true that the introduction of the SSNIP test in the 90s represented a more economically 
rigorous approach to market definition.35 However, the actual implementation of the 
SSNIP, even for traditional ‘one-sided’ markets, is very difficult in practice. 36  The 
quantitative tests 37  designed to implement the SSNIP require good information on 
consumers’ response to price increases that is normally unavailable, “so the results of the 
test may depend critically on how poor information is interpreted”.38 Indeed, there are 
“very few situations where there [is] sufficient quantitative data to perform the [HMT or 
SSNIP] test explicitly”,39 which explains the findings of a study concluding that the 
European Commission has used the SSNIP test in 11% of its definitions of relevant 
product markets.40 Not surprisingly, after conducting a comprehensive examination of 
cases involving multisided markets in the EU and the US, Filistrucchi et al. found that 
“none of the competition authorities appear to have applied a specific two-sided market 
formula to perform the SSNIP test.”41 This makes total sense: the SSNIP and other 
quantitative tests are just one way to define markets,42 and if they result impracticable in a 
given case due to unavailability of sufficient data or other reasons, competition authorities 
																																																								
33 Filistrucchi (n 28) 14. 
34 Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Bjorn Olav Johansen and Lars Sorgard, ‘Upward Price Pressure in Two-Sided 
Markets: Incorporating Feedback Effects’ (2016) <https://economix.fr/docs/713/UPP-TSM-
20170327.pdf>. 
35 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law (4th Edition OUP 2011) 66. 
36 Howard H Chang, David S Evans and Richard Schmalensee, ‘Market Definition. Assessment of the 
Relevant Market in Competition Matters - a Report Prepared for the Federal Competition Commission of 
Mexico’ (2011) 22. 
37 See European Commission (n 6) para 39. 
38 Chang, Evans and Schmalensee (n 36) 8. 
39 Atilano Jorge Padilla, ‘The Role of Supply-Side Substitution in the Definition of the Relevant Market in 
Merger Control - a Report for DG Enterprise A/4, European Commission’ (2001) 17. 
40 Copenhagen Economics, ‘The Internal Market and the Relevant Geographic Market’ (2003) 7. 
41 Filistrucchi et al. (n 22) 338. 
42 European Commission (n 6) para 15. 
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can nevertheless define markets based on all the quantitative and qualitative evidence43 at 
their disposal. As the Commission explains:  
 
“There is a range of evidence permitting an assessment of the extent to 
which substitution would take place […] The Commission follows an open 
approach to empirical evidence […] The Commission does not follow a rigid 
hierarchy of different sources of information or types of evidence.”44 
 
Therefore, it is submitted that to define online platform markets taking into account the 
feedbacks between their different sides, rather than endeavouring to apply complex two-
sided formulas that require seldom-available data, the best course of action is to rely on all 
of the evidence that might be available in the case at hand and use the conceptual side of 
the SSNIP test,45 as even when this test cannot be quantitatively applied “it nevertheless 
provides a useful way of analysing the evidence and judging the extent of substitution 
between products or locations.”46   
 
Finally, it is argued that market definition and the assessment of market power, especially 
in dynamic markets, should be not be carried out in a rigid manner (i.e. placing too much 
relevance on the exact market boundaries), which entails that competitive constraints that 
are not considered at the market definition stage can be nevertheless duly accounted for at 
subsequent stages of the competition analysis. In some cases, it may be appropriate or 
convenient to define separate markets for each side of the platform and consider the 
impact of interdependencies and network effects as part of the assessment of dominance 
or the competitive assessment (in mergers). Indeed, this is the approach followed by the 





43 Such as inter alia functionality of services, technical characteristics, specific features of consumer demand, 
customer surveys, market studies and evidence of past substitution. ibid paras 37–43. 
44 ibid para 25. 
45 ‘The most important aspect of the SSNIP is its conceptual side, not its quantitative side […] Even when 
no detailed data are available, it is useful to think of the market definition question in terms of SSNIP […]’ 
See Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition (2nd Edition OUP 2007) 1147. 
46 New Zealand Commerce Commission, ‘Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines’ (2013) para 3.24. 




4.1.3 The Absence of Nominal Prices on at least one Side 
 
Problem: When a group of customers enjoys a service free of charge, quantitative tools 
such as the SSNIP test become unfit for purpose, given that such tools have been 
“designed to examine the reactions of one set of customers, not two, to changes in 
price”,48 and “[t]here is no sound way to analy[s]e a 5 percent increase in a price of zero – 
5 percent of zero is still zero.”49 Moreover, on the free side of the market, price is clearly 
not the decisive parameter based on which customers’ consumption decisions are made. 
Rather, as observed by competition authorities, when a product or service is offered at a 
zero price, the primary dimension of competition is quality.50 
 
Therefore, for industries where competition takes place on the basis of quality attributes, 
Hartman et al. have proposed replacing the SSNIP test with a different quantitative 
version of the same that focuses instead on quality changes: the SSNDQ (small but 
significant and non-transitory decrease in quality) test.51 Under this test, “the pertinent 
question to ask is whether a change in the [quality] attributes of one commodity would 
induce substitution to or from another. If the answer is affirmative, then the differentiated 
products, even if based on alternative technologies, ought to be included in the relevant 
product market.”52 These authors propose a 25% decrease in any quality attribute, which 
“implies that if an existing manufacturer lowers the quality of a key [quality] attribute of 
an existing product up to 25%, ceteris paribus, and no substitution to other product occurs, 
then the original product constitutes a distinct antitrust market.”53 
 
However, quality is a multi-dimensional concept comprising both objective and subjective 
components: whilst some quality attributes are certain, objective and observable, such as 
performance, durability or the capacity of a car, others are subjective and dependant on 
consumers’ perceptions, such as aesthetic appeal or prestige associated with a particular 
																																																								
48 Renata B Hesse, ‘Two-Sided Platform Markets and the Application of the Traditional Antitrust Analytical 
Framework’ (2007) 3(1) Competition Policy International 192. 
49 David S Evans, ‘Antitrust Economics of Free’ (2011) John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 555 2. 
50 See for example Case COMP/M5257, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (2010) [101]; Case COMP/M6281, 
Microsoft/Skype (2011) [81]. 
51 Raymond Hartman, David Teece, Will Mitchell and Thomas Jorde, ‘Assessing Market Power in Regimes 
of Rapid Technological Change’ (1993) 2 Industrial and Corporate Change 317. 
52 ibid 334. 
53 ibid 339–340. 
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brand.54 Moreover, quality is also relative, since the preferences and desires of one person 
can be despised or disregarded by another. Hence, the quantitative assessment and 
measurement of quality attributes can prove extremely complex and cumbersome, since 
whilst it may be possible to describe subjective preference factors based on empirical 
market research, “it is considerably more difficult to quantify and compare levels of 
product quality.”55  
 
As a result, a quantitative SSNDQ test is unworkable for two reasons: firstly, given the 
lack of a precise measurement of quality, it is extremely challenging to identify anything 
equivalent to a 5-10% price increase. Secondly, in a hypothetical scenario where this is 
possible, quantifying the effects of the quality degradation on the revenues of the 
undertaking subject to scrutiny in order to determine whether the decrease in quality is 
profitable can prove impossible.56  
 
Best course of action: it is submitted that thinking about substitution in terms of SSNDQ 
on the ‘free’ side of a platform is conceptually appealing,57 as it faithfully depicts the basis 
on which customers of ‘free’ online services may likely decide to switch their demand to 
other platform (or one-sided) suppliers: for example, if average users were experiencing 
issues when logging in to Facebook, because the website is crashing due to user overload 
or other reasons, the pertinent question would be whether users would switch away from 
Facebook to other social network platforms such as Google+, Tumblr or Twitter.58 This 
																																																								
54 OECD, ‘The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis’ (2013) 6. 
55 ibid; ibid 79 (European Commission’s submission). 
56 ‘Price increases can immediately be translated into the evaluation of profits, while a very complex 
assessment would be needed for profits derived from quality degradation (such as calculations of cost 
savings)’. See OECD (n 54) 80 (European Commission’s submission). 
57 “The notion of substitution must be part of the analysis, even though it does not rely on [the] formalistic 
method underpinning the SSNIP test." Florence Thépot, ‘Market Power in Online Search and Social-
Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided Markets’ (2012) CLES Working Paper Series 4/2012 19. 
58 Aleksandra Gebicka and Andreas Heinemann, ‘Social Media & Competition Law’ (2014) 37 World 
Competition 149, 158. 
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analysis, however, must (i) rely on qualitative methods59 and (ii) take into consideration, 
when possible, the feedback effects between the free side and the other sides.60  
 
4.2 Product Differentiation and Innovation  
 
Problem: Product differentiation and innovation in online markets pose additional 
complications for market definition. In the face of differentiated products, substitution 
analysis may lead to arbitrary results. In turn, innovation from potential competitors, a 
significant competitive constraint, is excluded from the analysis. 
 
Demand-side substitutability is the main competitive constraint taken into consideration 
to delineate markets. However, product differentiation makes its determination extremely 
cumbersome.61 For example, smartphones are differentiated in terms of screen resolution, 
battery life, operating system, camera resolution, size, weight, memory, microprocessors, 
and several other attributes, and they have higher or lower prices, depending on the 
different combinations of the referred attributes. When products are differentiated in this 
way, over a broad range of features and prices, there are no obvious gaps in the chain of 
substitution, nor are there any stark distinctions between products. To make things even 
more complicated, it is not always possible to convert product features in perceived 
consumer value, since the value of particular product feature “varies widely with the eye 
of the beholder”.62 For some people, a fast microprocessor in a smartphone renders 
																																																								
59 ‘[A]t present competition authorities tend to rely upon qualitative methods of assessing product quality 
where necessary. Such methods can include the use of material obtained through prior or on-going market 
investigations, from consumer surveys and interviews, as well as an examination of internal documents and 
business practices of the firm(s) under scrutiny. Market information gathered by such means might then 
form the basis for revealed preference analysis, or other analytical techniques by which market dynamics can 
be assessed.’ OECD (n 54) 6; ‘The area of Internet search is one example since competition is based on 
quality of the product, rather than on its price, and this is by nature hard to measure with quantitative 
criteria.’ Zingales (n 27) 34. 
60 For example, Facebook users could be tempted to switch to a different platform when confronted with a 
decrease in quality; however, the stronger the network effects, the less likely they will switch to other social 
networks, in spite of the quality degradation.  
61 The analysis of cross-elasticity of demand between two products does not take into consideration the 
constraining effect of multiple imperfect substitutes. It may be the case that none of the substitutes is 
particularly close to the product at hand, but their combined effect may be to prevent the firm under 
scrutiny from exercising market power. Also, cross-elasticity of demand may be useful to determine whether 
two products are especially close substitutes, but that does not necessarily mean that the absence of cross-
elasticity of demand should place differentiated products in separate markets. James A Keyte, ‘Market 
Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need for a Workable Standard’ (1995) 63 Antitrust Law 
Journal 697, 702 and 746. 




significant added value, whereas for others the microprocessors´ speed is of no relevance, 
and therefore it offers no comparative gain. Hence, it is extremely difficult to generalise 
consumer preferences and include them in the analysis of whether a change in price of 
iPhones will make people switch to Samsung smartphones. Worse still, when products or 
services are offered at zero-prices and the main parameters of competition cannot be 
quantified with precision (as in the case of quality or innovation), drawing precise market 
boundaries is likely to amount to an arbitrary attempt to separate substitutes that 
constrain the competitive behaviour of the firm under scrutiny from those that do not.63 
 
Moreover, as explained in Chapter 1, in innovation-intensive industries, incumbents are 
disciplined by the threat that another undertaking will “come up with a drastic innovation 
that causes demand for the incumbent’s product to vanish.”64 As Pleatsikas and Teece 
contend: “it is not just immediate entry that tempers behaviour in high-technology 
industries; it is also the threat of the next generation of products and services that is of 
concern to incumbents”, and this threat “may help to constrain behaviour, as current 
market leaders can never be sure that a shift will not occur tomorrow.”65 Therefore, 
according to Padilla, to define markets in dynamic industries: 
 
“[t]he relevant experiment should analyse substitution patters between the 
incumbent’s product (which is currently available to consumers) and the 
hypothetical product offerings of potential entrants. The results of this 
experiment are necessarily vague and inconclusive, since the price and 
performance characteristics of the latter set of products are, almost by 
definition, undefined.”66 
 
Best course of action: the difficulties explained above are neither new nor exclusive to 
online platform markets. In a roundtable on Market Definition held by the OECD in 
2012, competition authorities of over 30 countries presented their experiences concerning 
market definition in markets characterised by product differentiation and innovation.67 
The great majority of these authorities, including the European Commission, know that 
there is not much to do in this regard: precise boundaries in markets with differentiated 
products are almost certain to leave out of the market some substitutes, and predicting 
																																																								
63 Michael L Katz and Howard A Shelanski, ‘Mergers and Innovation’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 1, 33. 
64 Padilla (n 39) 67. 
65 Christopher Pleatsikas and David Teece, ‘The Analysis of Market Definition and Market Power in the 
Context of Rapid Innovation’ (2001) 19 International Journal of Industrial Organization 665, 672. 
66 Padilla (n 39) 70. 
67 OECD, ‘Market Definition’ (n 14) 197 et seq. 
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future competitive dynamics, the evolution of the markets and potential entry is 
inherently speculative and uncertain.  
 
As market definition should not be arbitrarily conducted, or determined on the basis of 
wishful thinking about the evolution of technology or competition, the best course of 
action is (i) to acknowledge the problems of market definition in the context of product 
differentiation and innovation, placing less emphasis on the precise definition of the 
market boundaries,68 and (ii) to factor in its methodological difficulties in the analysis of 
competitive effects. These recommendations stem from experience. For example, the US 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognised that “[r]elevant markets need not have 
precise metes and bounds”,69 and the OFT has explained that its approach “tends to 
reduce the importance of market definition and to increase the importance of other 
substantive analysis”70 in platform markets. Similarly, the Autorité de la Concurrence has 
noted: 
 
[The] imperfections related to market definition in certain contexts 
(differentiated products/geographic markets, two-sided markets, innovation, 
etc.) [have] long been recognised and the Authorité takes [them] into account 
in competition analysis. This second phase of assessment of the effects of 
the [merger or conduct] makes it possible to factor in the methodological 
difficulties of market definition.”71  
 
4.3 Collection and Processing of Consumer Data 
 
Problem: As explained in Chapter 2, data can confer a significant competitive advantage 
and raise barriers to entry. Efforts to have access to data, or lack of access to data, can 
effectively pose constraints on the behaviour of online firms, but a traditional market 
definition analysis is unsuited to capture them.  
 
To capture data-related constraints, Harbour and Koslov advanced the definition of 
‘markets for data’, in addition to the markets for the services that are enabled and 
																																																								
68 Padilla (n 39) 70, in the context of high-technology markets, proposes ‘to attribute a lesser role to the 
market definition exercise in the competitive assessment of markets.’ 
69 FTC and DOJ (n 10) s 4. 
70 OECD, ‘Two-Sided Markets’ (2009) 140 (United Kingdom’s submission). 
71 OECD, ‘Market Definition’ (n 14) 234–235 (France’s submission). 
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powered by such data.72 In particular, they contended that this approach to market 
definition would reflect the distinction between that collection at one point in time and 
subsequent expanded data usage, and also would recognise in a proper manner the high 
significance and value of growing datasets about consumers created from the operation of 
online services.73 More importantly perhaps, they noted that this approach would be 
consistent with online platform markets’ reality, as  
 
“Internet-based firms often derive great value from user data, far beyond the 
initial purposes for which the data initially might have been shared or 
collected, and this value often has important competitive consequences. In 
contrast, product market definitions based only on a snapshot of current 
data usage may not accurately capture this aspect of competition, especially 
in markets that exhibit network effects based on aggregations of data.”74  
 
Giving an example of a situation where it would have been useful to define an input 
market for data itself, these authors referred to the Google/DoubleClick merger, and 
suggested that even before the merger Google might have held a significant share in a 
hypothetical market for “data gathered via search”,75 and that Google’s acquisition of 
DoubleClick might have “substantially increased the likelihood that Google would acquire 
or maintain market power in that market”.76  
 
There is a lot to commend in this approach. First and foremost, it captures the 
competitive dynamics of an industry which a traditional market definition exercise would 
most likely miss. Traditional market definition can only address and identify competition 
for the services that are offered to users and advertisers on online platform markets, but it 
struggles to identify what occurs in the ‘background’: a race to gather as much data as 
possible to improve the quality and relevance of platform services. Secondly, a putative 
market for data could allow to appreciate a new dimension of market power (‘data market 
power’), since an online platform can reinforce its position by playing simultaneously in 
multiple parallel markets where it can collect additional data and verify, test and process it 
																																																								
72 Pamela Jones Harbour and Tara Isa Koslov, ‘Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An Expanded Vision of 
Relevant Product Markets’ (2010) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 769, 773. 
73 ibid. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid 784; These authors also suggested a ‘somewhat broader market', such as “data used for behavioral 
advertising”’, which would include not only search data, but also data gathered from other sources and 
applications that offer clues regarding consumer preferences. ibid 785.  
76 ibid 784. 
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to draw further insights,77 thereby deriving additional value far beyond the benefits arising 
from the original data collection. 
 
Best course of action: in spite of its conceptual appeal, the ‘market for data’ argument 
suffers from a fundamental flaw, which is given by the fact that a ‘market for data’ will be 
essentially fictional if data are not marketed to customers. As explained in Chapter 2,78 the 
main platform providers do not trade the data they collect; rather, they use it as an input 
for the provision of their respective services. Therefore, the ‘market for data’ concept fails 
to meet the most fundamental requirement for a market to exist, which is the presence of 
actual market transactions between suppliers and customers of a product.79 Since it is 
fictional and based on a theoretical misconception, its implementation may bring about 
more confusion than clarity.  
 
After all, data is an asset, and should be treated as such, for which reason its implications 
should be taken into consideration at later stages of the competitive assessment.  
 
4.4 Conclusions on Market Definition in Online Markets 
 
Market definition in online platform markets is admittedly more difficult than in 
traditional one-sided markets. However, its inherent difficulties are no compelling reason 
for competition agencies to dispense with a formal market definition stage,80 let alone to 
justify less intervention in online markets.81 Instead, they warrant a flexible approach that 
conceives a fluid and integrated analysis of market definition and market power capable of 
capturing all meaningful competitive constraints exerted on the firm or firms under 
scrutiny, including those left out of the market boundaries as a result of the unsuitability 
of the traditional market definition exercise to capture them.     
 
The challenges arising from multisidedness in conjunction with those stemming from 
product differentiation and innovation justify placing less importance on the precise 
boundaries of the market, and giving more relevance to substantive assessments of the 
																																																								
77 Zingales (n 27) 40. 
78 See Chapter 2 Section I.3.3.2.  
79 This criticism is shared by Darren S Tucker and Hill B Wellford, ‘Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data’ (2014) 
Antitrust Source 4. 
80 Louis Kaplow, ‘Why (Ever) Define Markets?’ (2010) 124 Harvard Law Review 437. 
81 See Chapter 1 Section III.1. 
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extent to which the products included in the relevant markets, distant substitutes not 
included therein but nevertheless important, the feedback effects between the platform’s 
different sides, the threat of disruptive innovation, and access or lack of access to 
consumer data constrain the behaviour of the undertaking or undertakings under scrutiny. 
As the UK Competition Authorities contended, “the precise boundaries of the relevant 
market may not be important, because a competitive effects analysis can take into 
accounts constraints [that lie] outside the market or market segmentation.” 
 
It is submitted that, to avoid false negatives, markets must be drawn as narrowly as 
possible, “identifying the smallest subset of products for which there is consumer 
demand.”82 However, to avoid false positives, the market definition challenges explained 
above must be duly accounted for in some point of the competitive analysis. In this way, 
it is acknowledged that a chosen market definition concerning a digital market may be less 
informative than in other cases, which circumstance is borne in mind at the assessment 
stage of competition analysis.  
 
5. Product Market Definition in Markets for Search Engines, Social 
Network and E-commerce Platforms  
 
5.1 Search Engines  
 
The Commission has defined search engines as “a tool designed to search for information 
on the Internet. It consists of a search box in which queries can be typed. The results of a 
given query are then usually presented in a ranked list of results.”83 As explained in 
Chapter 2,84 there are general or horizontal search engines, such as those operated by 
Google, Microsoft (Bing) and Yahoo, which are designed to render an exhaustive list of 
search results on any topic, and vertical search engines, which focus on specific categories 
of online content such as for instance travel, product, medical and legal, such as Kayak, 
NexTag, PogoFrog and Lexisnexis.  
 
																																																								
82 Zingales (n 27) 37. 
83 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (n 50) [30]. 
84 See Chapter 2 Section I.2. 
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When a user enters a search query in any general search engine, two types of results are 
rendered: ‘organic search results’ and ‘paid search results’.  
 
‘Organic search results’ are based on an index of the World Wide Web that is kept by 
relevant search engine, and delivered by algorithms that rank their likely relevance to the 
queries entered by users. Search engines permanently deploy ‘crawlers’ or ‘spiderbots’ that 
systematically search the web in order to construct an as comprehensive as possible 
picture (‘index’) thereof. The more comprehensive the index of a search engine is, the 
greater its competitive advantage over other search engines will be. Additionally, it must 
be reminded that search engines’ algorithms improve the more they are used. Therefore, 
the larger the user base (and the more data) a search engine has, the greater its possibilities 
to improve will be.  
 
On the other hand, search engines sell ‘paid search results’ or ‘search-based ads’ to 
advertisers, based on a ‘keyword bidding system’. According to this system, advertisers bid 
on search query terms referred to as ‘keywords’, such as for example ‘guitars’, ‘electric 
guitars’, or ‘Ibanez electric guitars’. Bids are placed on second-price auctions with reserve 
price,85 and advertisers are charged only when a user clicks on an ad (that is, they are 
charged on a ‘cost-per-click- or ‘CPC’ basis). However, the highest bid does not secure 
the highest slot (the first slot at the top of the search engine results page, or ‘SERP’). 
Given that search engines charge on a CPC basis, they need to consider the number of 
clicks an ad is likely to attract in order to maximise revenue. A search engine can earn 
more revenue if it places ads with lower CPC bids in higher slots insofar as such ads 
generate more clicks than ads with higher CPC bids. To this effect, search engines 
estimate the ‘click-through-rate’ (‘CTR’) for an ad as well as its relevance to viewers, 
which determines the ‘quality score’ for each bid. The ‘keyword bidding system’ in 
conjunction with the ‘quality score’ algorithm determine the CPC advertisers have to pay 
and the slots they are awarded. As in the case of search queries, having more advertisers 
(and consequently the adds they bring with them) increases the overall quality of ads by 
increasing the number of ‘ad choices’ to deliver.86 
																																																								
85 For a detailed discussion of these auctions see Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky and Michael 
Schwarz, ‘Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars’ Worth 
of Keywords’ (2005) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11765 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w11765>. 





Since search query and search advertising volume is of the essence to the performance of 
search engines, they compete to enter into search advertising intermediation agreements 
with website publishers.87 Through these agreements, search engines providers install a 
search box on the publishers’ websites, and whenever a user enters a query, in addition to 
the search results, also search ads are shown. When a user clicks on the search ad, both 
the search engine and the publisher split revenues.  
 
The main commercial search engines operate, partly, in a non-transaction multisided 
market. The platform serves Internet users on the one side and advertisers on the other, 
and no direct interactions between the two sides can be observed.88 Therefore, separate 
markets for the user and advertiser sides ought to be defined. The search platform also 
serves website publishers by crawling and indexing their websites’ content in organic 
search results; however, no market should be defined for this group of customers, 
because there is only a subtle interaction between website publishers and search engines89 
which is insufficient to justify the existence of an actual market.90 Instead of defining an 
artificial market for this group, the significance and comprehensiveness of the search 
engine’s index should be considered at the competitive assessment stage. Finally, some 
search engines also provide search advertising intermediation services. Since these services 
have a transactional nature, a single market must be delineated (rather than two separate 
markets for advertisers and website publishers).  
 
It is submitted that separate markets for online horizontal search, online search 
advertising and search advertising intermediation should be defined. Given that Google is 




87 Website or content publishers are basically any website having space to sell advertising.  
88 See above Section I.4.1.1. 
89 Website publishers use communication standards such as Robot Exclusion Protocols (REP) or XML to 
communicate to search engines about the content of their websites and the extent to which they want to be 
indexed and displayed in organic search results.  
90 Some authors sustain that a market for indexing web content should be defined. See for instance, Thomas 
Hoppner, ‘Defining Markets for Multi-Sided Platforms: The Case of Search Engines’ (2015) 38 World 
Competition 349, 365; Martin Herz, ‘Google Search and the Law on Dominance in the EU. An Assessment 
of the Compatibility of Current Methodology with Multi-Sided Platforms in Online Search’ (2014) SSRN 
paper 25–26 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497932>. 
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5.1.1 Horizontal Search 
 
Since search engines provide the online search service free of monetary charge, a 
quantitative SSNIP cannot be applied to determine demand-side substitution. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual side of the SSNIP test remains useful, and substitution 
analysis can be thought of in terms of the likely reaction of uses to a degradation of the 
main parameter of competition in this market: quality (i.e. a conceptual SSNDQ). This 
analysis can be complemented with evidence such as inter alia market surveys, functional 
substitutability and evidence of past substitution.    
 
The question to ask is, accordingly, to which services would Google’s users switch in case 
of a degradation of quality suffered by its search services? Logically, it would be expected 
that users switch to competing horizontal search engines, but it may be the case that some 
consumers decide to perform their searches somewhere else.  
 
It has been suggested that some vertical search engines compete fiercely with Google, for 
which reason they can be deemed viable substitutes and should be included in the same 
relevant market.91 It is submitted that this view is incorrect.  
 
Search queries serve different purposes, and can be classified in (i) informational, where 
the intent is to locate content concerning a particular topic in order to satisfy the need for 
information of the searcher (for example, “what does EBITDA mean?”); (ii) navigational, 
where the intent is to locate a specific website or location, whether it exists or not (for 
example, “where is Birmingham”, or “www.bbc.co.uk”); and (iii) transactional, where the 
intent is to locate a website with the goal of carrying out a transaction (for example, “price 
of Ibanez Jem guitar”).92 Whilst certain information of transactional nature such as for 
example, on products, flights or restaurants, can be found via both horizontal and vertical 
search engines, the lion’s share of search queries can be made on horizontal search 
engines only.93 As Wagner-von Papp observes, “[w]hile every search done on a vertical 
																																																								
91 See for example Andrea Renda, ‘Searching for Harm or Harming Search? A Look at the European 
Commission’s Antitrust Investigation against Google’ (2015) CEPS Special Report No. 118 27–28. 
92 See Bernard J Jansen, Danielle L Booth and Amanda Spink, ‘Determining the Informational, 
Navigational, and Transactional Intent of Web Queries’ (2008) 44 Information Processing & Management 
1251, 1256. 
93 It has been reported that transactional queries represent about 10% of all search queries. See Giacomo 
Luchetta, ‘Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market?’ (2014) 10 Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 185, 195; Jansen, Booth and Spink (n 92) 1251. 
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search engine can be done on a general search web engine, it is not possible to do a 
general search [on] a vertical search application.”94 Put in other words, there is only partial 
‘one-way’ substitution between horizontal and vertical search, which justifies the 
delineation of separate markets.95 
 
In addition, vertical search engines face great challenges to compete effectively with 
horizontal search engines, because comprehensive coverage of all topic areas constitutes a 
fundamental driver of demand. The paramount significance of comprehensive search 
results has been confirmed by Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt, who explained to the 
FTC that the search platform needs to build brand equity with its users by providing 
consistently relevant results regardless of the search query’s content, and that high quality 
(relevant) results across-the-board lead to specific queries in commercial search:  
 
“So if you, for example, are an academic researcher and you use Google 30 
times for your academics, then perhaps you’ll want to buy a camera… So 
long as the product is very, very, very, very good, people will keep coming 
back… The general products then creates the brand, creates demand and so 
forth. Then occasionally, these ads get clicked on.”96 
 
According to FTC staff, “Schmidt’s testimony is corroborated by the representations of 
several of the vertical search firms, who note that they are dependent on horizontal search 
providers for significant amounts of their traffic, because even many vertical search users 
tend to begin their search with a query on Google, Bing or Yahoo!”.97 Consequently, 
although vertical search engines exert competitive pressure on horizontal search 
providers, as they steal away from them mostly transactional search traffic which is the 
easiest to monetise, it seems that horizontal and vertical search are more complementary 
services rather than substitutes,98 for which reason a separate market for horizontal search 
should be defined.  
 
																																																								
94 Florian Wagner-von Papp, ‘Should Google’s Secret Sauce Be Organic?’ (2015) 16 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 1, 23. 
95 For example, in Microsoft (Tying), the Commission defined a separate market for streaming media players 
and media players having less functionalities, since ‘[w]hile a streaming media player is […] a substitute for 
media players which deliver less functionality, substitution the other way round is not readily available as 
less performing media players do not satisfy specific consumer demand, such as demand for streaming or 
for video playback.’ See Case COMP/C-3/37792, Microsoft I (2004) [415]; Similarly, see Case 
COMP/M2420, Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi (2004) [134]. 
96 FTC Staff (n 86) 66. 
97 ibid. 
98 Hoppner (n 90) 363. 
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5.1.2 Online Search Advertising 
 
Competition authorities largely agree on the existence of separate markets for both offline 
and online advertising.99 Within the segment of ‘online advertising’, it must be determined 
whether online search advertising constitutes a separate market from online display (non-
search) advertising. Search engines’ advertiser customers are charged a price to place their 
ads, so a quantitative SSNIP test, modified to account for feedbacks between the twos 
sides, seems in principle attractive to determine substitution. However, there are two 
major obstacles to the implementation of this test: firstly, as explained above,100 sufficient 
and good data to implement this test is very difficult to obtain, to the extent that to date 
no competition authority has implemented it, and secondly, any chosen benchmark price 
is likely to be arbitrary, as the ad placement fees charged under the second-price auction 
system vary from advertiser to advertiser (depending on their bids) and are subject to 
constant variations. Nevertheless, the conceptual side of the SSNIP can still be used. 
Accordingly, the relevant question to ask is whether a 5 to 10% increase in the price of 
search advertising by Google would shift the demand of its advertisers to non-search ads 
(aside from to competing platforms). 
    
It is unlikely that advertisers regard search and display advertising as substitutes. Their 
different objectives and targeting capabilities render substitution for one another rather 
limited. Firstly, search advertising aims to address immediate and real-time requests of 
users with a transactional content, 101  and “is intended to elicit a response from a 
consumer, such as the purchase of a product or signing up for a service.”102 It is 
considered “the most effective marketing ever”, 103  since it tends to “generate an 
immediate online buying act.”104 Conversely, display advertising is geared towards creating 
demand and building brand awareness.105 Confirming this lack of substitutability between 
search and display advertising, in a study on the competitive operation of online 
																																																								
99 The European Commission has made this distinction in several cases. See Case IV/JV1, 
Telia/Telenor/Schibsted (1998) [16]; Case COMP/M4731, Google/DoubleClick (2008) [56]; Microsoft/Yahoo! 
Search Business (n 50) [61]; Case COMP/M5932, News Corp/BSkyB (2010) [262–268]; Case COMP/M7217, 
Facebook/WhatsApp (2014) [75]; Similarly, see Autorité de la Concurrence, ‘Opinion No. 10-A-29 on the 
Competitive Operation of Online Advertising’ (2010) 24. 
100 See above Section I.4.1.2. 
101 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (n 50) [66]. 
102 FTC Staff (n 86) 10. 
103 ibid. 
104 Autorité de la Concurrence (n 99) 28. 
105 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (n 50) [66]. 
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advertising, the Autorite de la Concurrence observed that several advertisers were 
unanimous in stating that “purchasing [search ads] does little to meet the communication 
needs of brand renown, because the expressions options are confined to text, [and] it is 
hard to construct image and renown with searches alone.”106 The different objectives 
pursued by both types of advertising has been ratified by Google’s chief economist Hal 
Varian: “[o]ne way to think about the difference between search and display/brand 
advertising is to say that ‘search ads help [to] satisfy demand’ while ‘brand advertising 
helps to create demand”.107 
 
In the FTC investigation into Google’s alleged anticompetitive practices, FTC staff found 
that Google’s internal documents and testimony confirm that there is no viable substitute 
for search ads.108 FTC staff observed that “[b]oth AdWords vice-president of product 
management Nick Fox and chief economist Hal Varian have previously stated that search 
advertising spend does not come at the expense of other advertising dollars. And former 
Google CEO Eric Schmidt has twice testified unequivocally […] that search advertising is 
‘the most effective tool for reaching the customers that are actually prepared to buy’, and 
‘has the best ROI of any advertising as best we can determine’”.109 These findings are 
confirmed by the Autorite de la Concurrence:  
 
“[t]he answers to the Autorite’s questions concerning a rise in the price of 
the AdWords service bear out the fact that few advertisers would want to 
reallocate a significant portion of their advertising expenditure on search-
based ads were there to be a moderate increase in the price of this type of 
advertising. It thus confirms the limitations of substitutability between 
search-based ads and other types of advertising.”110 
 
In Google/DoubleClick,111 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business,112 Comcast/NBC Universal113 and 
Facebook/WhatsApp,114 the European Commission assessed whether search and non-search 
advertising constitute separate markets, but left the precise market definition open. 
Notably, it observed in Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business that “a significant number of 
																																																								
106 Autorité de la Concurrence (n 99) 28. 
107 Hal Varian, quoted in FTC Staff (n 86) 70. 
108 ibid 72. 
109 ibid. See page 146 of this report for numerous statements from Google’s executives and advertisers 
noting lack of substitution between search and display advertising.  
110 Autorité de la Concurrence (n 99) 34. 
111 Google/DoubleClick (n 99) [48 et seq.]. 
112 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (n 50) [62 et seq.]. 
113 Case COMP/M5779, Comcast/NBC Universal (2010) [46]. 
114 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 99) [74 et seq.]. 
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respondents believe that search advertising is a market in its own right that cannot be 
grouped together with any other online advertising activity.” 115  More recently, the 
Commission observed:  
 
“The market investigation also supported to a large extent the existence of a 
further sub-segmentation of the online advertising market between search 
and non-search advertising. Indeed, the majority of the advertisers who took 
part in the market investigation considered that search and non-search ads 
are not substitutable as they serve different purposes (for search ads, mainly 
generating direct user traffic to the merchant’s website, while, for non-search 
ads, mainly building brand awareness) and, as a result, most advertisers 
would not be likely to switch from one type to another in the event of a 5-
10% price increase. Similarly, the majority of the competitors who took part 
in the market investigation submitted that search and non-search ads are not 
substitutable from an advertiser's point of view.”116   
 
FTC staff arrived to the same conclusion in its Google investigation,117 as well as other 
competition authorities around the world.118 Although the definition of separate markets 
for search and non-search advertising is of course not without detractors,119 the distinction 
is well grounded in considerations of substitutability, technical differences, and special 
characteristics of demand, for which reason a separate market for search advertising is 
justified.   
 
5.1.3 Search Advertising Intermediation (or Syndication)  
 
The consumers in this market are website publishers that want to provide search services 
and return search advertisements on their websites (‘syndication partners’), and the sellers 
are horizontal search engines. Through this service, “if a user clicks on an advertisement 
																																																								
115 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (2010) (n 50) [71]. 
116 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 99) [76]. 
117 FTC Staff (n 86) 72. 
118 Autorité de la Concurrence (n 99) 30 ‘It follows from all the foregoing that display is not a close 
substitute for search-based ads and therefore cannot be deemed to be part of the same market.’; Australian 
Competition & Consumer Commission, ‘Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc - Proposed Search Engine 
Agreement’ (2009) 
<http://registers.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/903283/fromItemId/751043>, noting a 
separate national market for the supply of ‘online paid search advertising’; Canadian Competition Bureau, 
‘Archived — Google Inc. Terminates Advertising Agreement with Yahoo! Inc. in Canada’ (2008) 
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02746.html>, noting concerns of the 
proposed deal on Internet search advertising in Canada.  
119 See for example James D Ratliff and Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘Online Advertising: Defining Relevant 
Markets’ (2010) 6 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 653, and Catherine Tucker and Alexander 
Marthews, ‘Social Networks, Advertising, and Antitrust’ (2011) 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1211. It is worth 
mentioning that these articles received funding from Google.  
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provided in response to a search on the partner’s Web site, the search engine shares the 
revenues it generates from the click with the syndication partner.”120 
 
The obstacles to apply a quantitative two-sided SSNIP to delineate the boundaries of this 
market are same as those explained in the preceding section. Nevertheless, substitution 
can be determined based on other available evidence.  
 
In the FTC investigation into Google, FTC staff interviewed several publishers of 
different sizes, and they provided “very consistent responses on the issue of cross-
elasticity of demand.”121 In particular, the publishers reported that search and search 
advertising syndication is more effective in monetisation terms than display advertising or 
any other content they might include on their websites, and that they do not view other 
types of advertising as viable substitutes for search and search advertising syndication.122 
More importantly, none of the publishers told the FTC Staff that “a modest (5 to 10 
percent increase) in the price for search and search advertising syndication would cause 
them to shift away from search and search advertising syndication in favour of other 
forms of advertising or web content.”123 In addition, FTC staff observed that Google had 
been deploying significant efforts to reduce the amounts of revenue it shares with website 
publishers from search intermediation services, and that “Google’s successful efforts to 
systematically reduce revenue share constitutes a natural experiment to determine the 
likely response to a SSNIP.”124 Observing that of the interviewed website publishers none 
reduced or ceased to use search and search advertising syndication in response to these 
price increases, FTC staff concluded that “[t]he publishers’ response to Google’s price 
increases has been universally consistent with the proposition that search and search 
advertising syndication (search intermediation) is a relevant market”.125 
 
The Commission has recently confirmed this separate market. In 2016, the Commission 
sent to Google a Statement of Objections on restrictions that the company has placed on 
the ability of certain third party websites to display search advertisements from Google's 
competitors. According to the Commission, these restrictions have been imposed in the 
																																																								
120 DOJ, ‘Yahoo! Inc. and Google Inc. Abandon Their Advertising Agreement’ (2008) 
<https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-981.html>. 







‘market for search advertising intermediation’, where Google operates through its 
‘AdSense for Search’ platform.126  
 
5.2  Social Networks 
 
Social network platforms have been defined as “web-based services that allow individuals 
to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a 
list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list 
of connections and those made by others within the system.”127 Although social network 
platforms’ functionalities vary significantly and are permanently evolving as a result of 
constant innovation, their most common and defining feature consists of visible ‘user 
profiles’ that display a list of ‘friends’ who are also users of the platform.128 In addition to 
the profile and list of friends functionalities, other important features include the 
exchanging of messages (one-to-one, one-to-group or one-to-many), sharing information 
(by posting pictures, videos or links), commenting on postings and recommending 
friends, although a site does not have to include all of these features in order to qualify as 
a social network.129  
 
Social networks are highly differentiated. For example, LinkedIn has an essentially 
professional orientation, whilst Twitter’s mean feature is the sharing of short text 
messages (‘tweets’) with any user that decides to ‘follow you’. Additionally, there is an 
even greater number of more specialised social network sites that revolve around age 
(Kidzworld.com), language or nationality (Orkut, with great presence in Brazil and 
Estonia), music (Ping.com), news (Reddit.com) or other aspects of identify or affiliation 
(such as CafeMom.com for mothers or Ravelry.com for people interested in knitting).130 
Moreover, social network platforms engage in continuous development of new product 
or service features,  a large amount of which is done with the aid of third parties.131 For 
																																																								
126 European Commission, ‘Press Release - Antitrust: Commission Takes Further Steps in Investigations 
Alleging Google’s Comparison Shopping and Advertising-Related Practices Breach EU Rules’ (2016) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2532_en.htm>. 
127 M Boyd Danah and Nicole B Ellison, ‘Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship’ (2007) 
13 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 210, 211. 
128 ibid. 
129 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 99) [51]. 
130 Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Antitrust and Social Networking’ (2012) 90 NCL Rev. 1771, 1777–1778. 
131 Devi R Gnyawali, Weiguo Fan and James Penner, ‘Competitive Actions and Dynamics in the Digital 




example, the market leader Facebook had over 9 million integrated third-party apps in 
2012.132 These applications “are valuable strategic assets for the firm because they help 
enrich customers’ experiences and retain existing customers.”133 
 
As users pay no fee to use the platform, social networks derive their profits mostly from 
display advertising. Advertising on social networks takes different forms, and the ad 
targeting capabilities vary depend on the richness of platform’s user base.134 
 
Since the main social networks are essentially advertisement-supported media platforms, 
they operate in a two-sided non-transactional market, catering users on one side and 
advertisers on the other. As a result, separate markets must be delineated for each of these 
groups. In addition, some social networks like Facebook operate as a software platform 
which developers are able to use to create ‘applications’ that plug seamlessly into the 
social network’s website, thereby accessing users. Since software platforms have a 
transactional nature, as there are observable transactions between members of two 
different groups of customers,135 only one market for the software platform should in 
theory be defined (rather than two markets for users and application developers). 
However, since the market defined for the user side overlaps with the market for social 
network software platforms to a great extent (as they refer essentially to the same service 
and both include the platform´s user base), for ease of analysis, only markets for the user 
and advertiser side will be defined, while the competitive implications of the third group 
of customers (application developers) will be taken into consideration at the stage of the 
competitive assessment.136 
 
It is therefore submitted that separate markets for social networking services and display 
advertising should be distinguished. It must be noted, however, that a precise definition 
																																																								
132 Brittany Darwell, ‘Facebook Platform Supports More than 42 Million Pages and 9 Million Apps – 
Adweek’ (2012) Adweek <http://www.adweek.com/digital/facebook-platform-supports-more-than-42-
million-pages-and-9-million-apps/?red=if>. 
133 Gnyawali, Fan and Penner (n 131) 597. 
134 See below Sections I.5.2.2 and II.5.2. 
135 Developers make available the applications through Facebook and users download these applications to 
integrate them in their respective profiles. 
136 This was the approach followed by the Commission in Microsoft I: it defined a single market for Client PC 
Operating Systems, and considered the competitive implications of app developers in later stages of the 
competitive analysis, coining the term ‘applications barrier to entry’ to describe the positive feedback loop 
between the operating system’s both sides. See Microsoft I (n 95) [459]. 
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on both sides is likely to be impossible, as there are different degrees of substitution 
between different kinds of social networks and advertising formats.  
 
5.2.1 Social Networking Services 
 
It must be noted from the outset that social networking services are only available online, 
and do not have readily identifiable substitutes in brick-and-mortar businesses.137  
 
As in the case of the market for horizontal search engines, absence of monetary prices 
and quality- and innovation-based competition render the implementation of a 
quantitative test to define markets impracticable. Consequently, substitution must be 
determined based on other evidence and criteria. 
 
In LiveUniverse v. Myspace,138 the plaintiff argued that the defendant operated in the market 
for Internet-based social networking. Myspace attempted to include other types of 
websites that allow interaction between users in the relevant market, but the California 
Central District Court disagreed, arguing that:  
 
“Internet connectivity services are not reasonable substitutes, because their 
primary function is simply to give users the ability to access the Internet. As 
to online dating sites, although they do have similar “organic, interactive 
qualities” to social networking websites, their dominant function and 
purpose is to enable users to meet potential dates. Online dating sites are not 
reasonable substitutes for social networking websites, because the latter 
websites have significantly more functions and appeal than do online dating 
sites. For example, social networking websites are used to get in touch with 
old friends and to keep current friends informed about what’s new and 
exciting. Although social networking websites may also be used for dating, if 
MySpace suddenly were to shut down, its members would not fill the 
social void by turning to online dating sites. Instead, they would likely 
set up profiles on a different social networking website” (emphasis 
added).139 
 
In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission observed that there is certain overlap of 
functionalities between social networking services and consumer communication apps, 
																																																								
137 Jared Kagan, ‘Bricks, Mortar, and Google: Defining the Relevant Antitrust Market for Internet-Based 
Companies’ (2010) 55 NYL Sch. L. Rev. 271, 290. 
138 LiveUniverse, Inc v Myspace, Inc, CV 06-6994 AHM, 2007 WL 6865852 (CD Cal 2007). 
139 ibid 9. 
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but that nevertheless there are significant differences between them.140 In particular, social 
networking services tend to offer a richer social experience than consumer 
communication apps (such as Skype or WhatsApp), their messages are not expected to be 
responded to in real time, and they enable communication and information sharing with a 
wider audience than consumer applications apps. 141  Perhaps more importantly, the 
Commission contended that social networking services can be further segmented based 
on their intended use. It argued that “[r]espondents to the market investigation generally 
consider that a distinction could be drawn between social networking services promoting 
interpersonal contact for private and entertainment purposes (such as Facebook and 
Google+) and services which are used for professional purposes (such as LikedIn or 
Xing).”142 Regrettably, the Commission left the exact boundaries of the market for social 
networking services open, as it considered that the merger under investigation would not 
give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market.143  
 
It is submitted that (online) social networking services constitute a separate market144 
which does not include other services such as online dating sites, consumer 
communication apps or other internet connectivity services. This is because although 
certain websites like for instance YouTube, Pinterest or eHarmony offer functionalities 
that are also provided by social networking websites, most notably the possibility of 
interaction with other users and sharing content, they essentially constitute different 
products from the users’ point of view, are used in different ways, and furthermore are 
accessed by users at the same time. As a result, these other sites or services are 
complements rather than substitutes, for which reason should not be included in the same 
relevant market.  
 
Moreover, the fact that different sites fall within the definition of ‘social network’ does 
not necessarily mean that they are competitors in the same relevant market. Social 
networking sites differ largely in terms of inter alia offered functionalities and user 
interfaces, as a result of which they may be also perceived as different services in the eyes 
of consumers. For example, Twitter is specialised in the communication of short 
																																																								
140 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 99) [52–53]. 
141 ibid [54–56]. 
142 ibid [59]. 
143 ibid [62]. 




messages, Instagram in the publication of photographs, and Facebook offers more 
extensive ways to draw users’ attention to different contents like inter alia postings, 
messages, photos, videos and ‘social ads’. Consequently, “depending on the specific 
perspective selected, services such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram cannot be attributed 
to the same market, or only to a restricted degree.”145 Accordingly, different markets for 
specialised social networking websites revolving around specific personal interests or user 
engagement could in theory be defined, depending on the actual degree of demand-side 
substitutability between different social networks.  
 
It is thus posited that a market for general social networking services (promoting 
interpersonal contact for private and entertaining purposes146) is an independent product 
market. This market includes the platforms that offer the most comprehensive social 
experience, such as Facebook, Google+ and Myspace. Specialised social networks should 
be included in separate markets, as they are commonly used in conjunction with (rather 
than instead of) general social networking platforms;147 that is to say, they are complement 
rather than substitute products. At any rate, any competitive pressure exerted by 
specialised social networks upon general social networks ought to be considered at the 
stage of the competitive assessment. 
 
5.2.2 Non-search Advertising (Display/Social Ads) 
 
As explained above, there are two main types of online advertising: search-based 
advertising and display advertising. Display advertising refers to banners and videos that 
are shown next to content on websites, emails and in-game advertising.148 As already 
discussed, search-based advertising is likely to constitute a product market on its own. 
Similarly, display advertising is likely to be an independent product market as well. In 
support of this conclusion, the Commission has observed that “when a publisher decides 
to allocate a given space on a web page to a non-search (e.g. display) ad, this would not be 
																																																								
145 Monopolkommission, ‘Special Report 68: Competition Policy: The Challenge of Digital Markets’ (2015) 
72 <http://www.monopolkommission.de/index.php/en/reports/special-reports/284-special-report-68>. 
146 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 99) [59]. 
147 [Some social networks] are specialised services which serve a specific market niche by virtue of 
concentrating on a specific user group such as professionals (LinkedIn and Xing) or stressing a specific 
functionality such as sharing images (Instagram), and are hence regarded by users more as complementary 
services. Monopolkommission (n 145) 73. 
148 CMA, ‘The Commercial Use of Consumer Data – Report on the CMA’s Call for Information’ (2015) 53. 
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substitutable with a “search generated” advertising space”,149 and that “the majority of 
advertisers who took part in the [Facebook/WhatsApp] investigation considered that 
search and [display] ads are not substitutable.”150 
 
Social ads are commonly considered as part of display advertising.151 However, there is a 
growing perception amongst advertisers in the sense that social ads are not substitutable 
with other types of display advertising. In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission explored 
the possibility of defining a separate product market for display advertising services on 
social networking sites, but did not reach a final conclusion. In particular, it noted that a 
number of respondents considered that other types of display advertising are not as 
effective as advertising on social networks and notably on Facebook, on account of 
Facebook’s “large and highly engaged audience and its ad targeting opportunities”, but 
that other respondents were of the opinion that many other advertising platforms offering 
display ads are equally effective.152  
  
There is a very compelling case to consider social advertising as a separate product 
market. In this type of advertising on social networks, advertisers have very detailed 
knowledge about their audience, in the manner of likes, friends, interests, time spent 
online and location, for which reason targeting capabilities, and therefore ad effectiveness, 
are enhanced to a significant extent.153 In addition, social ads are seen as ‘walled gardens’, 
with the website publisher (the social network) providing an end-to-end solution 
comprising the entire necessary infrastructure to buy, insert and analyse campaign 
performance.154 The enhanced targeted possibilities and end-to-end solution is likely to 
yield superior ad click-through-rates155 and provide a unique customer experience which 
may prove unsubstitutable from the advertisers’ point of view. Conversely, the ‘general’ 
display advertising market is highly fragmented, where the entire process from campaign 
																																																								
149 Google/DoubleClick (n 99) [52]. 
150 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 99) [76]. 
151 Tucker and Marthews (n 119) 1215. 
152 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 99) [77]. 
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155 Some authors have already presented evidence on the greater effectiveness of social ads relative to 
regular display advertising. See Catherine Tucker, ‘Social Advertising: How Advertising That Explicitly 
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planning to execution and performance tracking require the participation of multiple 
players. Indeed, display ads are inserted on webpages through a highly complex process of 
real-time bidding, typically on an ad exchange, that involves the participation of inter alia 
data management platforms (DMP), ad servers, ad networks and supply-side platforms 
(SSPs), which ultimately entails “an overly complicated mix of vendors, with each 
delivering part of the solution, often requiring the customer to put the various parts 
together into an integrated solution.”156  
 
5.3 Online Marketplaces  
 
Online marketplaces (also known as e-commerce platforms or online trading platforms) 
are MSPs through which online dealers and consumers are able to interact, thus making it 
possible to match supply and demand.157 They are essentially intermediaries that help 
buyers meet sellers of different kind of products. Just like the platforms analysed in the 
preceding sections, trading platforms are also significantly differentiated. Some platforms 
such as eBay or Amazon offer a broad and comprehensive range of products, whilst other 
platforms specialise in a limited product range, such as Etsy (homemade goods), Newegg 
(electronic sellers), Alibaba (wholesalers) or Shopify (online stores). Moreover, some 
platforms serve a third group of customers: advertisers. In addition, trading platforms are 
also differentiated in terms of website design, payment options and rating systems.158 
Online marketplaces only charge sellers for consummated transactions, although some 
platforms such as Amazon and Etsy also charge listing fees.159  
 
Since e-commerce platforms are transactional by definition,160 one relevant market must 
be defined, instead of one market for sellers and another for buyers. In addition, some e-
commerce platforms serve a third group of customers: advertisers. As seen above, 
advertising-supported media is a type of non-transactional market, and as such, two 
different markets for users and advertisers must be defined.  
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5.3.1 Online Marketplaces 
 
It is firstly necessary to determine whether online trading (or ‘e-commerce’) is a market in 
its own right separate from brick-and-mortar retailing, or whether e-commerce is 
essentially a new channel in competition with traditional retailing. On account of the fact 
that online shoppers have lower search costs and are able to more easily compare prices 
and products of different sellers than offline consumers; that consumers are not 
geographically confined anymore, but rather they can order from any location worldwide; 
that online retailers are able to maintain lower inventory and save the costs of maintaining 
a brick and mortar store, which determines a diametrically different cost structure (in 
terms of variable versus fixed costs and with respect to cost level); and that data mining 
and big data analytics enable retailers to better price discriminate and to research and 
monitor the competitors’ pricing,161 it is possible to argue that online trading may be a 
separate product market from traditional retailing. The question of whether online trading 
is a complement to or a substitute for traditional trading, however, is not likely to have a 
general answer, as it depends on national preferences, the product at hand and its 
characteristics, for which reason no generalisations can be made. Indeed, online retailing 
varies strongly depending on the product categories at hand. For example, products 
falling within the “music” and “laptop/tablet” categories have a high percentage of sales 
online (65% and 36% respectively), whilst those in the “make-up” and “groceries” 
categories have a low one (19% and 3% respectively).162 Accordingly, this evaluation must 
be made on a case-by-case basis.163  
 
With regard to online trading platforms, it is of the essence to be clear as to what is the 
service they offer. Taking the example of eBay, as a transactional platform that caters two 
groups of customers thereby matching demand and supply, what eBay truly sells is access 
to a transaction.164 eBay is not a retailer (it does not sell any products), nor does it provide 
parcel delivery services.  
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The problem is, however, that from the buyers’ point of view, their demand can be for 
the intermediary service that is provided by the online trading platform, or the actual 
products that are offered on it. In the former case, all platforms and portals offering 
intermediary services for selling/purchasing products should be in theory included in the 
relevant market, i.e. other online trading platforms, online shopping malls and price 
comparison portals.165 Conversely, where the buyer side demands the actual products (and 
not the intermediary activity), the aforementioned undertakings compete also with other 
Internet dealers and retailers, and even brick-and-mortar shops. Similarly, from the sellers’ 
standpoint, they have the option to use the intermediary services provided by an online 
trading platform or other intermediaries, or alternatively, to trade directly via a proprietary 
online shop. In the first case, as on the buyer side, the relevant market will comprise 
online trading platforms, online shopping malls and price comparison sites. On the other 
hand, where the demanded product is the possibility to deal directly with consumers, the 
relevant market should in principle include all alternatives to trading via online 
intermediaries, i.e. online shops.166 
 
Therefore, the relevant question to ask is whether in a specific case intermediated 
transactions (transactions consummated through online marketplaces) are constrained by 
direct transactions (without the intervention of a platform). If the answer is affirmative, 
candidate substitute products will include other trading platforms that offer the possibility 
to transact on both sides, and also non-intermediated trading, such as online retail 
transactions consummated on online shops. As the Monopolkommission observes, an 
online trading platform “is not a market in its own right since it competes with other 
trading platforms from both the buyer’s as well as the seller’s perspective, and under 
certain circumstances with other providers which enable the sale and purchase of a 
product that is in demand.”167 
 
To determine whether intermediated transactions have close substitutes, it is advisable to 
analyse the platform’s different sides separately. In the eBay/Gmarket merger case, noting 
that the proposed transaction would have a different impact upon sellers and buyers, the 
Korean Federal Trade Commission (‘KFTC’) analysed substitution possibilities for both 
sides independently. The KFTC observed that both merging parties operated in the 
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‘Internet open market’, described as an “online market place where anyone can sell or 
purchase goods through the Internet for a certain amount of sales commission.”168  On 
the buyer side, the KFTC observed that online shopping malls were close substitutes for 
Internet open markets, given that consumers do not distinguish open markets from web-
based shopping malls when shopping online, and they can easily switch purchase between 
the two. By contrast, on the seller side, the KFTC reached the conclusion that there were 
no substitutes for Internet open markets, since when sellers attempt to switch their online 
sales venue from an open market to an online shopping mall, they must undergo a very 
strict review process, in addition to the fact that both types of marketplaces apply 
different fees and conceive different payment procedures, thus indicating weak 
substitutability.169  
 
Notably, the KFTC did not consider proprietary online stores and shops as close 
substitutes for online trading platforms and online shopping malls, because the consumer 
experience is significantly different, and substitution is likely to be ‘one-way’. E-
marketplaces like eBay (essentially a matchmaker) and Amazon (a matchmaker and 
retailer) are characterised by having remarkably comprehensive catalogues, 
communication channels with different vendors, buyer and seller protection programmes, 
reviews and rating systems, and other ancillary services, as opposed to online dealers 
which by definition are specialised in narrow product categories and do not provide the 
consumer experience online marketplaces do. For the same reason, there is just limited 
substitution between an online trading platform and a specialised online dealer, since 
whilst a whole universe of purchasing possibilities are given by the former, only few 
purchases can be made on the latter. As Phillips et al. observe, “there might be some other 
specialized auction niches available, but eBay offers nearly any product available.”170 In 
addition, small retailers cannot afford wide-reaching advertising campaigns and may find 
it expensive to buy search ads in order to be featured in the sponsored section of search 
engines’ results, for which reason their online shops will lack the necessary traffic to be 
viable.171 This lack of traffic further limits substitutability between retailers’ proprietary 
online shops and online marketplaces and shopping malls.  
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Therefore, a broad market for online marketplaces (which includes online trading 
platforms, online shopping malls and price comparison portals) can be firstly 
distinguished. It does not follow, however, that undertakings active in that market do not 
feel competitive pressure from specialised online dealers and even brick-and-mortar 
shops; rather, substitution from the point of view of consumers, especially sellers, is 
limited, and for which reason the competitive constraints exerted by these players ought 
to be considered at the stage of the competitive assessment.    
 
Finally, it must be noted that substitution possibilities are also dependent on the specific 
goods being traded (for example new vs. second-hand products) and the respective sale 
format (for instance fixed price/ auction). For example, second-hand products are sold 
almost exclusively on online trading platforms. This circumstance limits sellers’ 
substitution possibilities for selling this kind of goods. Indeed, “[m]ost goods traded on 
eBay are second-hand.”172 In addition, whether a product is sold on an auction or at a 
fixed price also affects substitution possibilities. Auction format listings, one of eBay’s 
most significant innovations, in which a seller selects a minimum price for opening bids 
with the option to set a reserve price for the item (which is the minimum price at which 
the seller is willing to sell the item) has been described by eBay as a “distinctive forum 
with an auction format [that] creates a sense of urgency among buyers to bid for goods 
and creates an entertaining and compelling trading environment”. 173  This specialised 
method of selling gives rise to a near perfect marketplace for which there are no close 
substitutes.174 Indeed, in In Re eBay Seller Antitrust Litigation175 the record demonstrated that 
“eBay employees, industry analysts, potential competitors such as Yahoo!, and Internet 
bloggers all recognize the online auction market as a separate economic entity distinct 
from the fixed-price format.”176 Accordingly, narrow markets can be distinguished on this 
basis. As the Monopolkomission observes:  
 
“there are indications that it is possible to define a separate market for online 
auctions of used products, differentiated according to groups of goods. This 
emerges from the fact that, first, there are no adequate substitutes outside 
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the internet, and that, second, the auction format may be more attractive for 
the sale of used goods than fixed prices, in particular for private individuals, 
because there frequently are no market prices.”177 
 
5.3.2 Display Advertising 
 
Some online trading platforms are also active in the display advertising market.178 For 
example, according to eBay, its first-party data produces a deep understanding on users’ 
shopping intent, which allows the platform to deliver personalised ads to ‘the right 
audience at the right time.’179 
  




As explained above, market definition is not an end in itself, but an important tool to 
carry out a detailed competitive assessment in light of the specific circumstances of each 
case. In Article 102 TFEU proceedings, such assessment begins with the assessment of 
dominance.  
 
In EU Competition Law, dominance is “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the 
relevant market by affording it the power to behave, to an appreciable extent, 
independently of its competitors, its customers, and ultimately of the consumers.”180 The 
Commission has clarified that the notion of independence is related to the degree of 
competitive constraints exerted on the firm under scrutiny; dominance entails that said 
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firm is not constrained or is barely constrained by competitive pressure, and hence that it 
enjoys substantial market power over a period of time.181 
 
2. Dominance and Multisided Platforms 
 
The need to take into account the interactions between the different sides of a multisided 
platform in the competitive analysis under Article 101 TFEU was recently endorsed by 
the CJEU in Cartes Bancaires.182 The CJEU held that, to assess whether coordination 
between undertakings is by nature harmful to the proper functioning of normal 
competition, it is necessary to take into consideration  
 
“all relevant aspects – having regard, in particular, to the nature of the 
services at issue, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and 
structure of the markets – of the economic or legal context in which that 
coordination takes place, it being immaterial whether or not such an aspect 
relates to the relevant market. 
 
That must be the case, in particular, when that aspect is the taking into 
account of interactions between the relevant market and a different related 
market […] and, all the more so, when, as in the present case, there are 
interactions between the two facets of a two-sided system.” (emphasis 
added). 183 
 
Even though this case did not include any assessment of dominance, the spirit of the 
CJEU’s statements quoted above can be readily transposed to assessments under Article 
102 TFEU and be interpreted as mandating that the link and interdependences between 
the sides of the multisided platform under investigation be considered in the assessment 
of whether such platform holds a dominant position in any of the relevant markets 
already defined. This is the approach that will be followed below.184     
 
Moving on to the assessment of dominance itself, the Commission explains that such 
assessment takes into account the competitive structure of the market, and especially (i) 
the market position of the dominant undertaking and its competitors; (ii) constraints 
imposed by the credible threat of future expansion by actual competitors or entry by 
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potential competitors; and (iii) countervailing buyer power.185 The first step presupposes 
the definition of the relevant market and the calculation of market shares. The following 
steps entail an analysis of the barriers to entry and expansion and other factors that may 
constrain the behaviour of the dominant firm.  
 
3. Market Shares  
 
The size of an undertaking’s market share in absolute terms and relative to those of its 
competitors is commonly the starting point in the assessment of market power.186 Market 
shares have been traditionally used as a proxy of market power. The CJEU has held that 
“very large shares [above 50 per cent] are in themselves, and save in exceptional 
circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position”,187 and the Commission 
has noted that dominance is not likely if an undertaking’s market share is below 40% in 
the relevant market, although market power may still be found with shares under that 
threshold.188 
 
Market definition and market share analysis provide very useful information on the 
competitive constraints an undertaking faces, as well as on the competitive landscape 
where it operates. However, under no circumstance should this analysis be considered as a 
proxy for a proper competitive assessment. As explained above, 189  in industries 
characterised by dynamic competition, product differentiation and multisided markets, 
delineating a clear boundary to distinguish products that are ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the markets is 
a utopian effort, and since market shares depend on the choice of where that boundary is 
precisely located, relying on market shares without considering other evidence in such 
markets is likely to lead to arbitrary results. Moreover, in markets where barriers to entry 
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186 Jones and Sufrin (n 35) 62. 
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Furthermore, dynamic industries where firms compete for the market rather than in the 
markets are by definition characterised by an incumbent with a large market share. 
However, such high market share is not necessarily a reflection of market power, as 
incumbents need to innovate constantly so as not to be leapfrogged by innovative 
newcomers.190 The General Court confirmed this view in Cisco, where it held that the 
consumer communications sector 
 
“is a recent and fast-growing sector which is characterised by short 
innovation cycles in which large market shares may turn out to be 
ephemeral. In such a dynamic context, high market shares are not necessarily 
indicative of market power and, therefore, of lasting damage to 
competition.”191 
 
In view of the above, market share analysis can be used as a preliminary screening 
mechanism to rule out cases in which the presence of market power seems unlikely.192 By 
contrast, if market definition is problematic (as is likely to be the case in online platform 
markets) and one or more candidate markets yield large market shares that have remained 
stable or increased over a considerable period of time, then such market shares can be 
deemed a preliminary sign of market power that warrants further analysis.  
 
4. Barriers to Entry and Expansion 
 
When entry or expansion is easy, market power is unlikely to be durable. Determining the 
likelihood of entry and expansion, accordingly, plays a fundamental role in the assessment 
of dominance (and market power in general).  
 
The Commission explains that an undertaking can be deterred from exercising market 
power if expansion or entry is likely, timely and sufficient. Expansion or entry will be 
likely if it is sufficiently profitable for the competitor or entrant; for it to be timely, it must 
be sufficiently swift to deter or defeat the exercise of substantial market power; and for it 
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to be sufficient, it must be of a magnitude enough as to be able to deter any attempt to 
exercise market power by the firm under analysis.193 
 
In the end, the relevant question is whether entry or expansion poses a credible 
competitive constraint on the incumbent.194 In online markets, the extent to which such a 
competitive constraint is credible depends largely, but not exclusively, on the following 
factors: 
 
- Direct and indirect network effects 
- Parallel use of multiple services  
- Switching costs  
- Access to data – data-driven economies of scale, scope and speed, trial-and-error 
effects and spillovers   
- Strength of dynamic competition 
 
Focusing on these factors and taking into consideration meaningful competitive 
constraints that lie outside the relevant markets defined above,195 the next section analyses 
whether Google, Facebook and eBay hold a dominant position therein. 
 
5. Assessment of Dominance of Google, Facebook and eBay 
 
5.1  Google 
 
The Commission has observed that in the horizontal search market “Google has a market 
share of over 90% in the European Economic Area (EEA).”196 Similarly, it has been 
reported that Google’s share of paid search in the EU was 82% in 2015.197 Finally, the 
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Commission recently observed that Google has had a market share around 80% in the last 
ten years in the market for search advertising intermediation.198   
 
A group of commentators calls into question the informative value of the 
abovementioned market shares199 on account of the difficulties affecting market definition 
in online platform industries.200 However, it would be only possible to entirely dismiss the 
informative value of market shares in these markets if such market shares had noticeably 
shifted over time, or in the words of the General Court in Cisco, if said market shares were 
‘ephemeral’.201 Yet, this is not the case of Google: since 2002 its market shares in the 
aforementioned markets have been consistently on the rise, and as the Commission has 
observed, the longer the period of time a high market share is held, “the more likely it is 
that it constitutes an important preliminary indication of the existence of a dominant 
position.”202 It must be emphasised that Google’s dominant position cannot be inferred 
from the referred market shares; rather, these large shares serve as a preliminary check of 
market power.  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, on the user side, search engines compete primarily on the basis 
of quality, that is, the capacity to deliver the most relevant results in response to search 
queries. Relevance is dependent to a significant extent upon scale and learning-by-doing. 
More queries allow the search engine to engage in experimentation aimed at improving 
the relevance of its results. Search engines have the ability to observe what are the links 
that are more frequently clicked on by users after entering a specific search query, and if 
many users click on a link that was originally ranked at the end of the search results, the 
algorithms will take on board this information and place that link at the top, demoting at 
the same time the links that are less frequently or rarely clicked on. More consumers using 
a search engine with greater frequency enable the search engine to run more experiments 
to predict consumer preferences, and the more trials are conducted to this effect, the 
better the search engine will get at improving the relevancy of results.  
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Google and its supporters argue that the significance of scale and data has been largely 
overstated,203 and that in fact data is subject to diminishing returns to scale. Indeed, in 
Microsoft/Yahoo! both Microsoft and Google recognised that “the value of incremental 
data decreases as the amount of data increases.” 204  However, neither Google nor 
Microsoft has been able to “identify a fixed number of queries or ads that constitutes the 
‘minimum efficient’ point of operation,”205 and no competition agency thus far has been 
able to determine at which point the value of incremental data decreases. Ultimately, the 
answer to this question will vary depending on the type of query at hand. Chapter 2 
demonstrated that whilst the diminishing returns to scale argument may hold for popular 
searches, it does not hold for less frequent (‘tail’) queries. Accordingly, large search 
engines do have an advantage relative to small-sized search engines with respect to these 
queries, and since relevance of results ‘across the board’ enhances the attractiveness of a 
search engine,206 a dominant search engine with a large user base, and therefore access to 
more data, is likely to be insulated from competitive pressure regarding quality of search 
results.   
 
The abovementioned economies of scale and learning-by-doing are combined with 
economies of scope of user data. Every search query reveals a preference of a specific 
user, which allows the search engine to provide relevant search results; however, if 
consumers use not only Google’s search engine but also other services provided by said 
firm such as Google Maps, Chrome, Android, Gmail and the like, the variety of data 
stemming from different sources allows the platform to develop rich user profiles, to get 
better at predicting users’ preferences and tastes, and to offer personalised search results.  
 
Economies of speed also come into play. Chapter 2 explained that when users’ interests 
change as a result of a specific phenomenon (such as the death of celebrity), platforms 
must swiftly adapt their algorithms accordingly. A search engine with larger user base, and 
therefore more data, will be able to adapt more quickly to such change in users’ interests, 
whilst the remaining search engines will lag behind. The capacity to adapt quickly to such 
changes increases the attractiveness of the large search engine relative to its competitors.   
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In view of the economies of scale, scope and speed explained above, rivals search engines 
face an extremely tough challenge in improving search quality and convincing consumers 
to switch to their respective search engines. Indeed, it has been reported that in 2010 
Microsoft invested “more than $4.5 billion into developing its algorithms and building the 
physical capacity necessary to operate Bing”;207 however, although it has gained market 
share, especially in the US, it still lags behind. In addition, the size of a search engine’s 
web index is also significant for the efficient performance of a search engine, and the 
larger the web index, the more information the search engine will have to match a specific 
query with relevant results. According to Google, its web index “is similar to a map made 
up of one trillion intersections. So multiple times every day, we do the computational 
equivalent of fully exploring every intersection of every road in the United States. Except 
it'd be a map about 50,000 times as big as the U.S., with 50,000 times as many roads and 
intersections.”208 As of 2015, Google had indexed over 40 billion websites, followed by 
Bing with only 14 billion.209 
 
The application of the test proposed in Chapter 2 to determine whether an undertaking 
enjoys a data advantage210 leads to the conclusion that Google’s data advantage raises 
barriers to entry that are difficult to overcome. As seen above, no other search engine has 
ever been close to match Google’s scale of search data, and its web index is significantly 
more comprehensive than that of its closest competitor. In addition, no other company in 
the world has a similar assortment of products offered for free in exchange of personal 
data,211 for which reason Google’s economies of scope in data are also extremely difficult 
to match. Economies of scale and scope of data improve the quality of Google’s 
algorithms as a result of learning-by-doing, thereby enabling Google to adapt more 
quickly to changes in consumers’ preferences and interests in real-time (i.e. economies of 
speed).   
 
But even if rival search engines were able to overcome Google’s big data advantages and 
larger web index, and find a way to provide results of higher quality (more relevant) than 
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those of Google, it is doubtful that users would actually switch to Google’s competitors. 
This is because multihoming is a rather strange phenomenon in horizontal search. In 
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, the Commission observed “that users tend to ‘single-
home’, meaning that they perform over 90% of their search queries within a month on 
one single search engine”,212 and noted that “[t]he very limited share of user multi-homing 
between Microsoft and Yahoo [then second largest search engine] shows that users rarely 
run checks between these two platforms.”213 Single-homing in horizontal search may be 
the consequence of entrenched surfing habits and search personalisation, in such a way 
that if users are accustomed to a search engine, they may not try other search engines 
even if they perceive lower quality results.214 Moreover, perceptions about search results’ 
quality are likely to be influenced by brand. Indeed, in a 2013 study conducted by 
SurveyMonkey and reported in Search Engine Land: 
 
“[u]sing the same search term, respondents had to choose between a Google 
search results page and a Bing search result page. In this survey the SERP 
headers were swapped with Google results listed as Bing results and Bing 
results listed as Google results. Of the respondents who received the 
swapped search result pages, a larger percentage of respondents still chose 
Google results, even though they were actually Bing search results.”215 
 
The study concludes that not only are users “biased toward Google, but they are 
influenced by a site’s brand as well.”216  
 
Single-homing habits are reinforced by economies of scope in data and personalised 
search. The more a given customer uses Google’s search engine and its plethora of free 
services (browser, maps, mobile OS, etcetera), the more Google can collect and process 
personal data to render personalised search results (and targeted advertising). 
Personalisation of search results and platform services, accordingly, creates switching 
costs for users. As Herz observes, “[a]s the formulated algorithms enable a constantly 
evolving (and potentially self-improving) searching experience, consumers will keep 
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benefiting directly from using one engine only. The likeliness of finding the correct result 
is decreased whenever customers switch.”217  
 
If Google’s competitors face an almost insurmountable challenge in catching up with 
Google, the picture looks even grimmer for newcomers. There are significant fixed costs 
related to R&D and the development and maintenance of service infrastructure.218 It has 
been estimated that the core code for a search engine is around 3 million lines and takes 
up to USD 100 million to develop, which excludes the costs of running the service.219 
Since Google became the market leader in 2002, only Microsoft with its deep pockets and 
after having entered into a partnership with Yahoo!  has been able to make a rather minor 
dent on Google’s market share. Another entrant, DuckDuckGo, has also been able to 
remain in the market, but only because it has managed to attract privacy-sensitive users in 
the promise that it collects no personal data. However, to date, DuckDuckGo remains a 
fringe competitor, and in no case can it be considered a serious challenger of Google.220  
 
It could be argued that Google nevertheless feels the threat of an entrant introducing a 
new ‘killer’ product that would render Google’s search engine and related products 
obsolete. However, the mere theoretical possibility of entry is not a sufficiently credible 
constraint if not based on realistic grounds.221 In light of the record of entry into the 
search engine-related markets, the Schumpeterian threat does not seem to be a convincing 
constraint.    
 
The fact that neither actual nor potential competitors in horizontal search are a serious 
threat to Google does not entail that no competitive pressure is exerted upon the leading 
search engine. Indeed, horizontal search traffic can be diverted towards vertical search 
engines in all directions: queries for product purchases can be made on Amazon, eBay or 
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any price comparison site; queries for travel can be made on Expedia, TripAdvisor, 
Booking.com, Kayak.com and the like; informational queries can be made on Wikipedia 
or Quora, and local queries can be made on Yelp. As Wagner-von Papp observes, “[t]he 
competitive pressure on any one general web search services does not exclusively come 
from the other general web search services, but also in the form of vertical search services 
from all different directions depending on the nature of the search.”222 Moreover, with the 
increasing use of mobile devices, search queries are increasingly made on vertical search 
engines’ apps.  
 
It is impossible to accurately determine the extent to which search queries made on 
vertical search engines and apps constrain Google’s behaviour without empirical data on 
the actual number of searches made on such search engines and their apps and their 
evolution over time; however, there is certain information from which a preliminary 
conclusion can be derived. Notably, vertical search engines serve queries of transactional 
nature (users are looking to book flights, hotels or buy products), which are those easier 
to monetise. 223  If vertical search engines and apps were indeed exerting significant 
pressure upon Google, a large portion of transactional search traffic would be directly 
served by vertical search engines and apps, as a result of which Google’s profitability in 
paid search would be adversely affected. However, Google’s global search ad revenues 
rising from USD 32.63 billion in 2013 to USD 44.46 billion in 2015 indicate otherwise.224 
Not only that, Amazon, which has been dubbed by Google as its “biggest search 
competitor’225 spent USD 158 million on Google search ads in 2013, more than any other 
firm,226 which confirms the statements of several vertical search engines in the sense that 
they depend on horizontal search engines for significant amounts of their traffic, and that 
many vertical search users begin their search with a query on an horizontal search engine, 
mostly Google.227 The fact that a giant vertical search provider like Amazon is highly 
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dependant on Google’s search ads, in conjunction with Google’s growing revenues in this 
type of online advertising, suggests that the competitive pressure stemming from vertical 
search engines is rather limited.  
 
Insofar as Google serves the overwhelming majority of search queries, advertisers will feel 
compelled to advertise on its search engine. This is all the more true for small-sized 
advertisers, as the cost of optimising a campaign on Bing or Yahoo! may be 
disproportionate, having regard to the expected CTC.228 As a matter of fact, the Autorite 
de la Concurrence observed that Google’s large user base is advertisers’ main justification 
for opening an AdWords account: polled advertisers contended inter alia that Google is 
“an inescapable feature of the web”, and that it enjoys an “hegemony in Internet 
searches.”229 Indirect network effects are thus easy to appreciate: more users on the free 
side will attract more advertisers on the paid side, since advertisers value a larger audience 
to which they can target their ads. These indirect network effects are combined with and 
fuelled by the abovementioned economies of scale, scope and speed, thereby giving rise to 
a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop which has been called the “virtuous cycle”:230 as 
Google attracts more users with its free services (search engine, maps, YouTube, and so 
on), it is able to gather larger amounts of valuable user data necessary to improve its 
search algorithms and develop user profiles, and such user data obtained on the free side 
can be reprocessed and reused to better target users with targeted advertising. In turn, by 
being able to target users with more relevant ads, “the search engine is more likely to 
attract advertisers (as consumers are more likely to click on their ads) and thereby increase 
its advertising revenue and profits. Moreover, the search engine can target users with 
these personalised ads across media (such as on their personal computers, smartphones, 
tablets and soon, household appliances) and across services (such as texts, maps, videos, 
etcetera). This too increases the likelihood of consumers clicking on a relevant sponsored 
ad […] or seeing a display ad.”231  
 
The degree to which advertisers are dependent on Google’s search ads are reflected in 
Google’s freedom to set a keyword policy that is disapproved by both media agencies and 
advertisers. In 2010 Google announced that it would no longer prohibit the use of brand 
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names as keywords in advertisements, even as keywords on which companies other than 
the brand owner intend to bid. The decision was highly disapproved by advertisers, but 
Google implemented it nevertheless. As a result, Google is able to “impose a new rule 
without fearing a falloff in demand or defection to the competition.”232 
 
Nevertheless, it may be the case that other types of advertising exert competitive pressure 
upon paid search. In the context of the Google/DoubleClick merger case, then FTC 
Commissioner Harbour argued that search and display advertising were converging, 
especially in terms of targeting capabilities.233 In the European version of this case, the 
Commission noted that the ability of non-search ads to target relevant costumers was 
improving, and that part of search advertising expenditure was being focused on 
generating brand awareness and not only towards directly generating sales, for which 
reasons “from an advertiser’s point of view search and [display] ads can be considered 
substitutable to a certain extent.”234 However, the Commission also observed that from 
the publishers’ perspective “there is no possible substitution between selling ad space for 
search and selling ad space for [display]”, as a result of which publishers consider search 
and display ads as “rather complementary in the sense that search advertising ‘completes’ 
or ‘complements’ the sale of [display] advertising space by publishers.”235 Accordingly, 
substitution between these two types of advertising is limited, which justifies the 
definition of separate markets for each of them, but nevertheless, these two types of 
advertising might constrain each other to some extent.  
 
By having the largest network of advertisers, Google is able to dominate the search 
advertising intermediation market, which in turn reinforces its position in the horizontal 
search market. Given the size of some website publishers (for example, eBay or Amazon), 
Google is able to secure a large number of search queries to enhance its scale effects and 
improve its search and ad serving algorithms.236 In turn, foreclosure of competing search 
engines from a substantial part of the search advertising intermediation market through 
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exclusive or restrictive agreements like those found by the FTC237 reduces their ability to 
achieve minimum efficient scale and thus to compete effectively with Google.238 As a 
matter of fact, website publishers represented to the FTC that Bing’s search syndication 
offering is inferior, at least partly because Microsoft’s network of advertisers is smaller 
than Google’s.239 With its considerably larger advertiser base, Google is more likely to 
have high-quality and more relevant ads for any given query, which improves its 
monetisation rate relative to Microsoft to a significant extent.240 
 
Indeed, not only do Google’s competitors get far fewer queries than Google, but also 
their syndication partners make significantly less money on each click. Amazon, Google’s 
second largest syndication partner after eBay, reported to the FTC that Bing and Yahoo!’s 
advertisements monetise at about 46% the rate of Google’s advertisements. Because of 
this ‘large monetisation gap’, Amazon explained to the FTC, Amazon only uses Bing and 
Yahoo! for a very small percentage of its total search syndication needs.241  
 
In view of the above, it is highly likely that Google holds a dominant position in the 
markets for horizontal search, search advertising and search advertising intermediation. 
As Chirita contends, “[t]he problem is that the competitive pressure on Google is either 
ineffective or non-existent.”242 In particular, the strength of indirect network effects from 
the user to the advertiser side, and the self-reinforcing positive feedback loop between the 
three markets fuelled by learning-by-doing and economies of scale, scope, and speed, tend 




As explained in Section I.5.2.1, defining a market for online social networking services can 
prove tremendously difficult and to some extent arbitrary. Since market definition will be 
inevitably imprecise, market share calculations should not play a preponderant role; 
however, market share analysis can still serve as a screening tool to dismiss cases in which 
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market power is unlikely. Even if a wide market definition including YouTube (which is 
not quite a social network) and other specialised social networks like LinkedIn and 
Pinterest is adopted on the user side, Facebook is the undisputed market leader with a 
market share of 43.9% as of February 2016.243 This share varies depending on the country. 
For example, as of March 2016, Facebook has a market share of 82.56% in the UK.244 In 
addition, Facebook’s number of daily active users has increased steadily from 665 million 
in Q1 2013 to 936 million in Q1 2015.245 Hence, it is possible to preliminarily conclude 
that Facebook is extremely popular amongst users and enjoys a position of leadership in 
broadly defined market for social networking services, for which reason further analysis is 
warranted.  
 
The technology necessary to create a social networking platform seems to be widely 
available, and capital costs appear to be minimal, as suggested by the array of existing and 
newly appearing social networking sites.246 However, it does not follow that barriers to 
entry are low.  
 
Direct network effects on the user side lead to strong concentration. The more users a 
social networking platform has, the greater the value of the network to its members. The 
more friends the average user can connect with through Facebook, the more his profile 
and participation are worth to him personally, because the user does not have to go 
somewhere else to keep in touch.247  
 
It has been suggested that users endure growing costs (congestion and organizational 
costs) as social networks grow larger, “because users’ newsfeeds become increasingly 
difficult to manage [… and] large social networks make it harder for users to restrict 
certain communications to smaller subgroups, which in turn represents another type of 
cost”.248 These growing costs are said to limit concentration tendencies. However, this 
argument is not very convincing, because platforms take measures not to overwhelm 
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users. For example, Facebook uses algorithms based on its users’ revealed preferences and 
friends to filter the information shown in their newsfeed and make it more attractive to 
their interests.249 
 
Moreover, lack of interoperability reinforces direct network effects and protects the 
incumbent’s user base. If users cannot communicate across social network platforms, they 
will have the incentive to join the largest network in order to be able to interact with a 
greater universe of users. More users will attract more users, and so on. As Gebicka and 
Heinemann observe, “there is the idea of ‘I will have a Facebook profile because everyone 
is on Facebook’, which suggests facility and as such guarantees less effort, and in 
consequence attracts more and more people.”250 
 
Furthermore, lack of data portability results in high switching costs, because contacts, 
shared information, messages, comments and photographs cannot be transferred when 
switching to a different network.251 To circumvent lack of data portability, users of course 
have the alternative of reposting their profile information, wall posts, photos, videos, and 
any other information, but this alternative is of course time consuming, impossible in 
certain cases and subject to errors, for which reason users are more likely to “simply live 
with their existing Facebook page.”252 Accordingly, users become locked-in and will not 
switch to other social network providers, even though they are entirely free to do so if 
they wish.253 The right to data portability introduced by the recently passed GDPR254 is 
expected to change this scenario, although its impact on competition in social network 
markets remains uncertain.255  
 
Lock-in effects are demonstrated by the fact that users have opposed to several policy and 
operating changes on the part of Facebook,256 without actually switching to competing 
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platforms. Indeed, changes to Facebook’s privacy policies are a matter of course,257 but 
such changes have not caused any real impact whatsoever upon Facebook’s growth. 
 
Switching costs are reinforced by the stickiness of Facebook: it is remarkably difficult to 
terminate a Facebook account.258 As Weber Waller observes:  
 
“[w]hile temporary deactivation is not particularly difficult, it can be 
psychologically and socially difficult, with friends, colleagues, and family 
members being unable to reach you through the system and inquiring off-
line if everything is ok. Moving from temporary to permanent deactivation is 
even more difficult. Facebook requires a two-week period before taking 
down a page. Failure to deactivate certain links to Facebook or inadvertently 
hitting the “Like” or “Share” on other websites will nullify the deactivation 
and require beginning again.”259   
 
Heterogeneous preferences can in principle constrain Facebook’s market power on the 
user side, provided that users switch to differentiated platforms. However, these 
differentiated platforms tend to be specialised social networks that serve a specific market 
niche, focusing on a determined user group (like LinkedIn that serves professionals) or by 
emphasising functionalities like pictures sharing (like Instagram), and hence are 
considered by users as complementary rather than substitute services.260 Indeed, they tend 
to be used in tandem with Facebook instead of one another. As a result, it is doubtful 
“that these services are able to endanger the market position of a broader-based service 
with a larger number of users in the long term.”261  
 
Further, Facebook offers APIs and tools to application developers so they can develop 
and integrate apps in the platform, thereby having direct access to Facebook’s users. In 
this way, users can access more and more applications without leaving their Facebook 
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page, which generates more traffic, data and user engagement. Positive indirect network 
effects flow between users and application developers: more users increase Facebook’s 
value to the developer side, since app developers can reach a larger audience with their 
apps, and more app developers enhance the value of the platform to the user side, since 
users have more apps at their disposal.  
 
Moreover, a large social network platform with a large user base will be certainly more 
attractive to advertisers than a small network with few users. There are strong indirect 
network effects stemming from the user side that link the advertiser side: more users 
entail more eyeballs advertisers can reach with their ads, and at the same time, more users 
provide the social network platform with more valuable data in the form of postings, 
comments, likes, shared pictures, videos and stories and the like, which allow the social 
networking site to develop more detailed user profiles and therefore to enhance its ad 
targeting capabilities to the benefit of advertisers. As a result, it is possible to appreciate a 
‘virtuous cycle’ similar to Google’s: more users attract more users and generate more data; 
data is used to improve users’ social networking experience by making their social 
interactions more relevant to their interests; in turn, data is used to create user profiles 
and derive valuable insights to better target advertisements,262 and this combination of 
more users/more data attracts more advertiser engagement, in a positive feedback loop 
reinforced by high switching costs to users and system stickiness.  
 
The application of the test proposed in Chapter 2 leads to the conclusion that Facebook’s 
data advantage raises barriers to entry. With 2 billion monthly active users as of the 
second quarter of 2017,263 Facebook is able to collect large amounts of personal data that 
are not available to its competitors in the same volume. Its recent acquisitions of 
Instagram and WhatsApp expanded the scope of Facebook’s data collection capabilities. 
Accordingly, Facebook has at its disposal the largest amount of data relevant for social 
network interactions and for the provision of display and social targeted ads. It must be 
noted, however, that Facebook’s data advantage is highly dependent on direct network 
effects and user engagement. Facebook has explained that “[t]he size of our user base and 
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our users’ level of engagement are critical to our success”,264 and that it is vital to 
encourage a broad range of users to contribute content. This is because, if users stop 
engaging on Facebook, the quality and frequency of postings would decrease, the 
platform would become less attractive to others as a result of lack of new content, there 
would be less data, and Facebook’s profits would accordingly decrease.265 Indeed, lack of 
consumer engagement and the strength of Facebook’s direct network effects are the 
explanation of Google’s unsuccessful attempt of entry into the social networking market: 
in 2011 Google launched its Google+ social network, which quickly became the “fastest-
growing network thingy ever”, with more than 500 million users in just 18 months.266 
However, Google could not convince users to share content on and engage with its social 
network platform. Google+ could not overcome Facebook’s direct network effects, 
because users wanted to share content where their entire group was, and they did not want 
to have a shared social network experience in a second redundant place.  
 
As a direct consequence of the above, the threat of potential competition does not seem 
to be a credible constraint disciplining Facebook. If Google, with its financial strength and 
big data advantage, was unsuccessful in its attempt to displace Facebook, it seems unlikely 
that other undertaking may succeed in doing so. Disruptive innovation from unexpected 
sources, as Schumpeterians contend, is always a threat in high-tech markets, but if not 
supported by evidence and a dynamic record of entry into the market, it is only 
speculation, and as such, it should not be given too much weight.     
 
Insofar as Facebook remains being the leading social networking platform with the largest 
user base, it will continue attracting more advertisers. In 2014 Facebook reached a 75% 
market share of global social ad spending.267 Moreover, Facebook offers the possibility to 
advertise with ‘sponsored stories’. Sponsored stories are generated from the actions a user 
takes with an advertiser’s business or app (for example, when a user or ‘fan’ likes one 
advertiser’s page), and conveyed to such user’s contacts (friends) on their newsfeeds. 
Since sponsored stories take the form of user content, they tend to elicit a different type 
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of reaction and engagement from users. As noted by Facebook, “[w]hen people hear 
about your brand from their friends, they’re twice as likely to engage.”268 Accordingly, 
these social ads are reportedly more effective (obtain higher CTR) than display ads.269 In 
Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission noted that several respondents considered that other 
forms of non-search advertising are “not as effective as advertising on social networking 
websites and notably on Facebook, due to Facebook's large and highly engaged audience 
and its ad targeting opportunities.”270 This is consistent with Tucker and Marthews’ 
findings: “when advertisers target ads based on who is friends with whom, they can 
double the number of clicks, because advertisers can uncover consumers who may also be 
interested in their product.”271  
 
However, insofar as social ads are constrained by display ads, the market power enjoyed 
by Facebook on the advertiser side is likely to be reduced. In a display advertising market 
that includes social ads for market share calculations, Facebook remains the leader with 
25% market share, but the market becomes fairly fragmented with Google having 13%, 
Twitter 5%, Yahoo! 5%, AOL 4%, Amazon 3%, Microsoft 2% and LinkedIn 1%.272 At 
any rate, if a relevant market for social ads is defined, any constraining effect stemming 
from display ads and even paid search must be considered (even if such types of 
advertising are not included in the relevant market), as their combined pressure could 
indeed constrain Facebook’s market power in such relevant market. 
 
In view of the above, it is argued that Facebook holds a dominant position in the social 
networking services market. It is also likely that Facebook holds a dominant position in 
the market for social ads, but such conclusion depends largely on the competitive 
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Whilst eBay is undoubtedly one of the leaders of a broad market for online marketplaces, 
it does not automatically follow that it holds a dominant position therein. As the 
Commission observes, there are several other important players in such market, including 
Amazon, Allegro, Spartoo, Zalando and Chrono24, for which reason this market seems to 
be fairly fragmented. However, the methods to measure market shares in these markets 
are subject to important limitations. Sometimes, market shares are based on traffic.273 
Alternatively, market shares are calculated based on a total market consisting of the net 
turnover of the largest online shops trading physical goods in a geographic area.274 Market 
shares based on traffic or turnover can only provide information on an online 
marketplace’s popularity, sales volume and size. However, little can these market shares 
tell about the extent to which eBay may behave independently in respect of specific types 
of sellers or products. Therefore, the consideration of additional factors is necessary.  
 
Firstly, eBay’s strong position can be explained mainly by positive indirect network effects 
between sellers and buyers. The value of eBay increases to both groups the more both 
groups of customers grow.275 In addition, reputation systems amount to a significant 
switching cost, especially for sellers. According to Gross and Acquisti, eBay’s reputation 
system is remarkable both for the amount of feedback provided by its users (more than 
half of completed transactions result in feedback provided by the seller or the buyer or 
both) and for the overwhelming percentage of positive feedback.276 Resnick & Zeckhauser 
explain this phenomenon: eBay users feel a sense of belonging to a community that they 
are committed to maintain, and ‘courtesy feedback’, or the exchange of reciprocal 
kindness, as well as fear of retaliation, lead to buyers and sellers providing predominantly 
positive feedback. 277  These disincentives to provide negative feedback, even when 
unsatisfactory transactions take place or the buyer experience is negative, enhance the 
overall reputation of eBay’s platform, which in turn boost positive network effects 
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between buyers and sellers. Moreover, it is difficult to build up reputation on several 
online trading platforms, since reputation depends on the number of transactions a seller 
has successfully consummated on a specific network.278 On top of that, as demonstrated 
by Resnick et al., good reputation allows sellers to charge higher prices, 279 and since 
transferring reputation from one platform to another is not possible, established sellers 
become locked in. The reputation mechanism also works for buyers to some extent, 
although it is less important than for sellers. 
 
Secondly, eBay, as well as other online marketplaces, have increasing scale effects, which 
lead to market concentration. This is because operating an online trading platform entails 
relatively high fixed costs (for example, the management of databases), but the variable 
costs triggered by additional transactions are significantly low, which makes it more 
difficult for potential newcomers to enter the market, as they have to make considerable 
infrastructure investments.280 However, scope for differentiation reduces concentration in 
e-marketplaces: in addition to the market leaders eBay and Amazon Marketplace, which 
have a comprehensive range of products, there are several platforms specialising in selling 
automobiles (Shift), real estates (Zeppediy), music gear (Reverb), clothing (Zalando) and 
other specific products. The possibility to multihome between these platforms reduces the 
strength of eBay’s market power. 
 
More crucially, militating against eBay’s and other online marketplaces’ market power is 
the fact that online retail, at least for certain products, is essentially one distribution 
channel, which means that, as a matter of principle, sellers can sell somewhere else (online 
or offline) to pay a lower commission or avoid paying the commission altogether, and 
buyers can shift their demand to other online outlets or brick-and-mortar shops based on 
price and/or convenience considerations.281 To assess market power more conclusively, 
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In the Staff Working Document accompanying the Final Report on the e-commerce 
sector inquiry, the Commission observed that 61% of the respondent retailers use their 
online shops as the sole online selling channel; 31% of the respondent retailers sell via 
their online shops as well as on marketplaces; and 4% of the respondent retailers sell 
online via online marketplaces only.282 Accordingly, the first group of retailers constrain 
eBay’s market power when the products they sell are also sold on eBay. In addition, since 
they have no other alternatives to reach a large audience online, eBay’s market power is 
likely to be stronger in respect of the last group of retailers, which is comprised of small- 
and medium-sized enterprise (SME) retailers, 283 and weaker in respect of the second 
group, as its members have the option to sell via their proprietary online shops (although 
this assessment must be made on a case-by-case basis, as some proprietary online shops 
will lack the necessary traffic to be a viable alternative to selling on online marketplaces).  
 
Moreover, the Commission also observed:  
 
Marketplaces are particularly relevant for retailers selling clothing and shoes 
and consumer electronics. In contrast, the average proportion of sellers on 
marketplaces selling household appliances or computer games and software 
is more limited. The importance of marketplaces as a sales channel also 
differs depending on the nature of the product and whether customers 
would expect to find the products for sale on marketplaces.284 
 
Therefore, the market power of eBay and other online marketplaces also depends on the 
product at hand. Generally, market power will be stronger in respect of products that are 
commonly or almost exclusively traded in online marketplaces. In this connection, the 
Monopolkommission has called into doubt a possible dominant position of Amazon in a 
market for online book trade where it holds a market share of approximately 80%, as 
consumers are likely to switch to stationary book trade in case of an exercise of market 
power on Amazon’s part. 285  Conversely, second-hand products are traded almost 
exclusively on online marketplaces, especially on eBay,286 as they are sold by individuals 
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that want to avail themselves of the possibility to reach a large audience of buyers through 
the platform, for which reason eBay’s market power will be stronger in respect of this 
segment of products.  
 
In addition, the listing format also has implications for the assessment of market power. 
Online retail is essentially based on a fixed-price model, and players such as Amazon or 
PriceMinister only use this model. However, eBay offers a mixture of fixed prices and 
auctions, with the possibility to use these two formats in conjunction with each other in 
one listing:  when this is the case, the auction runs parallel to the fixed price sale, and 
when a buyer selects the “buy-it-now” function, the auction ends automatically.287 This 
listing flexibility and the availability of auction format increase the attractiveness of eBay 
and raise switching costs for sellers of products for which the auction format is more 
popular, as is the case of goods in limited supply where the demand is unknown to the 
seller and it is difficult for the seller to know the appropriate price, such as idiosyncratic 
products,288 antiques, coins and celebrity memorabilia.289 Accordingly, some sellers, such as 
SME retailers, antique dealers and individuals selling second-hand products, may be 
effectively locked-in to eBay when they have no other viable alternatives to reach a large 
audience of buyers. eBay’s loyalty-enhancing features and investments, such as loyalty 
schemes, customer support, recommendation functionalities, customer reviews and 
convenient payment methods (i.e. PayPal), reinforce lock-in effects.  
 
With 167 million active users and 25 million active sellers as of March 2017,290 eBay has 
access to a tremendous amount of transactional data and purchasing behaviour, which it 
uses to boost sales through product recommendations targeted to specific consumers 
based on their revealed interests. As Graef observes, ‘[t]he collection and analysis of data 
about the purchasing behaviour of users, their virtual shopping cart and the items they 
have viewed, liked or rated permits the platform to better predict in what products users 
are interested based on their similarity with other users.”291 Product recommendations 
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enabled by data analysis increase sales and sellers’ revenues, thereby attracting more sellers 
and more product offerings, which in turn attracts more buyers. Access to this data has 
enabled eBay (and also other large e-marketplaces like Amazon) to enter the display 
advertising market. However, eBay has not been able so far to challenge established 
players like Facebook and Google, and remains a minor player in that market. 
 
The application of the test included in Chapter 2 to analyse a ‘data-advantage’ leads to the 
conclusion that, whilst eBay has indeed a data-driven competitive advantage relative to 
other smaller players and potential entrants, such a data-advantage does not raise 
insurmountable barriers to entry. This is due to the role that data plays in online 
marketplaces’ business models: whilst data can boost a platform’s sales as a result of the 
knowledge on consumer preferences it provides, data is not of the essence to intermediate 
transactions between sellers and buyers. Rather, the key to an online marketplace’s success 
is the exploitation of indirect network effects: when the platform manages to get both 
sides on board in sufficient numbers,292 indirect network effects operate in a positive 
feedback loop which derives into a comprehensive product catalogue and large audience 
of buyers.293 Data can, of course, assist in the efforts to reach such an outcome, but lack 
of access to data does not prevent a platform from providing the matchmaking service.294   
 
Dynamic competition constrains eBay’s market power to some extent. As eBay reports:  
 
“we continuously invest in innovation and technology aimed at more 
efficiently connecting buyers and sellers on our platform. For example, in 
recent years we have heavily invested in machine learning and artificial 
intelligence technology that can be deployed in areas such as machine 
translations of listings, trust and safety measures, and improving the search 
and site user experience.” 
 
These efforts signal healthy dynamic competition in the market for online marketplaces. 
Yet, the constraints stemming from dynamic competition should not be overstated: as 
Haucap and Heimeshoff observe, eBay has enjoyed a position of leadership almost from 
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the early beginnings of e-commerce, especially in online auctions,295 and this position has 
not been challenged by innovative entrants.    
 
In view of the above, it is posited that eBay does not hold a dominant position in the 
market for online marketplaces. Crucially, this market has another big player (Amazon), as 
well as several marketplaces specialised in specific products which constrain eBay’s market 
power with regard to the relevant product categories. Perhaps more importantly, eBay and 
all other trading platforms and online retailers face to a greater or lesser extent 
competition from both online and offline shops. Customers can buy products from a 
wide range of retailers, distributors, shopping malls, price comparison portals and the like. 
At least in theory, if eBay increases its fees significantly, sellers are likely to pass this cost 
on to consumers, and if the products sold by eBay’s sellers are offered at lower prices on 
other trading platforms or brick-and-mortar shops, buyers are likely to make their 
purchases somewhere else. This circumstance limits eBay’s ability to increase its fees, 
which suggests that eBay’s market power is indeed mitigated by forces lying within and 
outside its relevant markets.  
 
This is not tantamount to arguing that eBay does not have market power. If narrow 
markets are distinguished, such as a market for online auctions of used products or 
idiosyncratic products, it is highly likely that eBay holds a dominant position therein, as 
sellers are significantly limited in their possibilities to reach a similar audience of buyers 
through other channels. At any rate, this analysis must be carried out on a case-by-case 
basis.  




Broadly speaking, loss of users may degrade the quality of a platform’s product and 
reduce its ability to attract and retain users, advertisers or sellers (depending on the 
platform’s business model). If a platform acquires more users relative to its competitors, a 
quality gap is likely to arise, and if the quality differences become noticeable to users, data-
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driven network effects may accelerate the quality gap through a feedback loop, thereby 
attracting new users and the competitors’ users.  
 
Under this dynamic, the incentive of online firms to engage in anticompetitive behaviour 
to tip the market in their favour and achieve and/or maintain a monopoly is a significant 
one. When that incentive is coupled with the ability to resort to anticompetitive practices, 
dominant platforms can readily distort the competitive process, to the detriment of 
consumers. The Sections below outline some data-driven abusive practices in which 
online platforms may engage. The potential of these practices being implemented by 
dominant firms confirms and reinforces the need for competition authorities to remain 
alert and vigilant in online markets.  
 
2. Exclusionary Conduct 
 
Article 102 TFEU prevents dominant undertakings from “limiting production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers.” Any unlawful foreclosure or 
handicapping of competitors, by which competition is hindered even further to the 
detriment of consumers, is a form of ‘limiting production’ captured by this provision. 
 
In the data-driven economy, production, markets or technical development may be 
limited when firms are unlawfully prevented from having access to critical data in a timely 
manner. To this effect, dominant undertakings may resort to exclusionary practices such 
as inter alia exclusive dealing and refusal to supply.  
 
2.1 Exclusive Dealing 
 
Online platforms may prevent rivals from accessing data through exclusivity provisions 
with third-party providers. This type of conduct is currently under investigation in the 
Commission’s probe into Google’s alleged anticompetitive practices.296 
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It was explained in Chapter 2 that scale is of the essence in some data-driven industries, 
such as search and search advertising. If smaller rivals and entrants are unlawfully 
prevented from accessing the scale of data necessary to compete effectively, a quality gap 
between the incumbent’s and its competitors’ services is bound to emerge, and as a result 
of data-driven network effects, such quality gap may increase dramatically. In this context, 
the Commission is investigating certain intermediation agreements into which Google has 
entered with website publishers for the provision of search and search advertising services 
on their websites.297 The Commission has sent to Google a Statement of Objections with 
the preliminary view that certain agreements with a limited number of large third parties 
(the so-called “Direct Partners”) imposing exclusivity (requiring third parties not to source 
search ads from Google’s competitors), premium placement of a minimum number of 
Google search ads (requiring third parties to take a minimum number of search ads from 
Google and reserve the most prominent space on their search results pages to Google 
search ads, and also requiring that competing search ads cannot be placed above or next 
to Google search ads) and the right to authorise competing ads (requiring third parties to 
obtain Google's approval before making any change to the display of competing search 
ads) have allowed Google to protect its dominant position in online search advertising 
and hindered competition on the search advertising intermediation market.298  
 
Relatedly, FTC Staff recommended to sue Google for the use of exclusivity provisions in 
search and search advertising syndication agreements. FTC Staff observed that 
Microsoft’s greatest challenge was to obtain sufficient scale through collection of search 
and search advertising data,299 and that Google resorted to contractual restrictions to 
prevent Microsoft from gaining the scale of data necessary to compete in the markets for 
general search and search advertising in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.300 In 
particular, FTC Staff noted that Google had tied up a substantial portion of the search 
advertising syndication market: Google had exclusive or restrictive agreements with 12 of 
the top 20 companies (60%) and 4 of the top 5 (80%), with the 20 largest companies 
accounting for 94% of total query volume. 301 Access to such largest top companies was 
by far the most efficient method for Microsoft’s Bing to gain query volume in the search 
syndication channel, but Google effectively blocked such access. 
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FTC Staff observed that “Google’s interest in renewing deals with some of its largest 
syndication customers may have been, in part, to keep Microsoft from gaining scale.”302 
Google’s exclusionary intent was clearly depicted in internal documents regarding the 
2010 AOL syndication agreement renewal: 
 
“AOL holds marginal search share but represents scale gains for a Microsoft 
+ Yahoo! Partnership … AOL/Microsoft combination has modest impact 
on market dynamics, but material increase in scale of Microsoft’s search & 
ads platform.”303 
 
Within this context, “[w]hen a senior Google executive was informed that Microsoft [was] 
aggressively wooing AOL with large guarantees,”304 he responded:  
 
“I think the worse case scenario here is that AOL users get sent to Bing, so 
even if we make AOL a bit more competitive relative to Google, that seems 
preferable to growing Bing.”305 
 
FTC Staff observed that according to “Google documents, the company sought to pursue 
the AOL deal aggressively even though AOL represented “[a] low/no profit partnership 
for Google […]” 306  Ultimately, FTC Staff concluded that “Google’s exclusive and 
restrictive agreements have not only helped to maintain, preserve, and enhance Google’s 
monopoly power in the market for search and search advertising syndication (search 
intermediation), but also in the underlying markets for search and search advertising.”307 
 
Search engines can be accessed in different ways, and Google’s exclusivity provisions are 
not limited to search advertising intermediation agreements with web publishers. Google 
has, for example, concluded exclusive search default distribution deals with Mozilla 
Firefox, Apple’s Safari and Opera, under which each of these browsers had Google as a 
the default search engine.308 Similarly, in the Commission’s Android investigation, the 
Commission has found that “Google has granted significant financial incentives to some 
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of the largest smartphone and tablet manufacturers as well as mobile network operators 
on condition that they exclusively pre-install Google Search on their devices.”309 These 
exclusive distribution agreements are likely to compound foreclosure effects for rival 
search engines, as they reduce even further the availability of channels to access search 
and search advertising data.   
 
2.2 Refusal to Supply 
 
In light of the significance of data in online markets, some have questioned whether the 
rivals of an incumbent could rely on Article 102 TFEU to gain access to large troves of 
data they need to compete effectively; that is to say, whether data can be considered as 
some sort of “essential facility”.310  
 
The ‘essential facility doctrine’ is framed within the context of refusals to deal, and is 
based on the idea that a monopolist has a duty to ‘share’ its facilities with everyone asking 
for access, including competitors, for which reason it stands as a narrow exception to the 
general rule that undertakings, even monopolistic ones, are free to deal with whom they 
may deem fit. Unsurprisingly, only under exceptional circumstances may an obligation to 
deal be imposed on dominant undertakings on the basis of the essential facilities doctrine. 
 
According to the CJEU rulings in Magill,311 Bronner,312 and IMS Health,313 such exceptional 
circumstances are: (i) the refusal in question concerns a product the supply of which is 
indispensable for carrying out the business in question, (ii) the refusal prevents the 
emergence of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand, (iii) the 
refusal is not justified by objective considerations, and (iv) the refusal is likely to exclude 
all competition in the secondary market. Perhaps the indispensability criterion is the most 
difficult to meet. In Bronner, the CJEU specified that a product or service is indispensable 
only (a) if there are no alternative products or services, and (b) there are technical, legal or 
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economic obstacles that make it impossible or unreasonably difficult for any undertaking 
seeking to operate on the downstream market to develop, possibly in cooperation with 
other companies, alternative products or services.314 
 
In view of the strictness of the abovementioned requirements, it is safe to argue that a 
refusal to supply data will be abusive only if it is proven that the data owned by the 
incumbent is truly unique, and that there are no other ways for the competitor to obtain 
the data that it needs to supply its services. 315  In particular, the indispensability 
requirement, which demands that there are no economically viable alternatives316 to obtain 
the input the supply of which is required, is especially hard to meet.  
 
However, in Microsoft317 the GC seems to have lowered the standards above. With regard 
to the indispensability requirement, the Court held that competitors should be put ‘on an 
equal footing’318 with Microsoft, rejecting the five alternative methods that in the opinion 
of Microsoft would have ensured a minimum level of interoperability sufficient for 
effective competition.319 In addition, with regard to the ‘new product’ requirement, the 
GC observed that the appearance of a new product cannot be the only parameter which 
determines whether a refusal to license an IPR is capable of causing prejudice to 
consumers within the meaning of Article 102(b) TFEU, as such “prejudice may arise 
where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also of technical 
development.”320  Accordingly, it is possible to hypothesise a scenario where a firm 
requests access to data owned by an incumbent in order be placed ‘on equal footing’ to 
compete and improve a currently existing product (instead of producing a new service), 
the refusal of which may be deemed abusive within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. 
However, since the GC’s judgment in Microsoft was not appealed, it is uncertain whether 
the CJEU approves of these lower standards. According to Larouche, the GC’s lower 
standards may be specific to Microsoft in view of Microsoft’s ‘super-dominance’. 321 
Therefore, at least in theory, this route to gain access data from an incumbent could be 
potentially successful when attempted against a super-dominant undertaking. At any rate, 
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the Commission has acknowledged that “[g]eneral competition law is applicable in the 
context of data-driven business models, [and it] may be invoked to claim a wider access to 
data held by one economic operator.”322 
 
 3. Leveraging Abuses 
 
One of the most striking trends in online platform markets is the expansion of some 
platforms into related and/or adjacent markets. When online platforms are vertically 
integrated, their competitive incentives obviously change. For instance, in mobile 
ecosystems, when a platform owns a mobile OS, an App store and one or several popular 
apps, the platform finds itself in a “frenemy” relationship with independent app 
developers.323 To compete effectively, any app (for example MapQuest’s app) must be 
fully available and functional on Apple’s and Google’s mobile ecosystems. At the same 
time, as a result of indirect network effects, the app can increase demand for iPhone and 
Android devices. Therefore, both the app and the super-platform benefit from this 
relationship, and in this sense they are “friends”. However, the platform may offer 
competing apps on their respective App store (i.e. iOS Maps and Google Maps), and in 
this sense the app and the super-platforms are “enemies”.  Under the ‘enemy’ prong of 
this relationship, the platform has an incentive to steer users and advertisers to its own 
apps, to the detriment of rival apps. A similar dynamic occurs when a search engine starts 
competing on different segments of vertical search, or when an online marketplace starts 
offering products that compete with those of its sellers.  
 
In this context, according to the OECD, the platform “may seek to exclude third-party 
applications developers, either to protect its own vertically integrated applications 
subsidiary or to prevent the emergence of a potentially competing platform.”324 To this 
effect, the platform may inter alia give preferential treatment to its own products and apps, 
deprive the independent app or product developer of the ability to distribute its app or 
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product effectively, and degrade the independent app’s functionality.325 In addition, a data-
driven firm may be able to leverage a data-advantage from one market onto other related 
markets. 
 
3.1 Preferential Treatment 
 
Preferential treatment of a platform’s products was one of the core issues of the 
Commission’s Google Shopping case.326  
 
By the late 2000s and early 2010s, in response to the challenge posed by vertical search, 
Google began to make copies of the most successful specialised search engines like 
Kayak, Foundem and Yelp (leading to Google Travel, Google Shopping and Google 
Local). Since the ‘clones’ were not as popular and successful with users as the original 
vertical search engines, Google introduced what was called ‘universal search’. In a 
nutshell, universal search displayed links to Google’s own vertical search services in a 
more advantageous manner than to its competitors, thereby effectively diverting traffic 
from Google’s vertical competitors to its own versions of those companies.327 These 
practices led to antitrust scrutiny by both the FTC and the Commission, with the former 
closing its investigation in 2013328 and the latter recently imposing a €2.42 billion fine on 
Google.329 
 
By having access to the largest pool of search query data, Google was able to identify 
industry segments into which it could expand to increase traffic and gather more data, 
thereby protecting its core markets (general search and search advertising). According to 
the Commission, Google engaged in a double practice consisting of systematically giving 
prominent placement to its own comparison shopping service, and demoting rival 
comparison shopping services in Google’s search results. These practices resulted in a 
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significant advantage compared to Google’s rivals, in breach of EU antitrust rules.330 It is 
worth noting that the Commission’s decision in this case focused on comparison 
shopping services only. However, the Commission observed that it continues examining 
Google’s treatment in its search results of other specialised Google search services, and 
that its decision of the Google Shopping case “is a precedent which establishes the 
framework for the assessment of the legality of this type of conduct.”331 Accordingly, the 
decision is likely to be very important for potential complainants active in other vertical 
search segments like Maps, Local, Travel and Finance.  
 
Preferential treatment can also take place by means of contractual restrictions. Google 
controls the open-source system Android OS. The fact that such OS is open-source 
means that it can be freely downloaded, used and modified by anybody. Accordingly, 
“[a]ny device manufacturer that wishes to install “bare Android” can do so free of any 
Google apps whatsoever, and subject to minimal restrictions and few obligations to 
Google or anyone else.”332 However, a “bare Android” is of little or no use to regular 
users. The great majority of consumers will want a “normal” Android phone with Google 
Maps, Google search and other popular apps, along with the Google Play Store necessary 
to download any additional apps they may wish. To have Google Play and the most 
popular Google apps installed on an Android device, device manufacturers (OEMs) must 
sign a Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA).  
 
Under the MADA, OEMs must pre-install all Google applications designated by 
Google.333 The Commission has been able to confirm that Google has made the licensing 
of the Play Store on Android devices conditional on Google Search being pre-installed 
and set as the default search service, and relatedly, that Google requires the pre-
installation of its mobile browser Chrome in return for licensing the Play Store or Google 
Search.334 The pre-installed apps must be prominent, with certain ads presented “at least 
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than one level below the Phone Top.”335 Perhaps more importantly, Google demands that 
Google Search “be set as the default search provider for all Web search access points”, 
including “assist” and “voice search” functions.336 In addition, Google requires that its 
Network Location Provider service be preloaded and set as the default, tracking the 
geographic location of users at all times, and sending that location information to 
Google.337 Last but not least, Google requires that whenever a mobile app presents a 
webpage, said webpage must be rendered by a “Google WebView Component”, which is 
the core of a web browser.338  
 
In view of the above, in April 2016, the Commission sent to Google a statement of 
objections, communicating its preliminary view that Google has abused its dominant 
position by imposing the contractual restrictions explained above. The Commission 
observed that, as a result of such restrictions, rivals search engines and mobile browsers 
are prevented from accessing the market, as a result of which Google’s dominant position 
in general search internet services has been reinforced and consolidated.339  
 
3.2 Obstacles to the Effective Distribution of an App or Product  
 
As seen above, Google has been accused to ‘falsify’ its search algorithm to increase the 
ranking of its own content and services within the organic search results (i.e. 
“promotion”). The flipside of this practice is the deliberate reduction of the ranking of 
specific services and content provided by competitors (i.e. “demotion”). In this 
connection, the Commission recently found:  
 
“rival comparison shopping services appear in Google's search results on the 
basis of Google's generic search algorithms. Google has included a number 
of criteria in these algorithms, as a result of which rival comparison shopping 
services are demoted. Evidence shows that even the most highly ranked rival 
service appears on average only on page four of Google's search results, and 
others appear even further down. Google's own comparison shopping 
service is not subject to Google's generic search algorithms, including such 
demotions.”340 
																																																								
335 MADA, section 3.4.(2)-(3), quoted in Edelman and Geradin (n 333) 7. 
336 MADA, section 3.4.(4), quoted in ibid. 
337 MADA, section 3.8(c), quoted in ibid 7–8. 
338 ibid. 
339 European Commission (n 309).  




The Commission established that the overwhelming majority of users click on the results 
that are higher up in the first page of search results. Indeed, the ten highest-ranking 
generic search results on page 1 together generally receive approximately 95% of all clicks 
on generic search results (with the top result receiving about 35% of all the clicks), while 
the first result on page 2 of Google's generic search results receives only about 1% of all 
clicks.341 On account of Google’s persistently high market shares in horizontal search 
across the EU (exceeding 90% in all EEA countries342) and the importance of being 
‘visible’ in Google’s search results to obtain traffic, demoted competitors are prevented 
from offering and distributing their services effectively. There is a long list of service 
providers that have complained of having been demoted in Google’s SERP, including 
MapQuest, Photobucket, ESPN, Yahoo Images, Streetmap, Foundem343 and several other 
firms members of the Fairsearch344 and ICOMP coalitions.345   
 
Alternatively, distribution of a product or app can be thwarted by an outright ban placed 
by a platform owner. In mobile ecosystems, platform owners (i.e. Google and Apple) and 
independent app developers cooperate with each other to extract personal data and track 
and target users with behavioural ads.346 Accordingly, any independent app that decides to 
‘go rouge’ and devise a new business model capable of threatening the permanent flow of 
data may suffer retaliation from the platform owner.  
 
That type of retaliation is one explanation for the conflict between Disconnect and 
Google. Disconnect, Inc. is a company that develops, markets and sells privacy and 
security software for mobile devices and computers. Disconnect has described its 
business model in the following fashion: 
 
“When a consumer uses his Android mobile phone to read the Financial 
Times’ story about the Commission’s SO against Google, he unknowingly 
receives 17 “network requests” from sites and services other than the FT, all 
attempting to open invisible connections to his device. Seven of these 




343 See generally Consumer Watchdog.org, ‘Traffic Report: How Google Is Squeezing Out Competitors and 
Muscling into New Markets’ (2010) A study by Inside Google. 
344 Fair Search, ‘FAIR SEARCH’ <http://fairsearch.org/>. 
345 ‘Members’ (ICOMP) <http://i-comp.org/members/>. 
346 Ezrachi and Stucke (n 264) 167–169. 
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and services that invisibly track the user in order to make a comprehensive 
profile of his personal information as he uses applications and browses the 
web. This tracking not only violates personal privacy, but also leaves users 
vulnerable to malware and identity theft. Disconnect Inc.’s revolutionary 
technologies reveal and block this problematic tracking.”347 
 
Google banned Disconnect from the Play Store in 2014, claiming that it was interfering 
with other apps on the Play Store without authorization.348 Disconnect, conversely, claims 
that Google banned Disconnect because its technology interferes with Google’s revenue 
stream from invisible tracking. After the ban, Disconnect could not be found on Google’s 
Play Store any longer. This circumstance was reflected on its sales.349 The conflict ended 
up in a complaint filed with the Commission by Disconnect against Google,350 the 
decision of which remains pending. 
 
3.3 Degradation of Functionality  
 
Since web usage is increasingly shifting to smartphones and other mobile and connected 
devices, independent apps’ profitability and success depend on their interoperability with 
the Apple and Android mobile ecosystems, which they do not control.351 Indeed, as 
Stucke and Grunes report, independent apps and platforms like Twitter, LinkedIn, Yelp, 
Coupons.com and even Facebook have all acknowledged to their investors their 
dependence on such ecosystems.352 
 
Firms can resort to the creation of obstacles for interoperability as a strategy to raise 
barriers to entry and foreclose competition. In Intel,353 the FTC found that Intel had 
introduced certain features to its compilers354 which effectively slowed the performance of 
software written using Intel’s compilers on non-Intel x86 CPUs, such as Opteron, and 
																																																								
347 Disconnect, Inc., ‘Complaint of Disconnect, Inc. Regarding Google’s Infringement of Article 102 TFEU 
through Bundling into the Android Platform and the Related Exclusion of Competing Privacy and Security 
Technology Case COMP/40099’ <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2109044/disconnect-
google-antitrust-complaint.txt>. 
348 Kannon Yamada, ‘Google Just Banned This Privacy Tool: How to Use Disconnect’ (2015) MakeUseOf 
<http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/google-just-banned-privacy-tool-use-disconnect/>. 
349 Disconnect, Inc. (n 347) para 13. 
350 See Disconnect, Inc. (n 347). 
351 Ezrachi and Stucke (n 264) 155–156. 
352 Stucke and Grunes (n 325) 294. 
353 In the Matter of Intel Corporation [2009] FTC Docket No. 9341. 
354 A compiler is a tool used by software developers to write software. See FTC, ‘Analysis of Proposed 




that, to the unknowing public, OEMs and software vendors, the slower performance of 
non-Intel-based computers when running some software applications was mistakenly 
attributed to the performance of non-Intel CPUs.355 
 
Therefore, there is the possibility that the controllers of mobile ecosystems alter their 
mobile OS in a way that degrades the functionality of independent apps and online 
platforms, for example, by impairing their performance or making them run slower.356 If 
consumers become disenchanted with a given app’s (for example, Trivago) degraded 
performance induced by a mobile OS owner, consumers may flock to competing apps 
owned by such mobile OS owner (for example, Google Trips).  
 
3.4 Leverage of a Data-advantage from one Market onto Another Market 
 
In France, the dominant gas provider used the personal data it gathered as a regulated 
monopoly to compete in a different market. After the gas market was opened to 
competition, and in particular since 2007, consumers could choose between GDF Suez’s 
offers at regulated tariffs and market offers, which all gas suppliers including GDF Suez 
provided.357 
 
The competitor Direct Energie filed a complaint with the Autorité de la Concurrence, 
arguing that GDF Suez was engaging in exclusionary practices. In particular, one practice 
was the use by GDF Suez of databases of costumers on regulated tariffs, which it had 
gathered as a regulated monopoly, to offer them gas and electricity deals. The use of such 
databases, according to the complainant, gave GDF Suez an incomparable advantage for 
keeping its dominant position in the gas market and acquiring new customers in the 
electricity market.358 
 
The Autorité de la Concurrence held that the “advantages gained through this behaviour 
cannot be replicated under reasonable conditions, since no database exists that would 
allow competitors to precisely locate gas consumers and know their consumption level, in 
																																																								
355 ibid. 
356 Stucke and Grunes (n 325) 295. 





order to propose them offers that are better suited to their profile”, and that such 
behaviour “is incompatible with competition on the merits, because it is not the product 
of a specific innovation that GDF Suez may have introduced, but is merely inherited from 
its former status as monopolistic gas supplier.”359 GDF Suez was found to have abused its 
dominant position, and was ordered to grant its competitors access to some of the 
consumption data it collected as a provider of regulated offers.360  
 
Similarly, the Belgian Competition Authority found that the National Lottery had abused 
its dominant position when launching its sports betting product Scooore!.361 As in the case 
above, the National Lottery used contact details of persons registered in its IGS-database 
acquired in the context of its legal monopoly in order to enter the sports betting market 
with the launch of Scooore!. According to the Belgian Competition Authority, “the 
National Lottery did not acquire these contact details following competition on the 
merits, but in the context of its legal monopoly, [and such] data, having regard to their 
nature and size, could not be reproduced by competitors on the market at reasonable 
financial conditions and within a reasonable period of time.”362 
 
Both cases concerned dominant undertakings using data acquired in the context of the 
legal monopolies they once enjoyed. The abuse is not as straightforward, consequently, 
when the data is gathered following competition on the merits, for example, as a result of 
innovative products. However, if a dominant undertaking has used other unlawful 
practices to attain, maintain or reinforce its dominant position, then the use of data 
acquired from its unlawfully attained or maintained dominant position is not competition 







360 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (n 315) 20. 
361 Belgian Competition Authority, ‘Press Release Nr 15-2015’ (2015) 
<https://www.belgiancompetition.be/en/about-us/actualities/press-release-nr-15-2015>. 
362 ibid. 





This Chapter agrees with the observation of the hands-off approach’s proponents in the 
sense that market definition in online markets is problematic, that assessments of 
dominance and market power in general based on rigid market boundaries are likely to 
lead to mistaken conclusions, and that traditional competition analysis has an excessive 
focus on price which is inconsistent with the dynamics of competition in online markets. 
However, at the same time, this Chapter demonstrates that such observations are an 
unconvincing justification for low intervention in online markets. Competition law is 
sufficiently flexible to take into consideration the special features of digital industries and 
adapt accordingly. Markets can be readily defined, and assessments of dominance can be 
properly made without excessive fixation on price considerations, having due regard to 
quality, innovation and the interdependences between the different sides of the relevant 
MSP subject to scrutiny. In addition, some firms have the incentive and ability to engage 
in data-driven anticompetitive practices, and the Commission and other competition 
agencies around the world have already begun to investigate and punish them. This fact 
confirms the need for having vigilant and alert competition authorities in online 
industries, and further rests credibility to the hands-off approach. 
 
At the same time, by defining product markets and assessing dominance in the most 
popular online industries, this Chapter demonstrates that platforms follow very different 
business models, and consequently derive their profits, and market power, from different 
sources and factors. For example, direct network effects are of paramount significance for 
social networks, but play little to no role in markets for search engines and online 
marketplaces. Similarly, search- and social network-related services cannot be provided 
without data, whereas the sale intermediation services provided by online marketplaces 
are not dependent on data to the same extent. It follows that (i) dominance and the 
competitive effects of the practices in which the platforms belonging to those markets 
engage must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and (ii) any “one-size-fits-all” regulation 
applicable to ‘online platforms’ is likely be incapable of accounting for online platforms’ 
different business models and the competitive implications derived therefrom, for which 





CHAPTER 4. Interrelated Competition and Online Privacy 




The problems arising from data-driven competition in online markets are not confined to 
competition law only. On the flipside, the collection and processing of consumer data 
impinge upon consumers’ privacy. As Commissioner Vestager explains: 
 
“Very few people realise that, if you tick the box, your information 
can be exchanged with others […] Actually, you are paying a price 
[…] You give away something that was valuable. I think that point is 
underestimated as a factor as to how competition works. 
 
The more data you can collect, the more you know, the better the 
product you can provide, but also the more powerful will you be 
towards others […] It isn’t solely a competition issue […] It’s very 
important for us to be able to say what is competition-related and 
what is an issue of privacy, [and] how you can be as secure on the net 
as you can be in the physical world.”1 
 
Competition in online markets creates a natural tension between undertakings’ incentives 
and consumers’ online privacy. This tension leads to interrelated concerns.  On the one 
hand, competition creates the incentive for undertakings to gather and process as much 
data as possible, and this incentive has the potential to derive into heightened barriers to 
entry2 and the ability of dominant undertakings to engage in data-driven anticompetitive 
conduct;3 on the other hand, the ‘data-race’ in which online firms participate to gain a data 
advantage results in widespread surveillance and the violation of individuals’ data 
protection rights.  
 
																																																								
1 Interview with Margrethe Vestager, ‘Margrethe Vestager, Lewis Crofts and Robert McLeod in 
Conversation with Europe’s New Competition Commissioner’ (2015) <http://mlexmarketinsight.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/MLex-Interview-Vestager-22-01-151.pdf>. 
2 See Chapter 2 Section II.5.2.3. 
3 See Chapter 3 Section III. 
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The interrelated nature of competition and data protection issues in online markets has 
prompted some laudable efforts to tackle them in a joint fashion. Theories have been put 
forward to define markets for data, to take into account data protection considerations 
under the consumer welfare standard, and to consider privacy protection as a non-price 
parameter of competition. This Chapter discusses these theories and reaches a conclusion 
on whether their implementation is sound competition policy. It is submitted that each of 
these approaches faces some type of obstacle for its successful implementation. Firstly, 
the ‘market for data’ approach is too fictional, as it does not meet the most basic 
requirement for a market to exist, which is the existence of actual market transactions 
between suppliers and customers of a product. Secondly, the approach that makes data 
protection considerations cognisable under the consumer welfare standard is just another 
expression of the long-standing debate on whether or not competition law assessments 
should include non-competition considerations in its substantive analysis, for which 
reason its novelty is rather illusory, and its impact on competition enforcement likely to 
be zero: competition assessments already allow for the consideration of non-competition 
issues (such as data protection) to exclude the application of competition law, but conduct 
that is not objectionable from a competition policy perspective cannot be punished in 
competition proceedings on non-competition grounds. Thirdly, the ‘privacy as a non-
price parameter of competition’ approach is theoretically correct: some consumers in 
some online markets do indeed value the privacy protection offered by the services they 
use, and adopt their consumption decisions accordingly. However, privacy protection is 
not a meaningful parameter of competition, because its existence as such is predicated on 
assumptions which are not met in reality.  
 
Section I describes five stages of privacy harms that are commonplace in online markets. 
These privacy harms arise from the manner in which online firms compete. Insofar as 
competition remains data-driven and with no data protection granularities being offered, 
these privacy harms are bound to be augmented. Section II explains the most intellectually 
convincing attempts to bring data protection issues to the core of competition analysis, 
and explains why their implementation is not advised or unlikely to be successful. Section 




I. Privacy Harms arising from Data-Driven Competition  
 
In addition to the competition concerns analysed in Chapters 2 and 3, the collection and 
processing of consumer data by online firms also give rise to online privacy concerns. In 
particular, problems arise because much of the data collected and processed by online 
firms is ‘personal data’; i.e. information that relates to an identified or identifiable 
individual. In the EU, the protection of personal data is a fundamental right enshrined in 
the Charter, and its processing is subject to compliance with specific rules.4 Competition 
in online markets creates tension between undertakings’ incentives and individuals’ right 
to data protection. Insofar as the main way to compete online is by gathering personal 
data and processing it for the provision of free services and targeted advertising, there will 
be increased pressure to gather more and more data. This increased pressure, in turn, will 
compound the privacy harms that are commonplace online.  
 
Privacy harms arising from data-driven competition are oftentimes downgraded and 
understated. For example, Thierer has observed: “[p]ractically every new information 
technology launched today is initially labeled “creepy” and creepiness is often the primary 
(or only) alleged harm that is cited as the basis of much online privacy regulation”.5 It is 
argued, to the contrary, that privacy harms go way beyond creepiness. They include the 
reduction of individuals’ private space and lack of control over personal data, increased 
potential of data theft, the narrowing of individuals’ choices, amplified information 
asymmetries and enhanced discrimination:  
 
1. Widespread and comprehensive data collection is increasingly diminishing the private 
space of individuals.  
 
The business model of online platforms is based on ‘tracking’ people, their relationships 
and their behaviour. In other words, surveillance. 6  This surveillance constitutes an 
invasion into the private space of consumers, especially when consumers are not aware of 
																																																								
4 See Chapter 5 Section I.2. 
5 Adam Thierer, ‘The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing’ (2013) 36 Harv. 
JL & Pub. Pol’y 409, 417–418. 





the ‘tracking’ that is taking place,7 and in particular where people do not have any choice 
in whether they are watched and tracked online.8  
 
The tracking of users and accumulation of their data has an incremental adverse effect on 
privacy. Entirely different conclusions can be drawn from search queries consisting of the 
words ‘paris’, ‘hilton’ and ‘louvre’ as opposed to ‘paris’, ‘hilton’ and ‘nicky’, but if more 
and more search queries are added to the analysis, the information-revealing properties of 
data can be easily appreciated.9  More data allows for the drawing of remarkably precise 
inferences. By way of example, in 2006 AOL made public over 20 million search queries 
conducted by thousands of subscribers over a three-month period. After replacing the 
subscribers’ names or user IDs with identification numbers to protect the searchers’ 
anonymity, AOL posted the data for research purposes. The data connected the 
‘anonymised’ AOL member with his or her search queries, the number of websites 
identified by AOL’s search engine as responsive to the search queries, and the resulting 
website the individual chose to visit. Based on this information, the New York Times was 
able to identify one subscriber named Thelma Arnold:  
 
“search by search, click by click, the identity of AOL user No. 4417749 
became easier to discern… It did not take much investigation to follow that 
data trail to Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga., 
frequently researches her friends’ medical ailments and loves her three dogs.”10  
 
In a similar vein, a 2009 study showed how it is possible to predict individuals’ Social 
Security numbers (which is highly sensitive information in the US) from information 
obtained from publicly available Internet sources (birth information from Facebook 
profiles and data from a database of deceased individuals’ Social Security numbers).11  
 
																																																								
7 [T]he invisibility of the practice to consumers raises privacy concerns, as does the risk that data collected 
for behavioral advertising – including sensitive data about children, health or finances – could be misused." 
FTC, ‘Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles For Online Behavioral 
Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology’ (2009) 9 <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/federal-trade-
commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral>. 
8 ibid. 
9 Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, ‘Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics’ 
(2013) 11 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 239, 251. 
10 Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller, ‘A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749’ (2006) The New 
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>. 
11 Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross, ‘Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public Data’ (2009) 106 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 10975. 
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Moreover, once data like search queries or a cookie number are linked to an identified 
individual, it is almost impossible to disentangle them. This circumstance compounds this 
incremental adverse effect on privacy to an extent such that an individual’s private life can 
be irreversibly exposed. To make things worse, after its generation, users have virtually no 
control over their personal data, let alone of the information obtained from data mining. 
In addition, as a consequence of digitalisation, data is easier to replicate and share after its 
production.12 These circumstances serve as fuel for the general perception shared by 
consumers of lack of control over their personal data.13 
 
2. Storage of big data increases the potential of data theft and the harmful consequences 
of data security breaches. 
 
The more data is collected and stored, the higher the risks of data breaches. According to 
Kroll consulting, reported thefts of electronic data exceeded reported thefts of physical 
property from global companies for the first time in the year 2010.14  
 
In addition, large-scale data breaches are becoming more frequent: for example, a hacking 
attack in 2008-09 that compromised Heartland Payment Systems Inc. (a US-based card 
processing company) and other companies affected over 130 million credit and debit card 
numbers, 15  and a data breach of Sony’s PlayStation Network and Sony Online 
Entertainment resulted in exposed data for 24.6 million users, including their name, 






12 Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the Information Age (Bepress: Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford 2002) 61. 
13 ‘A feeling of a loss of control appears to be a core theme, perhaps helping to explain consumers’ specific 
fears about how their data might be used." See CMA, ‘The Commercial Use of Consumer Data – Report on 
the CMA’s Call for Information’ (2015) 116. 
14 Kroll Consultancy, ‘Global Fraud Report, Economist Intelligence Unit Survey Results Annual Edition 
2010/2011’ (2011) <http://fr.kroll.com/media/pdfs/FraudReport_English-US_Oct10.pdf>. 
15 Kim Zetter, ‘TJX Hacker Charged With Heartland, Hannaford Breaches’ (2009) Wired 
<https://www.wired.com/2009/08/tjx-hacker-charged-with-heartland>. 
16 Reuters Staff, ‘UPDATE 2-Sony Breach Could Cost Card Lenders $300 Mln’ (2011) Reuters 
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/sony-creditcards-cost-idUKN2826485220110428>; Dan Goodin, ‘Sony 




3. Big Analytics leads to inferences and automated decision-making which narrow 
individuals’ choices. 
 
Innovative data mining techniques produce more information about users without their 
intervention. Inferences and automated processes based on algorithms and AI take 
control over the decisions about an individual’s life, leading to concerns about narrowing 
of choice. Data-based personalisation of online services has resulted in algorithms 
determining what content or advertisements a user will see when going online. For 
example, when Facebook modified its News Feed in 2011, several users complained 
about having ‘disappeared’ from the website: the platform’s new default setting resulted in 
users only seeing news and updates from the friends with whom they ‘interact most’.17 In 
this connection, Eli Pariser has contended that the “invisible algorithmic editing of the 
Web’ is moving us very quickly toward a world in which the Internet is showing us what it 
thinks we want to see but not necessarily what we need to see”, giving as an example the 
different Google’s search results that two of his friends got when they both searched for 
‘Egypt’ during the revolutionary activity that took place in such country in February 2011: 
based on their respective search history, one person obtained news stories, whilst the 
other obtained travel advice.18 
 
4. Increasingly accurate accumulated knowledge derived from data collection and 
processing creates information asymmetries. 
 
Online services are provided under barter-like transactions, where users exchange their 
personal data for free access. 19  However, those transactions are consummated in 
inefficient markets where information asymmetries, further compounded by big analytics, 
are rife.  
 
There is little to no awareness of how and why consumer information is used, stored and 
transferred online.20 Worse still, even when consumers are aware of their disclosure of 
personal information to use online services, they hardly grasp the level to which an online 
																																																								
17 Kashmir Hill, ‘Resisting The Algorithms’ (2011) Forbes 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/05/05/resisting-the-algorithms/>. 
18 ibid; See generally Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What The Internet Is Hiding From You (Penguin 2012). 
19 John M Newman, ‘Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations’ (2015) 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149. 
20 Ofcom, ‘Being Online: An Investigation of People’s Habits and Attitudes - Ofcom’ (2013) 
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/internet-and-on-demand-research/internet-use-and-
attitudes/being-online>. See below Section II.2.3, discussion on Condition 1.  
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platform may know his personal interests and preferences. Vertically integrated platforms 
can combine data gathered from all of the services they provide, or alternatively, data 
troves can be pooled together as a result of mergers or acquisitions of Internet firms, or 
combined without the direct knowledge and interaction of consumers (for instance, by 
data brokers), leading to new valuable insights about them. As a result:  
 
“Transacting with a big data platform is like a game of poker where one of the 
players has his hand open and the other keeps his cards close. The online 
company knows the preferences of the transacting individual inside and out, 
perhaps better than the individual knows him or herself. It can therefore usurp 
the entire value surplus available in the transaction by pricing goods or 
services as close as possible to the individual’s reservation price.”21 
 
5. Data-driven decision-making can lead to discrimination and cause financial and other 
harms to individuals. 
 
According to a report prepared for the White House, powerful algorithms have the 
potential of encoding discrimination in automated decisions.22 Big analytics enable the 
emergence of correlations that allow individuals to be ‘scored’ and slotted into categories 
or segments of consumers of similar characteristics such as ethnicity, income level and 
education (for example, ‘Modest Wages’, ‘Rural Everlasting’, or ‘Resilient Renters’).23 
These scores are generated mostly for marketing purposes, but they can be also used in 
ways that influence the opportunities of individuals, for example, to find housing.24 In this 
regard, it has been reported that data are being surreptitiously used for ‘redlining’.25 It has 
also been reported that credit checks and other scouring of online background 
information are being combined into algorithmic screening categories that may exclude 
individuals from being considered for jobs or loan applications. 26  In addition, the 
combination of a home address and other data can “create an almost perfect proxy for 
race”,27 which may result in situations of discrimination against individuals and groups. 
For example, investigating personalised ads which are rendered by Google’s AdSense 
when a Google search for a person’s name is entered, Sweeney found statistically 
																																																								
21 Tene and Polonetsky (n 9) 255. 
22 Executive Office of the President, ‘Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values’ (2014) 45 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf>. 
23 FTC, ‘Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ (2014) 19–20. 
24 Executive Office of the President (n 22) 46. 
25 Redlining is the act of denying or increasing the cost of services such as loans, insurance or healthcare to 
residents of neighbourhood composed mostly of minorities. Tene and Polonetsky (n 9) 254.  
26 Nathan Newman, ‘Data Justice: Taking on Big Data as an Economic Justice Issue’ (2015) 3. 
27 ibid 6. 
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significant discrimination in ad delivery based on searches of 2184 racially associated 
personal names across two websites: black-identifying names generated ads suggestive of 
an arrest in 81 to 86 per cent of name searches on one website and 92 to 95 per cent on 
the other, whilst white-identifying names generated ads suggestive of an arrest in 23 to 29 
per cent on one site and 0 to 60 per cent on the other.28 
 
Therefore, contrary to statements that “there is little or no evidence of any harm or 
threatened harm” to informational privacy, 29  privacy harms arising from data-driven 
competition are a real and concrete issue that is adversely affecting “the core values and 
principles which privacy protection seeks to promote, [which phenomena] may have a 
broader impact on society as a whole.”30 
 
II. Approaches that bring Privacy Considerations into the 




Since competition in digital markets raises interrelated competition and privacy concerns, 
some theories have been articulated to address privacy issues in competition analyses, 
mostly in the context of mergers and unilateral conduct. The list below is not exhaustive;31 
rather, it contains the most intellectually sound approaches that could hypothetically 
persuade competition authorities and judges to include privacy considerations in 




28 Latanya Sweeney, ‘Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery’ (2013) SSRN paper 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208240>. 
29 Lucas Bergkamp, ‘EU Data Protection Policy: The Privacy Fallacy: Adverse Effects of Europe’s Data 
Protection Policy in an Information-Driven Economy’ (2002) 18 Computer Law & Security Review 31, 32. 
30 OECD, ‘Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report’ (2014) 57. 
31 For example, other efforts have been made on the basis of privacy being a fundamental human right and 
undue concentration of economic power. See generally Geoffrey A Manne and Ben Sperry, ‘The Law and 
Economics of Data and Privacy in Antitrust Analysis’, 2014 TPRC Conference Paper (2014). 
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1.1 The ‘Market for Data’ Approach 
 
This approach was explained in Chapter 3 Section I.4.3. Let us recall that its proponents 
advance the definition of ‘markets for data’, in addition to the markets for the services 
enabled and fuelled by such data. 
 
1.2 The ‘Integrationist’ Approach 
 
The EDPS recently argued that “privacy and the protection of personal data should be 
considered not as peripheral concerns but rather as central factors in the appraisal of 
companies’ activities and their impact on competiveness, market efficiency and consumer 
welfare”,32 given that “consumers are also data subjects, whose welfare may be at risk 
where freedom of choice and control over one’s personal information is restricted by a 
dominant undertaking”,33 for which reason “it may be necessary to develop a concept of 
consumer harm, particularly through violation of rights to data protection, for 
competition enforcement in digital sectors of the economy”.34 
 
Peter Swire puts forward a similar argument.35 He contends that “privacy harms can 
reduce consumer welfare, which is a principal goal of modern antitrust analysis”,36 for 
which reason “[i]t would be illogical to count the harms to consumers from higher prices 
while excluding the harms from privacy invasions – both sorts of harms reduce consumer 
surplus and consumer welfare in the relevant market”.37 He refers to research showing 
that many consumers have significant concerns about privacy, and argues that “[f]or these 
individuals, their consumer preferences are subject to harm if standard online surfing 
shifts to a less privacy-protective structure due to a merger or dominant firm behavior”.38 
 
																																																								
32 EDPS, ‘Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor.  Privacy and Competitiveness 
in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer 
Protection in the Digital Economy’ (2014) 26. 
33 ibid 31. 
34 ibid 32. 








1.3 ‘Privacy as Non-price Parameter of Competition’ Approach 
 
It is acknowledged that companies compete not only on the basis of price,39 but also on 
other dimensions such as quality, choice and innovation. Given that in certain markets40 
companies to a greater or lesser extent compete on the basis of the level of data 
protection they offer to their users, privacy can indeed amount to a non-price parameter 
of competition. Since reductions in non-price competition as a result of mergers or 
conduct are addressed and punished by competition law, reductions in privacy due to 
mergers or conduct should be also cognizable harms in competition assessments. As a 
matter of fact, the FTC expressly acknowledged privacy as a non-price parameter 
competition in its Google/DoubleClick decision.41 
 
Swire has put forward a similar argument. For him, privacy harms can lead to a reduction 
in the quality of a good or service, which is a standard category of harm that results from 
market power.42 Commenting on the Google/DoubleClick merger, Swire asserted that the 
merger would entail the combination of Google’s ‘deep’ information about an individual’s 
actions, such as detailed information about search terms, with DoubleClick’s ‘broad’ 
information about an individual’s actions, such as the surfing behaviour of an individual 
after leaving Google, and that this combination of ‘deep’ and ‘broad’ information “may be 
a significant reduction in the quality of the search product” for the “many millions of 
individuals with high privacy preferences.”43 Therefore, if reduction of product quality is 
an effect actionable under competition law and consumers regard privacy as an aspect of 
product quality, reductions of privacy protection should be taken as consumer harm in 
competition assessments.  
 
																																																								
39 See for example European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] OJ C 
45/7, para 11: ‘In this Communication, the expression “increase prices” includes the power to maintain 
prices above the competitive level and is used as shorthand for the various ways in which the parameters of 
competition — such as prices, output, innovation, the variety or quality of goods or services — can be 
influenced to the advantage of the dominant undertaking and to the detriment of consumers.’ . 
40 See for example Case COMP/M7217, Facebook/WhatsApp (2014) [125] where the Commission notes 
some degree of competition on the basis of data protection in the consumer communications apps market. 
41 [W]e investigated the possibility that this transaction could adversely affect non-price attributes of 
competition, such as consumer privacy”. FTC, Google/DoubleClick [2008] FTC File No. 071-0170 6. 




Lande offers another variant of Swire’s approach, focusing on consumer choice rather 
than quality.44 Commenting on the Microsoft/Yahoo! Merger, he asserted: “[a]ntitrust is 
actually about consumer choice, and price is only one type of choice. The ultimate 
purpose of the antitrust laws is to help ensure that the free market will bring to consumers 
everything they want from competition. This starts with competitive prices, of course, but 
consumers also want an optimal level of variety, innovation, quality, and other forms of 
nonprice competition. Including privacy protection.”45 Consequently, “a merger which 
significantly reduces the intensity of competition in any information-based market must 
be examined for its potential effects on all dimensions of competition – including privacy 
– rather than just for its price effects.”46 
 
2. Problems with these Approaches 
 
2.1 The ‘Market for Data’ Approach 
 
As explained in Chapter 3 Section I.4.3, this approach suffers from an insurmountable 
conceptual flaw. Chapter 2 explains that data is an input to production rather than a 
standalone product, for which reason, save for a few exceptions,47 online platforms do not 
market data. Consequently, any of these ‘markets for data’ will be essentially fictional, as 
there are no actual market transactions between suppliers and customers of data.  
 
2.2 The ‘Integrationist’ Approach 
 
The proponents of this approach suggest that the notion of consumer welfare should 
incorporate data protection considerations, thereby implying a departure from a purely 
economic analysis of consumer welfare. Notably, this seems to be another expression of 
the long-standing debate of whether or not competition law assessments should include 
																																																								
44 Robert Lande, ‘The Microsoft-Yahoo Merger: Yes, Privacy Is an Antitrust Concern’ [2008] 714 FTC: 
Watch 9 1. 
45 Lande (n 44). 
46 ibid. 
47 See Chapter 2 Section I.3.3.2.3. 
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non-competition considerations in its substantive analysis,48 for which reason its novelty is 
rather illusory. As such, it does little to change the current state of affairs with regard to 
the interaction between competition law and data protection.   
 
The Commission’s official stance in this regard is against balancing competition with 
other public policy (non-competition) interests, such as data protection, insofar as such 
public policy interests cannot be taken into consideration in competition assessments.49 In 
practice, the Commission has balanced public interest considerations such as 
environmental policy,50 employment policy51 and the protection of public health52 in the 
enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU. Similarly, the Commission examines claims put 
forward by dominant undertakings in the sense that their allegedly exclusionary conduct is 
objectively necessary, for example, for health or safety reasons related to the nature of the 
product in question.53 For instance, in Port of Genoa,54 the Commission confirmed that 
environmental issues (“the protection of the sea bed”) can be taken into consideration as 
objective justification, and similarly, in GVG/FS,55 the Commission confirmed that public 
safety concerns may in theory be considered as an objective justification. Lastly, the EU 
Merger Regulation imposes upon the Commission the obligation to conduct its 
competition assessments within the general framework of the achievement of the 
fundamental objectives of the EU,56 for which reason the Commission is allowed to take 
into consideration public policy concerns in its appraisal processes.57  
 
However, public policy interests are almost invariably taken into consideration in 
competition analysis only to exclude the application of competition law. 58 In Article 101 
																																																								
48 On this topic see generally Christopher Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (1st edition, Bloomsbury 
Publishing plc 2009); Constanze Semmelmann, Social Policy Goals in the Interpretation of Article 81 EC (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 2008). 
49 European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article [101(3) TFEU] [2004] OJ C 101/97, 
para 42: ‘Goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account to the extent that they can be 
subsumed under the four conditions of Article [101(3)].’ 
50 Case No 94/986/EC, Philips/Osram (1998) [27]. 
51 Case No 93/49/EEC, Ford/Volkswagen (1992) [23]. 
52 Case No 94/770/EC, Pasteur-Mérieux/Merck (1994) [89 and 108]. 
53 European Commission (n 39) paras 28–29. 
54 Case No 97/745/EF, Port of Genoa (1997) [21]. 
55 Case No COMP/37685, GVG/FS (2004) [136]. 
56 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (the EU 
Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1, recital 23. 
57 Case T-12/93, Comité Central d´Entreprise de la Société Anonyme Vittel v Commission [1995] ECR II-1247 [38–
39]. 
58 The exception can be found in Article 21(4) EU Merger Regulation, which allows Member States to take 
appropriate measures to protect (public policy) legitimate interests such as public security, plurality of the 
media and prudential rules. EU Merger Regulation (n 56).  
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TFEU cases, public policy interests can outweigh the finding of restriction of 
competition, as a result of which the agreement, originally perceived as anticompetitive, is 
allowed. 59  Something similar occurs in Article 102 TFEU cases. A prima facie abuse can be 
exempted from the prohibition contained in such provision if objectively justified or if its 
anticompetitive effects are outweighed by efficiencies. 60  In merger control cases, it is 
examined whether or not a merger would significantly impede effective competition, in 
particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, and if that is 
the case, public policy considerations may be raised to allow the otherwise anticompetitive 
merger.61 If public policy concerns do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the 
relevant agreement, conduct or merger which triggered the competition proceedings, then 
such agreement, conduct or merger will be condemned in view of its anticompetitive 
effects.  
 
For instance, a group of browser providers or a dominant browser provider may 
implement a ‘Privacy-compliant Ads’ policy under which the group of browsers or the 
dominant browser blocks any ads and websites that do not meet the terms of such policy 
(for example, ads and websites that resort to intensive behavioural tracking).62 The group 
of browsers can raise an ancillary defence under Article 101(3), putting forward the 
argument that the restriction of competition is necessary for the protection of the 
fundamental right to data protection of individuals, and similarly, the dominant browser 
provider can contend that its conduct is objectively justified on the same ground. 
 
Conversely, it is very difficult to imagine how an agreement, conduct or merger that is 
only objectionable on non-competition grounds can be punished after a competition 
investigation. Merging competition and data protection assessments (or including data 
protection considerations in the consumer welfare standard) could lead to a scenario 
where in competition proceedings procompetitive conduct is punished on data protection 
																																																								
59 See for example Joined cases T-528/93, 542/93 543/93 and 546/93, Métropole Télévision v Commission 
[1996] ECR II-649 [118]. 
60 However, EU Courts have never condoned abusive conduct on the basis of public interest objectives.  
61 For example, in connection with the Lloyds/HBOS merger in the UK, the OFT concluded that the merger 
would result in significant lessening of competition in relation to personal current accounts, banking 
services for SME and mortgages. However, the merger was not blocked, as it was decided that the 
competition concerns identified by the OFT were outweighed by significant benefits to the public interest in 
ensuring the stability of the financial system. See OECD, ‘Public Interest Considerations in Merger Control’ 
(2016), 12. 




grounds, in the absence of competition issues. It is submitted that this outcome is 
unacceptable, as the EU “competition rules have as their objective the protection of 
competition on the market and cannot be detached from this objective”.63 Incorporating 
the assessment of public policy considerations such as data protection in competition 
appraisals and admitting the possibility to condemn business practices on data protection 
(or other non-competition) grounds would inevitably lead to legal uncertainty, 
inconsistency, subjectivity and unpredictability in the enforcement of competition law. 
 
On a more fundamental level, competition and data protection pull in opposite directions. 
On the one hand, competition is conceived as the best means available to ensure the 
efficient allocation of resources and increase consumer welfare in the form of low prices, 
better quality products, wider choice and more innovation.64 As noted in Chapter 2, the 
advent of big data has fuelled innovation in online markets, leading to the emergence of 
new products, services and business models, thereby increasing consumer welfare. As a 
result, data-driven products and services, which are the result of big data technological 
advances, should be applauded from a competition policy perspective (provided that they 
operate within the boundaries of competition on the merits). On the other hand, to the 
extent that data is valuable and confers a competitive advantage over competitors, more 
competition will inevitably increase online undertakings’ appetite for data, leading to the 
collection and processing of more data; however, as seen in Section 1 above, more data 
processing leads to enhanced profiling and more insights about consumers’ preferences 
and interests, increased tracking, and consequently, less online privacy. The tension 
between competition policy and data protection 65  here can be easily appreciated: 
competition policy, which seeks inter alia to enhance consumer welfare, should welcome 
and encourage the disruptive innovation brought about by data-driven competition taking 
place in online markets; yet, more competition will unavoidably lead to more data 
collection and privacy-intrusive practices. The inclusion of data protection considerations 
in the consumer welfare standard would do no more than making this tension apparent. 
 
																																																								
63 European Commission (n 49) para 43. 
64 European Commission (n 39) para 5. 
65 This tension has been noted by the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union, which 
considered the GDPR as an impediment to innovation and economic progress. See American Chamber of 
Commerce to the European Union, ‘AmCham EU Position on the Genera Data Protection Regulation’ 




Perhaps based on the considerations above, both the Commission and the CJEU have 
rejected a concurrent application of competition and data protection assessment in 
competition cases where this approach has been suggested. In Asnef-Equifax, the CJEU 
held:  
“[…] since […] any possible issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data 
are not, as such, a matter for competition law, they may be resolved on the 
basis of the relevant provisions governing data protection.”66 
 
Similarly, the Commission expressed the same position in Google/DoubleClick,67 and more 
recently in Facebook/WhatsApp:  
 
“[a]ny privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of 
data within the control of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall 
within the scope of the EU competition law rules but within the scope of the 
EU data protection rules.”68  
	
2.3 ‘Privacy as Non-price Parameter of Competition’ Approach 
 
This is the most convincing and sound attempt to make privacy cognisable under 
competition law, because it does not endeavour to collapse two different analytical 
frameworks of two independent branches of law, but instead it attempts to translate 
privacy into terms with which competition law is familiar.  
 
This approach is theoretically correct. As the Commission and the FTC have 
acknowledged,69 in some markets such as the electronic communications services market, 
some consumers choose their service providers based on, inter alia, the degree of privacy 
protection they offer (whether considered as a non-price parameter competition in itself 
or as a manifestation of quality). However, a reality check shows that, in spite of the 
growing concerns of consumers about the protection of their personal data,70 privacy has 
not emerged as a significant parameter of competition,71 and when market participants 
																																																								
66 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, SL v Asociación de Usuarios de 
Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2006] ECR I-11125 [63]. 
67 Case COMP/M4731, Google/DoubleClick (2008) [368]. 
68 Facebook/WhatsApp (n 40) [164]. 
69 See above footnotes 40 and 41.  
70 See below text accompanying footnotes 76 to 82.  
71 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, ‘Competition Law and Data’ (2016) 25. 
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choose to differentiate themselves by the data protection levels they offer, they are 
destined to remain niche participants.72  
 
The processing of personal data requires a legal basis. The most common legal bases 
invoked by data controllers are user consent and necessity for the performance of a 
contract to which the data subject is a party.73 Both legal bases presuppose some type of 
‘privacy contract’74 into which consumers enter to enjoy seemingly free online services. In 
this context, the privacy as a non-price parameter of competition argument is conceived 
within a neoclassical economic framework, in which consumers are able to choose the 
optimal amount of privacy they want under the privacy contracts they enter into. Pasquale 
describes this conception as follows: 
 
“Companies compete to offer more or less privacy to users. If there are many 
companies in a given field, they will probably offer many different levels of 
privacy to consumers. If consumers choose to use services from companies 
that offer little to no privacy protection, that reveals a preference to spend 
little to nothing on (or looking for) privacy.”75  
 
This model can be illustrated with the following example: a social networking site can 
choose between two privacy policies, A and B. Policy A entitles the social network to re-
use the information it obtains from users, whereas policy B is more restrictive in this 
regard. Obviously, the social network has the incentive to choose policy A, as it can derive 
more profits therefrom as compared to policy B, unless consumer demand is affected by 
the expected privacy harm. If consumer demand shifts as a result of the expected privacy 
harm, a social network having policy A is less attractive than one having policy B.    
 
The theoretical construction above seems efficient and comforting, but requires several 
assumptions to work out in practice: 
 
1) Consumers ought to make thorough reflections on whether or not to choose an 
online service based on the terms of the privacy policy they carefully read. 
																																																								
72 For example, the search engine DuckDuckGo.  
73 DPD, Article 7(a) and (b); GDPR, Article 6 (1) (a) and (b). 
74 These are privacy policies, notices or terms and conditions of the different websites and services which 
process personal data.  
75 Frank A Pasquale, ‘Privacy, Antitrust, and Power’ (2013) 20 George Mason Law Review 1009, 1009. 
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2) The undertaking’s choice of privacy policy must be effectively implemented, 
which requires that users can readily verify any departure from it; 
3) There must be effective punishment in case any of such departures take place; and 
4) There must be viable competitors offering different degrees of data protection, 
from which different degrees of privacy harm can be expected.    
 
Regrettably, none of these conditions are met in reality.  
 
Condition 1:  For this condition to be fulfilled it is necessary that consumers effectively (i) 
care about their data being collected by undertakings; and (ii) read and understand the 
privacy contracts they enter into. 
 
There is copious survey evidence showing that online privacy is a core concern of users. 
For example, BEUC, a Europe-wide consumer protection organisation, has noted that 
70% of EU consumers are worried about how their data is being collected and 
processed.76 Similarly, a survey conducted by the European Commission found that 
disclosing personal data is a big issue for 63% of respondents at EU level, and for 67% of 
UK respondents.77 Relatedly, a survey prepared by the ICO found that the protection of 
personal data is a top three concern amongst social issues for 21% of respondents.78 In 
the same vein, a study commissioned by the Direct Market Association found that 31% of 
the population is unwilling to provide personal information, whilst 53% decide to provide 
personal information depending on the expected benefits.79 In the US, in a study on 
adults’ perceptions about online advertising, 64% of the respondents agreed to the 
statement “someone keeping track of my activities online is invasive.”80 Last but not least, 
a study commissioned by TRUSTe concluded:  
 
“[…]consumer online privacy concerns remain extremely high with 92% of 
US internet users worrying about their privacy compared with 89% in January 
2013. The high level of concern is further evidenced by 47% saying they were 
																																																								
76 BEUC, ‘Supplementary Written Evidence (OPL0068) – Online Platforms and the EU Digital Single 
Market, BEUC Additional Comments’’ (2015) 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-
market-subcommittee/online-platforms-and-the-eu-digital-single-market/written/25081.html>. 
77 European Commission, “Special Eurobarometer 359: Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic 
Identity in the European Union” (the "EC Survey") (2011) Tables section, 15. 
78 ICO, “Annual Track 2014” (2014) 10. 
79 Direct Marketing Association, ‘ ’Data Privacy: What the Consumer Really Thinks’’ (2012) 7. 
80 Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, ‘Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users’ Understanding of 
Behavioral Advertising’ (2016) SSRN Paper 22 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1989092>. 
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always or frequently concerned and 74% were more concerned than last 
year.”81 
 
It transpires from the above that users indeed care about the collection of their personal 
data, and that they tend to dislike such fact. However, it is an undisputed fact that 
consumers seldom read, let alone understand, privacy policies.82 As a result, there seems 
to be a dichotomy between users’ privacy concerns and their actual online behaviour. This 
phenomenon has been termed as the ‘privacy paradox’.83 
 
The privacy paradox has been explained in terms of convenience. For example, Chisholm 
has observed: “ if you look at the behaviour of consumers online, very often when given a 
choice between a bit more privacy and a bit more convenience, it is convenience that is 
chosen.”84 Thus, confronted with a privacy policy they must accept to use an online 
service, consumers just ‘tick the box’ and proceed to enjoy the service without reading it, 
thereby choosing convenience over privacy. 
 
Convenience may well be the explanation for the behaviour of a portion of consumers. It 
is submitted, however, that this is just part of the story. Privacy policy design issues, 
asymmetric information and impediments to rational decision-making also play a 
significant role.  
 
Firstly, privacy policies are almost invariably lengthy. One study showed that a user would 
take 244 hours per year, or 40 minutes a day, to read all the privacy policies of the 
websites he visits, which is more than half of the average time users spend on the 
Internet.85 The same study shows that if users actually read all such policies, this would 
entail USD781 billion in opportunity costs.86 The foregoing is confirmed by stories 
reported in the media in the sense that some website’s privacy policies are lengthier than 
																																																								
81 TRUSTe, ‘Consumer Opinion and Business Impact. TRUSTe Research Report’ (2014) 3. 
82 For instance, according to the EC Survey, only 34% of consumers stated having read and understood 
privacy policies. See EC Survey (n 77). 
83 Patricia A Norberg, Daniel R Horne and David A Horne, ‘The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information 
Disclosure Intentions versus Behaviors’ (2007) 41 Journal of Consumer Affairs 100. 
84 Alex Chisholm, ‘Oral Evidence - Online Platforms and the EU Digital Single Market’ (2015) 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-
market-subcommittee/online-platforms-and-the-eu-digital-single-market/oral/24274.html>. 
85 Aleecia M McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, ‘The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies’ (2008) 4 I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy 543, 563. 
86 ibid 564. 
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Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Macbeth.87 Moreover, in addition to lengthy, privacy polices are 
difficult to understand,88as they are often expressed in incomprehensible legal language.89 
Further, they are typically vague as to under which circumstances and to whom personal 
data may be transferred, 90  simply referring, for instance, to ‘improving customer 
experience’ or ‘trusted third parties.’ For example, a survey conducted by Deloitte showed 
that only 22% of Internet users who read privacy policies understood how firms were 
supposed to use their data.91 Indeed, the CMA confirmed that “consumers want more 
transparency and clearer explanations of how their data will be used before they consent 
to its collection.”92 To make things worse, privacy policies commonly change over time. 
For instance, Facebook has historically and increasingly introduced changes to its privacy 
policy, which has led to users’ data being more publicly available.93  
 
Secondly, online privacy choices are affected by significant information asymmetries, as 
data subjects without exception know less than data holders about the scope and 
pervasiveness of data collection and the use of shared or collected volunteered or 
observed personal data. Even if people effectively read all relevant privacy policies on a 
regular basis, they still would not know what specific kind of data is being held, for how 
long, in what format, under which security measures, for what purposes it will be used 
(for instance, targeted advertising or price discrimination) or to whom the data may be 
shared.94 In addition, data subjects know very little about and cannot duly assess the 
consequences of agreeing to specific present collections, uses or disclosures of their data.95 
For example, consumers cannot possibly know about the data aggregation and data 
mining practices of companies, what kind of information about them is out there, how 
accurate the same is, and how such information may be used by prospective employers to 
accept or decline a job application or by insurance companies to set the amount of an 
																																																								
87 Alex Hudson, ‘Is Small Print in Online Contracts Enforceable?’ (2013) BBC News 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22772321>. 
88 Erik Sherman, ‘Privacy Policies Are Great -- for PhDs’ (2008) Moneywatch 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/privacy-policies-are-great-for-phds/>. 
89 Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Digital Markets, Data, and Privacy: Competition Law, Consumer Law, and Data 
Protection’ (2016) MAGKS, Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 14-2016 11. 
90 CMA (n 13) 136. 
91 Deloitte, ‘“Data Nation 2014: Putting Customers First”’ (2014) 10. 
92 CMA (n 13) 138. 
93 Matt McKeon, ‘The Evolution of Privacy on Facebook’ (2010) <http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-
privacy/>. 
94 Katherine J Strandburg, ‘Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect’ (2013) Vol. 
2013, Article 5 University of Chicago Legal Forum 95, 144. 




insurance premium.96 Relatedly, whilst the biggest consumer concern is unauthorised 
sharing of data to third parties, most consumers do not know about the existence and 
practices of companies that buy personal data for enhanced profiling purposes.97 
 
Thirdly, as noted, privacy as a non-price parameter of competition presupposes an 
informed and rational person who makes appropriate decisions about whether to consent 
to various forms of collection, use, and disclosure of personal data; 98  however, 
behavioural economics and social science research have empirically shown that, far from 
being informed and rational agents, people are affected by bounded rationality that limits 
our ability to thoroughly search for the best outcome, as well as by framing effects and 
heuristics.99 
 
Indeed, “in the presence of complex, ramified consequences associated with the 
protection or release of personal information, our innate bounded rationality limits our 
ability to acquire, memorize and process all relevant information”.100 Instead, people 
resort to simple models and strategies. For example, when confronted with a choice 
between a zero-priced product and the same product having a positive yet negligible price 
tag (say 10 pence), bounded rationality causes people to choose the zero-price option, in 
spite of any possible privacy harms that may ensue that would not take place had the 
product sold at positive price been chosen.101 Similarly, empirical research has found that 
the overwhelming majority of consumers believe that the term ‘privacy policy’ conveys a 
baseline level of practices that protect online privacy, regardless of its actual terms.102 
Relatedly, privacy seals are commonly considered as sign of reliability of a given website 
showing them, in spite that consumers are unaware of what a site must do to acquire a 
																																																								
96 Newman (n 26) 3. 
97 ‘Consumers are largely unaware of the existence of data brokers.’ See FTC (n 23) C-3. 
98 Solove (n 95) 1883. 
99 Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, ‘What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us about Privacy’, in 
Alessandro Acquisti, Stefanos Gritzalis, Costas Lambrinoudakis and Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati (eds), 
Digital Privacy: Theory, Technologies and Practices (Auerbach Publications, Taylor & Francis Group 2007) 364. 
100 ibid 369. 
101 “The fact that people willingly abrogate the privacy of their own personal information by conveying such 
information to firms over the Internet in order to try free products, despite preferences for privacy, is 
therefore likely attributable to bounded rationality and information asymmetry on the part of the 
consumer”. Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington, ‘Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s 
Most Popular Price’ (2013) 61 UCLA L. Rev. 606, 639. 
102 Joseph Turow, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Deirdre K. Mulligan, Nathaniel Good and Jens Grossklags, ‘The 
FTC and Consumer Privacy in the Coming Decade’ (2006) 3 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society 723, 748. 
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seal, or even what a genuine seal actually looks like.103 Moreover, the manner in which 
choices are framed are likely to shape and skew people’s privacy preferences.104 For 
example, in an experiment conducted by Good et al., users had to install one software 
between two choices, KaZaA and eDonkey. The terms of use of the former said little 
about the type of information being collected and did not offer an opt-out, whereas the 
latter disclosed detailed information about what personal information could be collected, 
offering an opt-out of this process. The majority of participants indicated that “KaZaA 
didn’t seem as bad as eDonkey”, which suggests that the way in which the provision of 
information is framed can lead to different impressions about security or risks involved, 
with vague terms creating an impression of increased security or less risks.105Additionally, 
heuristics106 are likely to guide decision-making processes more than rational choices. For 
instance, people assess familiar dangers as riskier than unfamiliar ones (‘availability 
heuristic’);107 people tend to discount as improbable events that are difficult to picture 
mentally such as identity theft (‘simulation heuristic’); and individuals tend to relate 
reliability with a website’s professional appearance and design (‘representativeness 
heuristic’).108 
 
As a result, even if consumers in general are concerned about the protection of their 
personal data, there are several issues that prevent them from making rational and 
informed decisions as to whether or not to use a service under the privacy policies 
presented to them.  
 
Condition 2: This condition requires that consumers have (i) a reasonable level of 
knowledge on how personal data is used; and (ii) the possibility to corroborate the firms’ 
observance of their commitments included in their privacy policies.  
 
None of these two requirements are met. Firstly, as seen in Condition 1 above, consumers 
seldom read the privacy policies of the sites they use, and if they read them, they are 
																																																								
103 Trevor Moores, ‘Do Consumers Understand the Role of Privacy Seals in E-Commerce?’ (2005) 48 
Communications of the ACM 86, 88. 
104 Solove (n 95) 1887. 
105 Nathaniel Good, Jens Grossklags, David Thaw, Aaron Perzanowski, Deirdre K. Mulligan and Joseph 
Konstan, ‘User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users’ Decision Process about Consensually Acquired 
Spyware’ (2006) 2 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 283, 323–324. 
106Heuristics can be defined as simple and efficient techniques which help learning or problem solving. See 
Acquisti and Grossklags (n 99). 
107 Solove (n 95) 1887. 
108 Acquisti and Grossklags (n 99). 
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commonly not capable of understanding them, as they are written in legalese. And even 
those who are able to understand legalese cannot find any information on how data will 
be used and shared, as privacy policies are drafted in vague terms and are commonly 
amended from time to time.  
 
Secondly, firms’ data collection, storage and processing practices are not directly 
observable by consumers,109 for which reason they can hardly verify whether the different 
data protection commitments of online undertakings are honoured. Indeed, the 
algorithms developed by online platforms are protected by IPRs, and the ways in which 
they operate, how they combine data, and the concrete results arising from data 
processing remain highly secret.110 In addition, even if a company observes its privacy 
commitments, nothing prevents it from purchasing data from other companies (for 
example, data brokers) to develop more detailed consumer profiles, without consumers’ 
knowledge and consent. This practice is commonly concealed from consumers.111 
 
Condition 3: This condition requires strong and effective enforcement of the data 
protection laws. However, data protection laws and enforcement have been strongly 
criticised as ineffective.    
 
In Europe, data protection law has been dubbed ‘dead letter’, as the law and related court 
judgments are having “only a marginal effect on data processing practices.” 112  The 
influential privacy scholar Omer Tener has contended that EU data protection 
“enforcement has been fickle, and sanctions weak.”113 In the UK, empirical research led 
McCullagh to conclude that “the regulator’s investigative and enforcement powers […] 
have been, and continue to be, lamentably weak and ineffective.”114 In addition, security 
breaches resulting in undesired data disclosures, privacy loss and identity theft are 
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becoming an increased and recurrent phenomenon, with ineffective enforcement of data 
protection law being pointed out as one of its underlying causes.115 In the U.S., it is 
commonly agreed that neither federal nor state laws are effective at addressing forms of 
data collection by companies such as Facebook and Google,116 and the FTC has been 
hardly criticised for ineffective enforcement of American privacy laws under Section 5 of 
the FTC Act.117 
 
Condition 4: This condition requires effective competition and availability of consumer 
choice, both in terms of online service providers and different degrees of data protection 
offered by them under their privacy policies.  
 
Regrettably, this condition is not met in reality. As seen in the preceding Chapters, some 
online platform markets are characterised by the presence of undisputedly dominant 
firms, high barriers to entry and several types of feedback effects that render the 
likelihood of success of any challenge launched by a competitor against the incumbent 
very slim.  
 
Moreover, privacy policies are adhesive by definition, presented as a take-it-or-leave-it 
option. Think of Apple’s iTunes Store end-user agreement.118 This agreement pops up 
from time to time requiring user consent. Users who intend to download apps, music or 
any other available content have no choice but to agree to such terms. Consent is 
technically given, but there is nothing close to bargaining in this process, and every firm 
providing online services invariably offers this type of binary ‘option’, without any room 
for granularity. Hence, even if consumers read them, they can neither renegotiate nor 
reasonably expect to change the privacy policies of firms such as Apple, Google or 
Facebook, and if they do not accept the terms of the policies presented to them, they 
cannot use the services altogether. 
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There are significant concerns arising from the operation of online markets which are not 
limited to competition law. As a direct consequence of the data race in which online firms 
participate to gain a ‘data-advantage’, they reduce individuals’ private space, compound 
their lack of control over personal data, increase the potential of data theft, narrow 
individuals’ choices, reinforce information asymmetries and create new discrimination 
routes. 
 
To tackle the interrelated competition and privacy concerns in online markets, theories 
have been put forward to bring data protection considerations into the centre of 
competitive assessments. This Chapter demonstrates that each of these approaches is 
affected by one or another obstacle for its successful implementation. Firstly, delineating 
‘markets for data’ entails defining a non-existent market, as there are no observable 
market transactions between firms supplying and consumers purchasing data. Secondly, 
the inclusion of data protection considerations in the consumer welfare standard could 
lead to a counter-intuitive scenario where, in competition proceedings, agreements, 
mergers or conduct are punished on non-competition grounds.  Whilst it is true that the 
operation of online markets poses a serious threat to the fundamental right to data 
protection of individuals and also raises competitive issues, it does not follow that 
competition and data protection assessments should be combined into one sort of two-
headed monster characterised by unpredictability and subjectivity. Thirdly, whilst the 
‘privacy as a parameter of competition’ approach is theoretically correct, in reality, privacy 
has not emerged as a meaningful competition parameter, in spite of consumers’ well-
documented and growing concerns about the protection of their personal data.  
 
The fact that privacy has not yet emerged as a meaningful parameter of competition 
despite the preferences of 60%-70% of consumers who are concerned about their online 
privacy shows that online markets are performing poorly. Consumer dissatisfaction 
should be heeded. Contending that consumers do not really care about the protection of 
their personal data because they continue using online products and services that are 
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highly privacy-invasive119 is tantamount to arguing that people do not care about potential 
plain crashes because they continue flying. In practice there is no choice, and concrete 
actions should be taken to correct this state of affairs. 
																																																								









As explained in Chapter 4, between 60% and 70% of consumers are concerned about the 
manner in which their personal data is processed by online firms. Lack of control over 
personal data is a ‘core theme’ for consumers.1 Accordingly, there is a latent demand for 
online products and services that are more privacy-friendly, or at least that offer more 
granularity in terms of data protection. However, markets forces have failed to satisfy this 
demand. The reason for this lies, firstly, in data protection and consumer protection 
regulatory failures that arise before competition enforcement, and secondly, in certain law 
infringements by online platforms through which they avail themselves of these regulatory 
failures in order to maintain and strengthen their dominant positions and exploit 
consumers.  
 
On the data protection front, the processing of personal data requires a legal basis. The 
most common legal basis to which online firms resort is user consent, which must be 
specific and informed. The fact that user consent must be specific and informed means in 
practice that data protection law places upon users the highly labour-intensive task of 
carefully reading and understanding the privacy policies of all the online services they use, 
as amended from time to time, in order to make a conscious decision as to whether the 
data collection practices of a given online firm are consistent with their privacy 
preferences.  
 
The abovementioned cumbersome task that data protection law places upon consumers 
clashes with consumer protection regulatory failures. There is a significant informational 
gap between online firms and consumers, since companies know everything about their 
data collection practices and the value they can derive therefrom, but some consumers 
struggle even to understand what a privacy policy is. The complex drafting technique used 
																																																								
1 CMA, ‘The Commercial Use of Consumer Data – Report on the CMA’s Call for Information’ (2015) 116. 
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in privacy policies and consumers’ bounded rationality and impediments to rational 
decision-making compound this informational gap.  
 
The interaction between these regulatory failures leads to a scenario where, of those 60%-
70% of consumers that are concerned about the protection of their personal data, a big 
portion of them chooses to remain in blissful ignorance, and proceeds to simply ‘tick the 
box’. Other consumers attempt to understand the privacy-related implications arising 
from the use of online services, but fail to overcome the informational gap and their 
bounded rationality. Finally, a portion of those consumers is able to defeat these 
obstacles, just to realise that pervasive online tracking is almost unavoidable, and that 
there are no viable choices to protect their online privacy. As a result, there is no pressure 
on dominant firms to innovate in privacy-friendly services, in spite of the latent demand 
for them.  
 
Online platforms may be tempted to avail themselves of the regulatory failures above to 
attain or strengthen their dominant position. In particular, since platforms are aware of 
the lack of consumer engagement with privacy policies, they may process personal data 
without giving due notice and therefore without meeting the requirements for consent to 
be valid (and without any legal basis whatsoever) in order to gather more valuable data 
than they are legally entitled to. In this way, they can fuel data-driven network effects and 
expand more easily onto related markets. At the same time, online platforms may engage 
in unfair commercial practices or otherwise violate consumer protection rules to prevent 
potential consumer engagement with privacy policies and deepen consumer confusion 
and misinformation with regard to the privacy-related consequences that arise from the 
use of their services. In this way, they ensure that the pressure to develop and offer 
privacy-sensitive solutions consistent with the preferences of many unsatisfied consumers 
remain low. A question that follows is whether a new category of abuse of dominance 
based on such infringements can be created, and how can this abuse be established and 
prosecuted. 
 
It is submitted that the detrimental effects on competition arising from the violations of 
data protection and consumer protection law by some online platforms warrant the 
creation of a new category of abuse on this basis.  However, to address such a complex 
scenario with many layers of interrelated issues falling within the remit of different 
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branches of law, a coherent and sound approach to law enforcement is required. It is 
argued that the substantial assessments of the different branches of law that are relevant to 
the digital economy should not be collided with each other, as some have proposed.2  
 
However, at the level of enforcement, Article 102 TFEU can use certain infringements of 
data protection and consumer protection law, as duly assessed and established under their 
relevant substantial provisions, as the basis to trigger competition proceedings. Such 
interaction requires that (i) one or more infringements be established by data protection 
and/or consumer protection authorities in final decisions; (ii) there is a close connection 
between the infringements and the infringer’s dominant position, and (iii) the 
infringements cause or are likely to cause exclusionary effects and/or exploit consumers.  
 
Maintaining the analytical independence of the different bodies of law involved 
contributes to the achievement of predictability and legal certainty, and ensures respect of 
the principle of legality. In turn, conceiving a new approach to law enforcement as 
described above improves the internal coherence of EU law, regard being had to the 
policy-linking clause of Article 7 TFEU and more generally the objectives of the 
European Treaties.  
 
Section I gives an overview of the main data protection and consumer protection rules 
that are relevant to the digital economy, describing the main concerns falling within their 
remits that are commonplace in online markets. Thereafter, it explains the manner in 
which said concerns interact in a loop (the ‘vicious cycle’). It is argued that the interrelated 
nature of the concerns comprising the vicious cycle and the integrity of the legal system as 
a whole require a joint effort on the part of law enforcers and policymakers. Section II 
introduces the ‘holistic enforcement approach’ (HEA). In particular, it explains (II.1 to 
II.4) under which conditions data protection and consumer protection infringements can 
be the legal basis of a hypothetical abuse of dominance case instituted against a dominant 
platform, as well as the manner in which such abuse can be established and prosecuted. 
The proposed approach requires coordination amongst competition, data protection and 
consumer protection authorities, and is staggered in two stages: in stage one, data 
protection and consumer protection authorities must establish the relevant infringements 
in final decisions, and in stage two, Article 102 TFEU proceedings are commenced 
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against the infringer based on the attainment or strengthening of a dominant position as a 
result of such infringements. Abuses can be exclusionary and exploitative. For an 
exclusionary abuse to exist (II.5), the data protection law and consumer protection law 
infringements must imply a departure from normal competition that lessens competition 
in one or more relevant markets. For an exploitative abuse to exist (II.6), dominant 
platforms must impose unfair trading conditions which they would not be able to impose 
under competitive conditions, contrary to their users’ preferences. Concluding this 
Section, arguments against and in support of the HEA are discussed (II.7). Section III 
concludes.  
 
I. The Vicious Cycle 
	
1. General  
 
As seen in Chapter 3,3 some online markets are particularly concentrated, and their 
respective incumbents are isolated from meaningful competitive pressure. In such 
markets, consumer choice is extremely limited. Facing little competition, dominant 
platforms are able to coerce consumers into accepting privacy policies that allow for 
excessive extraction of personal data, since they know that the demand for their services 
will not shift to other providers offering more privacy-friendly services (as privacy has not 
emerged as a meaningful parameter of competition).  
 
However, consumer surveys are consistent in the sense that a great portion of consumers 
is concerned about their online privacy, and consequently are interested in services that 
are more ‘privacy-friendly’. As a result, there is a latent demand for privacy-friendly online 
services yet to be realised, and market forces should urge newcomers and market 
participants to come up with services that are capable of fulfilling the privacy 
requirements of 60-70% of EU consumers.4  
 
Market forces, however, have failed to exert pressure for the provision of privacy-friendly 
options, partly, due to a combination of data protection and consumer protection 
																																																								
3 See Chapter 3 Section II.5. 
4 See Chapter 4 Section II.2.3, discussion on Condition 1. 
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regulatory failures.5 Sections I.2 and I.3 below explain some basic concepts of these fields 
of law, as well as their respective regulatory failures impinging upon the competitive 
process in online markets. Section I.4 illustrates the operation of the ‘vicious cycle’, and 
Section I.5 explains how the status quo in online markets benefits online firms, to the 
detriment of consumers. It also explains that online platforms may resort to unlawful 
behaviour to keep the pressure for the provision of privacy-friendly options at bay, 
maintain the status quo and derive an anticompetitive advantage capable of maintaining 
and reinforcing their dominant positions and exploiting consumers.  
 
2. Data Protection Law 
 
2.1 General  
 
Article 8 of the Charter enshrines the protection of personal data as an independent right. 
Whilst the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU has considered privacy to be at the core 
of data protection, these rights are not identical, as they differ inter alia in their scope and 
with regard to their permissible interferences.6  
 
Article 16 TFEU is the legal basis for the enactment of rules on data protection. The EU 
first adopted data protection legislation in 1995 (the Data Protection Directive 1995,7 
‘DPD’). However, the scale of personal data processing and data processing technologies 
																																																								
5 ‘Regulatory failures arise, firstly, when the regulation is effective in reaching its goal of correcting the 
market failure, but achieves this objective at too high a cost for society, i.e. regulation is effective but 
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corrects for the market failure, i.e. regulation is efficient but ineffective. Thirdly, regulation can be both 
ineffective and inefficient. Thus defined, regulatory failures may be triggered by a lack of analysis of the 
regulatory issue, problems and contrasts in the regulatory process and lack of implementation and 
enforcement of regulation.’ See Giampaolo Galli and Jacques Pelkmans, ‘Introduction: Aims, Structure and 
Overview’, in Giampaolo Galli and Jacques Pelkmans (eds), Regulatory Reform and Competitiveness in Europe, 1 - 
Horizontal Issues (Edward Elgar Publishing 2000) 23–24. 
6 With regard to the scope of these rights, private life does not necessarily include all information on 
identified or identifiable persons, which is exactly what data protection law covers. In addition, data 
protection law imposes obligations relating to the processing of personal data on public authorities and 
private parties, as opposed to the right to privacy, which cannot be invoked directly against private parties. 
In turn, with regard to permissible interferences, personal data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or on some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law; if these conditions are met there is no interference with the right to data protection, although 
the collection, storage or disclosure of said data may still interfere with private life. See generally Juliane 
Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The Distinction between Privacy and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence 
of the CJEU and the ECtHR’ (2013) 3 International Data Privacy Law 222. 
7 Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
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have evolved dramatically since such time. 8  As the Directive was perceived as 
fundamentally out-dated, the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)9  was 
adopted by the European Parliament on 14 April 2016.10 The GDPR aims to increase 
individuals’ control over their personal data and accountability on the part of data 
controllers. Although the new GDPR came into force 20 days after its publication in the 
EU Official Journal (that is, on 25 May 2016), it will not be applicable until 25 May 2018, 
due to its two-year implementation period.    
  
Data protection law applies to the processing of personal data. The GDPR defines 
personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”, 
and elaborates this further by explaining that “identifiable natural person is one who can 
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a 
name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more 
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity of that natural person.”11 
 
In turn, the GDPR defines processing as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated 
means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or 
destruction.”12 
 
The processing of personal data requires a legal basis, the most common of which is 
consent of the data subject.13 The GDRP specifies that: 
 
																																																								
8 At the time of enactment of the DPD, only 1% of the EU population was using the Internet, Amazon and 
eBay were still being launched, the founder of Facebook was 11 years old and Google did not exist. See 
Viviane Reding, ‘Outdoing Huxley: Forging a High Level of Data Protection for Europe in the Brave New 
Digital World’ (2012). 
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) OJ L 119/1. 
10 ‘Data Protection Reform - Parliament Approves New Rules Fit for the Digital Era| European Parliament’ 
(2016) News - European Parliament  <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20160407IPR21776/data-protection-reform-parliament-approves-new-rules-fit-for-the-digital-era>. 
11 Article 4(1) GDPR.  
12 Article 4(2) GDPR.  
13 Article 6(a) GDPR. 
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“[c]onsent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely 
given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s 
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as 
by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral 
statement..”14 
 
The Article 29 Working Party (A29WP) has clarified the requirements of consent to be 
valid: 
 
‘Freely given’ means that, for consent to be valid, the data subject must be able to exercise 
a real choice, without significant negative consequences if he/she does no consent.15 
 
‘Specific’ means that the consent must clearly and precisely refer to the scope and 
consequences of the data processing. It cannot apply to an open-ended set of processing 
activities. Consent “notably includes which data are processed and for which purposes”.16 
 
‘Informed’ means that all information necessary for the data processing operation must be 
provided at the time the consent is requested, addressing all of the substantial aspects of 
the processing in respect of which the consent is needed.17 The individual concerned 
“must be given, in a clear and understandable manner, accurate and full information of all 
relevant issues […] such as the nature of the data processed, purposes of the processing, 
the recipients of possible transfers, and the rights of the data subject. This includes also an 
awareness of the consequences of not consenting to the processing in question.”18  
 
Two significant considerations apply to this requirement: Firstly, the way the information 
is given (in plain text, without use of jargon, understandable, conspicuous) is crucial in 
assessing whether the consent is “informed”. The way in which this information should 
be given depends on the context: a regular/average user should be able to understand it. 
Secondly, information must be given directly to individuals. It is not enough for 
information to be “available” somewhere. The information must be clearly visible (type 
and size of fonts), prominent and comprehensive.19 
																																																								
14 GDPR recital 32. 
15 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of “consent”’ (2011) 12. 
16 ibid 17. 
17 ibid 9. 
18 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘WP131 - Working Document on the Processing of Personal 
Data Relating to Health in Electronic Health Records.’ (2007) 9. 




Finally, unambiguous means that “the procedure to seek and to give consent must leave 
no doubt as to the data subject’s intention to deliver consent. In other words, the 
indication by which the data subject signifies his agreement must leave no room for 
ambiguity regarding his/her intent. If there is a reasonable doubt about the individual's 
intention, there is ambiguity.”20 
 
The E-privacy Directive21 is particularly relevant in relation to tracking techniques used by 
the overwhelming majority of online firms. According to its Article 5(3), access to 
information stored in a device of a user is only allowed “on condition that the subscriber 
or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance 
with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered 
the right to refuse such processing by the data controller.” This means that data 
controllers must obtain consent prior to the placement of cookies that are not strictly 
necessary for the provision of a service (for example, to track browsing behaviour when 
not using a search engine or outside a social networking platform).  
 
Other legal bases are where processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is a party (subject to proportionality22 and subsidiarity principles23); 
for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; to protect the 
vital interests of the data subject or another natural person; for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest; and for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued 
by the controller or by a third party (subject to proportionality and subsidiarity 
principles).24  
 
2.2 Regulatory Failure 
 
The most common basis invoked for the processing of personal data is freely given, 
informed, specific and unambiguous user consent. The recently enacted GDPR remains 
																																																								
20 ibid 21. 
21 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications) [2002] OJ L 201/37. 
22 The infringement of the interests of the data subject affected by the data processing may not be 
disproportionate in relation to the purpose to be served by the processing.  
23 The purpose cannot be achieved otherwise or using less drastic means.  
24 Article 6(1)(b) to (f) GDPR.  
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largely consent-based. Yet, it is precisely with regard to consent where the most salient 
problem arises. 
 
By being inherently consent-based, data protection law has placed upon data 
subjects/consumers the highly complex task of assessing the privacy-related 
consequences arising from the use of a given online service. Consumers are bound to 
carefully read the privacy policies of all the online services they use in order to decide 
whether the relevant online service provider’s data collection practices are consistent with 
their privacy preferences, and whether the expected benefits derived from using the 
service outweigh any possible privacy harms they may envisage. Consumers are also 
expected to actively read and understand every privacy policy in order to be able to 
exercise their data protection rights.  
 
However, as will be seen below, consumer protection regulatory failures render the 
successful execution of the aforementioned task extremely difficult. In practice, the 
majority of consumers, including those concerned about their privacy, simply ‘tick the 
box’, thereby giving a type of consent that is essentially fictional. According to Cate and 
Mayer-Schönberger, this situation is likely to “leave individuals’ privacy badly exposed, as 
individuals are forced to make overly complex decisions based on limited information, 
while data processors can perhaps too easily point to the formality of notice and consent 
and thereby abrogate much of their responsibility.”25  
 
3. Consumer Protection Law 
 
3.1 General  
 
Consumer protection as an overarching principle of EU law can be found in Article 38 of 
the Charter, which requires EU policies to ensure a high level of consumer protection, 
and in Article 12 TFEU, which requires that consumer protection requirements be taken 
into account in defining and implementing other EU policies and activities.  
 
																																																								
25 Fred H Cate and Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, ‘Notice and Consent in a World of Big Data’ (2013) 3 
International Data Privacy Law 67, 68. 
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The consumer protection rules are intended to ensure that consumers can choose 
effectively from amongst the options offered in the marketplace, with their critical 
faculties unimpaired by violations such as deception or the withholding of material 
information.26 Generally speaking, diversity of standards and consumer confidence is 
detrimental to the smooth functioning of the internal market and distorts competition, 
whilst common standards, choice and fairness are beneficial.27 The implementation of 
consumer policies at EU level “can enable consumers to make informed choices that 
reward competition, and support the goal of sustainable and resource-efficient growth, 
whilst taking account of the needs of all consumers.”28 
 
To achieve the aforementioned aims, consumer protection law targets inefficiencies 
arising from market failures relating to imperfect information, and particularly asymmetric 
information between producers and consumers.29 In addition, inequality of bargaining 
power between undertakings and consumers is one of the main concerns consumer 
protection law is designed to tackle. As the CJEU has held, “the system of protection 
introduced by the [Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts] is based on the 
idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both 
the bargaining power and his level of knowledge.”30 Finally, consumer protection law is 
called upon to address market failures that arise from rationality problems of consumers, 
such as hyperbolic discounting,31 over-optimism32 and framing effects.33 
 
																																																								
26 Neil W Averitt and Robert H Lande, ‘Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and 
Consumer Protection Law’ (1997) 65 Antitrust Law Journal 713, 713. 
27 EDPS, ‘Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor.  Privacy and Competitiveness 
in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer 
Protection in the Digital Economy’ (2014) 24. 
28 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Consumer Agenda – 
Boosting Confidence and Growth’ (2012) 2. 
29 Fernando Gomez, ‘EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition Law: How Related Are They? A 
Law and Economics Perspective’ (2003) InDret Working Paper No. 113 6. 
30 Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Rocío Murciano Quintero and others [2000] 
ECR I-4941 [25]. 
31 Hyperbolic discounting refers to the fact that consumer preferences are not consistent over time, which 
suggest that, when taking decisions, individuals may lack foresight in the short-term, but seem more rational 
in the long term. See Jana Valant, ‘Consumer Protection in the EU – Policy Overview’’ (2015) European 
Parliamentary Research Service 13 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/565904/EPRS_IDA(2015)565904_EN.p
df>. 
32 Over-optimism relates to the fact that individuals are in general over-optimistic with regard to their 
capabilities and future. ibid. 
33 See Chapter 4 text accompanying footnotes 104 and 105.  
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Among the EU consumer aquis, the following Directives are particularly relevant to the 
digital economy: 
 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive:34 it defines unfair commercial practices as those 
that materially distort or are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with 
regard to the product of the average consumer whom they reach or to whom they are 
addressed.35 An example of such practices are misleading commercial practices, which are 
those (i) which contain false information and are therefore untruthful or in any way 
deceive or are likely to deceive the average consumer;36 or (ii) which omit material 
information that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an 
informed transactional decision,37 in both cases causing or being likely to cause the 
average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would have not taken otherwise. 
An example of such misleading commercial practice is where a trader hides or provides in 
an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner the aforementioned material 
information, or when the trader fails to identify the commercial intent of the practice if 
not already apparent from the context.38 According to this Directive, a misleading action 
occurs when a practice misleads “in any way, including overall presentation”.39 Put in 
other words, deception can take place through deceptive presentation of information, 
even if the information provided is factually correct.40  
 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts:41 it applies to consumer contracts, 
which are known by the advantage enjoyed by suppliers in defining terms and provisions 
which consumers cannot negotiate. A non-negotiated term is deemed unfair under this 
Directive if “contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
																																																								
34 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market,  (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) [2005] OJ L 
149/22. 
35 Article 5(2)(b) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
36 Article 6(1) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
37 Article 7(1) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
38 Article 7(2) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.  
39 Article 6(1)(d) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.  
40 European Commission, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices Guidance’ 
<https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ucp/public/index.cfm?event=public.guidance.browse&Article=Article-
62&elemID=74#Article-62>. 




consumer.”42 This Directive require that contracts be drafted in plain, intelligible language, 
with the consumer having the actual opportunity of examining all the terms; in case of 
doubt, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer should prevail.43  
 
3.2 Regulatory Failures 
 
First and foremost, there is a significantly informational gap between undertakings and 
consumers: online platforms enter into privacy contracts with more information relevant 
to the monetary value of the data to be exchanged than the consumer, for which reason 
consumers are placed on “the less advantageous side of an agreement formed and 
executed with asymmetric information.”44 Indeed, whilst companies know everything 
about the data collection practices in which they engage, some consumers struggle even to 
understand what a privacy policy is. For example, in one recent study 65% of the 
participants did not know that the statement “[w]hen a website has a privacy policy, it 
means that the site will not share my information with other websites and companies 
without my permission” is false.45 Additionally, big data mechanisms are opaque, and 
consumers cannot observe what kind of personal data will be processed, or how or for 
what purposes it will be processed.  
 
Secondly, consumer protection policy takes as a benchmark “the average consumer, who 
is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect”, 46  which 
presupposes consumers who observe all available information, rationally process it and 
make choices that increase their welfare accordingly. However, as Thaler and Sunstein 
observe, the assumption “that almost all people, almost all the time, make choices that are 
in their best interest is false.”47 People have bounded rationality and commonly make their 
decisions based on heuristics, simplified models and the way choices are framed. Bounded 
by limited information and limited information processing capabilities, people are prone 
																																																								
42 Article 3(1) Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.  
43 Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, recitals.  
44 Jan Whittington and Chris Jay Hoofnagle, ‘Unpacking Privacy’s Price’ (2012) 90 N. C. L. Rev. 1327 1341. 
45 Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy and Nora A Draper, ‘The Tradeoff Fallacy: How Marketers Are 
Misrepresenting American Consumers and Opening Them up to Exploitation’ (2015) A Report from the 
Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania 4. 
46 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, recital 18. 
47 Richard H Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. (Yale 
University Press 2008) 9. 
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to make ‘satisfactory’ substantive decisions instead of ‘optimal’ substantive decisions.48 
Bounded rationality also cause people to underestimate certain risks (such as privacy 
harms) and overstate their ability to assess the terms of the contracts they are entering 
into. People oftentimes make bad decisions when rewards are immediate and harms are 
deferred, or when the relationship between cause and effect (using a service and expected 
harms that may derive from such use) is complicated and not immediately visible. The 
fact that privacy policies are often long and drafted in complex legal terms compounds 
these issues. 
 
4. Operation of the Vicious Cycle 
 
Confronted with the task imposed by data protection law and the consumer protection 
regulatory failures explained above, most consumers fail to read the privacy policies of the 
websites they use, and simply proceed to ‘tick the box’. For instance, UK Minister of State 
for Culture and the Digital Economy Ed Vaizey MP has expressed:  
 
“You get these very complex terms and conditions. I signed up to some this 
morning, to an unnamed provider, on my tablet in order to update my 
software – I do not have a clue what I signed up to.”49 
 
Other consumers attempt to become informed on the implications of their online 
activities, but fail to do so as a result of the existing informational asymmetry between 
undertakings and consumers, the complex drafting technique used by online firms in their 
privacy notices, and their bounded rationality and impediments to rational decision-
making.50 
 
As for those consumers who manage to overcome the aforementioned obstacles and 
ultimately understand the privacy-related implications of their online actions, they realise 
that data collection is everywhere, that online tracking is the norm and that there are 
																																																								
48 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law 
Review 211, 214. 
49 House of Lords, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’ (2016) 62–63. 
50 ‘[M]any consumers appear unhappy with how well firms explain why they collect data and consider that 
more could be done to improve transparency.’ CMA (n 1) 106; Similarly, Ofcom, ‘Being Online: An 
Investigation of People’s Habits and Attitudes - Ofcom’ (2013) 35 <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-
and-data/internet-and-on-demand-research/internet-use-and-attitudes/being-online>: ‘Most [participants] 
had little or no awareness of how and why their information was used, stored and transferred online, and 
many participants lacked any real understanding of cookies and targeted advertising.’ 
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virtually no viable choices to protect their online privacy. These consumers become 
resigned to ubiquitous data collection and tracking.51  
 
Therefore, of the 60-70% of EU consumers that are worried about how their data is being 
collected and processed, some have chosen to remain ignorant on the online privacy issue 
because getting informed is considered a very cumbersome task; some simply cannot 
understand or are confused about the privacy-related implications arising from the use of 
online services; and finally others are resigned to not having online privacy, because 
essentially there are no suppliers offering sufficient levels of data protection. This lack of 
viable choices takes us back to the competition issue, with which the vicious cycle is 
closed: 
																																																								
51 ‘[A] large pool of [people] feel resigned to the inevitability of surveillance and the power of marketers to 
harvest their data [...] [T]he larger percentages of people in the population who are resigned compared to 
people who believe in principle that tradeoffs are a fair deal indicate that in the real world people who give 
up their data are more likely to do it while resigned rather than as a result of cost-benefit analysis’. Turow, 





5. The Vicious Cycle Serves the Interest of Data-Driven Firms   
 
Widespread consumer confusion and ignorance, and resignation to online privacy on the 
part of informed consumers, are the elements of a status quo that protects the 
advertisement-based business model discovered and consolidated by Google, followed by 
Facebook and quickly spread across the Internet.  
 
Under said business model, users provide the free raw material from which firms extract 
their profits. Data has proven remarkably valuable. The value of data is the reason why 
Facebook, a company that charges no fees for the use of its services, was valued at USD 
104 billion for its Initial Public Offering, the highest IPO valuation of an American 
company.52 Acknowledging the value of data, most online firms have deployed efforts to 
																																																								


































monetise users’ personal data ranging from browsing behaviour, revealed preferences, 
search queries to location tracking data. For example, the Brightest Flashlight app, a 
popular free app on the Android marketplace, collects and broadcast users’ locations and 
device IDs to advertising networks and other third parties each time they launch the app.53 
The advent of the Internet of Things will exacerbate this trend, with an increasing number 
of ‘offline’ firms attempting to derive profits from user tracking. For instance, following 
Google’s business model, the CEO of Allstate Insurance argued: 
 
“There are lots of people who are monetizing data today. You get on Google, 
and it seems like it’s free. It’s not free. You’re giving them information; they 
sell your information. Could we, should we, sell this information we get from 
people driving around to various people and capture some additional profit 
source…? It’s a long term game.”54 
 
Motivated by an insatiable hunger for data, any voices raised against data-driven business 
models are strongly resisted by incumbents. Claims from privacy-advocates are readily 
dismissed as attacks against innovation and technological progress.55 Arguments from 
competition officials and scholars about the significance of data for the competitive 
process are also largely downplayed.56 
 
But the fact remains that online platforms and firms prey on people who are neither 
buyers, sellers nor customers, but rather their products. These firms ignore any existing 
boundary in their quest for data and the insights they can derive therefrom, in attempts to 
influence users’ behaviour for commercial purposes. As Stucke and Grunes explain: 
 
“As more people use [a platform’s array of services], the more data the 
company collects, the more refined the user profile, the more likely the 
company can target users with information they might find relevant at critical 
																																																								
53 Nicole Vincent Fleming, ‘Sharing Your Location… In a Flash | Consumer Information’ (2013) Federal 
Trade Commission <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/sharing-your-location-flash>. 
54 Shoshana Zuboff, ‘Google as a Fortune Teller: The Secrets of Surveillance Capitalism’ (2016) Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/the-digital-debate/shoshana-zuboff-
secrets-of-surveillance-capitalism-14103616-p2.html?printPagedArticle=true>. 
55 “Sometimes the opposition between privacy and innovation is explicit, but more often it is implicit in 
rhetoric that aligns innovation with unfettered information collection and processing” Julie E Cohen, ‘What 
Privacy Is for’ (2012) 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1919. 
56 See generally Darren S Tucker and Hill B Wellford, ‘Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data’ (2014) Antitrust 
Source; D Daniel Sokol and Roisin E Comerford, ‘Does Antitrust Have a Role to Play in Regulating Big 
Data?’, in Roger D. Blair (ed), The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property and High Tech (CUP 
2017). See also Chapter 2 Conclusions.  
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purchasing moments, and the more opportunities the platform can observe 
consumer behaviour and refine its algorithms accordingly.”57  
 
Data protection law should counter the increasingly invasive practices of some online 
firms, but in practice, powerful online platforms routinely choose to violate such law and 
pay a rather symbolic fine.58 The processing of personal data without consent and any 
legal basis and the growing offering of seemingly free products and services result in the 
deprivation of users’ privacy and the accumulation of data-driven power in the hands of 
few firms. Under this dynamic, the bigger gets bigger, and privacy becomes an out-dated 
ideal.59 
 
However, privacy is valued by the majority of Internet users. When the consequences of 
using the Brightest Flashlight were made public, voices were raised in the sense that the 
developer’s data collection practices were unacceptable. 60  Aware of this consumer 
dissatisfaction, data-driven firms endeavour to keep consumers uninformed, confused 
and/or resigned to the privacy threats posed by the use of online services. By preserving 
the status quo, such firms can ensure that the number of consumers aware of the 
invasiveness of their services remains low, and therefore, they can rest assured that no 
privacy-based competition will threaten their lucrative business model. Consumer 
protection law should step in to correct the existing information asymmetries, but 
platforms circumvent its rules to preserve the status quo. 
 
Considered in isolation, the processing of personal data without legal basis, on the one 
hand, and consumer protection violations to preserve the aforementioned status quo, on 
the other hand, are only reproachable under data protection and consumer protection law, 
respectively. However, as will be seen below,61 such practices are capable of deriving into 
the strengthening of dominant positions and the exploitation of consumers. 
 
																																																								
57 Maurice Stucke and Allen Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP 2016) 187. 
58 Adam Clarke, ‘Google’s Privacy Violations Are More Affordable Than You Think’ (2013) Motherboard 
<https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/pgg9qy/googles-privacy-violations-are-more-affordable-
than-you-think>. 
59 Cofounder of Sun Microsystem Scott McNealy told a group of reporters: “You have zero privacy anyway. 
Get over it”.  ‘Scott McNealy on Privacy: You Still Don’t Have Any’ (2015) PCWorld 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/2941052/scott-mcnealy-on-privacy-you-still-dont-have-any.html>. 
60 “Though I didn’t realize it at the time, I was potentially handing over a boatload of data to advertisers.” 
Robert McMillan, ‘The Hidden Privacy Threat of … Flashlight Apps?’ (2014) Wired 
<https://www.wired.com/2014/10/iphone-apps/>. 
61 See below Section II.5.3.  
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II. The Holistic Enforcement Approach 
 
1. Aim of the Approach 
 
This Chapter proposes a ‘holistic law enforcement approach’ (HEA), which involves 
cooperation and coordinated enforcement amongst competition, data protection and 
consumer protection agencies.  
 
In 2014 the EDPS sparked the debate on the intersection between the competition, data 
protection and consumer protection laws in the digital economy.62 The EDPS pleaded for 
more collaboration between policy-makers of these respective fields63 in light of their 
commonality of goals and the related concerns affecting online markets. Subsequently, in 
2016, the EDPS reiterated this plea, arguing that “there is a quite fragmented scenario in 
enforcing EU rules, with competent authorities not necessarily talking to each other whilst 
dealing with cases featured by considerable overlaps in terms of substance.”64 
 
Relatedly, the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) and the Commission have 
acknowledged that joined-up enforcement and overcoming ‘regulatory fragmentation’ 
have become an urgent need, with president Juncker expressly calling for the Commission 
to overcome ‘silo mentalities’.65 In addition, the European Parliament recently called for 
the EU to overcome legal fragmentation when drafting new legislation, and to encourage 
a high level of coherence when Member States implement EU law.66 
  
As a response to these calls, the HEA is conceived as one route to address the concerning 
tendencies affecting digital markets (i.e. weak competition, violation of fundamental rights 
and deepened information asymmetries) in a manner that enhances the coherence of EU 
law.  
																																																								
62 EDPS (n 27). 
63 ibid 38. 
64 EDPS, ‘Opinion 8/2016: The Coherent Enforcement of Fundamental Rights in the Age of Big Data’ 
(2016) 9 < https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-09-23_bigdata_opinion_en.pdf >. 
65 Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘President Juncker’s Political Guidelines’ (2014). 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/president-junckers-political-guidelines_en>; BEUC, 
‘Response to Consultation “Empowering the National Competition Authorities to Be More Effective 
Enforcers”’ (2016) <http://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2016-
021_pki_empowering_the_national_competition_authorities.pdf>. 





2. Components of the HEA 
 
In spite that the data protection consent-based framework largely benefits online 
platforms, as they can rely on a fictional consent to engage in data processing activities, as 
shall be seen below, some platforms routinely process data without meeting the 
requirements for consent to be valid (and without any legal basis whatsoever). For large 
online platforms, violating data protection law is an affordable activity: they pay a 
negligible fine and derive huge profits from the additional data streams they unlawfully 
obtain.67 Aside from violating the fundamental right to data protection of individuals, 
these infringements allow for the unlawful extraction of great amounts of personal data 
that entrenches market power and distorts competition. Data processing without legal 
basis leading to the outcome above will be referred to as ‘Component 1’.  
 
By including deceptive and confusing terms in privacy policies and engaging in unfair 
commercial practices, online platforms contribute to the preservation of the status quo in 
online markets: they keep consumers uninformed or confused as to the privacy-related 
implications of using an online service, and deepen the information asymmetries affecting 
online markets. Large amounts of uninformed consumers translate into the absence of 
pressure on online platforms to offer privacy-friendly services, in spite of the unsatisfied 
preferences of numerous consumers. Unfair terms and commercial practices that cause 
the aforementioned effects will be referred to as ‘Component 2’. 68 
																																																								
67 Clarke (n 58).  
68 There is some overlap in data protection and consumer protection violations with regard to the provision 
of information on personal data processing to data subjects/consumers. The obligation to provide 
information serves different purposes under these two branches of law. In data protection law, the 
provision of such information is necessary for the data controller to fulfil the transparency obligation. See 
Brendan Van Alsenoy, Eleni Kosta and Jos Dumortier, ‘Privacy Notices versus Informational Self-
Determination: Minding the Gap’ (2014) 28 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 185. In 
consumer protection law, on the other hand, the obligation to provide clear information about the relevant 
product being offered serves to fulfil one of the main purposes of this branch of law: to eliminate 
informational asymmetries in the market place. 
As a result of this overlap, the distinction between Component 1 and Component 2 will not be always clear-
cut. Indeed, some data protection and consumer protection infringements may have a double effect: they 
can cause the violation of the data protection rights of individuals and increase information asymmetries in 
the marketplace. For example, failure to provide sufficient, clear and visible information as to the data 
processing practices of a platform can be a data protection and consumer protection infringement at the 
same time, having a visible double effect: it impedes the formation of valid consent (as it would not be 
informed), and therefore, data processing takes place without legal basis. Also, it prevents consumers from 
becoming properly informed on the privacy implications of using a given online service, thus contributing 




3. Implementation of the HEA  
 
Competition, data protection and consumer protection enforcement agencies ought to 
work within the limits of their respective remits, as defined by law. The boundaries of 
their respective powers and competences must be respected,69 and the substantial assessments 
of their fields of law must not, congruently, collide or merge with each other, as some 
have proposed.70 
 
Laws can, however, be enforced in a joint and harmonious manner to tackle interrelated 
issues arising from a common phenomenon. To respect this fundamental distinction 
between separate and independent substantial application of different laws and their 
harmonic and joint enforcement, the HEA is staggered in two stages. In stage one, 
infringements of data protection and consumer protection law must be established in final 
decisions passed by competent data protection and consumer protection authorities, as 
applicable. In this way, the principle of legality is complied with. A competition authority 
(DG COMP or a NCA), for example, cannot establish violations of said fields of law and 
prosecute them as competition infringements, as it would be acting beyond the 
competences it was attributed by EU law (or the relevant national law) and inadmissibly 
expanding the remit of competition law.71 In stage two, Article 102 TFEU proceedings are 
commenced based on a close connection between the infringements and the infringer’s 




Collaboration between competition, data protection and consumer protection agencies to 
establish the existence of Component 1 and Component 2 is logically of the essence. The 
EDPS recently proposed the creation of a ‘Digital Clearing House’,72 which would be a 
voluntary network of contact points in regulatory authorities at national and EU level who 
																																																								
69 EDPS (n 64) 9. 
70 See Chapter 4 Section II.1.2. 
71 Francisco Costa-Cabral and Orla Lynskey, ‘The Internal and External Constraints of Data Protection on 
Competition Law in the EU’ (2015) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 25/2015 32. 
72 EDPS (n 64) 22. 
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are responsible for regulation of the digital sector.73 Said Digital Clearing House could 
serve as the main venue to discuss appropriate legal regimes for complaints related to 
online services, to harmonise law enforcement, and perhaps more importantly, to verify 
the existence of Component 1 and Component 2 and build a case accordingly. 
 
In the Digital Clearing House or any other suitable channel, the relevant competition and 
data protection authorities (DPAs) must identify the data the processing of which is 
carried out unlawfully by the platform, and how such data is conferring upon the same an 
unlawful advantage that raises barriers to entry and lessens competition. In the same vein, 
the relevant competition and consumer protection authorities must identify online 
platforms’ techniques and practices which, by deepening information asymmetries, aim at 
preserving the status quo in online markets (i.e. widespread consumer confusion and 
resignation about lack of privacy on the part of informed consumers). 
 
Although difficult to achieve, collaboration between competition, data protection and 
consumer protection agencies is already taking place in the abuse of dominance 
proceedings commenced by the Bundeskartellamt against Facebook.74 
 
After having identified the unlawful data processing and unfair contract terms and 
commercial practices that distort the competitive process, the involved DPAs and 
consumer protection authorities must commence proceedings to establish the relevant 
infringements.  
 
A decision establishing the data protection infringement (i.e. that the personal data at 
stake have been processed unlawfully) passed by a competent DPA or one lead 
supervisory authority on behalf of several DPAs of EU member countries pursuant to the 
provisions of Articles 60 et seq. of the GDPR will serve in stage two (i.e. in Article 102 
TFEU proceedings) as conclusive evidence of the unlawfulness of the data processing and 
therefore, of the unlawfulness of any competitive advantage that might have been derived 
therefrom. Coordination between the lead supervisory authority (if applicable), the DPAs 
																																																								
73 ibid 15. 
74 “The German regulator is conducting the proceeding in close contact with the competent data protection 
officers, consumer protection associations as well as the European Commission and the competition 
authorities of the other EU Member States”. See Robert McLeod, ‘Novel But a Long Time Coming: The 
Bundeskartellamt Takes on Facebook’ (2016) 7 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 367, 368. 
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and the relevant competition authority (for instance, the European Commission) may be 
arranged through the European Data Protection Board75 and DG COMP.  
 
Similarly, a decision passed by a competent consumer protection authority establishing 
the existence of unfair commercial practices and/or unfair terms in consumer contracts 
will serve in stage two as conclusive evidence of deception strategically devised and 
implemented to distort consumer demand for privacy-friendly services and undermine 
competition on this dimension. Collaboration efforts between consumer protection 
authorities in case of intra-Community infringements may be deployed through the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation Network,76 which in turn could appoint an officer to 




Only after final decisions condemning data protection and consumer protection 
infringements are passed in the manner described above may Article 102 TFEU 
proceedings be commenced against the infringing platform, based on a close connection 
between such infringements and the infringer’s dominant position in one or more relevant 
markets. Such decisions will be proof in Article 102 TFEU proceedings of the overall 
anticompetitive strategy of the relevant dominant undertaking to strengthen its dominant 
position and hinder the emergence of meaningful privacy-based competition.  
 
It will be the task of the competition enforcer to prove that the relevant data protection 
and consumer protection infringements cause or are likely to cause harmful effects on 





75 See generally Chapter VII GDPR.  
76 See generally Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 
2004, on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of the consumer 
protection laws (the Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation) OJ L 364/1. 
77 See below Section II.5.3.  
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4. Close Connection Between The Infringements And The Infringer’s 
Dominant Position 
 
To trigger Article 102 TFEU proceedings based on the existence of Component 1 and 
Component 2, a close connection between the data protection and consumer protection 
infringements and the creation, maintenance or strengthening of the infringer’s dominant 
position must be established.  
 
To this effect, it is necessary to look at the platform´s business model. As seen in Chapter 
2, data serves as an essential input to production, especially for advertisement-based 
platforms. These platforms are particularly likely to derive market power from actions that 
enable them to amass greater amounts of data to improve their services and offer new 
ones, as well as from actions that preserve consumer ignorance as to the privacy-related 
consequences arising from using platform services. For these platforms, “there may be a 
close link between the dominance of the company, its data collection practices and 
competition on the relevant markets.”78 
 
Accordingly, multisided markets dominated by an advertising-based platform will be the 
primary candidates for the application of the HEA. However, nothing hinders the 
application of this approach to other data-intensive markets should the circumstances 
merit so. At any rate, the application of the HEA must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 
5. Exclusionary Abuse 
 
5.1 Theory of Harm 
 
When a dominant online platform displays behaviour that amounts to Component 1 and 
Component 2, it engages in an overall anticompetitive strategy to maintain and/or 
strengthen its dominant position and prevent the emergence of meaningful privacy-based 
competition. In addition, such strategy may confer upon the platform the ability to 
leverage its dominance onto other markets. In this case, privacy and consumer protection 
																																																								
78 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, ‘Competition Law and Data’ (2016) 24. 
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concerns fall within the scope of competition law, because the collection and use of 
personal data in violation of data protection law and/or through deceit and misleading 
practices in violation of consumer protection law increase the infringer’s market power.79  
 
It is acknowledged that this type of abuse is novel, and that there are no precedents 
supporting it. However, competition law has already made infringements of Article 102 
TFEU dependent on assessments under other fields of law. For example, in AztraZeneca,80 
the EU Courts had to determine whether specific behaviour consisting in the misuse of 
the patent system, not previously considered in EU case law, infringed Article 102 TFEU. 
The CJEU held that having recourse to highly misleading representations with the aim of 
leading public authorities into error (for the purposes of improperly obtaining exclusive 
rights) was “manifestly not consistent with competition on the merits and the specific 
responsibility on such undertaking not to prejudice, by its conduct, effective and 
undistorted competition”.81 The CJEU went on to conclude that it was an abuse “to lead 
the public authorities [to] wrongly […] create regulatory obstacles to competition, for 
example by the unlawful grant of exclusive rights to the dominant undertaking.”82 In this 
case, an Article 102 TFEU infringement was established based on an assessment under IP 
law. By way of analogy, the HEA contemplates an infringement of Article 102 TFEU 
based on assessments under data protection and consumer protection law: certain 
infringements of these laws cause competition-distorting effects with exclusionary and 
exploitative components.  
 
At any rate, Article 102 TFEU is an open-ended provision. As the CJEU has held, “[t]he 
list of abusive practices contained in [Article 102 TFEU] does not exhaust the methods of 
abusing a dominant position.”83 As a result, any conduct that fulfils Article 102 TFEU’s 
requirements is abusive, irrespective of whether it is included in its list or has been 
condemned in previous rulings.  
 
																																																								
79 ‘[T]he rules of fair competition and the privacy rules can be violated by [...] commercial operations on the 
internet. Companies with market power can use this kind of conduct to entrench their market position’. 
Monopolkommission, ‘Special Report 68: Competition Policy: The Challenge of Digital Markets’ (2015) 117 
<http://www.monopolkommission.de/index.php/en/reports/special-reports/284-special-report-68>. 
80 Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca v Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:770. 
81 ibid [98]. 
82 ibid [105]. 
83 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555 [173]. 
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It is established case law that a company in a dominant position engages in abusive 
conduct if it displays 
 
“behaviour […] which is such as to influence the structure of a market 
where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the 
degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods 
different from those which condition normal competition in products or 
services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the 
effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still 
existing in the market or the growth of that competition.”84 
 
Therefore, two requirements must be met for a finding of abuse. Firstly, the very presence 
of the undertaking in question must have weakened the market structure. This 
requirement is met by establishing the existence of the dominant position. Secondly, the 
undertaking must engage in conduct which (a) departs from normal competition (i.e. 
competition on the merits) and which (b) restricts competition in one or more relevant 
markets. 
 
When confronted with novel types of abuses, EU Courts have required actual or potential 
anticompetitive effects (instead of assuming such effects).85 For example, in AstraZeneca, 
after holding that the dominant firm’s conduct was contrary to competition on the merits, 
the CJEU held that this conduct did not constitute an abuse in itself; rather, an 
anticompetitive effect on the market was required, although “such an effect does not 
necessarily have to be concrete, and it is sufficient to demonstrate that there is a potential 
anti-competitive effect”.86 
 
Chapter 3 specifies the manner in which dominance must be assessed in online platform 
markets. Consequently, the two following sections focus on the second requirement 
above: the departure from normal competition (II.5.2) leading to the lessening of effective 




84 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co v Commission [1979] ECR 461 [91]. 
85 Alison Jones, ‘Standard-Essential Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the Smartphone Wars’ 
(2014) 10 European Competition Journal 1, 20. 
86 AstraZeneca v Commission (n 80) [112]. 
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5.2 Departure from Normal Competition  
 
In Post Danmark I, the CJEU held:  
 
“Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the 
market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less 
attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, 
choice, quality or innovation […] 
 
Article [102 TFEU] applies, in particular, to conduct of a dominant 
undertaking that, through recourse to methods different from those governing 
normal competition on the basis of the performance of commercial operators, 
has the effect, to the detriment of consumers, of hindering the maintenance of 
the degree of competition existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition.”87 
 
The concept of ‘competition on the merits’ has been widely criticised for being too vague 
and devoid of substantive meaning.88 It is submitted, however, that one discerning line to 
narrow down the types of conduct that are admissible to protect a dominant firm’s 
commercial interest could be found in the violation of other laws that leads to a 
competitive advantage: 
 
Component 1: The overall strategy of the largest online platforms analysed in this work is 
to collect and process as much data as possible, through any lawful or unlawful means. 
Confronted with the decision of whether or not to abide by the applicable data protection 
laws, some platforms commonly choose to infringe their provisions, as the fines are 
negligible relative to the rewards. More data derives in more precision when targeting ads 
to users, which in turns attracts more advertisers and therefore more advertising revenues. 
Accordingly, they draft they privacy policies in such a way that by default consumers 
consent to the processing of their personal data for myriad of purposes they cannot 
envision when they sign up for an online platform service. These default settings do not 
meet the requirements for consent to be informed and specific, and consequently, there is 
no valid consent and no legal basis for the processing of personal data. Online platforms 
with these default settings violate the fundamental right of individuals to data protection, 
thereby collecting and processing more personal data than they are legally entitled to, and 
																																																								
87 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrenceradet (Post Danmark I) [2012] ECR I-0000 [22–24]. 
88 Wolf Sauter, Coherence in EU Competition Law (OUP 2016) 110–111; Ekaterina Rousseva, ‘The Concept of 
“objective Justification” of an Abuse of a Dominant Position: Can It Help to Modernise the Analysis under 
Article 82 EC’ (2006) 2 The Competition Law Review 27, 30. 
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by doing so they increase their data-driven market power in breach of data protection law. 
When the data a platform unlawfully processes is of great competitive significance, as said 
data entrenches its monopoly power or enables it to leverage its market power onto 
adjacent markets, the platform raises barriers to entry and lessens competition. This modus 
operandi is inconsistent with ‘competition on the merits’.  
 
Component 2: Consumers’ privacy concerns and privacy-based competition in general are 
antithetical to the advertisement-based business model of the largest online platforms. 
Accordingly, these platforms devise their privacy policies in a way that makes it really 
difficult for consumers to understand the privacy-related consequences arising from the 
use of their services and to prevent their personal data from being collected and shared 
with third parties (advertisers and application developers). Platforms have an incentive to 
keep consumers ignorant and confused with regard to their data processing practices, as 
this state of affairs prevents the emergence of services that can threaten their advertising-
based business model. To preserve confusion and ignorance and give the false perception 
of control over one’s personal data, online platforms resort to unfair terms in consumer 
contracts and engage in unfair commercial practices to make the management of their 
services’ privacy settings as confusing as possible, in violation of EU consumer protection 
provisions. This modus operandi cannot be characterised as ‘competition on the merits’ 
either.  
 
The manner in which the existence of Component 1 and Component 2 can be established 
is explained below.    
 
5.2.1 Component 1  
 
DPAs and competition authorities must work together to identify scenarios under which 
unlawful collection and processing of data cause anticompetitive effects. To this effect, 
they must determine in a specific case (i) the kind of data that is likely to contribute to the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position in one or more relevant markets, and (ii) 
the fact that such data is or has been collected and processed unlawfully.  
 









Not all types of data will enable a platform to attain or strengthen a dominant position. 
After all, “the relevance of some kind of data may vary substantially with respect to 
different business models and data that are relevant for the provision of one service may 
be irrelevant for the provision of another.”89 To exemplify this point, two different types 
of data are discussed below. 
 
In 2014, Google paid USD3.2 billion to acquire Nest Lab, a manufacturer of thermostats 
and carbon monoxide detectors, and USD555 million to buy Dropcam, a producer of a 
home security camera. These acquisitions were most likely data-driven. The products of 
the acquired companies are IoT smart appliances. For example, by using their sensors, 
Nest Lab’s thermostats and CO detectors over time learn to turn on and off depending 
on whether there is somebody in the house, and as the appliances learn more about user 
habits and communicate with each other through the Nest network, they build “an 
aggregate picture of human behaviour, [anticipating] what we want before we know”.90 In 
turn, Dropcam enabled Google to capture more highly sensitive information about what 
takes place in its users’ homes.91  
 
At the time of the abovementioned acquisitions by Google, voices were raised in the 
sense that Google was after the data collected from people’s homes “to better target its 
advertising”.92 This is likely to be the case. After all, Google is ultimately an advertising 
company which has disclosed to the US Securities and Exchange Commission that it 
intends in the near future to serve ads and other content on inter alia refrigerators, car 
																																																								
89 Nils-Peter Schepp and Achim Wambach, ‘On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market Power Assessment’ 
(2015) 7 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 120, 121. 
90 Marcus Wohlsen, ‘What Google Really Gets Out of Buying Nest for $3.2 Billion’ (Wired, 2014) 
<https://www.wired.com/2014/01/googles-3-billion-nest-buy-finally-make-internet-things-real-us/>. 
91 Steve Lohr, ‘Google’s Nest to Acquire Dropcam for $555 Million’ (2014) Bits Blog 
<https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/googles-nest-to-acquire-dropcam-for-555-million/>. 





dashboards, thermostats, glasses and watches. 93  The acquisition of Nest Labs and 
Dropcam enabled Google to have devices on which ads can be served, and also to collect 
more personal data (such as offline behaviour at home) for better profiling, ad targeting 
and other purposes.  
 
Now consider locational data. Its significance for Google became apparent in a patent 
infringement and restraint of trade lawsuit filed in the U.S. by Skyhook against Google.94 
Skyhook, a provider of location services once used by competitors of Google such as 
Apple and MapQuest, announced in 2010 a partnership with Motorola (theretofore 
independent from Google), under which Skyhook was to provide location services to 
Motorola’s phones that used Android OS, to the detriment of Google’s location services. 
Skyhook contended that Google had leveraged its control of Android to convince OEMs 
to choose Google’s location services over Skyhook’s.95 Internal emails of Google revealed 
how important the Wi-Fi locational data was for it: 
 
“No one at Google was aware of this until Skyhook published their press 
release [referring to Skyhook’s partnership with Motorola]. We absolutely do 
care about this because we need wifi data collection in order to maintain and 
improve our wifi location service (especially after having Street View wifi 
data collection discontinued). Our wifi location database is extremely 
valuable to Google…  
 
It’s sad to see first Apple, now Motorola moving away from us, which means 
less collection for us.  
 
I cannot stress enough how important Google’s wifi location database is…” 
(emphasis added).96  
 
One could wonder why was locational data so important to Google. After all, Google 
Maps and Google’s Wi-Fi location services are priced at zero, and included as an add-on 
to Google’s free Android OS. The answer, again, lies in advertising. As Stucke and 
Grunes note:  
 
																																																								
93 Google Inc., ‘Letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission’ (2013) 
<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000128877613000074/filename1.htm>. 
94 Skyhook Wireless, Inc v Google, Inc, No 2010-03652-BLS1(Superior Court Civil Action 2011). 
95 ibid. 
96 The emails were made public by Business Insider. See Dan Frommer, ‘UNSEALED: Here Are 418 Pages 




“[Geo]-location and mapping data are key for advertisers. Using users’ geo-
location data, Google […] can track where people are and influence where 
they will go by providing them information on nearby advertisers (such as 
promoting a nearby Taco Bell). The first step is to target users by their 
location. The next step is to combine all the data on the user (tastes, search 




To determine whether certain data can contribute to the attainment or strengthening of a 
dominant position, it is necessary to focus on one or more specific online markets. As 
explained in Chapter 3,98 Google is dominant in the search and search advertising markets. 
To maintain its lead in this multisided market, Google must render more relevant search 
results to users and more targeted advertisements for advertisers. One strategy Google 
has deployed to this effect is the personalisation of its search services. Personalisation of 
services has a dissuasive effect on multi-homing, leads to the consolidation of user 
habits,99 increases switching costs and lock-in effects, and therefore tends to raise barriers 
to entry and enhance dominance. 
 
With personalised search, when a user enters a search query, the search results are based 
not only on the relevance of each webpage to the search term, but also on other factors100 
such as search history, web history, social network interactions, and location.101 
 
The factor ‘location’ is of the utmost relevance for search queries that are the easiest to 
monetise. When a user types ‘restaurants near me’ on Google or Google Maps, the 
following screens are shown: 
   
                         
																																																								
97 Stucke and Grunes (n 57) 93. 
98 See Chapter 3 Section II.5.1. 
99 Boris P Paal, ‘Internet Search Engines and Antitrust Law’ (2016) 11 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 
& Practice 298, 301. 
100 Bryan Horling, ‘Personalized Search for Everyone’ (2009) Official Google Blog 
<https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/personalized-search-for-everyone.html>. 








Google.co.uk Google Maps 
 
As can be seen, a list of targeted advertisements based entirely on the user’s location is 
rendered.  
 
Now then, consider the type of data that is available to Google as a result of the 
acquisition of Nest Labs and Dropcam, and the type of data to which Google has access 
via Google Maps and Android. The first type of data consists mostly of ‘offline’ 
behaviour and activities of people in their respective homes. The significance of such data 
for the provision of search and search advertising is likely to be minimal. Conversely, the 
data gathered via Google Maps and Android is of the essence for the personalisation of 
search results and the provision of targeted advertising based on users’ specific location. 
As one analyst notes, “[t]he better Google’s data is, the more its ads are worth — a strong 
incentive for continuing to collect and store exact location data.”102 The statements 
included in Google’s internal emails quoted above make a lot of more sense against this 
																																																								
102 Russell Brandom, ‘Police Are Filing Warrants for Android’s Vast Store of Location Data’ (2016) The 
Verge  <http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/1/11824118/google-android-location-data-police-warrants>. 
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background.103 Control of Google Maps and Android secures an unparalleled flow of 
locational data that Google can use to extend its dominance in its core business (search 
and search advertising) and expand onto neighbouring markets.104 
 
5.2.1.2 Unlawful Collection and Processing of Data  
 
The processing of personal data requires a legal basis. Data processed without legal basis 
is a serious violation of data protection law.105 Google has argued106 that it processes 
personal data based on (i) unambiguous consent of the data subjects, (ii) processing 
necessary for the performance of a contract, and (iii) processing necessary for the 
purposes of the legitimate interests of the controller.  
 
1) Consent  
 
(a) Notices on Mobile Devices 
 
Consent only exists when it is freely given, unambiguous, informed and specific.107 In 
particular, with regard to the ‘informed’ requirements, subjects of locational data must be 
previously informed about the identity of the controller, the purposes of the processing, 
the type of location data processed, the duration of the processing, whether the data will 
be transmitted to a third party, the right of access to and the right to rectify the data, the 
right to withdraw consent or temporarily refuse the processing of such data, and the right 
to cancel the data.108 
 
With regard to the ‘specific’ requirement, the A29WP has observed: 
 
																																																								
103 See above text accompanying footnote 96.  
104 For example, geolocation and mapping data are of the essence for the driverless cars business in which 
Google has been investing heavily recently. See Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke, Virtual Competition 
(Harvard University Press 2016) 152. 
105 Article 83 No. 5 literal a) GDPR.  
106 Dutch DPA, ‘Investigation into the Combining of Personal Data by Google, Report of Definitive 
Findings’ (2013) 20 
<https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/mijn_privacy/en_rap_2013-google-
privacypolicy.pdf>. 
107 See above Section I.2. 
108 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion on the Use of Location Data with a View to 
Providing Value-Added Services 2130/05/EN WP 115’ (2005) 4–5. 
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“Purposes must be specific. This means that – prior to, and in any event, no 
later than the time when the collection of personal data occurs – the 
purposes must be precisely and fully identified to determine what processing 
is and is not included within the specified purpose and to allow that 
compliance with the law can be assessed and data protection safeguards can 
be applied.”109 
 
As a consequence, a ‘general agreement’ of the data subject cannot constitute valid 
consent, regard being had to the sensitivity of the processing of location data, which 
“involves the key issue of the freedom to come and go anonymously”.110 Accordingly, the 
A29WP has held: 
 
“To the extent that developers of operating systems and other information 
society services themselves actively process geolocation data, (for example 
when they gain access to location information from or through the device) 
they must […] seek the prior informed consent of their users. It must be 
clear that such consent cannot be obtained freely through mandatory 
acceptance of general terms and conditions, nor through opt-out 
possibilities.”111 (emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, in Opinion WP115 on the use of location data with a view to providing value 
added services, the A29WP contended:  
 
“[The] definition [of consent] explicitly rules out consent being given as part 
of accepting the general terms and conditions for the electronic 
communications services offered.”112 (emphasis added)  
 
Bearing in mind the above, Google’s notices to render consent for the processing of 
location data valid will be analysed. The French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) has 
identified a least eight different purposes for the combining of personal data collected 






109 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation’ (2013) 39. 
110 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 108) 3. 
111 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation Services on Smart Mobile 
Devices 881/11/EN WP 185’ (2011) 14. 
112 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 108) 5. 
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- The provision of services for which data are combined at the request of users (as 
in the case of Gmail or Calendar); 
- The provision of services requested by the user in which data are combined 
without the user needing to know the data processing operation (for example, 
personalised search results); 
- Security purposes; 
- Product development and marketing innovation purposes; 
- The provision of the Google Account; 
- Advertising purposes; 
- Website analytics; and 
- Academic research. 113 
 
Therefore, location data may be lawfully collected and processed by Google provided that 
the consent it obtains from users is unambiguous, freely given, informed and specific in 
respect of each of the purposes listed above.  
 
Now then, when a user sets up a new Android device or installs any Google app (such as 





113 Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des Liberés (CNIL), ‘Appendix: Google Privacy Policy: 
Main Findings and Recommendations’ (2012) 
<https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/typo/document/GOOGLE_PRIVACY_POLICY-
_RECOMMENDATIONS-FINAL-EN.pdf>. 







Android notice iOS notice 
 
Based on these notices, Google says that users have to opt-in for location data 
collection.115 However, these notices are insufficient to give rise to valid consent, and 
Google cannot process location data under such notices for the purposes specified above. 
At best, the iOS notice is sufficient to give rise to consent for the processing of personal 
data necessary for the functioning of the digital map (‘Maps needs your location to give 
you directions, real-time traffic & public transport updates and results to nearby places’). 
The Android notice, in turn, is particularly vague as to when and for which purposes 
location data are collected (“Let apps better determine your location… Data may be 
collected even when no apps are running”). Additionally, the Android notice informs that 
“anonymous location data” are collected, but that statement is false: location data have a 
unique identifier linked to an individual’s phone, for which reason said individual can be 
readily identified.116 Consequently, such data are personal data, and requires valid consent 
(or other legal basis) for their processing.  
																																																								
115 See Jason Kincaid, ‘Google Responds To Smartphone Location Tracking Uproar, Says Android Is Opt-
In’ (2011) TechCrunch <http://social.techcrunch.com/2011/04/22/google-responds-to-smartphone-
location-tracking-uproar-says-android-is-opt-in/>. 
116 Julia Angwin and Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, ‘Apple, Google Collect User Data’ (2011) Wall Street 




In 2012 Google announced the introduction of a new privacy policy that would 
encompass all the services Google offers, replacing the previous individuals policies that 
governed each service. Said privacy policy117 governs the collection and processing of 
location data. Therefore, in order to get informed on Google’s data processing operations 
involving location and any other type of personal data, users need to delve into said 
privacy policy. Thus, the understanding of users as to the consequences of consenting to 
the processing of location data takes place after they actually give their consent (if they 
decide to read the privacy policy afterwards), unless they withhold their acceptance, read 
Google’s overarching policy, and then give their consent to the notices above, which is a 
rather unlikely scenario. As a result, the consent obtained by Google does not meet the 
‘specific’ and ‘informed’ requirements, and therefore is invalid. Any and all data processed 
based on such consent are unlawfully collected and processed.  
 
(b) The 2012 Google Privacy Policy Amendment  
 
As explained above, in 2012 Google merged the privacy policies of all of its services into 
one unique overarching policy. Since Google’s services are highly popular amongst EU 
citizens, this change was likely to affect the data protection rights of a large amount of 
individuals in the EU. The A29WP established a task force composed of six DPAs, led by 
the CNIL, to carry out an ‘examination’ of the lawfulness of such privacy policy 
amendment. Since the A29WP had no investigatory and enforcement powers under the 
DPD, this process was essentially informal, and ended up in separate investigations 
conducted under national laws by the DPAs participating in the task force. All of the 
DPAs composing the task force found that Google breached the data protection laws of 
their respective countries.118 
																																																								
117 Google Inc., ‘Privacy Policy – Privacy & Terms – Google’ 
<https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/>. 
118 See ICO, ‘Google to Change Privacy Policy after ICO Investigation’ (2016) <https://ico.org.uk/about-
the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2015/01/google-to-change-privacy-policy-after-ico-
investigation/>; Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, ‘Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
Sanciona a Google Por Vulnerar Gravemente Los Derechos de Los Ciudadanos’ (2013) 
<http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/revista_prensa/revista_prensa/2013/notas_prensa/news/2013_1
2_19-ides-idphp.php>; Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, ‘Decision Setting Forth Measures 
Google Inc. Is Required to Take to Bring the Processing of Personal Data under Google’s New Privacy 
Policy into Line with the Italian Data Protection Code’ (2014) 
<http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/3295641>; 
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In its investigation, the task force set by the A29WP distinguished between three types of 
Google users: authenticated users (signed in with a Google account), unauthenticated 
users (people using services like Search without a Google account) and passive users 
(people visiting third party websites with Google cookies). 
 
Google contented that it obtains consent from authenticated users by virtue of their 
acceptance to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy by ticking a box; for 
unauthenticated users, this acceptance would follow from the fact that they continue 
using the website, as such continued use constitutes acceptance according to Google’s 
Terms of Service. Google did not put forward any legal ground for the processing of 
personal data of passive users. 
 
In its privacy policy, Google explains that it may combine data from various services:  
 
“We use the information we collect from all of our services to provide, 
maintain, protect and improve them, to develop new ones and to protect 
Google and our users. We also use this information to offer you tailored 
content – like giving you more relevant search results and ads… 
 
We may combine personal information from one service with information, 
including personal information, from other Google services – for example, 
to make it easier to share things with people you know.” 
 
The DPAs comprising the task force concluded that the aforementioned purposes are not 
specific and do not detail properly the manner in which personal data is processed.119 In 
this connection, the Dutch DPA held:  
 
“[P]eople who decide to deliberately use Google services (regardless of 
whether they do so as authenticated or unauthenticated users) must be able 
																																																																																																																																																																
Persoonsgegevens, ‘CBP Issues Sanction to Google for Infringements Privacy Policy’ (2014) 
<https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/news/cbp-issues-sanction-google-infringements-privacy-
policy>; ‘Google Ordered by German Authority to Change Privacy Practices’ (2015) PCWorld 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/2907612/google-ordered-by-german-authority-to-change-privacy-
practices.html>. 
119 ‘Google gives incomplete or approximate information about the purposes and the categories of data 
collected. The Privacy Policy is a mix of particularly wide statements and of examples that mitigate these 
statements and mislead users on the exact extent of Google’s actual practices. Additional information is 
available in in-product privacy notices, the Help Center or blogs but the information available in these 
documents is inconsistent between the different sources or spoken languages, can be changed at any 
moment and is sometimes difficult to understand.’ Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des Liberés 
(CNIL) (n 113). 
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to understand in advance for what purposes Google collects the data and 
consequently be given control over whether they want to allow their data to 
be collected for those specific purposes. The purpose cannot be so vague or 
broad that during the collection process it cannot provide any framework 
against which it can be tested whether the data are necessary for that purpose 
or not… 
 
[N]either users nor regulators can automatically conclude from the purpose 
specification [of Google’s privacy policy…] that Google combines and 
processes all sorts of data originating from and about the use of various 
Google services for purposes which, from the user perspective, are as diverse 
as the display of personalised ads, product development or the 
personalisation of requested services based on information from other 
services. The example added by Google, ‘for example to make it easier to share 
things with people you know’, pertains to authenticated users and does not point 
out the fact that Google itself combines the data collected from all three 
types of users for its own purposes.”120 
 
Google’s privacy policy also states: 
 
“We use information collected from cookies and other technologies, like 
pixel tags, to improve your user experience and the overall quality of our 
services… For example, by saving your language preferences, we’ll be able to 
have our services appear in the language you prefer.” 
 
In this connection, the Dutch DPA held: 
 
“The average user cannot gather from Google’s cited purposes of improving 
the user experience and the overall quality of the services that Google can 
combine data from the contents of e-mail and documents with data that 
Google gathers on the use of other services, including geolocation services 
used on a smartphone with the Android operating system, to tailor services 
and to display targeted ads.”121 
 
Finally, with regard to the use of location details, the Dutch DPA concluded: 
 
“Google can use the content of search queries to determine an implicit 
(interest in a) location and can use GPS signals, device sensors, WiFi access 
points and IDs from radio towers to estimate the location. Because Google 
does not otherwise delimit or explain the use of the location details, the 
average Internet user cannot determine the nature and scope of the data 
processing.”122 (emphasis added)  
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121 ibid 63. 
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Thus, as the purposes defined for data collection and processing by Google are 
ambiguous and not specific enough, the ‘consent’ Google obtains from users is neither 
informed nor specific. Therefore, Google cannot resort to this legal ground to process 
locational and other types of personal data.123 
 
2) Necessity for the Performance of a Contract 
 
Android users must enter into a contract with Google to obtain permission to use the 
Android OS.124 Google Maps users can be either authenticated (with Google account) or 
unauthenticated users. From a legal perspective, only authenticated users can be said to 
have entered into a contract with Google, as only in this case there is an intention from 
both parties to be legally bound. Accordingly, an argument can be made in the sense that 
this legal ground could, in principle, only apply to Android and Google Maps 
authenticated users, as unauthenticated users have not entered into a contract in a strictly 
legal sense.125 
 
Nonetheless, irrespective of whether a binding contract comes into existence as a result of 
the use of the Google Maps website or app (as would be the case for unauthenticated 
users), the core issue in connection with this legal ground is whether or not the processing 
of location data is necessary for the performance of a contract, be it the license agreement 
to use Android OS, the contract for the opening of a Google Account or other 
agreement.  
 
According to the CJEU, “the concept of necessity […] has its own independent meaning 
in Community Law”.126 Indeed, ‘necessity’ is the second prong of the proportionality 
principle of EU law. The ‘necessity’ prong asks: “is the measure concerned necessary 
																																																								
123 “Google does not satisfy the criterion ‘informed’. The different purposes for which data are combined 
are not fully described, or are at least not described clearly enough in the [privacy policy]… because of this 
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124 Android Team, ‘Content License’ (2017) Android Open Source Project 
<https://source.android.com/license.html>. 
125 However, Google has stated that its Terms of Service give rise to a contractual relationship with all users 
of Google’s services, regardless of whether or not they are authenticated. See Dutch DPA (n 106) 85. 
126 Case C-524/06, Heinz Huber v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:724 [52]. 
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(indispensable) to realising the goals it is aimed at meeting?”127 In the case at hand, the 
natural question to ask is: is the processing of personal data necessary for the proper 
performance of a contract? The processing of personal data to perform a contract is not 
necessary unless such processing is of the essence and unavailable to complete the 
transaction.128 It follows that processing of personal data that is useful or facilitates the 
performance of a contract, or which renders such performance more profitable for the 
data controller, is not necessary. As the A29WP has contended: 
 
“[T]he fact that some data processing is covered by a contract does not 
automatically mean that the processing is necessary for its performance. For 
example, Article 7(b) is not a suitable legal ground for building a profile of 
the user’s tastes and lifestyles choices based on his click-stream on a website 
and the items purchased. This is because the data controller has not been 
contracted to carry out profiling, but rather to deliver particular goods and 
services… 
 
It is important to determine the exact rationale of the contract, i.e. its 
substance and fundamental objective, as it is against this that it will be tested 
whether the data processing is necessary for its performance.”129 
  
The substantial objective of the contract into which users enter with Google in respect of 
their Android devices is to govern the terms and conditions under which users can use 
the Android OS, that is, the software that allows users to operate said devices. 
Accordingly, it can be safely argued that relentless and pervasive collection of location 
data to personalise search ads and results, to display personalised ads to users whenever 
they go on the Internet, or for any of the purposes identified by the task force set by the 
A29WP to investigate Google’s 2012 Privacy Policy Amendment, is not necessary for the 
performance of said contract. Granted, collection of location data can improve the 
functionality of some of the apps installed in the relevant Android device, but it is an 
entirely different thing to sustain that the contract cannot be properly performed without 
the processing of location data for the purposes above.  
 
A somewhat similar argument can be made in respect of Google Maps’ unauthenticated 
and authenticated users. With regard to the former type of users, aside from the issue of 
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whether or not a contract arises from the use of Google Maps website or app, the fact 
that someone uses the service does it make it necessary to use users’ location data to 
personalise search ads and results, display ads or for any of the other purposes referred to 
above. Whilst the processing of location data might be necessary to provide the Google 
Map service (for instance, to give public transport updates and show nearby locations) 
and therefore perform the ‘contract’, processing of data for purposes ancillary to the 
provision of the Maps service itself is not. Therefore, Google needs to resort to a 
different legal ground to process the location data for any of such purposes.  
 
Similarly, with regard to authenticated users, regardless of any contractual arrangement, 
combining location data and data that users provide to Google, such as emails from 
Gmail and purchasing behaviour, in order to tailor search results, or combining data on 
and from the use of various Google services (including Google Maps) with data on visits 
to third-party websites in order to tailor display ads, is neither necessary nor proportionate 
to provide the Google Maps service or any of the other services Google offers (that is, to 
perform the contract). As the Dutch DPA held: 
 
“The combining of data on and from multiple services for [the purposes it 
investigated] is […] aimed at serving Google’s general business interest, 
specifically: to obtain information on the use of its own services and record 
and analyse visits to third-party websites (including advertisements) so that it 
can improve the quality of its services and develop new services based on 
data already collected.”130 
 
3) Necessity for the Legitimate Interests of the Data Controller 
 
This legal ground entails a balancing test: the data controller may rely upon this legal 
ground where the data processing is necessary for its legitimate interests, provided that 
such interests are not overridden by the data subject’s interests or fundamental rights.131  
 
A first question to ask in the case at hand is whether Google has a legitimate interest to 
process users’ location and other types of personal data. Google could invoke its 
“freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and 
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practices”, as enshrined in the Charter.132 As a matter of fact, the A29WP has held that 
marketing and advertising are activities conducted in accordance with a legitimate 
interest.133 However, Google cannot exercise such freedom without constraints; rather, its 
legitimate interests must be balanced against the interest and fundamental rights of the 
data subjects. 
 
The controller’s legitimate interest may only prevail when the data processing is 
‘necessary’. The enquiry into whether processing is necessary, in turn, is divided into two 
steps: whether the data processing observes the (i) subsidiarity and (ii) proportionality 
principles.  
 
The manner in which Google combines all sorts of personal data from various services, 
including location data, for its own commercial benefit, is not consistent with subsidiarity 
requirements. In this connection, the intrusiveness of data collection is a factor to 
consider. After a user agrees to location data sharing on an Android device or on Google 
Maps on an iOS device, location data is collected and sent to Google’s services even when 
apps are not running. This data sharing allows Google to build a persistent and extremely 
accurate portrait of where a user has travelled with his phone (and therefore where the 
user has been), to the extent that the FBI has requested from Google location data to 
place a suspect in a crime scene.134 Put in other words, after a user agrees to share his 
location data, Google always know where the user is (provided the user has the phone 
with him). There are certainly less intrusive ways in which Google could pursue its 
legitimate interests. As the A29WP has contended:  
 
“Assessing impact [on the data subjects’ fundamental rights] may involve 
considering […] whether large amounts of personal data are processed or 
combined with other data (e.g. in case of profiling […]) Seemingly innocuous 
data, when processed on a large scale and combined with other data may lead 
to inferences about more sensitive data [...] 
 
Depending on the nature and impact of these predictions, this may be highly 
intrusive to the individual’s privacy.”135  
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In addition, large-scale data collection is inconsistent with the proportionality principle.136 
Google is able to combine location data with all sorts of other data collected under its 
services, without the user knowing specifically what kind of data about him are processed, 
and when or under what circumstances the processing takes place. Said data processing 
has major consequences for the fundamental rights of the users of Google’s services. As 
the Dutch DPA argued:  
 
“[T]he data controller must take into account the impact [its] services will 
have on the individual privacy of the data subjects. The data controller must 
build in safeguards to prevent any disproportionate disadvantage […] 
 
The way in which Google may combine all sorts of data from various 
services, according to [its Privacy Policy], does not adequately demonstrate 
that a proportionate weighting of interests has taken place (proportionality 
principle).”137 
 
In view of the above, Google’s legitimate interest in basing its business model on 
advertising does not comply with the requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Nonetheless, even if Google were able to demonstrate the necessity of the processing of 
specific personal data (i.e. location data), Google must consider whether its legitimate 
interests override the data subjects’ interests and fundamental rights. In this second part 
of the analysis, the seriousness of the violation of the data subject’s privacy is of 
paramount significance, as well as safeguards such as transparency and effective opt-outs 
for data subjects. According to the A29WP, factors to consider regarding the seriousness 
of the infringement are inter alia the sensitivity of the personal data, the way in which 
information is processed and the status of the controller and data subject.138 The more 
sensitive the data is, the more the information combined, and the greater the imbalance of 
power between data controller and data subject, the greater the intrusion into the data 
subjects’ privacy will be.  
 
As noted above, location data is particularly sensitive, as it “involves the key issue of the 
freedom to come and go anonymously”.139  On top of this, Google tracks location 
relentlessly. As one analyst noted:  
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“Android phones pair to Google accounts at the operating system level, so as 
long as Location History is enabled when the phone is first launched, 
location data can be collected even if you’ve never opened the Timeline tab. 
The result is a comprehensive location record, collected entirely in the 
background.”140 
 
In addition to the large-scale location data collection, it must be borne in mind that 
location data are combined with large amounts of other data that Google collects under 
the other services it offers. Data processing of this kind can lead to “uncanny, unexpected 
and sometimes inaccurate predictions, for example, concerning the behaviour personality 
of the individuals concerned”, which may be particularly intrusive into the data subjects’ 
privacy.141  
 
Moreover, it must be noted that Google has an overwhelming bargaining power in respect 
of data subjects, largely due to the fact that there are no viable competitors offering more 
privacy-sensitive services. Consequently, it is an advantageous position to impose on data 
subjects “what it believes is in its ‘legitimate interest’”.142 
 
Last but not least, as explained above, Google is not transparent in the way it presents 
information to users about its data processing operations.143  Based on Google’s privacy 
policy, users cannot conclude what type of data is collected, when data is collected, how 
data is combined, and for what purposes it is combined. Additionally, Google offers 
labour-intensive and partial opt-outs options for only some of the purposes investigated 
by the task force, 144 and oftentimes the opt-outs do not result in the termination of the 
data processing. For example, Google’s ‘Ads opt-out’ only prevents Google from showing 
users ‘interest-based ads’, but opting-out does not stop ads altogether, including ads based 
on users’ recent searches or general location.145 Also, where cookie technology is not 
available (as is the case of mobile devices), interest-based ads ‘may’ still be shown, and 
users have to undertake laborious steps to effectively opt-out.146 In the end, the opt-out 
does not prevent Google from tracking users, nor does it stop the underlying data 
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processing; rather, it only prevents the showing of targeted ads under specific and limited 
circumstances. Furthermore, some opt-out tools result in significant loss of functionality. 
For instance, unauthenticated users can only opt-out from personalisation of search 
results on YouTube or Maps by refusing all the cookies in their browsers.147 
 
In view of the above, Google’s legitimate interests to process personal data are largely 
overridden by its users’ interests and fundamental rights, and therefore, it cannot rely on 
this legal ground for its locational data processing operations. This position is shared by 
the literature148 and data protection regulators.149  
 
4) Other Types of Unlawfully Acquired Data 
 
The analysis above focused on the importance of location data for search and search 
advertising services. However, the argument applies to any unlawfully collected data the 
processing of which is likely to increase a platform’s dominant position. Consider 
Google’s combination of YouTube data with data collected from other services. As a 
consequence of the 2012 Privacy Policy amendment, Google was able to combine 
YouTube data with data collected under any of its other services. This combination was 
not possible before under YouTube’s privacy policy.150 After the 2012 Privacy Policy 
amendment, Google was able to make its video recommendations based on users’ search 
results, and render search results based on video viewing behaviour.151 With over 1 billion 
active users each month,152 4,950,000,000 videos viewed everyday153 and over 1 billion 
videos uploaded,154 the amount of data that became available to Google to improve its 
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services, including search and search advertising, and the ensuing competitive advantage, 
became very difficult to match by Google’s competitors. 
 
The possibility of combining users’ personal data gathered from several Google services, 
including YouTube data, for the purposes investigated by the task force described above, 
was not informed by Google to its YouTube users. 155  Such combination requires 
informed consent from users to be lawful; yet, as explained above, Google does not 
obtain informed consent under its Privacy Policy. Therefore, such combination of data is 
not compliant with the GDPR, and the ensuing competitive advantage in the search and 
search advertising markets does not follow competition on the merits. Accordingly, 
Component 1 also arises from this unlawful processing of data.    
 
If the capacity to derive market power from unlawful processing of certain kinds of data 
can be established, the HEA can be a viable route to tackle anticompetitive behaviour 
based on the violation of users’ privacy156 and promote the fundamental rights of said 
users at the same time.  
 
5.2.2 Component 2 
 
Deepened information asymmetries (i.e. widespread consumer confusion and 
disinformation) and abuses of unequal bargaining power are the central elements of 
Component 2. Weak competition already reduces the incentives to innovate in privacy-
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friendly services.157 Weak competition coupled with these elements translate into virtually 
no pressure on online platforms to offer privacy-friendly services (i.e. to compete on the 
basis of privacy), as a result of which the latent demand for privacy-friendly services 
remains unrealised.   
 
To illustrate the existence of Component 2, the Terms of Use of Facebook and Google 
will be used below as examples. 
 
5.2.2.1 Deepening of Information Asymmetries  
 
Consider some provisions of Facebook’s Terms of Use: 
 
“Sharing Your Content and Information 
You own all of the content and information you post on Facebook, and 





Our goal is to deliver advertising and other commercial or sponsored 
content that is valuable to our users and advertisers. In order to help us 
do that, you agree to the following: 
 
1. You give us permission to use your name, profile picture, 
content, and information in connection with commercial, sponsored, or 
related content (such as a brand you like) served or enhanced by us. This 
means, for example, that you permit a business or other entity to pay us 
to display your name and/or profile picture with your content or 
information, without any compensation to you. If you have selected a 
specific audience for your content or information, we will respect your 
choice when we use it. 
2. We do not give your content or information to advertisers 
without your consent.” 158 
 
 
Privacy settings are access control mechanisms that enable users to choose which other 
Facebook users can access their profile information. Users can make this selection from a 
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predefined set of groups (i.e. Friends, Friends of Friends, only me and Public), or 
customise their own audience. Similarly, application settings are also access control 
mechanisms that offer a limited number of options regarding app visibility and data 
collection by app providers. In no part of Facebook’s Terms of Use, however, is there any 
reference to ‘advertising settings’, which is the access control mechanism under which 
users can in principle manage settings regarding social ads, sponsored stories, tracking and 
targeted advertising.159 Lack of transparency can be observed on the part of Facebook at 
this stage of the analysis, as concealing these settings makes it really difficult for users to 
access the options regarding advertising on Facebook based on their personal data.  
 
Facebook’s privacy settings offer users significant control regarding access to their data by 
other Facebook users. However, the situation is diametrically different in respect of the 
collection and use of data by Facebook and third parties (app providers and advertisers). 
For example, the advertising settings only allow users to opt-out from appearing in Social 
Ads, but gives not choice to opt-out from Sponsored Stories. More tellingly, Facebook 
indicates to its users that they are able to opt-out from tracking and targeted advertising; 
however, to this effect, it provides links to the websites of the American, Canadian and 
European Digital Advertising Alliance, thereby adding another layer of opaqueness and 
making it extremely hard for users to opt-out from the processing of their personal data 
by advertisers. Consequently, “users are able to choose from several granular settings 
which regulate access by other individuals, but cannot exercise meaningful control over 
the use of their personal information by Facebook or third parties. This gives users a false 
sense of control.”160 Put in other words, the manner in which users are presented with 
control options regarding their personal data is deceptive.  
 
Furthermore, studies have shown that average users are confused about privacy settings, 
or do not even know what they are.161 This confusion is compounded by the several 
changes to which privacy settings are subjected from time to time. For example, in 2010 
																																																								
159 Given that users by default give Facebook permission to use their names, profile pictures, content, and 
information for advertising purposes, Facebook offers an opt-out mechanism that fails to meet the 
requirements for consent to be legally valid. As a result, Facebook also processes its users’ personal data 
without legal basis.    
160 Brendan Van Alsenoy, Valerie Verdoodt, Rob Heyman, Ellen Wauters, Jef Ausloos and Gunes Acar, 
‘From Social Media Service to Advertising Network: A Critical Analysis of Facebook’s Revised Policies and 
Terms’ (2015) Report commissioned by the Belgian Data Protection Authority 22. 
161 Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross, ‘Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, and 
Privacy on the Facebook’, In Danezis G., Golle P. (eds), Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2006. Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, vol 4258. (Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg 2006). 
Chapter 5 
 244 
Facebook introduced certain ‘improvements’ to its privacy settings, after which, under the 
feature ‘Instant Personalization’, Pandora, Yelp and Microsoft Docs were granted access 
to users’ accounts by default. In order to change the settings, users had to find the 
relevant box and deselect it, and then block each site separately in order to make sure that 
no information was shared through profiles of friends who had not disabled this feature. 
This complicated process prompted a complaint with the FTC, it which it was argued that 
“privacy settings are designed to confuse users and to frustrate attempts to limit the 
public disclosure of personal information that many Facebook users choose to share only 
with family and friends”.162 Describing the sentiment about privacy settings and their 
constant changes, Dan Costa, Executive Editor for PCMag Digital Network, wrote: 
 
“…[N]o one really understands their own privacy settings now. When 
Facebook changed its settings six months ago, 65 percent of users chose to 
keep their profiles public. Or, more likely, they just thought they should click 
“yes” to everything. We have all done it, and that choice will now follow us 
around the Web—forever.”163 
 
Similarly, consider the introduction of Google’s shared endorsements in 2013.164 Said 
settings allow Google to include users’ names, photos and comments in ads based on 
ratings, reviews and posts made by users on Google+ and other services such as 
YouTube. These shared endorsements may be shown on the more than two million sites 
that are members of Google’s display advertising network.165 Google explained that “the 
only people who see [ads users have endorsed] are the people that you’ve chosen to share 
that content with”.166 However, endorsements through some services like Google+ Local 
are public, so a given user’s endorsement may be used in ads seen all over the Internet.  
More importantly, Google offered users only an option to opt-out from this 
‘advertisement endorsement’ by un-checking a pre-checked ‘Shared Endorsement’ box in 
their Google account settings, thereby effectively opting-in users to the new 
advertisement endorsements by default.  
 
																																																								
162 EPIC, ‘In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction and Other 
Relief’ (2010) 16 <https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/EPIC_FTC_FB_Complaint.pdf>. 
163 Dan Costa, ‘Facebook: Privacy Enemy Number One?’ (2010) PCMAG 
<http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2362967,00.asp>. 
164 Google Inc., ‘Shared Endorsements’ <https://myaccount.google.com/shared-endorsements>. 
165 This means, for example, that if a user follows a car manufacturer on Google+ or rates an artist on 
Google Play’s music service, that user’s name, photo and endorsement may show up in ads for that car or 
artist.  




In its information page on these new settings, Google stated: “Don't worry, your 
account’s privacy settings are not affected”167 (emphasis added). However, this is an 
extremely misleading assertion. The opt-out from advertisement endorsement is clearly a 
privacy setting in itself, as depending on whether the box is ticked or not the face and 
name of a given user may be placed in advertisements shown on the webpages of 
members of Google’s display advertising network. The purpose behind that statement 
was to prompt users to think that no privacy-related implications could arise from this 
change of settings. As Simon Davis from the Privacy Surgeon noted: 
 
“Claiming that the mechanism is not a privacy setting misrepresents the 
nature of the changes that have been made, inferring that there are few – if 
any – privacy implications of the new policy. Given the widespread data 
sharing that endorsements entail, this is clearly not a true depiction of the 
changed privacy environment.”168  
 
According to the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices, a commercial practice is 
misleading when it “contains false information and is therefore untruthful or in any way, 
including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even 
if the information is factually correct, and in either case causes or is likely to cause him to 
take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise”169 (emphasis added). 
By giving users a false sense of control over their personal data and misleading users 
about the privacy implications of a change of settings, Facebook and Google engage in a 
misleading commercial practice and therefore breach the referred Directive. Additionally, 
by hiding and/or providing in an unclear and ambiguous manner material information 
that consumers need to take an informed transactional decision, thereby causing or being 
likely to cause consumers to take a transactional decision that they would not have taken 
otherwise, 170   Google and Facebook shape misleading omissions. These findings are 
supported by the Commission, which has contended that “the use of defaults (choices 
consumers are presumed to make unless they expressly indicate otherwise) or the 
provision of unnecessarily complex information may, according to the circumstances of 
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the case, prove misleading”.171 The effects of these misleading practices and omissions are 
the preservation of the status quo in online markets: widespread consumer confusion and 
disinformation, and growing information asymmetries between platforms and users.  
 
5.2.2.2 Unequal Bargaining Power  
 
The unequal bargaining power between platform providers and users prevent even the 
most informed consumers (those very few who read and understand the privacy policies) 
from renegotiating the terms and conditions under which online platforms offer their 
services, as these are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This unequal bargaining power 
is directly connected to a competition concern: platforms are able to impose any terms 
they want on consumers, as they face no competition that could force them to offer more 
privacy-friendly policies.  
 
Oftentimes, online platforms abuse the unequal bargaining power that benefits them. 
Take the example of Facebook’s 2010 privacy settings amendment, or Google’s 2013 
shared endorsements settings explained above. Taking minimum steps to meaningfully 
publicise the amendments, both companies forcefully opted-in users to share their 
personal data to third parties, thereby effectively imposing upon them contractual terms 
which they could not assess in advance.     
 
Number 1 literal (i) of the Annex to the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts considers unfair a clause “irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with 
which he had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the 
contract.” In this connection, some have argued that “[h]indering access to contractual 
terms, e.g., through the use of many hyperlinks leading consumers from one website to 
another and yet another, or drafting contractual terms in a technical, hard-to-grasp 
language could be seen as not providing consumers with a ‘real opportunity’ to read the 
contract”.172 Accordingly, such clauses allowing Facebook and Google to process personal 
data for advertising purposes under their opt-out mechanisms, which are imposed upon 
consumers without an actual opportunity to assess them, can be deemed unfair under the 
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abovementioned Directive. This position finds support in the Opinion of AG Mengozzi 
in Content Services Ltd v Bundesarbeitskammer: 
 
 “[a]llowing operators in the field of electronic commerce to require their 
customers to carry out certain actions before they could access the 
information required under Article 5 of the Directive, even if all they had to 
do was to use a link shown when a contract was concluded, would risk 
opening the gates to possible abuses. It is in fact clear that, even though 
clicking on a hyperlink is an entirely commonplace action, within the 
capability of any internet user, not all users are in a position to understand, 
when the contract is concluded, that they need to click on the link in order to 
be able, should the need arise, to protect their own rights better in the 
future”173 (emphasis added). 
 
5.3 Effects on Competition  
 
As the theory of harm given by the concurrence of Component 1 and Component 2 
amounts to a novel abuse,174 following established case law, actual or likely anticompetitive 
effects are required. 175 The actual or likely anticompetitive effects must relate to the 
possible barriers which the dominant firm’s practices may create to the maintenance of 
the degree of competition existing in the relevant market or markets or the growth of that 
competition.176  
 
5.3.1 Component 1 
 
5.3.1.1 Restriction of Competition in one or more Relevant Markets 
 
As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, there are significant economies of scale and scope in 
data-driven markets such as the search and search advertising markets. Broadly speaking, 
the more data a search engine has, the better is its ability to render search results and 
search-based advertising that matches its users’ interests. In turn, learning-by-doing (better 
quality derived from more searches) entices more users to use the incumbent search 
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engine, thereby giving rise to indirect network effects on the advertising side: the more 
users a search engine has, the greater will be the number of advertisers wanting to see 
their products advertised on the search engine, which in turn increases the search engine’s 
advertising revenue.  
 
The locational data unlawfully acquired by Google reinforces the abovementioned data-
driven network effects and Google’s data advantage, thereby making its competitors’ 
market penetration more difficult. In addition, said data enable the personalisation of 
search results on the basis of user location. Personalisation of search results consolidates 
user habits and reduces multi-homing, thereby locking-in consumers on the search 
market. In turn, as location-based search queries are particularly attractive to advertisers, 
the provision of location-based search advertising is capable of locking-in consumers on 
the search advertising market.  
 
Had Google been compliant with data protection law, it would have been able to gather 
locational data and combine it with other data, including search and search advertising 
data, only from consumers giving their explicit consent to this effect. Whilst the manner 
in which the search and search advertising markets would have evolved in a data 
protection law-abiding scenario is inevitably uncertain, there are certain indications 
suggesting that there would have been more room for competitors to expand in these 
markets, and that Google’s dominant position would have not been of the same 
magnitude as that it currently enjoys.  
 
As explained in Chapter 4, consumer surveys are consistent in the sense that a proportion 
between 60-70% of consumers are concerned about their online privacy.177 Online privacy 
concerns encompass locational privacy. For example, in a 2015 Survey Cottrill and 
Thakuriah found that 34.9% of users agreed, and 16.1% strongly agreed, to the statement 
“[h]aving your location or travel data collected and stored by a private company (such as 
Google)” will place your privacy at risk.178 With over 50% of consumers concerned about 
their locational privacy, had due notice been given to them, communicating in a proper 
and clear manner that their locational data could be combined for the provision of search 
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and search advertising services and myriad of other purposes,179 it is highly likely that 
some of these consumers would have flocked to competing search engines and Map 
providers which could have differentiated themselves in terms of the privacy protection 
offered by their services, thereby becoming more attractive to those consumers who do 
not like being tracked.  
 
Regrettably, such scenario did not materialise, as Google resorted to unlawful data 
processing to make its services more attractive, lock-in consumers and hinder competition 
in the search and search advertising markets. Worse still, the restrictions of competition 
arising from unlawful processing of location data are not limited to these markets. For 
example, since the September 2016 version of Android Google’s app store (Google Play) 
constantly tracks users’ location, and location tracking cannot be switched off unless 
location tracking is disabled for all applications on the smartphone. According to one 
analyst:  
 
“This is because Google Play services pass on your location to installed 
apps via an API. The store also sends your whereabouts to Google to 
process. Google doesn’t want you to turn this off. 
 
It also encourages applications to become dependent on Google’s closed-
source Play services, rather than use the interfaces in the open-source 
Android, thus ensuring that people continue to run Google Play on their 
devices.”180 
 
In this way, Google uses users’ location to tout apps to them. In this connection, security 
researcher Mustafa Al-Bassam reported that he “almost had a heart attack” when he 
walked into a McDonald’s and was prompted on his Android phone to download 
McDonald’s app. Al-Bassam checked his privacy settings on his phone and realised that, 
unbeknown to him, Google Play had monitored his location thousands of times.181 He 
argued that “Google is encouraging developers to use the Play location API instead of the 
native Android API, making an open OS dependent on proprietary software.” 182 
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Accordingly, Google uses consumers’ locational data to make its Android OS and Google 
Play Store more attractive to app developers.  
 
According to Stucke and Grunes, when an undertaking uses “unfair tactics to attain or 
maintain its dominant position, then […] using the valuable consumer data from its 
illegally maintained or attained monopoly is not competition on the merits.”183 This 
conduct seems to be Google’s strategy. By engaging in conduct that amounts to 
Component 1, Google has made more difficult, or even impossible, the entry of 
competitors into, or the expansion of competitors in, the markets for search, search 
advertising, licensable smart mobile operating systems and app stores for the Android 
mobile operating system, 184 thereby reducing the degree of competition existing therein. 
 
5.3.1.2 Leveraging of Market Power and Financial Strength  
 
As a consequence of the roles of data185, firms with the most data are placed not only in 
the best position to dominate their core segments, but also to take control over other 
related fields as they become bigger and bigger.186  
 
In competitive markets, customers, and not firms, should be supreme, determining what 
should be produced and in what quantity and quality. If consumers reigned supreme in 
online markets, there would be availability of products that advance consumers’ privacy 
interests.187 Sadly enough, that is not the case, as dominant platforms have a significant 
degree of leeway to engage in practices that further their commercial interests instead of 
the preferences of their consumers. The collection of personal data in breach of data 
protection law allows Google and other platforms which engage in that conduct to amass 
more data than they are legally entitled to, which in turn secures success in their 
advertising business. For example, Facebook’s average revenue per user (ARPU) has 
increased steadily since 2010, and Google’s ARPU in the first quarter of 2014 was at least 
six times higher than Facebook’s. These companies make billions of dollars in profits 
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from their advertising business,188 and this trend is only likely to be reinforced if platforms 
remain unconstrained in their data collection practices. By processing personal data 
without legal basis, Google and other platforms dismiss the privacy preferences of a great 
portion of their users, and avail themselves of the violation of their rights to collect more 
data, fuel data-driven network effects, strengthen their financial power and broaden the 
universe of industry segments onto which they can expand. As Clemons contended, 
“some anti-competitive activities are subsidized through revenues gained through 
violation of privacy law […] rather than through violation of competition law itself”,189 
and this trend has led to a worrisome scenario:  
 
“A small number of American firms, among them Amazon, Google, and 
Facebook, now dominate the Internet ecosystem world-wide.  Their 
enormous profits from their core businesses enable them to subsidize almost 
any new business they wish, from self-driving cars to their own online 
content.  This is allowing them to expand into unrelated businesses, and will 
effectively block any and all EU firms, including UK firms, from entering any 
business that the Big Three American giants choose to dominate.  Moreover, 
as the experience of Foundem and Yelp and Yahoo Finance demonstrates, 
the Big Three can reclaim almost any online industry they choose to enter.”190 
 
One of the solutions Clemons proposes to stop this trend is to regulate the use of 
revenues derived from privacy violations “to fund other business in ways that limit 
competition”.191 
 
The processing of personal data without legal basis, aside from deriving increased 
revenues that allow subsidising expansion onto related fields, confers upon the infringing 
platform the raw material necessary to develop and provide services related to its core 
business and protect its dominant position at the same time. For example, it was 
established above that Google collects locational data under its Android OS and Apps for 
mobile devices without legal basis, and that it uses such unlawfully processed data to 
strengthen its dominant position in the search and search advertising markets (through 
the personalisation of search results based on location).192 However, the benefits of such 
unlawful processing do not end there. It was also seen above that Google shares such 
unlawfully processed data with installed apps on users’ Android devices in order to tout 
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apps to them depending on their location.193 In this way, it leverages its data-advantage 
arising from data collected in breach of data protection law onto the markets for 
licensable smart mobile operating systems and app stores for the Android mobile 
operating system, since app developers will be more attracted to Android OS and Google 
Play Store in view of the prospect of being able to reach consumers at the right time 
based on their location, regardless of their privacy preferences.     
 
The leveraging of a data-advantage arising from unlawful processing of data can be 
combined with other market power leveraging methods enabled by, for example, the 
control of informational bottlenecks. Chapter 3 explains the manner in which Google 
leveraged its market power in general search onto vertical search segments.194 It is worth 
recalling that by diverting traffic to its own services, Google was able to amass greater 
amounts of data of different kinds (including mapping data and local search data) which it 
could subsequently use to improve its services on the user side and enhance user profiling 
for advertising purposes, and also to expand onto other related markets such as inter alia 
the markets for personal assistants and self-driving cars.195 The unlawful processing of 
data collected under Android OS and Google apps is bound to, on the one hand, 
reinforce the data-advantage stemming from the leveraging of market power from 
horizontal to vertical search (as it increases the amount of data Google has at its disposal 
to improve its services), and on the other hand, make Google’s expansion onto related 
markets seamless. For instance, mapping data is of the essence for the development of 
autonomous cars.196 Google already has mapping technology (Google Maps), in addition 
to the crowd-sourcing app Waze, which provides real-time traffic, accident and police 
information. With unlawfully collected and processed mapping and locational data of 
million users, Google is able to improve its mapping technology, thereby gaining the 
upper hand in the race for the development of self-driving cars. Indeed, this may be one 
of the reasons why Google’s self-driving technology division (Waymo) “is widely 
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considered to be the front-runner among companies developing autonomous 
technology.”197 
 
Leveraging of market power chills innovation incentives and deters entry into the affected 
market segments. In the context of Google’s leveraging of market power from horizontal 
to vertical search, leaders of vertical search engines such as Yelp and TripAdvisor have 
stated that they would not have created their companies if Google had engaged from the 
outset in conduct that became customary afterwards (i.e. reduced traffic to their sites to 
the benefit of Google).198 
 
5.3.2 Component 2 
 
The unfair commercial practices in which some platforms engage, and the unfair 
contractual terms they impose in their privacy policies, have three main effects. Firstly, 
they deter consumers from attempting to become informed on the privacy-related 
implications of using a given service. Overwhelmed by the amount of complex and 
contradictory information contained in privacy policies and terms of use, some users 
prefer to remain in ‘blissful ignorance’ (“ignorant consumers”).  
 
Secondly, they preserve and enhance consumer confusion regarding online privacy. Some 
online platforms’ practices are designed to give a false sense of control over the ability of 
users to choose which type of personal data platforms may or may not collect, process 
and share, in such a way that some users use a given online service, for example, a social 
network, in the understanding that their personal data are not transferred to third parties, 
whilst in practice said data are shared to several ‘business partners’ (“confused 
consumers”). 
 
Thirdly, they increase the number of users that are resigned to giving up their online 
privacy. Privacy-savvy consumers will attempt to become aware of the privacy threats 
posed by certain online services. To this effect, they read and understand the privacy 
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policies of the services they use. But oftentimes, online platforms update their policies 
and opt-in users for data sharing without meaningful publicity of the update and consent 
on the part of users. This practice imposes on these savvy users the burden to check 
periodically the privacy policies of the services they use to verify whether there is any 
update that has changed their privacy settings. Accordingly, they end up ‘giving up’, as 
they believe that an undesirable outcome (lack of online privacy) is inevitable, and feel 
powerless to stop such a scenario (“resigned consumers”). 
 
The creation of these categories of consumers has important ramifications:  
 
5.3.2.1 Restriction of Competition in one or more Relevant Markets 
 
Continuing with the search and search advertising markets, the effects described above 
enhance consumer inertia (i.e.. consumers sticking to the default options), thereby raising 
barriers to entry for new products.  
 
Google processes personal data it collects from the array of services it offers free of 
charge to improve its search engine and personalise the search results. Said data 
processing is, however, inconsistent with the preferences of many users who want more 
control over their personal data. Aware of this dissatisfaction, some search engines have 
attempted to differentiate themselves on the basis of privacy protection (for example 
DuckDuckGo), but they have failed to make a successful challenge. This rather counter-
intuitive phenomenon can be partly explained by a growing number of ignorant, confused 
and resigned consumers.  
 
Ignorant consumers cannot understand Google’s long and complex privacy policy, and 
choose to believe that everything is fine with the privacy protection provided by this 
search engine, even when in reality it is likely to be contrary to their privacy preferences. 
Confused consumers think everything is fine with Google’s privacy settings, even when in 
reality Google has opted them in to share personal data. Finally, resigned consumers 
believe there is nothing they can do about Google’s privacy settings, as a result of which 




Additionally, by resorting to misleading commercial practices and omissions and unfair 
terms in privacy policies, online platforms take advantage of the difficulties consumer 
suffer to process complex options, thereby facilitating error and bias. Conduct of this type 
raises the dominant platform’s rivals’ costs, as the platform’s competitors must incur 
investments to de-bias the market (for instance, through advertising), which is extremely 
expensive and difficult in two-sided markets where the relevant product’s quality is 
difficult to assess.199 
 
Especially in markets with network effects and when the relevant product’s quality cannot 
be readily assessed by users, as is the case of search engines and the search and search 
advertising markets,200 deception and status quo bias may tip the market in favour of the 
deceptive firm, thereby raising barriers to entry and hindering the growth of competition 
in said markets.      
 
5.3.2.2 Barrier to the Growth of Privacy-based Competition 
 
By increasing the number of ignorant, confused and resigned consumers, deception with 
regard to privacy protection has far-reaching consequences going beyond specific relevant 
markets.  
 
Dominant platforms like Google and Facebook use deception strategically to foreclose 
privacy protection as an actual facet of competition. Complex and long privacy policies 
containing deceitful and misleading statements regarding the protection afforded to 
personal data they offer, in addition to regular policy updates that opt-in users to share 
their personal data for myriad of undefined purposes, give rise to sufficient widespread 
confusion as to what is the actual level of privacy protection each platform and online 
firms in general offer, whether such privacy protection is offered on a permanent basis or 
is liable to change at any given point in time, and whether it is worth it to endeavour to 
protect one’s personal data or give up to any prospect of online privacy altogether. As a 
result, there is a “reduced ability on the part of consumers to make informed decisions 
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when deciding whether and how to engage with firms”, 201  which translates into 
misinformation and distrust in the marketplace: some consumers use online services 
based on incorrect knowledge motivated by deceit, and other consumers learn that 
undertakings will prioritise revenues over privacy protection, so they assume there is no 
privacy protection to begin with.   
 
Therefore, the demand for privacy protection is significantly distorted, and privacy-based 
competition is undermined. As Vickers has contended:  
 
“Competition cannot work effectively unless consumers are reasonably well 
informed about the choices before them. Uninformed choice is not effective 
choice, and without that there will not be effective competition. Informed 
choice has two elements – knowing what alternatives there are, and knowing 
about the characteristics of alternative offerings. In particular, what matters is 
the ability of customers to judge the prospective value for money, for them, of 
the alternatives on offer”.202 
 
Uninformed choice and distrust203 reflect a ‘dysfunctional equilibrium’204 that prevents the 
emergence of privacy protection as a meaningful parameter of competition. If some 
consumers make transactional decisions as to whether or not to use an online service 
based on incorrect information, they cannot make correct assessments as to whether the 
privacy protection offered by a platform is consistent with their privacy preferences.  If 
another portion of consumers distrusts platforms’ and firms’ claims about the privacy 
protection they offer, such consumers will not make transactional decisions based on 
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Article 102(a) TFEU provides that an abuse of dominant position may consist in “directly 
or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions.”  
 
Some competition authorities have begun to consider the imposition of terms of use 
noncompliant with EU data protection and/or consumer protection law as an exploitative 
abuse within the meaning of Article 102(a) TFEU. In particular, in 2015 the 
Monopolkommission suggested that an exploitative abuse of market power may consist in 
the exploitation of user data to the disadvantage of users.205 Thereafter, in 2016, the 
Bundeskartellamt commenced abused of dominance proceedings against Facebook, on 
suspicion of having abused its market power by imposing specific terms of service on the 
use of data, in violation of Data Protection rules. 206  Andreas Mundt, President of 
the Bundeskartellamt, stated:  
 
“Dominant companies are subject to special obligations. These include the 
use of adequate terms of service as far as these are relevant to the market. 
For advertising-financed internet services such as Facebook, user data are 
hugely important. For this reason it is essential to also examine under the 
aspect of abuse of market power whether the consumers are sufficiently 
informed about the type and extent of data collected.” 207 
 
Although there is no available information on the course of these proceedings, it is 
submitted that the Bundeskartellamt’s initiative is a step in the right direction, as it 
acknowledges a potential negative impact of certain data protection/consumer protection 
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6.2 Case Law on Unfair Trading Conditions 
 
To establish the existence of an exploitative abuse based on the imposition of contractual 
terms on the collection and use of personal data in the dominant platform’s terms of use 
(or privacy policy), such terms of use must be reproachable from a data protection and/or 
consumer protection law standpoint. 208 However, in addition, such terms of use must be 
also unfair trading conditions within the meaning of Article 102(a) TFEU.  
 
The case law provides guidance and tests to establish under which circumstances trading 
conditions can be deemed unfair. In BRT v SABAM, certain questions on the 
interpretation of Article 86 EEC (now 102 TFEU) were filed with the CJEU, inter alia, 
whether an undertaking which enjoys a de facto monopoly in a Member State for the 
management of copyrights abuses its dominant position by demanding the global 
assignment of all copyrights without drawing any distinction between specific categories 
of such rights.209 The CJEU held that to appraise whether there is abuse in this sense, all 
relevant legitimate interests must be taken into account in order to ensure balance 
between the requirement of maximum freedom for the members of the undertaking and 
the effective management of their rights by the latter.210 The CJEU concluded that a 
dominant undertaking entrusted with the exploitation of copyrights abuses its position 
when “imposes on its members obligations which are not absolutely necessary for the 
attainment of its object and which thus encroach unfairly upon a member’s freedom to 
exercise his copyright”211 (emphasis added).  
 
Similarly, in GEMA, an amendment to the dominant undertaking’s statutes was 
challenged as unfair trading terms, as they limited the undertaking’s members’ freedom to 
exploit musical works. Basing its decision on SABAM, the Commission held that to 
determine whether the undertaking’s statutes constitute an abuse, “the decisive factor is 
whether they exceed the limits absolutely necessary for effective protection 
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(indispensability test) and whether they limit the individual copyright holder’s freedom to 
dispose of his work no more than need be (equity).”212 
 
In DSD, the Commission found a breach of Article 102(a) TFEU as “[u]nfair commercial 
terms exist where an undertaking in a dominant position fails to comply with the principle 
of proportionality.” 213  When asserting the foregoing, the Commission referred to 
paragraph 190 of United Brands, where the CJEU held that the possibility of a counter-
attack by a dominant undertaking must be ‘proportionate’ to the threat, taking into 
account the economic strength of the undertakings confronting each other. Accordingly, 
the ‘unfairness’ of the relevant commercial terms seems to be dependent on the economic 
strength of the dominant undertaking relative to its customers and consumers. Thus, the 
imposition of unfair terms is a manifestation of the dominant platform’s bargaining 
power. This is confirmed in Ahmed Saeed, where in the context of agreements to fix airline 
tariffs, the CJEU held that what in principle has the appearance of an agreement could be 
in reality the imposition of the dominant undertaking’s will on the other party, the 
agreement just being “the formal measure setting the seal on an economic reality 
characterized by the fact that an undertaking in a dominant position has succeeded in 
having the tariffs in question applied by the other undertakings.”214 
 
In a similar vein, in Alsatel, the allegedly dominant undertaking, which provided rental and 
maintenance services of telephone installations, drawn up a contract which contained 
clauses that allowed it to fix unilaterally the prices of supplements to the contract entailed 
by modifications of said installations, and also provided for the automatic renewal of the 
contract for a 15-year term if as a result of those modifications the rental was increased in 
more than 25%. The CJEU held that such clauses would constitute unfair trading 
conditions prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. 215 Accordingly, the unilateral imposition of 
terms that largely benefit the dominant undertaking may constitute unfair trading terms.  
 
Lastly, in Tetra Pak II, the dominant undertaking’s contracts contained clauses which inter 
alia forced customers to use only Tetra Pak cartons on its machines and obtain supplies of 
cartons exclusively from Tetra Pak (tied-sales), allowed Tetra Pak to retain exclusive rights 
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over modification, maintenance and replacement of spare parts and intellectual property 
rights over any technical improvements or modifications to the equipment, and provided 
for the charging of a ‘base rental’ and of a sliding scale of monthly rental charges 
according to the number of cartons used. The Commission found that the clauses “had 
no connection with the purpose of the contract”, and had the effect of making the 
customer totally dependent on Tetra Pak’s equipment and services.”216 The dominant 
undertaking put forward the argument that the reliability of the packaging equipment for 
diaries and other uses, as well as the protection of its commercial interests, justified the 
clauses. The GC held that, whether considered in isolation or together, the clauses were 
unfair, as they were “wholly unreasonable in the context of protecting public health, and 
also went beyond the recognized right of an undertaking in a dominant position to 
protect its commercial interests.”217 Accordingly, lack of connection with the contract’s 
main purpose, unreasonableness and excessive protection of the dominant undertaking’s 
commercial interests are also factors to consider when trading terms and conditions can 
be deemed abusive.  
 
6.3 Exploitative Abuse (Unfair Trading Terms) based on Violations of Data 
Protection and/or Consumer Protection Law 
 
It is submitted that when the terms of use (or privacy policies) of dominant online 
platforms provide for a de facto opt out system in respect of the collection and processing 
of personal data of users, and/or provide for a mandatory acceptance of terms on the 
collection and use of personal data for vague and broad purposes (such as ‘to improve the 
customer experience’ or ‘improve our services’) to use the dominant platform’s services, 
and/or contain misleading and deceptive terms that give consumers a false perception of 
control over their personal data, then such terms of use are unfair trading conditions 
within the meaning of Article 102(a) TFEU. The exploitative nature of the abuse stems 
from the fact that the dominant platform would not be able to impose such terms under 
competitive conditions, and consumers have no choice but to consent to them, contrary 
to their privacy concerns and preferences.  
 
																																																								
216 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International SA v Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1994] ECR II-755 [105–107]. 
217 ibid [140]. 
Chapter 5 
 261 
In competition proceedings, one or more decisions passed by data protection and/or 
consumer protection authorities establishing violations of their respective fields of law in 
the manner described above would serve as conclusive evidence of the exploitative abuse.  
 
According to O’Donoghue and Padilla, following the case law analysed above, several 
criteria ought to be met to determine whether specific terms are ‘unfair’. Firstly, the 
parties’ legitimate interests must be taken into account. Secondly, it must be determined 
whether the challenged trading terms and conditions are central to the contract’s 
legitimate object. And thirdly, by balancing the legitimate interests of the parties, it must 
be established whether the terms and conditions are (i) necessary; that is to say, there are 
no equally effective alternatives to achieve the legitimate goal with less restrictive or 
exploitative effect, and (ii) proportionate; that is, the legitimate goal the dominant 
undertaking pursues must not be outweighed by the exploitative effect on customers 
and/or consumers.218 Other considerations can be also factored in to establish unfairness, 
such as the bargaining power of the parties, whether the terms are merely the reflection of 
the undertaking’s will imposed on users (or whether the terms are unilaterally imposed 
and largely benefiting the dominant undertaking), and whether the terms are reasonable.  
 
1) Legitimate Interests of the Parties 
 
The business model of the largest online platforms studied in this work is advertisement-
based. Platforms require data to provide the relevant service on the user side (for instance, 
to display social interactions and search results that are relevant to the user) and also for 
marketing and advertisement purposes. This for-profit business model, characteristic of 
the Web 2.0, is a legitimate one. 
 
Users, in turn, have a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ when using ‘free’ platform 
services such as a search engine or a social networking site.219 When users join Facebook, 
they wish to share information and communicate with friends. When consumers use 
Google’s search engine, they wish to obtain certain information that is available online. 
Reasonable users would expect to receive some advertisements, so the services remain 
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offered at a zero-price. At the same time, users have the legitimate interest to be properly 
informed on the privacy-related consequences of using the platform service, as well as the 
steps they can take to protect their online privacy.  
 
2) Terms and Conditions central to the Contract’s Objective 
 
Clauses in terms of use and privacy policies that provide for the sharing of personal data 
to the platform itself and to third parties (application developers and advertisers) are 
admittedly central to the contract’s objective, which can be assumed to be the provision 
of the relevant platform service to the users of the platform’s different sides.  
 
3) Necessity and Proportionality  
 
Terms and conditions that violate the fundamental right of individuals to data protection 
and/or mislead and deceive consumers can be neither necessary nor proportionate, regard 
being had to the legitimate interests of the parties. 
 
The for-profit purpose of online platforms must be balanced with the users’ reasonable 
expectation of privacy and legitimate interest in being properly informed and not misled. 
Data collection and processing by online platforms should be “performed in a way that 
does not intrude unreasonably upon the data subjects’ privacy nor interfere unreasonably 
with their autonomy and integrity.”220 Terms of use that allow for the placement of 
cookies after entering a search query under an opt-out mechanism that enables permanent 
online tracking, the use of content from emails (Gmail) and documents (Google Drive) 
and locational data (Maps) to display targeted ads, or that give unlimited access to a user 
profile to service providers other than the platform itself, are inconsistent with the 
abovementioned reasonable expectation of privacy. In a similar vein, misleading and 
deceptive terms that provide for opt-out data collection mechanisms in a way that pushes 
users to unwittingly disclose their personal data and give them a false sense of control 
over the same are inconsistent with their legitimate interests in being fully informed about 
the privacy-related consequences of using the platform service.  
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A due balancing of both parties’ interests allows to conclude that terms and conditions 
that offer an opt-in mechanism for the processing of personal data for specific and 
properly explained purposes, that allow consumers to set their privacy preferences with 
ease and in an unambiguous fashion, and that do not push users to disclose information 
under a false impression of control, can meet the necessity and proportionate criteria. 
Conversely, it is extremely difficult to assert with credibility that clauses that violate two 
different branches of law are necessary and proportionate to the attainment of the 
contract’s objective, as they undoubtedly encroach upon users’ fundamental rights and 
legitimate interests in an unfair manner. Moreover, the unfairness is confirmed by the fact 
that the terms are unilaterally imposed by dominant platforms, that the bargaining power 
of consumers is virtually zero, and that opt-out mechanisms are concealed and hard to 
find, to say the least.  
 
7. Criticism of and Arguments in support of the HEA 
	
7.1 Criticism of the HEA 
	
7.1.1 Undue Expansion of the Scope of Article 102 TFEU  
 
Equating data protection and consumer protection infringements with exploitative and 
exclusionary abuses may be subject to criticism. There is a risk that it could be too easy to 
find an abuse of dominance by reference to multiple other areas of law, or that violation 
of any rule that aims to protect consumers could be potentially deemed an abuse of 
dominant position. 221  This risk, however, cannot materialise under the HEA herein 
proposed. 
 
Undertakings with market power might violate many laws that have little or no 
connection whatsoever with their position in the market. For example, an agricultural firm 
might fail to comply with safety or cleanliness standards applicable to food processing or 
a computer processor firm might violate employment discrimination laws. 222  These 
violations obviously cannot serve as basis to trigger Article 102 TFEU proceedings, as 
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they have little or no competitive impact. Article 102 TFEU requires a competition 
concern to be triggered, for which reason only violations of non-competition laws that are 
reasonably capable of making a significant contribution to the attaining, maintaining or 
strengthening of a dominant position can serve as basis to establish an abuse of 
dominance.    
 
Moreover, Article 102 TFEU seeks to prevent dominant undertakings from abusing their 
dominant position by inter alia raising prices, lowering quality, impairing choice, reducing 
innovation or adversely affecting other competition parameters. Accordingly, to serve as 
the basis of Article 102 TFEU proceedings, any violation of non-competition laws must 
have an adverse impact on any of such parameters.  
 
In the cases analysed above:223  
 
- Component 1 consolidates dominance, as a result of which the threat of an 
effective challenge to the advertisement-based business model of the largest 
online platforms is mitigated. As a consequence, ‘free’ services which are only 
financially viable through relentless tracking are likely to remain the norm, 
 
- Component 2 results in ignorant, confused and resigned consumers, which in turn 
derives into “limited incentives [for undertakings] to compete over the privacy 
protection they afford to consumer data.”224 
 
With mitigated threats of entry or challenges to dominant undertakings, there will be 
limited incentives to compete on the basis of privacy protection, for which reason the 
likelihood of undertakings innovating in privacy-friendly products and services is reduced, 
and the emergence and consolidation of this type of competition is effectively prevented. 
Consequently, innovation is negatively affected. In turn, lack of innovation on the basis of 
privacy protection entails that the latent demand for privacy-friendly services will remain 
unrealised, as a result of which consumer choice is effectively limited. 
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7.1.2 Flexibility and Coordination Concerns 
 
One of the main virtues of competition enforcement is its flexibility to adapt to new 
challenges. This is confirmed inter alia by the fact that the list of abuses under Article 102 
TFEU is non-exhaustive,225 and that competition enforcement tools can be adapted to 
address new economic realities and business models.226  Ex-ante regulation inherently lacks 
this flexibility, as legislative processes are commonly slow and rigid to adapt to market 
developments.227 
 
By being based on the violation of ex-ante provisions (i.e. data protection and consumer 
protection rules), the abuse prosecuted under the HEA will be capped by the scope of 
such provisions, thereby depriving Article 102 TFEU enforcement of its inherent 
flexibility. If dominant firms find ways to circumvent the data protection and consumer 
protection laws whilst still being able to cause the harmful effects on competition 
explained above,228 the HEA is rendered irresponsive and impractical.   
 
In addition, coordination between competition, data protection and consumer protection 
authorities lies at the core of the HEA. However, coordination costs under this approach 
may be high. In particular, there is a risk that cohesion between the agencies fails to be 
achieved, that they become rivals and fight for prestige or other reasons,229 or that they 
cannot agree upon basic goals, enforcement targets or the distribution of tasks and 
functions.  
 
7.1.3 The Existence of Alternatives  
 
The HEA may be also criticised on the basis that there are enforcement alternatives that 
may be more effective or efficient.  
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a) Law violations can be addressed under their respective bodies of law 
 
It is commonly argued that competition law should address competition concerns only.230 
Implicit in this assertion is the idea that laws must be enforced to address issues within 
their respective remits, without interaction with other overlapping fields, as opposed to 
the HEA. The parallel enforcement of the competition, data protection and consumer 
protection laws, irrespective of each other, is a logical and simpler alternative to address 
the deficiencies of online markets. Indeed, upon the entry into force of the GDPR, DPAs 
may impose fines of up to 4% of the infringing undertaking’s annual turnover, and the 
imposition of high fines under data protection law enforcement may serve as effective 
deterrence. In addition, some consumer protection agencies are actively tackling dominant 
firms. The Italian Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) recently 
imposed a €3 million fine on WhatsApp for unfair and aggressive commercial practices in 
connection with an amendment to its Terms of Services under which the messaging app 
forced consent for the sharing of its users’ personal data with its parent company 
Facebook. 231  Consumer protection enforcement of this kind is likely to increase 
transparency and raise consumer awareness as to online service providers’ data collection 
practices.  
 
However, the parallel enforcement of the competition, data protection and consumer 
protection laws has thus far proven ineffective, as shown by the existence of the vicious 
cycle.232 It is submitted that the HEA is a superior option, as it acknowledges the 
interrelated nature of competition, data protection and consumer protection concerns in 
online markets and proposes a course of action accordingly.   
 
b) The use of a ‘stand-alone’ abuse under the principle of fairness 
 
A competition agency may intervene using a ‘stand-alone’ abuse which is not based on 
existing ex-ante regimes. For example, a competition agency may argue that a dominant 
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undertaking’s deceptive behaviour that distorts consumer demand and preserves 
consumer inertia and status quo bias is contrary to the principle of fairness in Article 102 
TFEU and may amount to an abuse of dominance position if the other operational 
requirements of such provision are met.  
 
The notion of fairness is increasingly making inroads in competition policy debates. Both 
Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager and former head of the US DOJ 
Antitrust Division Renata Hesse have recently argued that competition law is concerned 
with fairness.233 Some have characterised this assertion as influenced by populism and the 
significance of fairness for competition enforcement as nil, since fairness is a “morally 
laden construct, frequently associated with what is good, right or just, and influenced by 
other values and beliefs in society.”234 However, competition provisions such as Articles 
101(3) and 102 TFEU contain explicit references to fairness (‘fair share’ of efficiencies 
and ‘unfair prices and trading conditions, respectively’), for which reason dismissing 
fairness’s significance for competition enforcement in its entirety appears problematic 
from a normative standpoint. If translated into specific, clear rules to be applicable, the 
fairness rationale may give competition authorities a viable alternative to combat the 
effects on competition described above.235 
 
c) Use of ex-ante regulation without collaboration between agencies 
 
Another approach may be to rely on ex-ante regulation to identify an abuse, but without 
collaboration with other law enforcement agencies. For example, Costa-Cabral and 
Lynskey argue that data protection may act as a ‘normative yardstick’ to assess the quality 
of a privacy policy.236 Under their approach, if a dominant undertaking exploitatively 
reduces the quality of its privacy policy, “consumers will be worse off than had 
competitive levels prevailed – which, when there is competition on data use policy, must 
normatively be set at compliance with data protection law.”237 Accordingly, they equate 
																																																								
233 See Renata B Hesse, ‘And Never the Twain Shall Meet? Connecting Popular and Professional Visions for 
Antitrust Enforcement’ (2016) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-
renata-hesse-antitrust-division-delivers-opening>; Margrethe Vestager, ‘Competition for a Fairer Society’ 
(2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/competition-fairer-society_en>. 
234 Mauritis Dolmans and Wanjie Lin, ‘Fairness and Competition Law: A Fairness Paradox’ (2017) No.4 
Concurrences Review 3. 
235 See above Section II.5.3. 




data protection infringements to degradation of quality of a dominant undertaking’s 
privacy policy, which may amount to an exploitative abuse under Article 102(a) TFEU. 
This may be a more practical and cost-effective way of using ex-ante regulation to inform 
the scope and severity of the abuse. The problem with this approach is that it requires 
actual competition on the basis of privacy protection, and as explained in Chapter 4, at 
present times, such type of competition is minimal.238 In addition, the data protection 
infringement must be necessarily established by a DPA (as competition authorities lack 
the competence to do so), for which reason some degree of collaboration between 
agencies may be inevitable.  
 
7.2 Arguments in support of the HEA 
 
7.2.1 Joint Action by Law Enforcers is Capable of Giving Rise to Synergies 
 
A HEA is likely to achieve results that further the goals of the different fields of law 
involved. If Article 102 TFEU proceedings are commenced on the basis of violations of 
data protection and/or consumer protection law as described above, not only would 
competition law be ensuring that competition is not distorted, but it would also improve 
the effectiveness of the right to data protection and act in furtherance of the benefit and 
interests of consumers.  
 
Indeed, the prospect of Article 102 TFEU proceedings based on the anticompetitive 
effect of violations of data protection law would deter dominant platforms from 
persevering in their strategy of violating user’s data protection rights to strengthen their 
positions. If dominant firms thus far have not been persuaded to abide by data protection 
law because the competitive gains from infringing such law outweigh the detrimental 
effects of data protection law enforcement, then the possibility of facing abuse of 
dominance proceedings based on the anticompetitive effect of such infringements is likely 
to ‘convince’ them to set their data processing practices at law-abiding levels. The same 
applies to Article 102 TFEU proceedings based on violations of consumer protection 
rules. The prospect of facing such proceedings is capable of persuading dominant 
platforms not to engage in unfair commercial practices and to draft their privacy policies 
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in a more transparent, simple and less vague manner. In this way competition law would 
be contributing to the reduction of information asymmetries between firms and users. 
 
7.2.2 The Constitutional Landscape after the Treaty of Lisbon supports a HEA  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon brought about three main changes in the EU legal order that 
support the implementation of the HEA.  
 
Firstly, under Article 6(1) TEU, the Charter became legally binding, vested with the same 
legal value as the EU Treaties. This means that the right to data protection (Article 8 of 
the Charter) and the requirement of a high level of consumer protection (Article 38 of the 
Charter) are of constitutional value.239 
 
The Charter is addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union and also to the 
Member States when implementing EU law.240 Whilst the horizontal effect of the Charter 
has been contested, because it is addressed explicitly to the aforementioned bodies only, it 
is increasingly accepted. The horizontal effect of the Charter in respect of the right to data 
protection follows from the CJEU reasoning in Google Spain, 241  “where it assessed 
Google’s responsibilities as a data controller in light of the rights to data protection and 
privacy, thereby ensuring the horizontal application of these rights.”242 In addition, in 
Benkharbouche,243 Lord Dyson concluded that EU Charter provisions which reflect general 
principles of EU law, such as a requirement of high level of consumer protection, do have 
horizontal direct effect.  Therefore, the right to data protection and the requirement of a 
high level of consumer protection are “binding on the Commission when exercising any 
of its competences, and on private parties when acting within the scope of EU law.”244 
 
Secondly, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced broad policy-linking provisions of ‘general 
application’: Article 7 TFEU provides that “[t]he Union shall ensure consistency between 
its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account”, and Articles 8-17 
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TFEU set out the matters that ought to be taken into consideration in all the activities and 
policies of the EU in furtherance of Article 7 TFEU. Notably, Article 12 TFEU, provides 
that “[c]onsumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and 
implementing other Union policies and activities”, and Article 16 TFEU provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them.” 
 
These provisions can be regarded as an obligation on the part of Union bodies and 
institutions to take due account of the public policies stated in them when implementing a 
specific Union policy (for instance, competition policy).245 In this way, when enforcing 
Article 102, “the Commission and the courts should make efforts to select the option that 
maximizes the policy aim stated in the integration clause, while preserving the competitive 
process.”246 
 
Thirdly, the Lisbon Treaty added the achievement of a ‘social market economy’ as one of 
the goals of the EU, and relocated Article 3(1)g TEC in Protocol 27 on “the Internal 
Market and Competition”.  
 
The CJEU has historically interpreted Article 102 TFEU in a teleological fashion, in light 
of the goals and tasks of the EU. Article 3(1)g TEC enshrined as one of the Union’s goals 
“a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted”. The CJEU 
has used this provision since Continental Can as the legal basis to apply Article 102 TFEU 
to unilateral conduct that harms the effective competitive structure and therefore 
consumers in an indirect way. Put in other words, Article 102 TFEU has been interpreted 
in a manner such as to achieve one of the Union´s aims: a system of undistorted 
competition. 
 
However, the new Article 3 TEU merged old Articles 2 and 3 TEC into a comprehensive 
provision which includes the Union’s economic and non-economic objectives and tasks, 
eliminating any reference to ‘undistorted competition’. In turn, Article 3(1)g TEC was 
relocated in Protocol 27 on “the Internal Market and Competition”. As a result, 
competition law is no longer an objective of the Union, but rather an integral part of the 
																																																								
245 See Opinion of AG Gelhoed in Case C-161/04, Austria v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-7183 [59–
60]. 
246 Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law’ [2013] CLES 
Working Paper Series 3/2013 46. 
Chapter 5 
 271 
internal market goal: the internal market necessarily “includes a system ensuring that 
competition is not distorted”, in such a way that the former cannot exist without the 
latter. The ‘competition’ objectives of the Union, on the other hand, are now much 
clearer than under the TEC, and consist of the establishment of an internal market with 
an aim to achieve a ‘highly competitive social market economy’.  
 
A teleological interpretation of Article 102 TFEU under the new constitutional landscape 
should acknowledge the inexorable link of competition law with the aforementioned 
objectives: Protocol No. 27 clarifies that market integration constitutes the specific aim of 
competition law,247 which means that after ensuring that competition in the internal 
market is not distorted, the competition rules should be interpreted in a manner such as 
to attain a ‘highly competitive social market economy’.  
 
The concept of ‘social market economy’ lacks definition in the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
concept was coined in 1946 by Alfred Müller-Armack, and is deeply rooted in 
Ordoliberalism. 248  Social market economy has been understood as “a compromise 
between the free market and social welfare requirements”,249 as well as “the expression of 
a philosophy committed to a humane society which aims at the dignity, well-being, self-
determination, encouragement, freedom and responsibility of all individuals.”250 Whilst the 
origin, history and legacy of the social market economy is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
it is worth noting here that, as it currently stands, “the social market economy concept is 
fortunately not embedded in any clear-cut ideology and thus remain open to modern 
interpretations.”251 Accordingly, the concept of ‘social market economy’ should be taken 
as an interpretative notion that envisions an internal market that is not of a purely 
economic nature; rather, it combines elements of a socio economic system, including 
elements of social justice and respect for fundamental rights,252 and considers the EU as 
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“some form of holistic polity with competence to act, or at least to consider, all aspects of 
the welfare of its citizens”,253 as listed in Article 3(3) TEU and Articles 8-17 TFEU.  
 
Based on the above, it can be argued that when the competition rules are enforced in 
situations where data protection and consumer protection policies are also at stake, 
competition law should be enforced in a manner that fulfils such policies to the greatest 
extent possible, in a manner consistent with Articles 7, 12 and 16 TFEU, while ensuring 
the effectiveness of the competitive process at the same time. This conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that the right to data protection and the requirement of a high level 
of consumer protection are binding upon EU bodies and institutions (including the 
Commission) when carrying out their duties, including law enforcement. A teleological 
interpretation of Article 102 after the Lisbon Treaty further supports the aforementioned 
conclusions: after ensuring that competition is not distorted, Article 102 TFEU should be 
applied in light of the goal of a highly competitive social market economy, taking into 
consideration all aspects of the welfare of EU citizens, including the right to data 
protection and a high level of consumer protection. This outcome is precisely what the 
HEA achieves.   
 
7.2.3 Promotion of Different Goals Pursued by Article 102 TFEU 
 
Probably as a consequence of the Chicago School’s ‘antitrust revolution’ in the US in the 
70-80s, consumer welfare is commonly accepted as the main objective of competition law.  
The review of the enforcement approach to Article 102 TFEU launched by the 
Commission in 2005 and the ensuing 2009 Guidance on Enforcement Priorities were 
marked by a preponderant focus on consumer welfare.254 
 
However, the goals of competition law, and of Article 102 TFEU in particular, are 
broader than just consumer welfare. In the case law on Article 102 TFEU of the 
European Courts said provision has been used to protect a system of undistorted 
																																																								
253 Lianos (n 246) 43. 
254 See for example European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] OJ C 
45/7, para 19. 
Chapter 5 
 273 
competition in several ways, such as by protecting equality of opportunity, 255 small 
firms, 256  the structure of the market and thus competition as such, 257  the effective 
competition structure,258 market integration,259 freedom of choice,260 economic efficiency261 
and consumer welfare.262 
 
As a natural consequence of this plurality of objectives, conflicts are likely to arise. In 
particular, a tension exists between ‘economic freedom’ or ‘freedom to compete’263 and 
consumer welfare. Economic freedom can be traced back to the Ordoliberal school of 
thought, under which competition policy’s aim is “the protection of individual economic 
freedom of action as a value in itself, or vice versa, the restraint of undue economic 
power.”264 Ordoliberalism is rooted in humanist values rather than economic efficiency, 
and its proponents believed that open access to the market is the best control of private 
and political power. 265  Conversely, consumer welfare takes a neo-classical position, and is 
concerned with the achievement of economic efficiencies266 that benefit consumers.  
 
Tension between economic freedom and consumer welfare has been observed in the 
literature.267 For example, if competitors that are not yet as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking are protected, such protection benefits equality of opportunity and 
competition as such (which are subsumed in the principle of economic freedom), but not 
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necessarily consumer welfare, as no economic efficiencies to the benefit of consumers 
may arise from that protection. In these cases, the question that follows is which goal 
should be the prioritised over the other.  
 
One of the advantages of the HEA is that it renders such tension irrelevant. Indeed, by 
punishing violations of data protection law that confer an unlawful anticompetitive 
advantage, raise barriers to entry and strengthen the dominant position of the infringer, 
equality of opportunity, the structure of the market and thus competition as such, and 
therefore ‘freedom to compete’ are promoted. 
  
In turn, by punishing violations of consumer protection law that deepen information 
asymmetries, promote consumer ignorance and confusion with regard to the protection 
of their personal data, and therefore prevent the emergence of privacy protection as a 
meaningful competition parameter, consumer welfare is enhanced. Consumer choice and 
innovation are two of the main components of consumer welfare. Choice does not have 
value in itself, but if consumers have different tastes, then consumer welfare increases if 
they can choose from a larger number of products that satisfy their preferences.268 By the 
same token, consumers may benefit and consumer welfare may increase when new 
products and services are introduced, provided that there is actual or potential demand 
for them.269 The joint enforcement of competition and consumer protection law is capable 
of increasing consumer awareness of online firms’ data collection practices, and 
consequently of the impact they have on users’ online privacy. With 60-70% of 
consumers concerned about the protection of their personal data, increased awareness of 
online firms’ data collection practices will provide undertakings the necessary incentives 
to innovate on the basis of privacy protection, and with privacy-friendly products and 
services ultimately launched on the marketplace, consumer choice will be expanded. Last 
but not least, the possibility to prosecute exploitative abuses in the manner herein 
proposed270 provides additional incentives for online firms to draft their privacy policies in 
a law-abiding fashion, which may increase consumer awareness of data collection 
practices even further, thereby contributing to more pressure for the introduction of 
privacy-friendly services.  
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III. Conclusions  
 
Some online markets, such as inter alia the markets for online search, search advertising 
and social networking services, are characterised by weak competition, widespread 
consumer ignorance and confusion about the consequences the use of a given platform 
service entails for users’ privacy, and consumers concerned about the protection of their 
online privacy but unable to act upon it as a result of information asymmetries, bounded 
rationality and the unavailability of viable privacy-friendly products and services. Thus far, 
the parallel enforcement of the competition, data protection and consumer protection 
laws has proven ineffective to remedy this state of affairs. 
 
This Chapter argues that, whereas the substantial assessments of the aforementioned laws 
should not be merged and confused with each other, said laws can nevertheless be 
enforced in a joint and harmonious fashion. One way to do this is through the HEA this 
Chapter advances. Under this approach, certain violations of data protection and 
consumer protection laws amount to an abuse of dominant position, as they enable an 
online platform to attain, maintain or strengthen such position, and to squash the latent 
demand for privacy-friendly alternatives that may threaten their advertising-based 
business model. In addition, some of such infringements exploit consumers directly, as 
they have no choice but to agree to the platform’s privacy policy even when said policy is 
unclear, deceptive and inconsistent with their privacy preferences.  
 
In particular, systematic breaches of data protection law by online platforms, aside from 
causing a detrimental effect on the right to data protection of individuals, allow them to 
gather, process and derive value from greater amounts of data than they are legally 
entitled to, thereby raising barriers to entry. In addition, the profits derived from excessive 
extraction of data in violation of data protection law, and the data unlawfully collected 
and processed, can be used to subsidise and develop data-intensive products in 
neighbouring markets. Put in other words, violations of data protection law enable 
dominant platforms to leverage their market power onto adjacent markets.  
 
In turn, privacy policies and certain commercial practices that contravene consumer 
protection rules widen the informational gap existing between platforms and users, 
fuelling consumer ignorance as to the violation of their fundamental rights. With the 
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overwhelming majority of consumers uninformed or confused about the data protection 
standards of dominant platform providers, there is little pressure to offer privacy-friendly 
services, despite that the same consumers are concerned about their privacy online and 
want more control over their personal data. As the CMA has noted: “if consumers are 
limited in their ability to make informed decisions and to challenge firms over the use of 
their data, this may mean that firms have limited incentives to compete over the 
protection they afford to consumer data”.271  
 
By resorting to violations of data protection and consumer protection rules as the basis of 
abuse of dominance proceedings, significant synergies between the fields of law involved 










This thesis demonstrates that the effective enforcement of Article 102 TFEU remains 
more important than ever to prevent dominant firms from abusing their position and 
exploiting consumers in digital markets. In view of the internal growth and expansion of 
the most popular platforms and their incentive and ability to engage in abusive practices, 
the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU is bound to gain more significance.  
 
Proposals for a sector-specific ex ante regulation to be applied in conjunction with 
competition law to address the perceived problems of digital markets and the excessive 
market power some online platforms enjoy should be discarded. Online platforms have 
brought about rapid technological progress and disruptive innovation, as a result of which 
new markets have been created, mature markets have been subjected to dramatic change, 
and incumbents have been displaced. Regulatory proposals, especially when they are the 
result of growing appeals from incumbents (think of proposals of telecom operators 
against OTT operators), are likely to protect established players under the excuse of the 
protection of competition.  
 
In addition, an ex-ante regulation applicable to online platforms would require an accurate 
definition of online platforms. This endeavour may prove impossible. Chapter 2 explains 
that online platforms share some common features, which are network effects, the 
provision of ‘free’ services on one side of the market, and the collection and processing of 
user data. However, commonalities end there. Chapter 3 analyses in depth the most 
successful and popular online services - search engines, social networks and online 
marketplaces - defining product markets for each of them. This analysis demonstrates 
that, aside from the provision of free services to one group of consumers, the similarities 
between them are rather superficial. For example, search engines attract users by offering 
the most ‘relevant’ results; social networks are attractive to users depending on the size of 
their user base, their orientation (for example, for general entertainment purposes like 
Facebook or professional purposes like LinkedIn) and their functionalities; and online 
marketplaces are more attractive depending on the comprehensiveness of their product 
catalogues or their specialisation in certain products, as well as for their feedback and 
review systems. On the ‘paid’ side of the market, search engines and social networks offer 
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advertising services which vary greatly in terms of format and intended purposes, whereas 
online marketplaces charge sellers a given fee for listings and consummated transactions, 
and resort to advertising as an additional (yet secondary) revenue stream.  
 
Chapter 3 also assesses whether Google, Facebook and eBay hold a dominant position in 
any of the product markets on which they compete. The assessment of dominance shows 
that these market leaders derive market power from different sources, and that some 
online markets are more competitive than others. For example, data is of the essence for 
the provision of online search and social networking services (and their corresponding 
advertising services), and providers with the greatest capacity to collect and process data 
in huge volumes, from different sources and at great speed reinforce their position in their 
core markets and are able to expand onto related markets. Direct network effects are 
absent in online search markets, whereas they are perhaps the most significant driver of 
success for social networks (on the user side). The markets for these services do not 
perform well from a competition standpoint, as their incumbents are insulated from 
competitive pressure and the threat of a successful challenge from existing market players 
or a potential entrant is minimal. Conversely, markets for online marketplaces perform 
somewhat better as a result of a greater number of important players and the combined 
price competition pressure stemming from online and offline sources. In addition, whilst 
data is indeed important for online marketplaces, as it enables them to boost their sales 
through product recommendations, their matchmaking services can be nevertheless 
provided without data. In these markets, indirect networks effects play a more 
preponderant role for a platform’s success.  
 
An ex-ante regulation is bound to be incapable of accounting for the subtleties above, let 
alone of subsuming them into one definition. If passed, it will be overly inclusive, its 
effects will be long-lasting, and the administrative burden arising from it will likely reduce 
the innovation that competition policy seeks to promote. 
 
Similarly, proposals for lax enforcement of competition law in online markets should not 
be heeded, as they rest on shaky assumptions. Firstly, there is no evidence that 
concentrated markets are more conducive to innovation. Secondly, there is no evidence 
that dominant undertakings abstain from engaging in procompetitive conduct by fear of 
liability under Article 102 TFEU. Thirdly, arguments about the social costs arising from 
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false positives being higher than those arising from false negatives are misplaced, as the 
error-cost framework on which they are based rests on several assumptions which are not 
fulfilled in online markets. Fourthly, and more importantly, the hands-off approach fails 
to take into account the significance of two recent phenomena: the rise of platforms and 
the collection and processing of data for commercial purposes.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the organisation of online markets’ leaders as platforms, and their 
common features, such as network effects. In particular, it explains that the combination 
of strong network effects, switching costs and locked-in consumers can lead markets to a 
tipping point. Once a market has tipped, the ensuing dominant position of the market 
leader is likely to be durable, contrary to the Schumpeterians’ assertions of market power 
being fleeting in dynamic industries. Take the example of Facebook. By taking advantage 
of strong network effects, it became the leader of the market for social networks, and no 
company, even Google with its tremendous data advantage and financial strength, has 
been able to launch a successful challenge.    
 
In addition, platforms commonly offer free services on one side of the market they serve. 
Free services have been construed as signalling the absence of a market and consumer 
harm. However, in reality, zero-priced products only mean that the supplier’s business 
model is more complex than usual, and that it is making money somewhere else. Zero-
priced products and services force competition authorities to come to grips with the 
relevant platform’s business proposition, and adapt their analytical tools accordingly. 
Network effects and free services can lead to concerns of great complexity and severity 
which warrant a vigilant role on the part of competition authorities.  
 
The collection and processing of data by online platform pose additional concerns. Thus 
far, there is significant uncertainty as to whether and how data raises barriers to entry and 
confer market power. Too much emphasis has been placed on whether or not data is 
widely available, and this emphasis misses the point. Data is an asset, but not a regular 
one. Its competitive significance depends to a great extent on its volume, variety and 
velocity, as well as on learning-by-doing and spill-overs among the different sides of a 
platform’s multisided market. The interaction of data-driven network effects with 
traditional network effects is capable of leading to a ‘virtuous cycle’ which may prove 
impossible to overcome by competitors. Take again the example of Facebook. One the 
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user side, direct network effects increase the value of the platform to other users, thereby 
attracting more users and therefore more traffic and data. Data enables the social network 
provider to carry out more experiments to render more ‘relevant’ social network 
interactions and consequently enhance the attractiveness of the platform to users. In turn, 
the economies of scale, scope and speed derived from more users and more data enable 
the platform to improve ad-targeting and therefore increase advertising revenues, and at 
the same time, to develop new data-intensive products and services that will increase the 
platform’s data collection capabilities. More users and perfected ad-targeting are bound to 
attract more advertisers, as a result of which advertising revenues will go up even further. 
Last but not least, the data the platform collects can be processed and reprocessed for 
different purposes on any side of its multisided market, and even adjacent markets (such 
as the market for personal assistants). These competitive dynamics raise novel, complex 
and alarming concerns of market power which deserve close attention on the part of 
competition authorities.  
 
Proponents of the hands-off approach also argue that competition authorities are bound 
to make costly errors when intervening in online markets, since traditional market 
definition tools are unsuited for digital industries, no inferences about market power can 
be made based on market shares, and traditional competition analysis has an excessive 
focus on price to account for the competitive dynamics of online industries characterised 
by disruptive innovation. Whilst these observations are correct, they fall short to justify 
light competition enforcement in digital markets. Chapter 3 departs from the ‘traditional’ 
excessive focus on price of competition analysis, and demonstrates that online markets 
can be readily defined, and dominance therein can be properly assessed. The key is to be 
aware of the challenges that digital markets pose for market definition and market power 
assessments, and to use the relevant analytical tools in flexible manner. Moreover, 
Chapter 3 also discusses several data-driven abusive practices in which dominant 
platforms may, and sometimes do, engage. If digital markets are left unchecked, abuses of 
market power are bound to arise. Flexible, careful and vigorous enforcement of Article 
102 TFEU remains the most important mechanism to ensure that dominant firms do not 
distort the competitive process in online markets.  
 
The problems arising from data-driven competition, however, are not restricted to 
competition policy. Specifically, problems stem from the fact that the user data online 
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firms routinely collect and process is mainly personal data, the protection of which is a 
fundamental right enshrined in the Charter. Thus, a natural tension arises: insofar as the 
main way to compete online is through the collection and processing of data to provide 
and improve existing free services, develop new ones and improve ad-targeting, there will 
be increased pressure to collect and process more personal data. However, this increased 
pressure will inevitably result in increased tracking and widespread surveillance in 
violation of individuals’ rights to data protection. Chapter 4 demonstrated how data-
driven competition results in reduced privacy and lack of control over personal data, 
increased potential of data theft, automated decision-making which narrows individuals’ 
choices, amplified information asymmetries and new avenues for discrimination. 
  
Recognising the interrelated nature of the dynamics of competition in online markets and 
online privacy harms, some approaches have been put forward to bring privacy concerns 
to the core of competition analysis. Chapter 4 discussed the three most intellectually 
sound approaches advanced in the literature, and explained the reasons why their 
implementation would not be sound competition policy. Firstly, the delineation of 
‘markets for data’ entails defining a fictional market, as there are no observable 
transactions between firms supplying and consumers purchasing data. As such, it is likely 
to bring more confusion to an already complex issue. Secondly, the ‘integrationist 
approach’, which advances the idea that the consumer welfare standard should be 
interpreted in light of data protection considerations, is capable of leading to a counter-
intuitive scenario where, in competition proceedings, agreements, conduct or mergers can 
be punished on non-competition grounds. This scenario would cause legal uncertainty, 
inconsistency, subjectivity and unpredictability in the enforcement of competition law. 
Thirdly, the ‘privacy as a non-price parameter of competition’ approach, although 
theoretically correct, is inconsistent with actual consumer behaviour in online markets. In 
spite that the majority of consumers (60%-70%) are concerned about the protection of 
their personal data and want more control over it, consumers do not make their 
consumption decisions based on the privacy protection afforded by the services they use, 
and consequently online firms, save very limited exceptions, do not compete on the basis 
of data protection.  
 
The fact that privacy has not yet emerged as a meaningful parameter of competition 
despite that the majority of consumers are concerned about their online privacy shows 
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that online markets are performing poorly. Consumers concerned about their online 
privacy and demanding more control over their personal data should be heeded. 
Contending that consumers do not really care about the protection of their personal data 
because they continue using privacy-invasive online products and services is equivalent to 
arguing that people do not care about potential plain crashes because they continue flying. 
However, online markers are bound to continue performing poorly, failing to satisfy the 
latent demand for online privacy-friendly products and services, firstly, as a result of a 
combination of data protection and consumer protection regulatory failures that arise 
before competition enforcement, and secondly, as a consequence of certain data 
protection and consumer protection law infringements by online platforms through which 
they avail themselves of those regulatory failures in order to maintain and strengthen their 
dominant positions. 
 
On the data protection front, the processing of personal data requires a legal basis. The 
most common legal basis to which online platforms resort is user consent, which must be 
specific and informed. This in practice means that data protection law imposes on 
consumers the highly cumbersome task of reading and understanding all the privacy 
policies of all the online services they use, as amended from time to time, in order to 
assess whether the data collection practices of the firms offering such services are 
consistent with their privacy preferences. This task may fit well with consumer protection 
policy’s notion of the average consumer, ‘who is reasonably well informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect.’ However, there are significant consumer protection 
regulatory failures preventing consumers to make an informed and reasoned decision as 
to the use of online services. Information asymmetries are a first obstacle. Whilst 
undertakings know everything about their data collection practices and the value they can 
extract from data, some consumers struggle to understand even what a privacy policy is. 
In addition, privacy policies are notoriously lengthy and drafted in complex terms which 
most consumers are incapable of comprehending. Furthermore, consumers are affected 
by bounded rationality that limits their ability to search for and achieve the best outcome. 
The interaction between these regulatory failures leads to a scenario where, of those 60%-
70% of consumers that are concerned about the protection of their personal data, a big 
portion of them chooses to remain oblivious of undertakings’ data collection practices, 
and proceed to ‘tick the box’ without engaging with the relevant privacy policy. Other 
consumers attempt to understand the privacy-related implications arising from the use of 
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online services, but fail to overcome the informational gap and their bounded rationality. 
Finally, the last portion of those consumers is able to defeat these obstacles, just to realise 
that pervasive online tracking is almost unavoidable, and that there are no viable choices 
to protect their online privacy. As a result, there is no pressure on dominant firms to 
innovate in privacy-friendly services, in spite of the latent demand for them. This lack of 
pressure, in the end, is a manifestation of a competition issue: weak competition in online 
markets that enables dominant platforms to coerce consumers into accepting privacy 
policies that are inconsistent with their privacy preferences. Accordingly, competition, 
data protection and consumer protection issues interact in a loop (the ‘vicious cycle’). 
 
Dominant platforms benefit from the regulatory failures above. They know that the status 
quo is characterised by lack of consumer engagement with their privacy policies, and that 
they can rely on an essentially fictional consent to process personal data. But some 
platforms take a step further to reinforce their positions, increase their profitability and 
protect their business model. Aware of the lack of consumer engagement with privacy 
policies, they can process personal data without meeting the requirements for consent to 
be valid, and without other legal bases, as a result of which they are able to process more 
data than they are legally entitled to, thereby fuelling data-driven network effects and 
consequently deriving an unlawful competitive advantage capable of strengthening their 
dominance. At the same time, they have an incentive to preserve consumer ignorance and 
confusion, as in this way they can keep the pressure to develop and introduce privacy-
friendly options at bay, thereby ensuring that the stream of data will continue flowing. To 
this effect, they include unfair terms in their privacy policies or otherwise engage in unfair 
commercial practices in violation of EU consumer protection rules. 
 
The law infringements explained above are, considered in isolation, only reproachable 
under data protection and consumer protection law, respectively. Yet, such infringements 
have a combined competition-distorting effect capable of deriving into the strengthening 
of dominant positions and the exploitation of consumers. Accordingly, this thesis 
proposes the creation of a new category of abuse of dominance based certain violations of 
said fields of law that distort the competitive process.  
 
However, to address such a complex scenario with many layers of interrelated issues 
falling within the remit of different branches of law, a coherent and sound approach to 
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law enforcement is required. This thesis proposes a ‘holistic enforcement approach’. 
Under this approach, the substantial assessments of the different branches of law 
involved remain independent from and irrespective of each other. This entails that 
proposals to collide competition assessments with data protection considerations should 
be disregarded. However, this approach advances the enforcement of these branches of 
law in a joint and harmonious manner. To this effect, the holistic enforcement approach 
requires that one or more law infringements be established by data protection and 
consumer protection authorities in final decisions, acting within the bounds of their 
competencies. Thereafter, in Article 102 TFEU proceedings, such infringements are 
linked to the infringer’s dominant position, the exclusion of competitors and/or the 
exploitation of consumers.  
 
The holistic enforcement approach is conceived as one route to address the concerning 
tendencies affecting digital markets (i.e. weak competition, violation of fundamental rights 
and deepened information asymmetries) in a manner that enhances the coherence of EU 
law. By acknowledging that certain infringements of data protection law and consumer 
protection law can distort the competitive process and cause the exclusion of competitors 
and exploitation of consumers, Article 102 TFEU proceedings can act in furtherance of 
the promotion of competition, the protection of the fundamental right to data protection 
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